[Cite as State. Lehmkuhle, 2019-Ohio-1044.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
VAN WERT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 15-18-10
v.
ERIK R. LEHMKUHLE, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR-11-11-146
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 25, 2019
APPEARANCES:
Reed D. Searcy for Appellant
Peter R. Seibel for Appellee
Case No. 15-18-10
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Erik R. Lehmkuhle (“Lehmkuhle”), appeals the
August 16, 2018 judgment of the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas
overruling his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
Procedural History
{¶2} On November 4, 2011, the Van Wert County Grand Jury returned a
thirteen-count indictment against Lehmkuhle alleging seven counts of first degree
felony Rape, one count of second degree felony Attempted Rape, and five counts of
third degree felony Gross Sexual Imposition. The charges stemmed from
allegations that Lehmkuhle sexually abused his then twelve-year-old daughter, S.Z.
Lehmkuhle faced multiple terms of life imprisonment, among other sanctions.
{¶3} On July 6, 2012, at the State’s request, a nolle prosequi was entered as
to seven of the counts, which included three counts of Rape and four counts of Gross
Sexual Imposition.
{¶4} On October 31, 2012, Lehmkuhle entered an Alford plea to one count
of third degree felony Gross Sexual Imposition.1 The five remaining counts, which
included charges of Rape and Attempted Rape, were dismissed.
1
An “Alford plea” is a specialized type of guilty plea when the defendant, although pleading guilty, continues
to deny his or her guilt but enters the guilty plea because the defendant believes that the offered sentence is
better than what the outcome of a trial is likely to be. State v. Carey, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-10-25, 2011-
Ohio-1998, ¶ 6, citing State v. Piacella, 27 Ohio St.2d 92 (1971). Although an Alford plea allows a defendant
to maintain his factual innocence, the plea has the same legal effect as a guilty plea. State v. Vogelsong, 3d
Dist. Hancock No. 5-06-60, 2007-Ohio-4935, ¶ 15.
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{¶5} On December 12, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and
imposed a prison term of forty-eight months upon Lehmkuhle, a mandatory period
of five years of post-release control, and registration as a Tier II sex offender.
Lehmkuhle was also given 458 days of jail time credit.
{¶6} The record indicates that Lehmkuhle was released from prison in
September of 2015, after serving his prison term, and was placed on post-release
control.
{¶7} On February 15, 2018, Lehmkuhle filed a post-sentence motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. In this motion, Lehmkuhle argued that his trial counsel
“misadvised” him of the potential effects of his Alford plea and guaranteed him that
he would get community control if he entered the plea. Lehmkuhle also argued that
the victim of the case, his now adult daughter, had recently come forward and
admitted that she fabricated the accusations of sexual abuse, which formed the
factual basis for his conviction for Gross Sexual Imposition. Lehmkuhle attached
his own affidavit and affidavits from his father and the victim to his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. In her affidavit, the victim, S.Z., claimed that she not only
fabricated the allegations of sexual abuse, but that when she attempted to change
her story during the pre-trial proceedings the investigating detective informed her
that she “would be in even more trouble than [Lehmkuhle].” (Doc. No. 171, Ex.
D). S.Z. averred that “[a]s a result I kept the fact that I lied about this whole thing
to myself.” (Id.).
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{¶8} On April 9, 2018 and June 19, 2018, the trial court conducted hearings
on Lehmkuhle’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Lehmkuhle testified on his
own behalf and presented testimony from his father and S.Z. The State presented
the testimony of the prosecuting attorney who handled Lehmkuhle’s plea and the
detective who investigated the case in 2011 and 2012.
{¶9} On August 16, 2018, the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling
Lehmkuhle’s motion. Specifically, the trial court stated the following in its
judgment entry:
[T]he Court has considered all the of the evidence and testimony
of the defendant, his father and his daughter and likewise has
considered the evidence and testimony * * * submitted by the
State of Ohio and has weighed the credibility of the witnesses and
finds that the Defendant has failed to sustain the burden of
establishing ‘manifest injustice’ as set forth in criminal rule 32.1
of the Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure for inadequate
assistance of counsel or for recanting of complainant’s testimony.
(Doc. No. 203 at 7).
{¶10} Lehmkuhle filed this appeal from the August 16, 2018 Judgment
Entry, asserting the following assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DENIED DEFENDANT
HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF OHIO
WHEN IT FAILED TO INCLUDE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IN ITS DECISION
DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW.
{¶11} For ease of discussion, we elect to address the assignments of error out
of order.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶12} On appeal, Lehmkuhle argues that the trial court abused its discretion
when it overruled his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Specifically, Lehmkuhle
maintains that he presented sufficient evidence at the hearing on the motion to
demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel prior to entering the
plea and that the allegations of sexual abuse against him were fabricated.
Standard of Review
{¶13} Under Crim.R. 32.1, “[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” This rule establishes a fairly
stringent standard for deciding a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526 (1992). The burden of establishing the existence
of “manifest injustice” is on the individual seeking to vacate the plea. State v. Smith,
49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. Under the manifest
injustice standard, a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea is allowed only in
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“extraordinary cases” and has been defined by the Supreme Court of Ohio as a “clear
or openly unjust act.” Id. at 264; State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 83 Ohio St.3d
203, 208 (1998). ‘A “manifest injustice” comprehends a fundamental flaw in the
path of justice so extraordinary that the defendant could not have sought redress
from the resulting prejudice through another form of application reasonably
available to him or her.’ ” State v. Brooks, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23385, 2010-
Ohio-1682, ¶ 8., quoting State v. Hartzell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17499 *2 (Aug.
20, 1999). The purpose of the manifest injustice requirement is to avoid the
possibility of a defendant pleading guilty to test the weight of potential punishment.
Smith, supra, 49 Ohio St.2d at 264.
{¶14} The decision whether to grant or deny a defendant’s motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is within the trial court’s discretion. State v. Brown, 10th
Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-112, 2018-Ohio-4984, ¶ 6, citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio
St.3d 521, 527 (1992). Abuse of discretion implies that the trial court’s attitude is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157
(1980).
Evidence Presented at the 2018 Hearing
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶15} Lehmkuhle presented his own testimony and that of his father, Charles
Lehmkuhle, in support of his claim that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea
on the basis that his trial counsel provided him with ineffective assistance during
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the plea proceedings. Lehmkuhle claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he convinced Lehmkuhle to enter a plea by telling Lehmkuhle that he would
be placed on community control and that he could easily reopen the case and
withdraw his plea if new information came to light. Thus, Lehmkuhle alleges that
his trial counsel never adequately explained the likelihood of him being sent to
prison and the level of difficulty for reopening his case once he entered his guilty
plea. Lehmkuhle also expressed displeasure with his trial counsel’s case strategy,
which was reiterated by his father, who testified that trial counsel did not contact
him regarding Lehmkuhle’s whereabouts on certain dates.
{¶16} However, at the hearing on his motion, Lehmkuhle did not call his
former trial counsel to testify. Nor has Lehmkuhle made any allegation that the
Crim.R. 11(C) plea proceedings conducted by the trial court explaining his rights
and ascertaining whether he entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently were deficient or otherwise inadequate.
2. The Victim’s Recantation
{¶17} The record indicates that the evidence supporting the charges listed in
the indictment consisted, in large part, of statements made by then twelve-year-old
S.Z. to numerous people regarding allegations of sexual abuse by Lehmkuhle.
Specifically, S.Z. initially disclosed the allegations of sexual abuse by her father to
school officials and claimed that she was afraid to return home to live with him.
The case was referred to Van Wert County Children Services and S.Z. was
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temporarily placed in foster care. S.Z. consistently repeated the allegations against
her father in detail to several people, including her foster mother, the children’s
services case worker, the investigating detective, and the medical examiner. The
record indicates that the allegations made by S.Z. involved digital-vaginal and
penile-vaginal penetration as well as oral sex.
{¶18} S.Z.’s statements regarding the sexual abuse were further
substantiated by contemporaneous entries in her diary, which were obtained by law
enforcement during its investigation. In addition, the report of the medical examiner
concluded that although the results of the physical exam did “not rule out or confirm
prior sexual abuse, * * a diagnosis of sexual maltreatment is warranted,” based upon
S.Z.’s “reported disclosure.” (Def. Ex. A). Thus, this was the status of the case at
the time Lehmkuhle entered his guilty plea in 2012.
{¶19} In 2018, S.Z. testified at the hearing on Lehmkuhle’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. At the time of the hearing, S.Z. was nineteen years old.
S.Z. stated that she had lied about each and every allegation of sexual abuse that she
had previously made against her father and that she likewise had lied every time she
retold the allegations to another individual. S.Z. explained that at the time she had
made the allegations, Lehmkuhle and her step-mother were going through an
acrimonious divorce. S.Z.’s step-mother had abruptly moved out of the home with
her half-siblings, leaving S.Z. with Lehmkuhle. S.Z. claimed that Lehmkuhle left
her alone at the house for long periods of time while he worked, which resulted in
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her feeling extremely lonely and receiving a lack of attention from her father. She
also claimed that Lehmkuhle often brought women home to engage in sexual
conduct with while S.Z. was supposed to be asleep. She also stated that she found
Lehmkuhle’s pornography and nude pictures of Lehmkuhle and other women while
“snooping” through his things.
{¶20} S.Z. explained that she went to live with a family friend for ten days
in the summer of 2011 and she no longer felt lonely. She claimed that she did not
want to return to living with Lehmkuhle and wanted “to stay with another family
for a little while longer,” so she fabricated the allegations of sexual abuse so that
she could remain out of Lehmkuhle’s home. (Apr. 9, 2018 Hrg. at 77). Shortly
thereafter, S.Z. was placed with a foster family for approximately eight months.
S.Z. claimed that as she heard the hardships of other foster children, she began to
regret the allegations she made about her father. She stated that “I realized that my,
my story was fake and that they have it much worse than I ever did.” (Id. at 80).
S.Z. claimed at that point she “wanted to tell the story differently.” (Id.).
{¶21} S.Z. alleged that when she attempted to change her story, by saying
the allegations against Lehmkuhle were false and had occurred in a dream, her foster
parents, the prosecuting attorney, and the investigating detective all told her to “be
quiet” and “not to say anything.” (Id. at 81). Specifically, S.Z. alleged that during
an investigative interview, the lead detective told her that she “would possibly go to
jail or face a more heavier sentence than [Lehmkuhle]” if she changed her story.
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(June 19, 2018 Hrg. at 6). S.Z. also alleged that the prosecuting attorney visited her
foster home for trial preparation and S.Z. asked her “what if it was a dream, like
what would happen?” S.Z. claimed that the prosecuting attorney responded by
telling her that “if I changed my story now that I would be in a lot of trouble because
I would be lying” and “they told me that I’d go to jail.” (Id.).
{¶22} S.Z. also claimed that she was confused about the nature of sexual
intercourse when confronted on the stand at the 2018 hearing with the journal entries
that she wrote in the summer of 2011, in which she stated that Lehmkuhle “had sex”
with her. Specifically, she stated that she thought having sex was the same as
hugging based upon watching her father’s pornography that she found in the home
and accidentally walking in on her father having sex. S.Z. maintained that based
upon her current understanding of sexual intercourse as an adult, Lehmkuhle never
touched her inappropriately in 2011.
