Legal Research AI

State Ex Rel. Stewart v. District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District

Court: Montana Supreme Court
Date filed: 1980-03-31
Citations: 609 P.2d 290, 187 Mont. 209
Copy Citations
10 Citing Cases
Combined Opinion
                                No. 79-73

                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                   1980

                            -

STATE EX REL. DONALD STEWART, JR.,
                      Petitioner,

          VS.

DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRTEENTH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT et al.,
                       Respondents.

                                         -
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
Counsel of Record:
      For Petitioner:
          D. Michael Eakin, Hardin, Montana
      For Respondents:
          James E. Seykora, County Attorney, Hardin, Montana


                                  Submitted:     March 3, 1980
                                      Decided:   APR 1 - 1&
                                                          9
Filed:



  -                             /If.W/
                                      erk
Mr.   J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

        T h i s i s a p e t i t i o n f o r a w r i t of p r o h i b i t i o n , s u p e r -

visory control, o r other appropriate r e l i e f i n the dissolu-

t i o n of a m a r r i a g e between members of t h e Crow T r i b e .

Respondent f i l e d a memorandum b r i e f opposing t h e p e t i t i o n ,

and upon r e c e i v i n g a r e p l y b r i e f from p e t i t i o n e r , w e assume

j u r i s d i c t i o n f o r d e c i s i o n a l p u r p o s e s w i t h o u t o r a l argument.

        P e t i t i o n e r Donald S t e w a r t f i l e d a d i v o r c e a c t i o n a g a i n s t

Tana C o r d e l i a S t e w a r t i n t h e T r i b a l C o u r t i n August 1979,

r e q u e s t i n g c u s t o d y o f t h e c o u p l e ' s two c h i l d r e n , Donald, a g e

3 , and Oli-Ann,           age 2.        There i s no showing of any s e r v i c e

o f s a i d a c t i o n upon Tana n o r any i n d i c a t i o n t h a t a n y t h i n g

occurred following p e t i t i o n e r ' s complaint.                      The p e t i t i o n e r

s e t s f o r t h t h a t t h e Crow T r i b e n e v e r ceded j u r i s d i c t i o n t o

t h e S t a t e of Montana b u t h a s i t s own d i v o r c e code a d o p t e d by

t h e T r i b e J u l y 8, 1978.

        I n October 1979 Tana f i l e d a d i v o r c e a c t i o n i n t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , a s k i n g

f o r c u s t o d y of t h e two c h i l d r e n and $150 p e r month c h i l d

support.         A h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h e m a t t e r b e f o r e t h e Honor-

a b l e Diane Barz, who o r d e r e d t h a t c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l

o f t h e c o u p l e ' s c h i l d r e n be g i v e n t o Tana d u r i n g pendency of

t h e a c t i o n , t h a t a 1977 C h e v r o l e t t r u c k b e l o n g i n g t o Tana be

r e t u r n e d t o h e r , and t h a t p e t i t i o n e r pay $150 p e r month

s u p p o r t d u r i n g pendency of t h e a c t i o n .

        W e n o t e t h a t b o t h p e t i t i o n e r Donald and h i s w i f e Tana

a r e e n r o l l e d members of t h e Crow T r i b e , a s a r e t h e i r c h i l -

d r e n , t h a t t h e y l i v e a t Crow Agency, Montana, w i t h i n t h e

e x t e r i o r b o u n d a r i e s of t h e r e s e r v a t i o n , and t h a t b o t h p a r -

t i e s a r e employees of t h e Crow T r i b e .
         Donald f i l e d t h i s p e t i t i o n promptly a f t e r h i s w i f e

f i l e d h e r d i v o r c e a c t i o n and a f t e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t re-

f u s e d t o d i s m i s s T a n a ' s a c t i o n f o r l a c k o f s u b j e c t matter
and p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n .    On October 26, 1979, t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d p e t i t i o n e r ' s motion t o d i s m i s s and as-

sumed j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e m a r r i a g e .

