IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE FILED
FEBRUARY 1997 SESSION
May 23, 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellee, ) No. 03C01-9606-CC-00242
)
) Washington County
v. )
) Honorable Arden L. Hill, Judge
)
ROBERT HARRISON BLEVINS, ) (Burglary and vandalism of property valued
) under $500)
Appellant. )
For the Appellant: For the Appellee:
David F. Bautista Charles W. Burson
District Public Defender Attorney General of Tennessee
and and
Debbie Huskins Sandy R. Copous
Assistant District Public Defender Assistant Attorney General of Tennessee
142 East Market St. 450 James Robertson Parkway
Johnson City, TN 37601 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
(AT TRIAL)
David E. Crockett
Laura Rule Hendricks District Attorney General
606 W. Main Street Route 19, Box 99
P.O. Box 84 Johnson City, TN 37601
Knoxville, TN 37901-0084 and
and Kent Garland
District Public Defender’s Office Assistant District Attorney General
for the 1st Judicial District P.O. Box 38
142 East Market Street Jonesborough, TN 37659
Johnson City, TN 37601
(ON APPEAL)
OPINION FILED:____________________
AFFIRMED
Joseph M. Tipton
Judge
OPINION
The defendant, Robert Harrison Blevins, appeals as of right from a jury
conviction in the Washington County Criminal Court for burglary, a Class E felony, and
vandalism of property valued under five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. He
was sentenced as a career offender to six years in the custody of the Department of
Correction for the felony and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the
misdemeanor to be served concurrently, but consecutively to previously imposed
sentences. The trial court also imposed fines totaling five thousand, five hundred
dollars. On appeal, the defendant states his issues as follows:
(1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his
convictions;
(2) whether the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the
defendant’s six prior convictions for burglary to impeach the
defendant’s testimony;
(3) whether the prosecutor violated the defendant’s right to a
fair trial by questioning him about his prior convictions and
by asking the trial court to clarify the impeachment
instruction to the jury; and
(4) whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s
request for relief from payment of fines.
We hold that the evidence is sufficient and that no reversible error occurred.
Officer Jeff Stork of the Johnson City Police Department testified that he
and Officer Jeff Jenkins responded to a call reporting a burglary in progress near the
Broadway Hotel and Perkins Restaurant at approximately 4:00 a.m. on July 29, 1994.
He explained that someone had called Officer Harrell and told him that a person was
inspecting the cars and looked like they were getting ready to break into one. Officer
Stork stated that he was instructed to park away from the area to avoid scaring anyone
off. He said that he and Officer Jenkins exited their vehicles and began walking among
the cars parked near the back of the parking lot while Sergeant Michael Harris, who had
also arrived, started checking the vehicles in the front of the lot. He recalled hearing
2
Sergeant Harris, who was approximately one hundred and fifty yards away, yell at
someone to get their hands up. Officer Stork said that he and Officer Jenkins ran to
Sergeant Harris and saw Sergeant Harris moving the defendant from the front door of a
gray Nissan and placing him over the hood of the vehicle. He stated that the driver’s
side window was broken and the door was open.
Sergeant Michael Harris of the Johnson City Police Department testified
that he also responded to the call regarding an automobile burglary in progress. He
stated that he parked his vehicle in the Perkins Restaurant lot and walked towards the
Broadway Motel parking lot. He said that as he walked towards the motel, he continued
to listen to his radio. Sergeant Harris testified that Officer Harrell, who was working off-
duty at a Wal-Mart located nearby, was talking to an unidentified person on the phone
regarding the burglary and was simultaneously communicating to him by radio the
information given by the unknown caller. Sergeant Harris said that as he walked in the
grass between two motel units, he approached the front of the victim’s vehicle. He
recalled hearing a loud popping noise and Officer Harrell telling him over the radio that
the caller stated that a window had just been broken out. Sergeant Harris said that he
then saw the defendant partially in the victim’s vehicle and that the passenger’s side
window was broken. He testified that he could see the defendant because a security
light was located very close to the victim’s car and explained that the defendant had
two-thirds of his body in the car. Sergeant Harris said that the defendant was crouching
down with one leg on the ground and the other in the vehicle, attempting to conceal
himself. He testified that the defendant had a pocketbook in his hands. Sergeant
Harris stated that he then told the defendant at least three times to raise his hands, and
when the defendant did not respond, he placed him on the front of the car and arrested
him.
