IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
October 12, 1998
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
FOR PUBLICATION ourt Clerk
Appellate C
Filed: October 12, 1998
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
APPELLEE, ) SULLIVAN CRIMINAL
)
v. ) Hon. R. Jerry Beck, Judge
)
NATHAN ALLEN CALLAHAN, ) No. 03S01-9711-CC-00136
)
APPELLANT. )
FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:
STEPHEN M. WALLACE JOHN KNOX WALKUP
Blountville Attorney General and Reporter
DARIAN B. TAYLOR
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville
OPINION
AFFIRMED HOLDER, J.
OPINION
We granted this appeal to decide whether a juvenile can constitutionally
waive the right to remain silent when the juvenile has not been informed of the
possibility of being prosecuted as an adult. We hold that: (1) neither the
Tennessee Constitution nor the United States Constitution requires police
officers to inform the defendant that he may be prosecuted as an adult; and (2)
juvenile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-the-circumstances test,
which requires consideration of factors consistent with those enumerated in Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979). The decision of the Court of
Criminal Appeals affirming the defendant's conviction is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
On March 30, 1994, the defendant, Nathan Allen Callahan, murdered both
his mother and his thirteen-year-old sister in the garage of the Callahan family
home. Both victims died as the result of multiple shotgun wounds. The mother
sustained close range shotgun blasts to the buttocks, to the back, to the
shoulder, and to the head. The defendant shot his sister at close range, once in
the buttocks and once in the head. The shotgun blasts to the victims' heads
displaced most of the victims' brain matter from their cranial cavities. The
defendant was fifteen years old at the time of the murders.
Prior to the murders, the defendant resided with his parents and his sister
in their upper-middle-class family home. The defendant indicated that he was
never abused and described members of his family as people "who try to do the
right thing." The defendant's relationship with his family began to deteriorate
when the defendant began abusing drugs. The defendant's father, Glen
2
Callahan, learned of the defendant's drug abuse around January 1, 1994, and
attempted to restrict the defendant's activities. The Callahans disciplined the
defendant by: selling his 1994 Pontiac Trans Am, restricting his contact with
drug-abusing friends, ceasing his allowance, and informing him that he could not
obtain a learner's permit until he passed a drug screen and improved his grades.
The defendant continued to test positive on drug screens despite his
parents' disciplinary measures. In February of 1994, the defendant's mother
traded her car for a 1994 black Camaro. She informed the defendant that he
could have the Camaro if he passed two drugs screens. The situation, however,
remained relatively unchanged. Approximately two days before the murders, the
defendant asked his sister in the presence of a friend, "What would you do if I
killed my Mom and Dad?" His sister replied: "Nathan, shut up. That's not nice
to say. You shouldn't do that, I would hate you forever if you did." The
defendant, however, devised a plan to kill his parents and his grandparents in
response to his activities being restricted.
On the day of the murders, the defendant had several lengthy telephone
conversations with James Saylor and Jonathan Mann. The defendant discussed
his plan with both Saylor and Mann. Saylor offered suggestions as to how the
defendant might murder his mother and other members of the Callahan family.
Unbeknownst to the defendant, these telephone conversations were recorded.
The first recorded conversation admitted into evidence occurred between
the defendant and James Saylor. The defendant informed Saylor that he was
"getting ready to go upstairs and get the gun." The defendant discussed the
possibility of remaining at the "house for a couple of weeks" after he murdered
his parents. He stated that he would kill his father when his father returned
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home from a business trip and that he would also kill his grandparents. The
defendant, however, expressed concern that others would became suspicious if
bills were not paid and his parents failed to appear for work. During the second
and third conversations with Saylor, the defendant stated that he could not find
the pistol and was going to have to use the shotgun. The defendant also
expressed concern that he would not be able to sneak up behind the victims with
a shotgun.
The defendant went into detail about his devised plan to kill his mother
and sister during the third recorded conversation with Saylor. He informed
Saylor that his mother and sister "went out to eat." He told Saylor, "Why don't
you come over, I'm gonna shoot them as they walk in the door. Come up behind
them, and shoot them in the garage so I don't get blood all over the house." The
defendant elaborated that he was "going to wait around the corner, you know at
the garage, when they walk in, I'm going to come up behind them, pow, pow.
(Laughs)." Saylor responded, "Why don't you just push them in the garage, and
turn the car on."
The defendant had a subsequent taped phone conversation with
Jonathan Mann. He told Mann that "I've got the goddamn gun outside the car,
and I'm looking out the blind. As soon as I see that fuckin' car, I'm gonna run out
there and wait for them. I'm gonna shoot them in the garage, 'fore they can get
in the house." He further told Mann that "I'll go to jail" "if I get caught." The
defendant asked Mann, "How many years do you think I'd get? Life?" Mann
responded affirmatively. The defendant then called Saylor on a three-way line
and again explained his plan. The defendant reiterated that "[w]e gotta kill my
grandparents tomorrow." Saylor recommended poisoning the defendant's
mother's food. The defendant responded, "No, I'm shooting her ass, bitch."
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The defendant's mother and sister returned home while the defendant
was on the phone. He placed the receiver down, leaving it off the hook so that
Saylor could hear the events. He walked outside, retrieved the shotgun, and
waited on his mother and sister to open the garage door. The garage door
opened, and they entered the garage. The defendant first shot his sister once.
He then shot his mother in the shoulder. His sister knelt down on the garage
floor. The defendant walked within a few feet of his sister and shot her in the
head. The defendant again pointed the shotgun in the direction of his mother
and pulled the trigger. The gun was empty. He reloaded the shotgun and shot
his mother in the buttocks. He then shot her in the back and in the head. The
defendant left the garage and re-entered the house. He picked up the telephone
receiver and told Saylor that he had killed his mother and his sister.
The defendant was apprehended by the police approximately four hours
after he murdered the victims. He was transported to the sheriff's department.
The defendant's father had returned from his business trip and granted the
police permission to question the defendant. The defendant was advised of his
Miranda rights on several occasions. At the sheriff's department, he was
informed:
You have the right to remain silent, anything you say can be used
against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for
advice before we ask you any questions, and have him with you
during questioning. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be
appointed before any questioning if you wish one. If you decide to
stop answering questions now without a lawyer present, you can
stop answering any time you wish.
The defendant read the waiver of rights form and then signed the form. The
defendant stated that he understood his rights.
5
The officers testified that the defendant's demeanor was "very calm." He
was not crying, shaking, or visibly upset. The defendant did not appear to be
under the influence of any substances. A drug screen later confirmed that the
defendant was not under the influence of any substances at the time he waived
his right to remain silent. The defendant stated that he wished to speak. The
officers then read the second part of the Miranda form to the defendant which
stated:
I have read this statement of my rights, and I know what my rights
are. I want to make a statement and answer questions. I do not
want a lawyer at this time. I understand, and know what I am
doing. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no
pressure or force of any kind has been used against me.
The defendant then reread and signed the form. He stated that he understood
what he was signing.
The defendant, after reading, signing, and indicating that he understood
both forms, began to speak about the murders. The defendant's lengthy
statement was transcribed by an officer. A bathroom break was taken during
the statement. The defendant was given a pack of cookies or crackers and a
soft drink. The defendant neither requested additional breaks nor complained
about the facility's quality. He neither requested an attorney nor indicated that
he wished to cease speaking. He never requested to see his father or any family
members. Officers testified that the defendant's demeanor was "calm" and
"polite" during the statement. The transcribed statement was read to the
defendant. The defendant acknowledged that the statement was accurate and
signed every page of the statement.
6
The defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement. He asserted that
while he "may have understood the literal language" of the Miranda warnings,
the officers failed to inform him of the "ramifications" of his waiver. He claimed
that the officers should have provided him with an "explanation of the judicial
system" and that the police officers should have informed him of the possibility of
being prosecuted as an adult.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. The trial court
held that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to remain silent. The court stated that the waiver
forms were "simple [and] straightforward, and perhaps designed to address all
levels of education." The court noted that the atmosphere of the interrogation
room was calm; that no undue pressure was placed upon the defendant; and
that the defendant was calm, clear, and cognizant during the waiver process.
The trial court rejected the defendant's argument that a police officer is
under an obligation to inform juveniles of the possibility they may be prosecuted
as adults. The court stated that a "police officer could not predict the future."
The court found that such a requirement could be dangerous because "anytime
the police officer steps over that boundary" and attempts to predict the future,
the officer runs the risk of misleading the juvenile.