        P e t i t i o n e r a l l e g e s he h a s no speedy, a d e q u a t e remedy a t

law, t h a t he i s f a c e d w i t h two s e p a r a t e a c t i o n s , and t h a t a n

a p p e a l from t h e r u l i n g o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d o e s n o t o f f e r

t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n a d e q u a t e remedy t o a v o i d d u p l i c i t o u s

actions.         In addition, petitioner notes t h a t there i s a r e a l

p o s s i b i l i t y of h a v i n g c o n f l i c t i n g c u s t o d y d e c r e e s , t h e r e b y

s u b j e c t i n g t h e c h i l d r e n t o continued custody l i t i g a t i o n .

        Tana a r g u e s t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e Crow T r i b e d o e s have a

Law and Order Code c o v e r i n g d o m e s t i c r e l a t i o n s , t h a t code

was n o t approved by t h e S e c r e t a r y o f I n t e r i o r and i s n o t

valid.        She a p p e a r s t o r e l y on a n o r d i n a n c e a d o p t e d i n 1953

by t h e Crow T r i b e t h a t gave j u r i s d i c t i o n t o t h e S t a t e of

Montana.         T h a t o r d i n a n c e was approved by t h e S e c r e t a r y of

Interior.

        The i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s whether t h e T r i b a l C o u r t i s

c u r r e n t l y exercising j u r i s d i c t i o n o r has exercised j u r i s -

d i c t i o n i n s u c h a manner a s t o preempt s t a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n

f o r members of t h e Crow T r i b e l i v i n g w i t h i n t h e e x t e r i o r

b o u n d a r i e s of t h e Crow ~ e s e r v a t i o n .

        B e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e above i s s u e , w e must d i s p o s e o f

t h e argument t h a t b e c a u s e t h e 1978 Crow Uniform Divorce Act
was n o t s i g n e d by t h e S e c r e t a r y of I n t e r i o r , t h e Act i s n o t

effective.           W e f i n d on t h e b a s i s of a l e t t e r of t h e s o l i -

c i t o r f o r t h e Department of I n t e r i o r d a t e d October 1 3 , 1976,

t h a t no a p p r o v a l i s n e c e s s a r y .      The S o l i c i t o r s t a t e d :
          "We recommend t h a t no a c t i o n be t a k e n e i t h e r t o
         approve o r d i s a p p r o v e o f t h e o t h e r t h r e e Crow
         Ordinances.           . .   s i n c e -- T r i b a l C o n s t i t u -
                                                 t h e Crow
         t i o n d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e i r a p p r o v a l b~ -
         ---                                                                 the
         Department -r- - t o become e f f e c t i v e . Depart-
                             f o them
         m e n t a l a c t i o n , a c c o r d i n g l y , e i t h e r way would be
         a g r a t u i t o u s a c t without l e g a l significance.
         Our d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t no a p p r o v a l i s r e q u i r e d
         would n o t , o f c o u r s e , f o r e c l o s e t h e Department
         from t a k i n g a p o s i t i o n i n any s u b s e q u e n t liti-
         g a t i o n challenging t h e v a l i d i t y of these ordi-
         n a n c e s . W e s h o u l d e v a l u a t e e a c h such l a w s u i t
         on a case-by-case b a s i s , and might d e c i d e t o
         s u p p o r t t r i b a l a u t h o r i t y i n t h e a b s e n c e of
         Departmental a p p r o v a l o f t h e s e o r d i n a n c e s . "
          (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )         Memorandum of S o l i c i t o r
         t o S e c r e t a r y of Department of I n t e r i o r , Octo-
         b e r 1 3 , 1976, p. 2.

        W n o t e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n i t s b r i e f c i t e d 25
         e

C.F.R.      S11.1,       a s r e q u i r i n g a p p r o v a l by t h e Department of

Interior.          Such a p p r o v a l i s n o t r e q u i r e d once a t r i b e h a s

e n a c t e d a law and o r d e r code t o r e p l a c e t h e C.F.R.                   provi-

sions.       25 C.F.R.         ll.l(d).         The Crow T r i b e h a s a d o p t e d a

comprehensive t r i b a l code and, t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t governed by

t h e p r o v i s i o n s of 25 C.F.R.          §11.       The S o l i c i t o r n o t e d con-

cerning s e c r e t a r i a l approval,             ". . . However,             t h a t Section

[25 C.F.R.         l l . l ( e ) ] i n o u r view a p p l i e s o n l y t o m o d i f i c a -

t i o n s of t h e C . F . R    code ( w h i l e t h e Department c o n t i n u e s t o

a d m i n i s t e r a C.F.R.       ' C o u r t of I n d i a n O f f e n s e s ' ) and d o e s n o t

b a r t h e t r i b e from e x e r c i s i n g i t s governmental power t o

a d o p t a s e p a r a t e code and t o e s t a b l i s h a t r i b a l c o u r t w i t h -

o u t S e c r e t a r i a l c o n s e n t . " Memorandum of S o l i c i t o r , s u p r a , p.

6 , f o o t n o t e 8.

         Here, t h e p r o v i s i o n s r e l i e d on by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

q u e s t i o n i n g t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e t r i b a l code a r e i n a p p l i c a b l e

t o t h e Crow T r i b e .        The Crow T r i b a l Code, b e i n g found d u l y

e n a c t e d , g i v e s t h e Crow T r i b a l C o u r t e x c l u s i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n

o v e r t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f m a r r i a g e a c t i o n s between members

r e s i d i n g w i t h i n t h e e x t e r i o r b o u n d a r i e s of t h e r e s e r v a t i o n .
     Having so found here, unlike our finding in ~arriveev.
Morigeau (1979),        Mont.     ,   602 P.2d 563, 36 St-Rep.
1798, under the principles of comity we should abstain and
leave to the Tribal Court the decisional task of divorce
matters between tribal members of the Crow Tribe.      In so
doing, we should reduce the "inter-governmental friction"
likening the "competing interests" of the State and the
tribes to a "Pullman type abstension situation."      Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co. (1941), 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85
L.Ed. 971.    See also, Fisher v. District Court (1976), 424
U.S. 382, 96 S.Ct. 943, 47 L.Ed.2d 106.
     This Court in State ex rel. Iron Bear v. Dist. Ct.
(1973)r 162 Mont. 335, 512 P.2d 1292, held:
     "Before a District Court can assume jurisdiction
     in any matter submitted to it, it must find sub-
     ject matter jurisdiction by determining: (1)
     whether federal treaties and statutes applicable
     have preempted state jurisdiction; (2) whether
     the exercise of state jurisdiction would inter-
     fere with reservation self-government; and (3)
     whether the Tribal Court is currently exercising
     jurisdiction or has exercised jurisdiction in
     such a manner as to preempt state jurisdiction."
     162 Mont. at 346, 512 P.2d at 1299.
     It would appear from the material submitted that the
Tribal Court, since the adoption of 1978 Crow Uniform
Divorce Act, is exercising exclusive jurisdiction over its
tribal members living on the reservation.     This being the

case, we find that Williams v. Lee (1959), 358 U.S. 217, 79
S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251, is controlling.     The Court held in
Williams:   ". . . to allow the exercise of   state jurisdiction
here would undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of
the Indians to govern themselves."     358 U.S. at 223, 79
        For t h e a b o v e - s t a t e d r e a s o n s and a f t e r a c a r e f u l con-

s i d e r a t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a b l e law, we h o l d t h a t p r o h i b i t i o n

i s t h e p r o p e r remedy i n t h i s c a s e and w e o r d e r t h a t t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i s m i s s t h e a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u t i o n , Cause No.

DR-79-114,        e n t i t l e d " I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e of Tana C o r d e l i a

S t e w a r t and Donald S t e w a r t , J r . "       I n s o doing, w e hold t h i s

r u l i n g i s l i m i t e d i n e f f e c t t o t h e Crow I n d i a n R e s e r v a t i o n .




W concur:
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