3
On cross-examination, Sergeant Harris admitted that he did not interview
any witnesses at the scene and that he did not know the name of the person who called
Officer Harrell. He stated that although he did not question him or obtain his name, he
spoke to a man who said that he had called Officer Harrell who was at Wal-Mart and
told him about the burglary. Sergeant Harris also conceded that he failed to mention at
the preliminary hearing that he heard a loud popping noise before seeing the defendant
in the victim’s car. He acknowledged stating at the preliminary hearing that the caller
said that the window was broken with a rock and that he searched the vehicle but did
not find a rock. Sergeant Harris also stated that he did not attempt to obtain fingerprints
from the vehicle.
Traci Jackson, the victim, testified that she and some friends left Legends
during the early morning hours of July 29, 1994, and went to Perkins Restaurant in
Johnson City. She stated that she drove her gray Nissan and waited in the car near the
entrance while Shannon Vaughn gave their names for the waiting list. The victim
recalled hearing the defendant, whom she did not know, talk to Vaughn for a couple of
minutes before she got back into the car. She testified that she then parked her vehicle
behind Broadway Motel because the restaurant’s parking lot was full. The victim stated
that the defendant had walked to where she had parked her car and started talking to
them. She remembered the defendant telling them that his name was Rob when
Vaughn asked him. She said that as they joined their other friends, she realized that
she had locked her keys and purse in the car and told her friends. She stated that she
attempted to open the doors but both were locked. The victim said that her friends told
her that they should eat first and then either get a spare set of keys from her house or
call the police. The victim testified that the defendant was present during the entire
conversation. She also admitted that the group may have stopped at one of her friend’s
motel room before walking to the restaurant.
4
The victim testified that they walked to the restaurant and that everyone
sat at a booth except the defendant, who sat approximately three booths away with two
other men. She recalled seeing the defendant leave after approximately five minutes.
She stated that approximately forty-five minutes later, they left and walked to the hotel
office to call the police or a locksmith. She said that the clerk told her that the police
were already in the parking lot. The victim testified that she saw Sergeant Harris and
asked him whether he could assist her in unlocking her car. She said that after talking
to Sergeant Harris, she discovered that someone had broken into her car and that the
passenger’s side window had been completely shattered. She stated that nothing had
been removed but that her purse had been moved from the passenger’s side floorboard
to the passenger’s seat. She also stated that she noticed a large rock lying under her
seat that afternoon when vacuuming the car. The victim said that she gave a
description of the defendant to Sergeant Harris. She also testified that the repair to her
window costed one hundred and seventy-nine dollars. The victim stated that she did
not give the defendant permission to enter or to damage her car.
Chad Hummon, an acquaintance of the defendant, testified that he saw
the defendant at Perkins Restaurant on July 29, 1994, at approximately 3:00 a.m.
talking to two women parked in a dark-colored car near the entrance to the restaurant.
He stated that he waved at the defendant and that he later sat at a table with him. He
said that the two women sat with them for awhile before moving to a separate booth.
Hummon testified that the defendant was in the restaurant with him for about one hour.
He also conceded having a prior conviction for secreting personal property.
The defendant testified that he left Nashville Sound on July 29, 1994, and
went to Perkins Restaurant with a group of his friends, including Hummon. He stated
that he parked his car in the rear because the lot was full and walked towards the
restaurant. He said that he saw Hummon starting to walk into the restaurant as a car
5
drove up to the entrance. The defendant testified that the victim was driving, another
woman was in the passenger seat, and a man was in the back seat. The defendant
recalled yelling at them and the passenger asking him to come to her side of the car.
He said that he then asked them whether they wanted to party and they said that they
wanted to eat first. According to the defendant, the passenger got out of the vehicle, he
sat in the passenger seat, and the passenger sat on his lap as the victim tried to find a
parking space. The defendant testified that the lot was full so they parked in the rear
close to his car. He said that the victim stopped at a friend’s motel room before they
walked to the restaurant.
The defendant stated that he saw Hummon when he entered the
restaurant and that he told the victim and her friends that he was going to sit with
Hummon instead. He stated that the victim and her friends sat at another table. The
defendant testified that he stayed for approximately an hour eating and talking with
Hummon. He said that when he left the restaurant, he declined Hummon’s offer for a
ride and walked to his car. According to the defendant, several uniformed police
officers started yelling at him to freeze as he started to step over a curb to go between
two cars. He denied being inside a gray Nissan or knowing anything about a rock being
thrown through the car’s window. He also denied knowing that the victim had locked
her keys in her car. The defendant admitted having prior convictions for attempted first-
degree burglary in 1987, four counts of third-degree burglary in 1987, aggravated
assault in 1989, larceny from a person in 1989, third-degree burglary in 1990, and two
counts of robbery in 1990.
In rebuttal, the victim testified that the only other person in her vehicle was
Shannon Vaughn who sat in the passenger seat. She also denied that the defendant
got into her car and rode with her to park her car.
6
Shannon Vaughn testified that she rode with the victim to Perkins
Restaurant and that she saw the defendant when the victim parked in front of the
restaurant and she went inside. She said that she was the only person with the victim
and that she rode in the passenger’s seat. She denied asking the defendant to get in
the car with them, that the defendant rode with them to park, and that she sat with the
defendant at a booth at the restaurant. She stated that the defendant sat two or three
booths away. Vaughn said that she was not sure how long the defendant stayed at the
restaurant but recalled that he left before they did.
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to establish the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the offenses of automobile burglary
and vandalism of property valued under five hundred dollars. Essentially, he asserts
that had the trial court excluded evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions for
automobile burglary, the jury could have found that the defendant’s testimony was
credible and rejected Sergeant Harris’ testimony. The state argues that the evidence
overwhelmingly supports the convictions and that the jury was entitled to reject the
defendant’s testimony as untrue. W e hold that there is sufficient evidence to support
the convictions.
Our standard of review when the sufficiency of the evidence is questioned
on appeal is "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2789 (1979). This means that we do not reweigh the evidence, but presume that
the jury has resolved all conflicts in the testimony and drawn all reasonable inferences
from the evidence in favor of the state. See State v. Sheffield, 676 S.W.2d 542, 547
(Tenn. 1984); State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978).
7
Pursuant to T.C.A. § 39-14-402(a)(4), a person commits burglary by
entering an automobile without the effective consent of the owner with the intent to
commit a felony or theft. Vandalism is defined as knowingly causing damage to or
destroying real or personal property of another without the owner’s effective consent.
T.C.A. § 30-14-408(a).
In the light most favorable to the state, the evidence shows that Sergeant
Harris discovered the defendant bending down in the passenger seat of the victim’s car
holding the victim’s purse in his hands. Also, a rock was found underneath the seat,
and the passenger’s side window was broken. Although the defendant testified that he
was merely stepping over a curb to walk between two cars when several officers
ordered him to freeze, the jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s claim and accredit
the testimony of the state’s witnesses. Under these circumstances, we conclude that
ample proof existed to allow a rational trier of fact to conclude that the defendant was
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of both burglary and vandalism of property valued
under five hundred dollars.
II. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Next, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing evidence of the defendant’s prior burglary convictions to impeach his
credibility. He argues that because the prior convictions involved the same crime for
which he was tried, the prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value for
credibility. The defendant asserts that the state should have been limited to using
convictions other than the burglary convictions for impeaching the defendant. In the
alternative, he contends that the six prior burglary convictions should have been
described as six convictions for crimes involving dishonesty rather than using the term
burglary. The state argues that the trial court properly allowed the evidence of the
defendant’s prior convictions. We agree.
8
The admissibility of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s discretion
and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Harris, 839
S.W.2d 54, 66 (Tenn. 1992). Pursuant to the conditions and procedures set forth in
Tenn. R. Evid. 609, the credibility of the accused may be attacked by presenting
evidence of prior convictions. One condition requires that the crime either be a felony
or a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(2). Also, the
trial court must find that the conviction’s probative value on credibility outweighs its
unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues. Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3). In
determining the probative value of the prior convictions, the trial court must assess the
similarity between the crime on trial and the crime underlying the impeaching
conviction. State v. Farmer, 841 S.W.2d 837, 839 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The trial
court must next analyze the relevance the impeaching conviction has to the issue of
credibility. Id.
Before trial, the state notified the defendant of its intent to use the
following convictions to impeach the defendant’s credibility at trial: (1) four counts of
third-degree burglary in 1987, (2) bail jumping in 1987, (3) attempted first-degree
burglary in 1987, (4) aggravated assault in 1989, (5) larceny from a person in 1989, (6)
third-degree burglary in 1990, and (7) two counts of robbery in 1990. The defendant
filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the defendant’s prior convictions due to
the similarity of the offenses to the charged offense of burglary of an automobile. In its
ruling on the defendant’s motion in limine, the trial court held that the bail jumping
conviction was inadmissible. It also concluded that the defendant’s remaining prior
convictions could be introduced to impeach the defendant’s credibility if he testified
because the offenses of burglary, robbery and larceny directly related to the
defendant’s truthfulness and the probative value on his credibility was not outweighed
by any undue prejudice.
9
The defendant relies upon Tennessee case law that has held that
evidence of the defendant’s conviction for an offense similar to the one on trial should
not be introduced for impeachment purposes because there is too great a danger of it
improperly showing a propensity to commit that type of crime. See, e.g., State v.
Roberts, 703 S.W.2d 146, 147 (Tenn. 1986) (in aggravated assault case, could not
show prior assault and battery conviction); Long v. State, 607 S.W.2d 482, 486 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1980) (in murder assault case, could not show prior second degree murder
conviction). However, the fact that a prior conviction involves a similar crime for which
the defendant is being tried does not automatically require its exclusion. As previously
noted, the trial court must analyze the prior conviction and the offense on trial to
determine whether the conviction’s probative value on credibility is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice on the substantive issues. See Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3);
State v. Farmer, 841 S.W.2d at 839.
In this case, the trial court considered the similarity between automobile
burglary and the defendant’s previous convictions for burglary, robbery and larceny. It
correctly concluded that the felony convictions were for crimes of dishonesty, thus
lending greater weight to their probative value regarding credibility. See State v. Miller,
737 S.W.2d 556, 559-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (burglary); State v. Caruthers, 676
S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tenn. 1984) (robbery); State v. Hardison, 705 S.W.2d 684, 686
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (petit larceny).
Also, the defendant made his credibility an important issue by denying any
wrongdoing and asserting legitimate conduct. Under these circumstances, we are not
inclined to question the trial court’s allowing all the convictions for the purpose of
impeachment. Thus, although the prior burglary convictions are similar to the offense
on trial, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the
10
convictions’ probative value on credibility outweighed any danger of unfair prejudice to
the defendant.
The defendant contends in the alternative that the trial court should have
limited references to his previous burglary convictions to his having six prior convictions
for crimes involving dishonesty. We note that the case upon which he relies, in which
this court allowed the trial court’s use of such a procedure, did not receive the blessing
of our supreme court. See State v. Ross Jones, No. 01C01-9405-CR-00176, Davidson
County (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 8, 1995), app. denied (Tenn. May 1, 1995) (concurring
in results only). In any event, Jones did not hold that the trial court is required to limit
the reference to prior convictions as the defendant requests. Rather, it only held that
the trial court’s use of such a procedure was not an abuse of discretion in that case. In
similar fashion, we believe that the circumstances in the present case do not reflect an
abuse of discretion by the trial court in not limiting any references to the defendant’s
previous convictions to felonies involving dishonesty.
III. PROSECUTOR CONDUCT REGARDING IMPEACHMENT
The defendant asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial because
the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by the manner in which he questioned the
defendant about prior burglary convictions being for automobile burglaries. The
defendant also contends that the prosecutor improperly requested that the trial court
instruct the jury regarding the proper use of evidence of the defendant’s prior burglary
convictions as its last instruction although an identical instruction had been given
earlier. The state argues that the actions of the prosecutor do not rise to the level of
misconduct.
First, we note that the defendant did not object at the time of the
prosecutor’s question regarding automobile burglaries nor did he include this issue in
11
his motion for new trial. Also, although he objected at the time of the jury instruction in
question, it was not included as an issue in his motion for new trial. Pursuant to Rule
3(e), T.R.A.P., an issue is considered waived for appellate review purposes if it is not
specifically included in the motion for new trial, but is an issue for which the result would
be a new trial. Such is the case before us. Moreover, in the context of plain error, we
see nothing that affects the substantial rights of the defendant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P.
52(b).
After the defendant acknowledged on cross-examination that he was
convicted in 1987 for four counts of third-degree burglary, the prosecutor asked him if
the convictions were for automobile burglaries. The defendant replied, “No, I don’t think
so.” Needless to say, to the extent that the question was for the purpose of eliciting
underlying facts of the former convictions, it was improper. See State v. Morgan, 541
S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tenn. 1976); Long v. State, 607 S.W.2d at 485. However, the
defendant’s negative response ended the inquiry and the matter was never mentioned
again. Under these circumstances and with the strong evidence against the defendant,
we do not believe that the question affected the jury verdicts to the defendant’s
prejudice.
As for the jury instruction claim, the defendant complains about the
prosecutor getting the trial court to repeat the instruction relating to considering
evidence of prior convictions only on the issue of credibility. After the trial court gave its
instructions to the jury, the prosecutor stated that it had failed to instruct the jury
regarding both the specific offenses for which the defendant had previously been
convicted and the proper consideration of them relative to credibility. The prosecutor
requested that the trial court instruct the jury accordingly, which it did. However, the
trial court had already instructed the jury in such a fashion.
12
Obviously, the trial court should not have instructed the jury twice relative
to the specific prior convictions of the defendant. However, there is no showing that the
prosecutor intentionally sought to influence the jury by having the instruction given a
second time, immediately before deliberation. We note as well, that the instructions
were an accurate statement of the law that limited the jury in its consideration of the
defendant’s prior convictions. Again, under these circumstances and the strength of
the evidence against the defendant, we do not believe that the prosecutor’s request
was misconduct or that the trial court’s reinstruction affected the jury’s verdicts to the
defendant’s prejudice. See Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344-45 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1976).
IV. FINES
The defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his request to
be relieved from the payment of fines totaling five thousand and five hundred dollars.
He asserts that because he supports a wife and two children and is uneducated,
unskilled and heavily in debt, the trial court should have waived the fines imposed. The
state argues that the seriousness of the offense, the need for deterrence and the
defendant’s extensive criminal background justify the imposition of the fines and that a
suspension or reduction of the fine would only depreciate the seriousness of the
offense.
At the trial, the jury returned a fine for the burglary at three thousand
dollars and for the vandalism at two thousand five hundred dollars, each being the
maximum for that class of offense. See T.C.A. § 40-35-11(b)(5) and (e)(1). At the
sentencing hearing, no testimony was presented by either party, which left the filed
presentence report and the proof at trial for the trial court’s consideration. The
defendant conceded that he had enough prior convictions to have a career offender
status, thereby requiring imposition of the maximum length of sentence for the felony
13
class involved. See T.C.A. § 40-35-108. The defendant was sentenced to eleven
months, twenty-nine days for the vandalism offense, to be served concurrently with the
burglary sentence.