The defendant raised the suppression/waiver issue at the appellate level.
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the defendant did not contend that his
confession was coerced. The defendant merely argued that his age and the fact
that he was not informed that he might later be prosecuted as an adult precluded
him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver. The court rejected the
defendant's argument and held that under a totality-of-the-circumstances review
7
the defendant's waiver was the result of a free and deliberate choice. The Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and
affirmed the defendant's convictions. Upon review, we affirm.
ANALYSIS
The defendant argues that both the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution mandate that a
juvenile suspect be informed of the possibility of being prosecuted as an adult
before the juvenile can make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the
right against self-incrimination. Accordingly, the defendant asks this Court to
adopt a per se exclusionary rule barring the use of a juvenile's confession when
the juvenile has not been warned of the possibility of being prosecuted as an
adult. In the alternative, the defendant argues that if this Court declines to adopt
a per se exclusionary rule, this Court should add to the list of factors considered
under the totality-of-the-circumstances test the inquiry of whether a juvenile was
informed of the possibility of being prosecuted as an adult.1 The defendant
maintains that his confession was unconstitutional even when analyzed under a
totality-of-the-circumstances test. We disagree and decline to adopt a per se
exclusionary rule.
1
The defendant argues that while the majority of jurisdictions have declined to adopt a per
se exc lusion ary rule , thos e juris dictio ns "h old th at the abse nce of a w arnin g abo ut ad ult
prosecution is at least one factor to be considered in ascertaining the voluntariness of a purported
waiver . . ." This is an inaccurate assessment of the status of the law. Most jurisdictions utilizing
the totality-of-the-circumstances test have: (1) held that police officers are not required to inform
juveniles of the possibility of being prosecuted as adults; and (2) incorporated the Fare factors
when analyzing the totality of the circumstances. The Fare factors, listed infra, do not include an
inquiry into whether police officials have informed a juvenile of the possibility of being prosecuted
as an a dult.
8
PER SE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution as applied through
the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
Tennessee Constitution also provides that a defendant cannot be compelled to
give evidence against himself. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9.
An accused may waive the right against self-incrimination. Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In Miranda, the United States Supreme
Court held that a suspect
must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479. The Court held that a suspect may knowingly and intelligently waive
the right against self-incrimination only after being apprised of his or her Miranda
rights. Id. Accordingly, a constitutional waiver of the right against self-
incrimination requires the accused to make an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary
waiver of the rights afforded by Miranda. Id. at 444.
Under federal constitutional law, courts must look to the totality of the
circumstances when determining whether an adult has made a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver under Miranda. North Carolina v. Butler, 441
U.S. 369, 373 (1979). The totality-of-the-circumstances test enunciated in Butler
was later adopted to analyze cases involving a juvenile's waiver of Miranda
rights. In Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), the Court held that a
9
juvenile's request for his probation officer during questioning was not "a per se
invocation of that juvenile's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda." Id. at
727-28. The Court concluded that the "totality-of-the-circumstances approach
[was] adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where
interrogation of juveniles is involved." Id. at 724-25. The factors enumerated in
Fare for evaluation were: "the juvenile's age, experience, education,
background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to
understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights,
and the consequences of waiving those rights." Id. at 725.
Tennessee courts have adhered to the federal totality-of-the-
circumstances test when examining waivers of Miranda rights. See State v.
Benton, 759 S.W .2d 427, 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (adhering to the totality-
of-the-circumstances test as stated in North Carolina v. Butler); see also State v.
Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Van Tran, 864 S.W.2d
465, 472 (Tenn. 1993). The defendant, however, urges this Court to replace the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach with the per se exclusionary rule adopted
by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295 (N.H.
1985). In Benoit, the court required that a juvenile be informed of the possibility
of a waiver of jurisdiction into an adult court as a constitutional prerequisite to the
admission of a police statement.2 Accordingly, the defendant would have this
Court append a new and mandatory warning to the litany of established Miranda
rights and warnings.
2
The d efenda nt's brief fails to reflect that State v. Ben oit, 490 A.2d 295 (1985), is no
longer pr ecede nt in New Ham pshire. See State v. Dandurant, 567 A.2d 592 (N.H. 1989) (holding
the standard Miranda warnings and not the Ben oit juven ile war nings applic able t o juve nile
interrogations).
10
The underpinnings of Miranda are to dissipate the compulsion inherent in
custodial interrogations, to prevent coerced self-incrimination, and to prevent
relevant defendant ignorance. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425 (1986);
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986); State v. Stephenson, 878
S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1994). Neither the United States Constitution nor the
Tennessee Constitution mandates that a criminal suspect be apprised of every
possible consequence of a Miranda waiver. See generally Colorado v. Spring,
479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987). Moreover, neither the federal constitution nor the
state constitution requires that a police officer admonish a suspect concerning all
possible methods of prosecution, modes of punishment, and maximum
penalties. Whether a juvenile shall be prosecuted as an adult is a method of
prosecution. Methods of prosecution are simply not within the purview of law
enforcement officials. Decisions concerning methods of prosecution and modes
of punishment are legal decisions within the authority of the district attorneys and
the courts. An officer's representation as to either the mode of punishment or
the method of prosecution is prophetic and potentially misleading. Accordingly,
neither the Tennessee Constitution nor the United States Constitution requires
police officers to inform juveniles of the possibility that they may be prosecuted
as adults.
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES
The defendant argues in the alternative that whether a juvenile is informed
of the possibility of being prosecuted as an adult should now be a factor in the
totality-of-the-circumstances test. His argument is premised on the assertion
"that a juvenile suspect cannot truly be aware of the consequences of waving his
constitutional rights without knowledge of [sic] that adult punishment may be
imposed." We disagree.
11
Prosecution as an adult is not a consequence of a waiver of Miranda
rights. A consequence of a Miranda waiver is "that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Whether a
juvenile may be prosecuted as an adult, however, is contingent upon the gravity
of the offense and the juvenile's background. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134
(noting that juveniles less than sixteen years of age may be prosecuted as an
adult for first degree murder and second degree murder). In the case now
before us, the defendant was prosecuted as an adult as a consequence of
committing a double homicide that included a premeditated and deliberate killing
and not as a consequence of waiving his Miranda rights.3
We have held that warning a juvenile of the possibility of being prosecuted
as an adult is not required for an effective Miranda waiver. Enumerating a
warning that is not required as a factor under the totality-of-the-circumstances
test is illogical and would in effect mandate the non-required warning.
Accordingly, we hold that juvenile waivers shall be analyzed under a totality-of-
the-circumstances test that requires consideration of the following factors:
(1) consideration of all circumstances surrounding the interrogation
including the juvenile's age, experience, education, and
intelligence;
(2) the juvenile's capacity to understand the Miranda warnings and
the consequences of the waiver;
(3) the juvenile's familiarity with Miranda warnings or the ability to
read and write in the language used to give the warnings;
(4) any intoxication;
3
W hile a w aiver ma y ultim ately le ad to a con viction , a wa iver n eithe r dicta tes th e m etho d
of prose cution no r the m ode of p unishm ent.
12
(5) any mental disease, disorder, or retardation; and
(6) the presence of a parent, guardian, or interested adult.
These factors are sufficiently capacious to encompass coercive tactics such as
threatening a juvenile with adult prosecution or promising leniency. While courts
shall exercise special care in scrutinizing purported waivers by juvenile suspects,
no single factor such as mental condition or education should by itself render a
confession unconstitutional absent coercive police activity. Colorado v. Connelly,
479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).
In the case now before us, the defendant does not allege that his waiver
was the result of coercion. The defendant was read his Miranda rights on
several occasions. The defendant reread his rights and verbally acknowledged
that he understood his rights. He signed the Miranda forms. Both the
atmosphere of the interrogation and the defendant's demeanor were calm. The
defendant was permitted to take a break and was provided a snack and a soft
drink. He possessed above-average intelligence and was able to read and write
in the language used to convey his Miranda rights. The defendant was not under
the influence of any intoxicants at the time of the waiver and did not appear to be
suffering from any mental disorders. His demeanor during his statement was
calm, polite, and cooperative. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's finding of a
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver.
The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals affirming the trial court's
judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal shall be taxed against the defendant,
Nathan Allen Callahan, for which execution may issue if necessary.
13
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
Concurring:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Birch, and Barker, J.J.
14