{¶23} In opposition to Lehmkuhle’s motion, the State presented the
testimony of the lead detective from the Van Wert City Police Department who
handled the case in 2011 and 2012. The detective recalled that he was the
investigating officer of the sexual abuse allegations against Lehmkuhle by S.Z. after
the case was referred to law enforcement by children services. The detective
interviewed S.Z. and discussed S.Z.’s diary entries with her line by line. He recalled
that S.Z. described the sexual conduct that she engaged in with Lehmkuhle in detail.
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{¶24} The detective also interviewed Lehmkuhle prior to him entering his
plea and recalled that Lehmkuhle challenged S.Z.’s credibility with respect to her
allegations, specifically that “[Lehmkuhle] painted [S.Z.] as having a lot of
problems, past problems, past sexual abuse, you know, he caught her doing a lot of
things that were inappropriate for a child of that age.” (June 19, 2018 Hrg. at 56).
The detective further elaborated that based on Lehmkuhle’s statements he believed
that S.Z. was fully aware of the nature of sexual intercourse from her father’s
description of her behavior. The detective explained that Lehmkuhle’s statements
about S.Z. prompted him to “fully vet [S.Z.]’s statement with a polygraph.” (Id. at
58). He testified that S.Z. passed the polygraph and the results of the test
“enhanced” her credibility. (Id. at 59). The detective also stated that in addition to
S.Z.’s statements and her polygraph results, there was also a medical examination
of S.Z. completed indicating that S.Z had been sexually abused.
{¶25} The detective stated that S.Z. never suggested to him that the sexual
conduct with Lehmkuhle happened in a “dream” or otherwise indicated that she
wanted to recant the allegations against Lehmkuhle. To the contrary, the detective
recalled S.Z. “felt that [Lehmkuhle] should go to jail for twenty-three (23) years and
that she wished to protect her [younger] sister Brielle from this happening to her.”
(June 19, 2018 Hrg. at 63). He also explained that if S.Z. would have indicated to
him that she wanted to recant or change her statement he would have documented
that in his report and notified the prosecuting attorney. However, no such notation
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was made in his investigative report. Thus, he denied S.Z.’s allegations that he
persuaded her not to change her story during his interviews with her.
{¶26} The prosecuting attorney, who handled the pre-trial proceedings and
Lehmkuhle’s plea in 2012, also testified for the State. The prosecuting attorney
categorically denied S.Z.’s allegations that she had threatened S.Z. not to change
her story by telling her that she would be subject to a punishment harsher than
Lehmkuhle if she recanted the allegations against him. The prosecuting attorney
testified that she never met with nor did she have “access to” S.Z. for trial
preparation before trial. (June 19, 2018 Hrg. at 75). Notably, the prosecuting
attorney’s testimony in this regard contradicts S.Z.’s testimony at the 2018 motion
hearing that she met with the prosecuting attorney at least three times for trial
preparation before the resolution of the case. The prosecuting attorney explained
that she was not the initial prosecutor assigned to the case. She was later brought in
when a conflict arose. At that time, S.Z. had already moved to Alabama to live with
relatives. The prosecuting attorney recalled that she at one point spoke with S.Z.’s
relatives to arrange for S.Z. to travel to Ohio for trial, however that did not occur
since the case was resolved by Lehmkuhle entering a plea.
{¶27} The prosecuting attorney further explained that she typically does not
meet with a child victim in a sexual assault case until she knows the case is going
to trial and, in those circumstances, she would ordinarily wait until close to the trial
to meet in order to avoid putting the victim through unnecessary trauma. She further
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stated that she would have taken notes if she had interviewed S.Z. and found nothing
in her case file to indicate that such a meeting took place.
Discussion
{¶28} In its judgment entry overruling his post-sentence motion to withdraw
his plea, the trial court addressed each of the two grounds alleged by Lehmkuhle
that a “manifest injustice” had occurred in his case. With respect to his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, the trial court stated:
While ineffective assistance of counsel may be a basis for a finding
of “manifest injustice,” the passage of time, between the
Defendant’s plea and raising the ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, coupled with the Defendant having served his sentence and
the availability of other remedies lessen the strength of the
inadequate assistance of counsel argument. The Defendant, all
during this time, had the opportunity of appeal as well as post-
conviction statues [sic] to raise the ineffective assistance of counsel
argument. It is noteworthy that neither party saw fit to call [trial
counsel] as a witness to substantiate the Defendant’s claim or
explain the circumstances surrounding the Defendant’s plea. The
Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw his Plea on the ground of
ineffective assistance of counsel is overruled.
(Doc. No. 203 at 5).
{¶29} As noted by the trial court, manifest injustice to support withdrawal of
a guilty plea can take the form of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Kocak,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0020, 2016-Ohio-8483, ¶ 40, citing State v. Dalton,
153 Ohio App.3d 286, 2003-Ohio-3813, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). But, see, State v. Joyner,
4th Dist. Pickaway No. 17CA5, 2017-Ohio-8652, ¶ 12. (“Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel surrounding a plea should generally be raised in a petition for
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post-conviction relief.”) When an alleged error underlying a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is the ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show (1) that
his counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty. State v. Tapia-Cortes,
10th Dist. Franklin No. CA2016-02-031, 2016-Ohio-8101, ¶ 13, citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
{¶30} We agree with the trial court that Lehmkuhle failed to substantiate his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim at the hearing on his motion. Lehmkuhle
relies, in part, on conversations that he allegedly had with trial counsel that are
outside the record. For reasons not apparent, Lehmkuhle chose not to call his trial
counsel as a witness at the hearing on his motion to withdraw. Thus, the only
evidence submitted in support of Lehmkuhle’s contention with respect to the advice
given to him by trial counsel regarding the nature of his plea are his own statements
presented through his testimony at the hearing.
{¶31} However, the State introduced the written, signed plea agreement with
an acknowledgment by Lehmkuhle that “no officer of this Court or any attorney has
promised or suggested that I will receive a lighter sentence or community control or
any other form of leniency in exchange for my plea of guilty, and if anyone did
make such a promise he or she had no authority to do that.” (April 9, 2018 Hrg. at
46, State’s Ex. 1 at ¶ 13.) The State also introduced a copy of the transcript from
the change of plea proceedings, which demonstrates that the trial court properly
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advised Lehmkuhle of the penalties he faced prior to entering his guilty plea,
including the possibility of a maximum prison term of sixty months. The transcript
also reveals Lehmkuhle stated on the record that he was satisfied with the services
and advice given to him by his former trial counsel. (State Ex. 1 at 38). Where
nothing in the record supports a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim
other than his own self-serving statements, the record is insufficient to overcome
the presumption that the plea was voluntary and properly entered. See State v.
Inskeep, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2016-CA-2, 2016-Ohio-7098, ¶ 37. “In such a
case, a trial court does not err when it overrules a motion to withdraw a plea pursuant
to Crim.R. 32.1.” Id.
{¶32} Moreover, we also find the trial court did not err in concluding that
Lehmkuhle failed to demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective for not contacting
Lehmkuhle’s father as a potential alibi witness. To the contrary, the record
establishes that at the time Lehmkuhle entered his plea, the majority of the evidence
supporting the State’s case hinged upon the credibility of S.Z.’s statements to
several individuals regarding the sexual abuse by her father and her journal entries
corroborating her allegations. There is nothing in the record to suggest that
Lehmkuhle would have changed his decision to enter a plea based upon trial
counsel’s conversation with Lehmkuhle’s father. Moreover, the record indicates
that trial counsel filed a “Notice of Alibi” on July 5, 2012, regarding Lehmkuhle’s
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whereabouts on certain dates with respect to three of the counts listed in the
indictment.
{¶33} Therefore, the record supports the trial court’s determination that
Lehmkuhle did not carry his burden in establishing both the Strickland prongs in
order to substantiate his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. For all these
reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Lehmkuhle failed to establish a “manifest injustice” on the basis of ineffective
assistance of his trial counsel sufficient to warrant a post-sentence withdraw of his
guilty plea.
{¶34} Lehmkuhle also asserts S.Z.’s purported recantation as grounds for
establishing that a manifest injustice has occurred in this case. The record reflects
that the trial court devoted two days to the hearing on Lehmkuhle’s motion to
withdraw his plea, the majority of which focused on S.Z.’s recantation. It is
axiomatic that witnesses credibility is an issue that the trier of fact must determine.
See e.g. State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, at ¶ 106; State v.
Dye, 82 Ohio St.3d 323, 329 (1998). The underlying rationale for deferring to the
trier of fact on credibility issues is that the trier of fact is best positioned to view the
witnesses and to observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections and to use
those observations to weigh witness credibility. See Myers v. Garson, 66 Ohio St.3d
610, 615 (1993); Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).
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{¶35} Here, the trial court heard extensive testimony from S.Z. regarding her
purported recantation of the allegations of sexual abuse against Lehmkuhle as well
as her claims that she felt coerced by law enforcement and the prosecuting attorney
in 2011 and 2012 to perpetuate the allegations that she now asserts to be false.
However, given the testimony from the lead detective and the prosecuting attorney,
which starkly contradicts S.Z.’s claims of their coercion, and further casts doubt
upon the veracity of her statements at the 2018 hearing, and S.Z.’s own admission
on the stand to being a “liar,” we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in
determining S.Z. was not credible with respect to her recantations of the allegations
at the 2018 motion hearing. (June 19, 2018 Hrg. at 22). Therefore, we do not find
that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that S.Z.’s testimony at the
motion hearing failed to substantiate that a “manifest injustice” has occurred in this
case. Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.
First Assignment of Error
{¶36} In his first assignment of error, Lehmkuhle claims that he was denied
due process of law because the trial court did not set forth specific findings of fact
and conclusions of law in its judgment entry overruling his motion to withdraw his
plea. However, Crim.R. 32.1, which governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas, does
not require the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. See e.g.,
State v. Parker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106062, 2018-Ohio-1847, ¶ 15; State v.
Galdamez, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-527, 2015-Ohio-3681, ¶ 46; State v. McFarland,
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7th Dist. No. 08 JE 25, 2009-Ohio-4391, ¶ 29; State v. Desellams, 11th Dist. Lake
No. 98-L-053, *12 (Feb.12, 1999). See, also, State v. Linder, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 99350, 2013-Ohio-5018, ¶ 9 (stating “[s]uch findings and conclusions assist an
appellate court in reviewing the exercise of discretion, but are not required when
ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. * * * Therefore, the fact that the trial
court did not make findings of fact and conclusions of law is not grounds for
reversal”) Linder, supra, citing State ex rel. Chavis v. Griffin, 91 Ohio St.3d 50, 51
(2001).
{¶37} Notwithstanding the numerous appellate districts, noted above, which
have held that a trial court has no obligation to state findings of fact and conclusions
of law as part of its judgment denying a motion to withdraw a plea, sufficient
findings of fact and conclusions of law are those that are comprehensive and
pertinent to the issues presented, demonstrate the basis for the decision by the trial
court, and are supported by the evidence. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279
(1999), paragraph three of the syllabus. Here, the trial court issued a seven-page
judgment entry detailing the evidence presented at the hearing and setting forth its
reasons for overruling Lehmkuhle’s motion. Accordingly, we find the trial court’s
entry provided sufficient notice to Lehmkuhle of its grounds for denying his motion
to withdraw his plea, and we further conclude Lehmkuhle’s argument that he was
denied due process of law is without merit. The first assignment of error is
overruled.
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{¶38} Based on the foregoing, the assignments of error are overruled and the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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