As for the fines, the record reflects that the parties and the trial court
misunderstood the respective roles of the jury and the trial court in imposing the fines.
The defendant asked the court to “suspend” the fines and the prosecutor asserted that
the state was opposed to a suspension, stating that “that’s the jury’s part of this, and
that’s the only part that they’re left with.” Then the trial court stated:
Well, it’s a way for the jury to speak, but, I don’t think
the jury when they set that fine understands it’s
to -- in some instances it’s almost impossible to collect, but
we’ll leave that for a future day.1 The motion to reduce the fine
is respectfully denied.
Each judgment of conviction in this case entered by the trial court states the amount as
a “fine assessed by the jury.” In this fashion, the record reflects that the parties and the
trial court believed that the fine to be imposed as part of the sentence was to be set by
the jury. Such is not the case.
Although the jury is to “fix” the amount of the fine and report it with a guilty
verdict, it is the trial court that is obligated to impose a fine, if any -- not to exceed that
fixed by the jury -- as part of the sentence. See T.C.A. § 40-35-301(b). The trial court’s
imposition of a fine, if any, is to be based upon the factors and principles of the 1989
Sentencing Act, such as, prior history, potential for rehabilitation, financial means, and
mitigating and enhancing factors, that are relevant to an appropriate, total sentence.
See State v. Bryant, 805 S.W.2d 762, 766 (Tenn. 1991). Thus, the trial court may not
simply impose the fine as fixed by the jury.
1
The trial court retains jurisdiction, even after final judgment, to modify the payment
sched ule or to red uce or re mit entire ly the amo unt of fines for which the defe ndant m ay be obliga ted. See
T.C.A . §§ 40-2 4-101, -1 02 and -104.
14
However, we need not remand the case for proper assessment of the
fine, because the record before us is sufficient to justify affirming the amount of the fine
imposed by the trial court. The presentence report reflects that the twenty-eight-year-
old defendant held employment for monthly periods in 1993 and 1994 with four
separate employers. No record of employment before 1993 is presented. The report
shows that the defendant owns nothing, but claims a debt of four thousand dollars in
addition to an unknown amount for child support for a child from a previous marriage.
The defendant is married and also supports a two-year-old child who lives with him and
his wife. The defendant is a high school dropout who obtained his GED. He claims to
be in good physical and mental health, but admitted previously using marijuana about
once a week for a few years. He has convictions for robbery, aggravated assault,
larceny from the person, burglaries, attempted burglary, and several misdemeanors. In
fact, the defendant was on parole when he committed the present offenses.
The defendant contends that his financial status and family needs justify
less than the maximum fines. Although indigency may in certain cases justify no fine,
as previously stated, it must be considered with the other relevant factors.
Thus, although the defendant’s ability to pay a fine is a factor
it is not necessarily a controlling one. We recognize that an
oppressive fine can disrupt future rehabilitation and prevent a
defendant from becoming a productive member of society.
Such results are not usually compatible with the purposes and
principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act. However, a significant
fine is not automatically precluded just because it works a
substantial hardship on a defendant -- it may be punitive in the
same fashion incarceration may be punitive.
State v. Marshall, 870 S.W.2d 532, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).
In the past, the defendant has shown little, if any, inclination to meet the
needs of his family and children through honest effort. His proven record of disregard
for conforming his conduct to the laws of society does not bode well for rehabilitation
occurring in the near future. In fact, his compilation of such an extensive record in his
15
ten years of adulthood, by itself, warrants maximum fines for punishment and
deterrence. Relief, if any, from the fines should await assessment under his future
conduct and circumstances. The amount of the fines imposed by the trial court is
proper.
In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the
judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
Joseph M. Tipton, Judge
CONCUR:
Jerry L. Smith, Judge
Thomas T. Woodall, Judge
16
State v. Blevins
Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
Date filed: 1997-05-23
Citations: 968 S.W.2d 888
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion