¶ 1 The State of Utah appeals from the Third District Juvenile Court's determination that the State "failed to meet its burden of proving abuse or neglect of the child by clear and convincing evidence." Because the juvenile court did not apply the appropriate statutory definition in determining that L.P. was not an abused child, we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 3 At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial judge asked the parties to brief the following issue: "At what point does the parental discipline of a minor child cross over into conduct that constitutes child abuse?" After reviewing the trial briefs, the juvenile court attempted to reconcile the broad definition of an abused child found in the Juvenile Court Act with the right of a parent to inflict corporal punishment. The juvenile court analyzed a number of "abuse-related" statutes2 and termination *Page 850 of parental rights cases and then apparently adopted legal standards therefrom, effectively narrowing the definition of an abused child found in section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i). In doing so, the juvenile court made the following ruling:
There really can be no fixed standard for when parental discipline becomes abuse since all children, parents, and circumstances are different. In this case there is no clear and convincing evidence of abuse, but rather clear and convincing evidence of frustration of parents and children trying to deal with each other in heated situations.
In its conclusion, the juvenile court stated, "[t]he State has failed to meet its burden of proving abuse or neglect of the child by clear and convincing evidence."3 The State now challenges that legal conclusion on the ground that it was based upon a legal definition of abuse not found in section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i). S.S.P. urges us to approve the definition apparently relied upon by the juvenile court and adopt criteria for determining when corporal punishment of a minor becomes abuse within the scope of section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i), including the following:
Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988).1) the need for the application of corporal punishment; 2) the relationship between the need and the amount of punishment administered; 3) the extent of injury inflicted; and 4) whether the punishment was administered in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.
¶ 6 The statutes referred to in footnote two, above, and relied upon by the juvenile court, although creating apparently conflicting definitions of what "punishment" of a minor child is permissible, are nevertheless impertinent to this case. It is incumbent upon the juvenile court to apply the proper definition from the appropriate statute. Although the sections referenced in footnote two indicate that physical punishment of a minor child may be exempt from criminal prosecution in certain instances, we are not reviewing a criminal case and therefore criminal statutes are inapplicable. Nor are we reviewing a case involving punishment inflicted upon a minor child by a school official; therefore section 53A-11-802(1) is also inapplicable. Here, we are reviewing a juvenile court proceeding held to determine whether that court may assert jurisdiction over L.P., see Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(c) (Supp. 1998), and the concept of varying definitions for varying purposes is not foreign to our jurisprudence. Cf.Kennecott Copper v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 1156, 1163 (Utah 1990). Thus, the juvenile court should have applied the definition of an abused child found in the Juvenile Court Act of 1996. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998).
¶ 7 The State and Guardian ad Litem agree with the juvenile court's observation that "all children, parents and circumstances are different." They argue that precisely for that reason, the broad definition of an abused child found in section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i) is necessary, and that the focus of the juvenile court should be on evidentiary findings to determine whether, by clear and convincing evidence, a child has "suffered or been threatened with nonaccidental physical or mental harm." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998). We agree. Because there are a myriad of circumstances with countless permutations, which may or may not justify intervention of the juvenile court, it is essential that the definition of an abused child remain broad so the juvenile court can effectively apply section 78-3a-104(1)(c).4
¶ 8 Rather than attempt to change the definition of an "abused child," the juvenile court must instead focus upon making detailed findings supporting its ultimate decision so that a body of case law can be developed. Cf. First Nat'l Bank in Fort Collins v.Rostek, 514 P.2d 314, 320 (Colo. 1973) (stating "as the body of case law develops, we can lay down more specific . . . rules");Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 997 (Me. 1982) ("`What is needed is . . . an attempt to develop a body of case law that gives courts improved guidance'") (citation omitted). Such factual findings may include, but are not limited to, the following: whether the acts complained of were in reasonable discipline of a minor by a parent or one in loco parentis, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-401(3) (1995); evidence of any bruises, contusions, or abrasions on the child, see id. § 76-5-109(1)(c) (Supp. 1998); "the need for the application of corporal punishment; . . . the relationship between the need and the amount of punishment administered; . . . the extent of injury inflicted; . . . whether the punishment was administered in a good faith effort to maintain discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm," Wise, 855 F.2d at 564; evidence of unreasonably cruel punishment such as beatings with a belt, paddle, hose, or other object, see Wood v. State, 450 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Ark. 1970); whether the child has been provided with suitable food and clothing, see State v. Johnson, 890 P.2d 641, 645 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1995); evidence of verbal threats or verbal abuse; and whether the incident was isolated or rather a step in an apparent progression of mistreatment. None of the factors listed above is necessarily dispositive of whether a minor is an abused child within the meaning of section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i). Instead, these evidentiary factors should guide the juvenile court as it exercises its broad discretion in making that determination.
¶ 9 In addition, comprehensive findings will enable an appellate court to review abuse determinations more effectively. For example, if the juvenile court's findings support an ultimate finding that the conduct complained of was in reasonable discipline of a minor, the inquiry may end. The juvenile court has a vantage point that enables it to determine whether punishment of a minor child is reasonable discipline or falls within the ambit of section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i). Because of the complex contextual nature of child abuse proceedings, and the significant impact of a determination of abuse or neglect,5 the juvenile court is in a far better position to evaluate the evidence than an appellate court, and the best interests of the children and families involved in these proceedings will be served by preserving the broad discretion of the juvenile court.
¶ 10 In this case, it is evident that the juvenile court did not apply the proper statutory definition in determining that L.P. is not an abused child. On remand, that court should apply the definition supplied by section 78-3a-103(1)(a)(i) to detailed findings in order to determine whether L.P. is an abused child.
Section 53A-11-802 of the Utah Code provides: "A school employee may not inflict or cause the infliction of corporal punishment upon a child who is receiving services from the school, unless written permission has been given by the student's parent or guardian to do so." Id. § 53A-11-802(1) (1997). "`Corporal punishment' means the intentional infliction of physical pain upon the body of a minor child as a disciplinary measure." Id. § 53A-11-801(2).
In addition to the statutes mentioned above that allow a certain measure of physical punishment to be inflicted upon a child without subjecting the actor to a legal penalty, Utah law also expressly permits conduct that would otherwise be criminal if the "actor's conduct is reasonable discipline of minors by parents, guardians, teachers, or other persons in loco parentis." Id. § 76-2-401(3) (1995).
I CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge.