MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions
Decision: 2016 ME 133
Docket: Som-15-589
Argued: June 10, 2016
Decided: August 16, 2016
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
STATE OF MAINE
v.
MICHAEL D. FIGUEROA
JABAR, J.
[¶1] Michael D. Figueroa appeals from a judgment of conviction of
unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 1103(1-A)(A)
(2015), entered in the Unified Criminal Docket (Somerset County, Mullen, J.)
after the denial of his suppression motion and upon his conditional guilty plea.
Figueroa contends that, because law enforcement did not specifically advise
him before a custodial interrogation that he had the right to the presence of
counsel during questioning, his statements during the interrogation must be
suppressed. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree. Here, where
Figueroa was already represented by counsel who consented to the
interrogation in his absence, where Figueroa himself initiated the
interrogation by telling jail personnel that he wanted to talk with the officer
2
who later conducted the interrogation, and where Figueroa was clearly
advised before the commencement of the interrogation that he had the right
to counsel, we conclude that Figueroa was adequately advised of his
constitutional rights and that he effectively waived the privilege against
self-incrimination, rendering his statements admissible against him at trial.
We therefore affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] Viewed in the light most favorable to the suppression court’s
decision, the motion record supports the following facts. See State v. Ntim,
2013 ME 80, ¶ 2, 76 A.3d 370. On April 7, 2015, Figueroa was arrested and
charged by uniform summons and complaint with aggravated trafficking in
scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(H) (2015). After his
arrest, Figueroa was transported to the Somerset County jail, where he
received Miranda warnings1 and invoked his right to counsel. The record does
not illuminate what the Miranda warnings consisted of when they were
delivered on this occasion.
[¶3] Figueroa was indicted on April 30 on charges of aggravated
trafficking in scheduled drugs (Class A), 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-A(1)(H), the
1 We refer throughout this opinion to the constitutional safeguards established by the United
States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3
Class B trafficking charge of which he was later convicted, and unlawful
possession of scheduled drugs (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 1107-A(1)(B)(1)
(2014).2 On April 15, 2015, counsel was appointed to represent Figueroa.
[¶4] While in custody, Figueroa told jail personnel on multiple
occasions that he wanted to speak with Maine Drug Enforcement Agent Kelly
Hooper. When jail personnel relayed this information to Agent Hooper, she
contacted the prosecutor, who offered to reach out to Figueroa’s counsel and
advise him of Figueroa’s wishes. Figueroa’s attorney called Agent Hooper and
stated that although he could not be present during the time that Agent
Hooper proposed to meet with Figueroa, he did not object to the interview as
long as it was recorded. This conversation between Figueroa’s counsel and
Agent Hooper occurred about one week before the officer went to the jail and
interviewed Figueroa.
[¶5] On May 1, 2015, at 2:27 p.m., Agent Hooper met with Figueroa at
the jail without any others present. Agent Hooper began an audio recording
and then delivered the following Miranda warnings without using a Miranda
card or asking Figueroa to complete a written waiver form.
The statute has since been amended. See P.L. 2015, ch. 308, § 2 (effective Oct. 15,
2
2015).
4
[¶6] “Mike,” she stated, “you know you have a right to remain silent.”
“Yes,” Figueroa affirmed. Agent Hooper continued, “Anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law. You have a right to an attorney. If
you can’t afford one, one will be furnished to you through the courts, which in
fact you do have an attorney and [your attorney], um, has told me it’s okay to
talk with you. You requested to talk with me.” “Yes, ma’am,” Figueroa replied.
Agent Hooper stated, “If you don’t want to answer questions at any point,
stop. If you change your mind, umm . . . .” “I have nothing to hide, Kelly,”
Figueroa replied.
[¶7] Agent Hooper did not expressly inform Figueroa that he had a
right for counsel to be present during the interview.
[¶8] In the course of the interview, Agent Hooper asked questions
about the crimes that Figueroa had been charged with, and Figueroa made
incriminating statements. The tenor of the interview was congenial, and
Figueroa referred to Agent Hooper by her first name. The interview was not
lengthy. Agent Hooper employed no deceptive practices, and she did not
promise to provide Figueroa with any assistance.
[¶9] On August 24, 2015, Figueroa filed a motion to suppress the
statements that he had made to Agent Hooper on May 1, 2015. The court held
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a hearing on the motion on November 3, 2015, during which it heard
testimony from Agent Hooper and admitted in evidence an audio recording of
the May 1 interview. On November 24, 2015, the court entered an order
denying Figueroa’s motion, concluding that although the Miranda warnings
provided were far from perfect, they were sufficient to intelligibly convey the
substance of Figueroa’s constitutional rights. The court also concluded that
Figueroa’s conduct during the interview demonstrated “an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of known rights” that was “voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice.” (Quotation
marks omitted.)
[¶10] On November 30, 2015, Figueroa entered a conditional guilty
plea to the Class B trafficking charge pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 11(a)(2),
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.3 The court
then entered a judgment of conviction on the plea, sentencing Figueroa to ten
years’ incarceration with all but thirty months suspended followed by a term
of three years’ probation, and ordering him to pay a $400 fine. Figueroa
timely appealed to us. See M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A).
3 The State dismissed the remaining charges pursuant to M.R.U. Crim. P. 48(a).
6
II. DISCUSSION
[¶11] Figueroa contends that Agent Hooper’s incomplete recital of the
Miranda warnings did not sufficiently communicate the substance of his right
against compulsory self-incrimination. He maintains that the warning that he
received was fatally defective because it only advised him of his right to
counsel generally, and entirely omitted any reference to his right to have
counsel present during the interview. He also insists that the infirmity of
Agent Hooper’s Miranda warning invalidated his waiver by depriving him of a
full awareness of the nature of the right that he abandoned.
[¶12] When a defendant challenges the denial of a suppression motion
on the basis of an alleged Miranda violation, we review the suppression
court’s factual findings for clear error, and review de novo whether the
defendant received sufficient Miranda warnings, and whether the defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the rights protected by
Miranda. See State v. Lockhart, 2003 ME 108, ¶ 21, 830 A.2d 433; State v.
Marden, 673 A.2d 1304, 1309 (Me. 1996). Here, because the suppression
court’s findings are uncontested, and because the State has not challenged the
suppression court’s determination that Figueroa was subjected to custodial
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interrogation, we consider only the adequacy of Agent Hooper’s Miranda
warnings and the validity of Figueroa’s Miranda waiver.
[¶13] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is jeopardized by the compelling pressures inherent in
custodial interrogation. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35
(2000) (discussing Miranda). “To give force to the Constitution’s protection
against compelled self-incrimination, the Court established in Miranda certain
procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their
rights . . . before commencing custodial interrogation.” Florida v. Powell,
559 U.S. 50, 59 (2010) (quotation marks omitted). The Powell court reiterated
Miranda’s requirements that a suspect must be warned
(1) that he has the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, (3) that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if he cannot afford an
attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if
he so desires.
Id. at 59-60 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶14] To protect the rights that the warnings describe, Miranda also
established an exclusionary rule, conditioning the admissibility of a suspect’s
statement during custodial interrogation upon proof that the defendant
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validly waived the privilege against self-incrimination after delivery of the
foregoing warnings. 384 U.S. at 476. “The warnings required and the waiver
necessary . . . are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to
the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.” Id. (emphasis
added). Thus, in order to demonstrate the admissibility of a suspect’s
statements during custodial interrogation, the State bears the burden of
proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) law enforcement
officers properly delivered Miranda warnings to the suspect before
commencing the interrogation, and (2) the suspect knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waived the privilege protected by the warnings. Marden,
673 A.2d at 1308-09.
[¶15] “The prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights
protected by the Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.” Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
For this reason, the rigidity of the Miranda doctrine does not extend to “the
precise formulation of the warnings” or otherwise require a “talismanic
incantation.” California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359 (1981). The safeguard of
the prescribed warnings may be satisfied by a “fully effective equivalent.” Id. at
9
360 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). “In determining whether police
officers adequately conveyed the four warnings, . . . reviewing courts are not
required to examine the words employed as if construing a will or defining the
terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably
convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.” Powell, 559 U.S. at 60
(alterations omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
[¶16] In State v. Ayers, we held that
[a]lthough some courts have required, strictly, that a person in
custody be informed specifically of his right to the presence of an
attorney during questioning, we regard as better reasoned those
cases holding that Miranda . . . is directed to insuring that the
substance of the constitutional rights of a person in custody be
intelligibly conveyed to him.
433 A.2d 356, 365 (Me. 1981) (citations omitted). In Ayers, where the suspect
was clearly advised that he had the right to have an attorney present before
questioning began, and the officer asked whether the suspect would be willing
to talk without having an attorney present, we concluded that the suspect had
been adequately informed of the rights protected by Miranda. Id.
[¶17] Here, Figueroa was warned, in unqualified language, that he had
“a right to an attorney.” He was advised that the courts would furnish him an
attorney if he could not afford counsel, and was expressly reminded that he
did have an attorney. He was also advised that his attorney had consented to
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the interview, which was about to occur in the attorney’s absence. Nothing in
the words used indicated that the right to counsel would be restricted after
the questioning commenced. Rather, when viewed in the context of the
surrounding circumstances, the warnings communicated an unqualified right
to counsel, which could have been invoked by Figueroa at any time. Cf. 2
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6(a) (3d ed. 2007) (stating that
when a defendant in custody and the defendant’s attorney “actually arranged
for an interrogation session to occur,” that circumstance “may have some
bearing on the need for Miranda warnings”). Under the circumstances of the
interrogation—which Figueroa initiated and to which court-appointed
counsel consented—we conclude that Agent Hooper’s warnings regarding the
right to counsel adequately and effectively apprised Figueroa that he had the
right to the presence of counsel during questioning.
[¶18] Furthermore, the court did not err in finding that Figueroa
understood the substance of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the evidence
demonstrates that Figueroa effectively waived those rights by agreeing to
speak with Agent Hooper after she advised him of his right to remain silent,
his right to counsel, and the possible use of his statements. Figueroa was
specifically warned that the State would use his statements against him, and
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was thereby advised of the consequences of his decision to speak with the
officer. “This is the ultimate adverse consequence [Figueroa] could have
suffered by virtue of his choice to make uncounseled admissions to the
authorities.” Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 293-94 (1988). We therefore
conclude that Figueroa knowingly and voluntarily spoke with Agent Hooper
after he was advised of his Miranda rights in a manner sufficient to protect
him from the “‘compelling pressures’ inherent in custodial police
interrogation,” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467),
and we affirm the denial of Figueroa’s motion to suppress.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
On the briefs:
Jeremy Pratt, Esq., and Ellen Simmons, Esq., Camden, for
appellant Michael D. Figueroa
Maeghan Maloney, District Attorney, and Joelle S. Pratt,
Asst. Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, Skowhegan,
for appellee State of Maine
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At oral argument:
Jeremy Pratt, Esq., for appellant Michael D. Figueroa
Joelle S. Pratt, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee State of Maine
Somerset County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-422
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY
State of Maine v. Michael D. Figueroa
Combined Opinion