State v. Campbell

No. 79-04
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1980

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
VS .
ARTHUR ELDON CAMPBELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Twelfth Judicial ~istrict,
Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
In and for the County of Hill
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:

Ralph T. Randono argued, Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Richard Larson argued, Assistant Attorney General,
Helena, Montana
Ronald Smith, County Attorney, Havre, Montana

Submitted: April 14, 1980
Decided: 4UG 5 - 1980
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
t h e Court.

The S t a t e i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n by f i l i n g a n informa-
t i o n c h a r g i n g a p p e l l a n t A r t h u r Campbell w i t h one c o u n t of

d r i v i n g under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l , s i x t h o f f e n s e , and

o n e c o u n t of o p e r a t i n g a motor v e h i c l e w h i l e adjudged a n

habitual offender. The i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d i n t h e T w e l f t h

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t C o u r t , H i l l County, t h e Honorable B . W.

Thomas p r e s i d i n g . Approximately two months a f t e r t h e f i l i n g

o f t h e i n i t i a l c h a r g e s a g a i n s t Campbell, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

g r a n t e d t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o f i l e a n amended i n f o r m a t i o n
adding a t h i r d count t o t h e charges. The added c o u n t c h a r g e d

Campbell w i t h n e g l i g e n t homicide.

Campbell e n t e r e d p l e a s of n o t g u i l t y t o a l l t h r e e

c o u n t s c h a r g e d i n t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n . He also filed a

motion t o s u p p r e s s t e s t i m o n y r e g a r d i n g c e r t a i n i d e n t i f i c a -

t i o n t e s t i m o n y and t h e r e s u l t s of a blood t e s t . Subsequent

t o a h e a r i n g on t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s , t h e t r i a l c o u r t

r u l e d t h a t t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n e v i d e n c e was a d m i s s i b l e b u t

t h a t t h e blood t e s t r e s u l t s s h o u l d n o t b e a d m i t t e d . The

S t a t e moved t o r e o p e n t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g f o r t h e p r e s e n -

t a t i o n of f u r t h e r e v i d e n c e . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e

motion and conducted a n o t h e r h e a r i n g i n t o t h e m a t t e r of t h e
a d m i s s i o n of a blood t e s t . After the hearing, the c o u r t

e n t e r e d a s u p p l e m e n t a l o r d e r denying C a m p b e l l ' s motion t o
s u p p r e s s t h e blood t e s t r e s u l t s .
P r i o r t o t r i a l on t h e c h a r g e s , Campbell moved t o s e v e r
Count I1 o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o t h e h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c
offender charge. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h e motion.
Campbell came t o t r i a l on t h e c h a r g e s i n t h e amended
i n f o r m a t i o n on May 1 4 , 1979. The j u r y found him g u i l t y of

a l l charges. Campbell moved f o r a new t r i a l o r a judgment
notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t . The m o t i o n s were d e n i e d , and

t h i s appeal followed.

A p p e l l a n t Campbell began t h e day of J u n e 6 , 1978, by

drinking a beer. A f t e r d r i n k i n g somewhere between t e n and

t w e l v e b e e r s , Campbell and h i s two companions, V i n c e n t and

Manuel Moreno, borrowed a Plymouth a u t o m o b i l e t o d r i v e t o

F r e s n o R e s e r v o i r t o go swimming.

Gus K e l l e r o b s e r v e d t h e Plymouth h e a d i n g w e s t from

Havre on Highway 2 toward F r e s n o . Keller was a l s o headed

w e s t on Highway 2 . The Plymouth p a s s e d h i s t r u c k . Keller

t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e Plymouth " t a p p e d " h i s t r u c k t w i c e a s i t

passed. Keller a l s o o b s e r v e d a highway p a t r o l c a r approach-

i n g from t h e w e s t w i t h i t s l i g h t s f l a s h i n g . Seconds l a t e r ,

Keller saw what a p p e a r e d t o b e a p u f f of d u s t a l o n g t h e r o a d

ahead.

The highway p a t r o l c a r K e l l e r o b s e r v e d i n t h e d i s t a n c e

was b e i n g d r i v e n by Patrolman Gordon Hage. Patrolman Hage

was p r o c e e d i n g e a s t on Highway 2 t o t h e s c e n e of a n a c c i -

dent. H e w a s d r i v i n g a p p r o x i m a t e l y 90 m i l e s p e r hour w i t h

h i s l i g h t s f l a s h i n g and s i r e n on. The p u f f of d u s t Keller

saw was c a u s e d by t h e c o l l i s i o n of t h e Plymouth t h a t Campbell

was d r i v i n g and Hage's p a t r o l c a r . The c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d

i n t h e p a t r o l m a n ' s l a n e n e a r t h e edge of t h e highway. The

Plymouth had t u r n e d a c r o s s t h e highway i n f r o n t of t h e

oncoming p a t r o l car. Patrolman Hage a p p l i e d h i s b r a k e s and

veered t o t h e r i g h t b u t w a s unable t o avoid t h e c o l l i s i o n .

T h e r e w a s no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e Plymouth

attempted t o s t o p h i s v e h i c l e before t h e c o l l i s i o n .

T h e r e w e r e no w i t n e s s e s t o t h e c o l l i s i o n o t h e r t h a n t h e

occupants of t h e vehicles. None of them remember t h e c o l l i -

sion i t s e l f . W i t n e s s e s who a r r i v e d on t h e s c e n e s h o r t l y
a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n found O f f i c e r Hage s t i l l i n s i d e h i s

vehicle. They h e l p e d him from t h e c a r j u s t a s i t b u r s t i n t o
flames. inc cent and Manuel Moreno w e r e d i s c o v e r e d l y i n g on
t h e ground some d i s t a n c e from t h e Plymouth. Campbell was
d i s c o v e r e d i n t h e f r o n t s e a t of t h e v e h i c l e w i t h h i s r i g h t

f o o t wedged under t h e c a r ' s b r a k e p e d a l and h i s body a n g l e d

s o t h a t h i s head was r e s t i n g on t h e s e a t n e a r t h e p a s s e n g e r

door.

A l l t h e p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c c i d e n t were s e v e r e l y

injured. They w e r e t a k e n immediately t o t h e h o s p i t a l i n

Havre and t r e a t e d f o r i n j u r i e s . An a t t e m p t w a s made t o

q u e s t i o n Campbell w h i l e h e w a s b e i n g t r e a t e d . Patrolman

S e y f e r t of t h e Highway P a t r o l a t t e m p t e d t o t a l k w i t h Campbell

b u t w a s t o l d by a n u r s e t h a t i t would b e b e s t i f h e d i d n o t

d o s o . Patrolman Walston and Deputy S h e r i f f Glover d i d t a l k

t o Campbell. They w e r e u n a b l e t o g e t any c o h e r e n t answers

from him. Campbell d i d respond t o some q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e

l o c a t i o n of h i s p a i n and o n c e s p e l l e d h i s name i n t h e ab-

s e n c e of t h e o f f i c e r s . G e n e r a l l y , however, Campbell showed

c o n f u s i o n and i n c o h e r e n c e .

Af t e r t h e s e a t t e m p t s t o q u e s t i o n Campbell, Patrolman

S e y f e r t r e q u e s t e d t h a t blood samples b e t a k e n from t h e occu-

p a n t s of t h e Plymouth. A blood sample w a s s u b s e q u e n t l y

t a k e n from Campbell. The ~ i s t r i c C o u r t found t h a t Campbell
t

was n o t p l a c e d under a r r e s t p r i o r t o t h e t a k i n g of t h e blood

sample, t h a t h e w a s n o t a d v i s e d of t h e p u r p o s e f o r t h e

t a k i n g of t h e blood sample, and t h a t h e d i d n o t c o n s e n t t o

t h e t a k i n g of t h e sample.
Campbell and Manuel Moreno u l t i m a t e l y r e c o v e r e d from

their injuries. Patrolman Hage remains p a r a l y z e d a s a

r e s u l t of i n j u r i e s h e s u f f e r e d i n t h e a c c i d e n t . inc cent
Moreno d i d n o t r e c o v e r from t h e i n j u r i e s he s u f f e r e d . He

d i e d J u l y 1 4 , 1978.

A t t r i a l t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d t h e r e s u l t s of t h e blood

a l c o h o l t e s t a d m i n i s t e r e d t o Campbell s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e

accident. The t e s t showed Campbell's blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t

was - 2 0 p e r c e n t . The S t a t e a l s o i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e t e n d i n g
t o show Campbell w a s d r i v i n g t h e Plymouth when t h e a c c i d e n t

occurred. Patrolman Harold Wood w a s c a l l e d a s an e x p e r t

witness. Patrolman Wood t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f

t h e e v i d e n c e a t t h e a c c i d e n t s c e n e l e d him t o c o n c l u d e t h a t

Campbell had been d r i v i n g when t h e Plymouth c o l l i d e d w i t h

the patrol car. Sandy B r y a n t , a r e s p i r a t o r y t h e r a p y t e c h n i -

c i a n who t r e a t e d Campbell d u r i n g h i s r e c o v e r y from i n j u r i e s

suffered i n the accident, t e s t i f i e d about a conversation she

o v e r h e a r d between Campbell and Manuel Moreno. Ms. Bryant

s t a t e d Moreno a s k e d Campbell, "Why d i d you do t h a t ? " to

which Campbell r e p l i e d , "You t o l d m e t o see i f I c o u l d n ' t

h i t him." Ms. B r y a n t s a i d t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n took p l a c e a b o u t
a week a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t and t h a t s h e t h o u g h t t h e men w e r e

t a l k i n g about t h e accident.
Campbell i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l i n d i c a t i n g t h a t

h e w a s n o t d r i v i n g when t h e cars c o l l i d e d . D r . Mark J a c o b s o n ,

a p h y s i c i s t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e a c c i d e n t l e d

him t o b e l i e v e t h e d r i v e r of t h e Plymouth would have been

thrown from t h e c a r on impact. This testimony implied

Campbell w a s n o t d r i v i n g s i n c e h e was n o t thrown from t h e
car. F u r t h e r , Manuel Moreno and Campbell b o t h t e s t i f i e d
t h a t V i n c e n t Moreno was d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t .

However, i n a s t a t e m e n t made s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t and

b e f o r e V i n c e n t Moreno d i e d , Manuel Moreno s a i d Campbell had

been d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d .
 Campbell r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s on a p p e a l :

1. id t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g t h e r e s u l t s
of C a m p b e l l ' s blood t e s t t a k e n s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t

i n t o evidence?

2. id t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r

t h e c h a r g e o f d r i v i n g w h i l e under t h e i n f l u e n c e of a l c o h o l ?

3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n r e f u s i n g t o s e v e r

Count I1 of t h e amended i n f o r m a t i o n from t h e o t h e r two

counts?

4. Is t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t s u p p o r t e d by s u f f i c i e n t

evidence?

The f i r s t i s s u e Campbell r a i s e s p r e s e n t s t h r e e ques-

t i o n s f o r consideration. The f i r s t q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d i s

whether Campbell was unconscious o r o t h e r w i s e i n a c o n d i t i o n

r e n d e r i n g him i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t t o t h e t a k i n g

o f t h e blood sample. T h i s q u e s t i o n a r i s e s b e c a u s e Campbell

was n o t p l a c e d under a r r e s t b e f o r e t h e t a k i n g of t h e blood

test. An a r r e s t i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o t h e t a k i n g of a blood

sample i f a d e f e n d a n t i s c o n s c i o u s and c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g

t o consent t o the t e s t . S t a t e v . Mangels ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 166 Mont.

190, 193, 531 P.2d 1313. S i n c e Campbell was n o t a r r e s t e d ,

t h e t e s t r e s u l t s would be i n a d m i s s i b l e h e r e i f Campbell was

c o n s c i o u s and c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g c o n s e n t .

The S t a t e d o e s n o t c o n t e n d t h a t Campbell was u n c o n s c i o u s

when t h e blood t e s t was a d m i n i s t e r e d . The q u e s t i o n , t h e r e -

f o r e , i s whether Campbell was i n a c o n d i t i o n r e n d e r i n g him

i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t t o t h e t a k i n g of t h e sample.

The s t a n d a r d f o r d e t e r m i n i n g whether a p a r t y i s i n a c o n d i -
t i o n r e n d e r i n g t h e p a r t y i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g c o n s e n t i s

s e t o u t i n Mangels where w e s a i d , ". . . w e only r e q u i r e

t h a t t h e i n c a p a c i t y b e d e t e r m i n e d on t h e b a s i s of t h e b e s t
e v i d e n c e which i s r e a s o n a b l y a v a i l a b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r . . ."
166 Mont. a t 194, 531 P.2d a t 1315. Applying t h a t s t a n d a r d

i n Mangels, we found t h a t a highway p a t r o l m a n i m p r o p e r l y

d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Mangels was i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g c o n s e n t t o

t h e t e s t where Mangels appeared c o n f u s e d , was s u f f e r i n g from

a b r a s i o n s a f t e r a n a c c i d e n t , and where t h e p a t r o l m a n d i d n o t

t a l k t o Mangels a t any t i m e b e f o r e t h e t a k i n g of t h e blood

sample. 166 Mont. a t 192, 194, 531 P.2d a t 1313, 1314.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s c a s e a p p l i e d t h e Mangels

t e s t and d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e b e s t e v i d e n c e r e a s o n a b l y a v a i l -

a b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r s h e r e i n d i c a t e d Campbell was i n a c o n d i -

t i o n r e n d e r i n g him i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t t o a

blood t e s t . The f o l l o w i n g e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e

s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g t o s u p p o r t t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e

D i s t r i c t Court. Patrolman S e y f e r t t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he

a r r i v e d on t h e a c c i d e n t s c e n e he found Campbell l y i n g on t h e

f r o n t s e a t of t h e Plymouth. S e y f e r t s t a t e d Campbell's f a c e

was c o v e r e d w i t h blood and t h a t Campbell was moaning and

groaning. S e y f e r t s a i d Campbell d i d n o t respond t o t h e

q u e s t i o n s he asked him. Patrolman S e y f e r t f u r t h e r s t a t e d

t h a t when he a t t e m p t e d t o q u e s t i o n Campbell a t t h e h o s p i t a l

a s h o r t t i m e a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t , a n u r s e t o l d him t h a t i t

was b e s t n o t t o t r y t o s e e Campbell.

Patrolman Walston s t a t e d t h a t he a t t e m p t e d t o q u e s t i o n

Campbell o u t s i d e t h e X-ray room a t t h e h o s p i t a l s h o r t l y

b e f o r e t h e t a k i n g of t h e blood sample. Walston t e s t i f i e d

t h a t h e asked Campbell h i s name and s e v e r a l o t h e r q u e s t i o n s
b u t g o t no meaningful r e s p o n s e . He s a i d t h a t a t one p o i n t

Campbell d i d answer a q u e s t i o n a s t o h i s name b u t gave

a n o t h e r name. Patrolman Walston s a i d Campbell mainly swore

and asked f o r "Dot" d u r i n g t h e t i m e h e a t t e m p t e d t o ques-

t i o n him.
 Deputy S h e r i f f Glover asked Campbell q u e s t i o n s f o r
a b o u t f i v e m i n u t e s a f t e r Campbell had been t a k e n t o t h e

hospital. Glover s t a t e d t h a t h e g o t o n l y one c o h e r e n t

answer from Campbell d u r i n g t h e q u e s t i o n i n g . Glover s a i d

Campbell gave him a name i n r e s p o n s e t o a q u e s t i o n a b o u t h i s
name. However, t h e name Campbell gave was n o t h i s own.

T h i s e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was c o r r e c t

i n d e t e r m i n i n g Campbell was i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t

t o t h e blood t e s t under t h e Mangels s t a n d a r d . I n Mangels

t h e o f f i c e r s o n l y had e v i d e n c e of c o n f u s i o n on t h e p a r t of

t h e d e f e n d a n t , minor i n j u r i e s , and d i d n o t a t t e m p t t o ques-

t i o n t h e defendant. Here, t h e o f f i c e r s o b s e r v e d t h a t

Campbell was s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d and i n g r e a t p a i n , w e r e

a d v i s e d by a n u r s e t h a t i t would be b e t t e r n o t t o t r y t o

t a l k t o him, and c o u l d n o t g e t him t o respond c o h e r e n t l y t o

q u e s t i o n s when t h e y d i d t a l k w i t h him. Given t h i s e v i d e n c e

a v a i l a b l e t o t h e o f f i c e r s , it appears they properly d e t e r -

mined t h a t Campbell was i n a c o n d i t i o n r e n d e r i n g him i n c a p -

a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t t o a blood t e s t .

The second q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d by t h i s i s s u e i s whether

Montana's i m p l i e d c o n s e n t s t a t u t e o n l y a l l o w s t h e t a k i n g of

a blood sample from a n i n d i v i d u a l a f t e r a v a l i d a r r e s t even

i f t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s unconscious o r o t h e r w i s e i n c a p a b l e of

r e f u s i n g t o consent t o t h e test. Mangels a l s o spoke t o t h i s

question. I n i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e implied consent s t a t u t e , w e

s p e c i f i c a l l y h e l d t h a t a n a r r e s t was n o t a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o

t h e t a k i n g of a sample i f t h e p a r t y t e s t e d was u n c o n s c i o u s

o r i n c a p a b l e of c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e t e s t . 166 Mont. a t 1 9 3 ,

531 P.2d a t 1314. Thus, i f Mangels i s g i v e n e f f e c t h e r e ,

t h e r u l e set o u t i n t h a t case disposes of t h i s question.
 Campbell a r g u e s t h a t Mangels s h o u l d be o v e r r u l e d i n s o f a r

a s it holds an a r r e s t i s n o t a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o administering

a blood t e s t when a p a r t y i s unconscious o r i n c a p a b l e o f

consenting t o t h e test. Campbell c o n t e n d s t h i s a s p e c t of
Mangels s h o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d b e c a u s e of t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e

o f t h e i m p l i e d c o n s e n t s t a t u t e and t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s -

l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g t h e s t a t u t e a s e v i d e n c e d by t h e t i t l e of

the original act. These a r e t h e same arguments o r i g i n a l l y

made i n Mangels. See 166 Mont. a t 193, 531 P.2d a t 1314.

The arguments d i d n o t p e r s u a d e u s t h e n and a r e no more

p e r s u a s i v e now. I t i s a p p a r e n t from a r e a d i n g of t h e i m p l i e d

consent s t a t u t e t h a t an a r r e s t i s not a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o

a d m i n i s t e r i n g a blood a l c o h o l t e s t t o a p a r t y who i s uncon-

s c i o u s o r o t h e r w i s e i n c a p a b l e of c o n s e n t i n g t o t h e t e s t .

We, t h e r e f o r e , r e j e c t Campbell's argument and a f f i r m t h e
d e c i s i o n made i n Mangels.

The t h i r d q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t e d by t h i s i s s u e i s whether
t h e F o u r t h Amendment p r o t e c t i o n a g a i n s t u n l a w f u l s e a r c h e s

p r o h i b i t s t h e t a k i n g of a blood t e s t from a n u n c o n s c i o u s o r

otherwise incapable person without an a r r e s t .

W e p r e v i o u s l y a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e i n S t a t e v. Deshner

( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158 Mont. 188, 489 P.2d 1290. I n Deshner p o l i c e had

a blood sample t a k e n from t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o r t l y a f t e r h e w a s

involved i n a n automobile accident. The d e f e n d a n t was

u n c o n s c i o u s when t h e sample was t a k e n . The p o l i c e d i d n o t

a r r e s t t h e d e f e n d a n t b e f o r e r e q u e s t i n g t h e blood sample.
The d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d t h e r e s u l t s of t h e blood t e s t s h o u l d
n o t be a d m i t t e d a t h i s t r i a l f o r m a n s l a u g h t e r . He contended
t h a t t a k i n g t h e blood sample w i t h o u t p l a c i n g him under

a r r e s t constituted an unconstitutional search. The C o u r t

found no m e r i t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s argument. 158 Mont, a t 192,
489 P. 2d at 1292. The Court stated the taking of the blood
sample under these circumstances was constitutionally proper
because the officer might reasonably have believed he was

confronted with an emergency situation in which the evidence
would be destroyed if time was taken to procure a warrant,
and the procedures used in taking the blood were reasonable.
158 Mont. at 193, 489 P.2d at 1293.
Campbell attacks the holding in Deshner by inference.
He does so by citing cases from other jurisdictions which
reach a result contra to the holding in Deshner. There is a
split of authority on the question of whether an arrest is
required before a blood sample can be taken from an uncon-
scious person. Annot., 72 A.L.R.3d 325, 84 (1976); 2 LaFave
Search & Seizure S5.4 (b) at 342-344. However, a United
States Supreme Court case decided since Deshner and at least
one commentator's analysis indicate we should reject Campbell's
argument to adopt the line of cases contra to Deshner.
In Cupp v. Murphy (1973), 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000,
36 L.Ed.2d 900, a defendant voluntarily went to a police
station to discuss the strangulation death of his estranged
wife with the authorities. The police noticed a dark spot
on the defendant's finger while questioning him. The police
asked the defendant if they could take a sample of scrapings
from his fingernails. The defendant refused to consent to
the scraping. Without consent, a warrant or an arrest, the
police took the fingernail scraping samples. The samples

revealed incriminating evidence which was introduced at the
defendant's homicide trial. The Court held the search did
not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. A
quote from Mr. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion sum-
marizes the holding of the Court:
 "The C o u r t t o d a y p e r m i t s a s e a r c h f o r e v i d e n c e
w i t h o u t a n a r r e s t b u t under c i r c u m s t a n c e s where
p r o b a b l e c a u s e f o r a n a r r e s t e x i s t e d , where
t h e o f f i c e r s had r e a s o n a b l e c a u s e t o b e l i e v e
t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was on t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s p e r -
s o n , and where t h a t e v i d e n c e was h i g h l y de-
structible. . ." 4 1 2 U.S. a t 300, 93 S.Ct. a t
2006, 36 L.Ed.2d a t 908.

I n d i s c u s s i n g Cupp and t h e s p l i t of a u t h o r i t y on t h e

i s s u e of whether a n a r r e s t i s an a b s o l u t e p r e r e q u i s i t e t o

t h e t a k i n g of a blood sample from a n u n c o n s c i o u s p a r t y i n a

drunk d r i v i n g s i t u a t i o n , LaFave, s u p r a , s t a t e s :

". . . Indeed, t h e c a s e f o r p e r m i t t i n g t h e
t a k i n g o f t h e blood sample upon p r o b a b l e c a u s e
t h a t t h e defendant i s intoxicated without f i r s t
a r r e s t i n g him i s , i f a n y t h i n g , s t r o n g e r t h a n
t h e c a s e f o r t h e s e a r c h e s conducted i n Cupp
and F r a n k l i n . I n t h e blood sample c a s e , a s op-
posed t o t h o s e c a s e s , t h e r e i s no room whatso-
e v e r f o r t h e argument t h a t t h e l a c k of a f o r m a l
a r r e s t may d e c r e a s e somewhat t h e c h a n c e s t h a t
t h e e v i d e n c e w i l l be d e s t r o y e d , f o r t h e 'eva-
nescent' c h a r a c t e r of t h e evidence i s i n h e r e n t
i n i t s n a t u r e and d o e s n o t depend upon any
m o t i v e of t h e d e f e n d a n t t o d e s t r o y it. T h a t
i s , t h e need f o r t h e blood sample a r i s e s o u t
of t h e f a c t , a s s t a t e d i n Schrnerber v . C a l i -
f o r n i a , ' t h a t t h e p e r c e n t a g e of a l c o h o l i n t h e
blood b e g i n s t o d i m i n i s h s h o r t l y a f t e r d r i n k i n g
s t o p s , ' a n emergency which i s i n no way a f f e c t e d
by whether o r n o t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s been f o r -
mally a r r e s t e d . I t i s t h e h e i g h t of f o r m a l i s m ,
t o say the l e a s t , t o suggest t h a t a warrantless
s e a r c h on p r o b a b l e c a u s e i n o r d e r t o m e e t t h i s
emergency i s r e a s o n a b l e o n l y i f t h e p o l i c e
f i r s t d e c l a r e t h e h o s p i t a l i z e d d e f e n d a n t under
arrest. I n p a r t i c u l a r , i t 'would be r i d i c u l o u s
t o r e q u i r e a p o l i c e o f f i c e r t o p e r f o r m some
formal r i t u a l of a r r e s t over t h e unconscious
body of a c r i t i c a l l y i n j u r e d p e r s o n who was a
p a r t y t o a f a t a l a u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t . ' The
claim t h a t the contrary position 'provides
some measure of a s s u r a n c e t h a t p r o b a b l e c a u s e
i s based upon c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e
blood-alcohol test r e s u l t s ' i s untenable, a s
t h e need f o r a c o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e t h a t p r o b a b l e
c a u s e e x i s t e d p r i o r t o t h e t e s t i s p r e s e n t under
either rule." 85.4 ( b ) a t 343-344.

The above summary of Cupp and L a F a v e ' s comments on t h e

q u e s t i o n i n d i c a t e t h e r e i s no p e r se a r r e s t r e q u i r e m e n t f o r

a warrantless search. That a n a l y s i s i s c o n s i s t e n t with

Deshner and t h e l i n e o f a u t h o r i t y from o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s
t h a t h o l d a n unconscious d r i v e r need n o t be a r r e s t e d b e f o r e

a blood sample c a n be t a k e n . Cupp and LaFave's comments

thus provide a s o l i d b a s i s f o r continuing t o adhere t o t h e

Deshner h o l d i n g . We, t h e r e f o r e , r e j e c t Campbell's argument

t h a t t h e l i n e of a u t h o r i t y c o n t r a t o Deshner s h o u l d be

a d o p t e d and r e a f f i r m t h e Deshner d e c i s i o n .

Having a n a l y z e d t h e t h r e e s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n s Campbell

r a i s e s under t h e f i r s t i s s u e , i t i s now n e c e s s a r y t o sum-

m a r i z e t h e a n a l y s i s t o r e s o l v e t h e u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n of

whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g t h e r e s u l t s of

t h e blood t e s t i n t o e v i d e n c e . I n i t i a l l y , t h e e v i d e n c e shows

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y found t h a t Campbell w a s i n a

c o n d i t i o n t h a t r e n d e r e d him i n c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t

t o t h e t a k i n g o f t h e blood sample when t h e sample was t a k e n .

T h i s means t h e a b s o l u t e a r r e s t r e q u i r e m e n t f o r c o n s c i o u s

i n d i v i d u a l s who a r e c a p a b l e of r e f u s i n g c o n s e n t e s t a b l i s h e d

by s t a t u t e and e x p l a i n e d i n Mangels d o e s n o t come i n t o p l a y .

Thus, t h e blood t e s t r e s u l t s a r e n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y inadmis-

s i b l e h e r e b e c a u s e no a r r e s t o c c u r r e d .

F u r t h e r , Campbell o n l y r e p e a t s arguments we p r e v i o u s l y

r e j e c t e d i n Mangels t o s u p p o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t Montana's

i m p l i e d c o n s e n t s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s a n a r r e s t b e f o r e a blood

sample c a n be t a k e n even i f a n i n d i v i d u a l i s u n c o n s c i o u s o r

otherwise i n a condition rendering t h e p a r t y incapable of

r e f u s i n g t o c o n s e n t t o t h e t a k i n g o f t h e sample. The a r g u -

ments w e r e n o t p e r s u a s i v e when p r e s e n t e d i n Mangels and a r e

no more s o now. Therefore, w e r e a f f i r m our decision t h a t
Montana's i m p l i e d c o n s e n t s t a t u t e d o e s n o t c o n t a i n a n abso-

l u t e a r r e s t r e q u i r e m e n t b e f o r e a blood sample can be t a k e n

from an u n c o n s c i o u s o r o t h e r w i s e i n c a p a b l e p e r s o n and h o l d

t h e blood t e s t r e s u l t s h e r e a r e a d m i s s i b l e under ~ o n t a n a ' s

implied consent s t a t u t e .
 ina ally, c a m p b e l l ' s F o u r t h Amendment c l a i m l a c k s m e r i t .

W e r e j e c t e d Campbell's argument i n Deshner. Cupp s u p p o r t s
the decision. Thus, t h e blood t e s t r e s u l t s a r e n o t inadmis-

s i b l e on t h e b a s i s of C a m p b e l l ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l argument.

T h i s summary shows none of t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by

Campbell c o n s t i t u t e a b a s i s f o r r e f u s i n g t o a d m i t t h e re-

s u l t s t o t h e blood t e s t . Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d

n o t err i n a d m i t t i n g t h e r e s u l t s i n t o e v i d e n c e .

The second i s s u e r a i s e d by Campbell i n v o l v e s t h e D i s -

t r i c t Court' s j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear t h e d r i v i n g while i n t o x i -

c a t e d c h a r g e s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him. J u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t o v e r c r i m i n a l m a t t e r s depends on t h e maximum

s e n t e n c e t h a t can be imposed f o r committing t h e c r i m e . When

t h e maximum s e n t e n c e i n c r e a s e s t o g i v e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

j u r i s d i c t i o n b e c a u s e of r e p e a t e d o f f e n s e s , proof of p r i o r

o f f e n s e s d o e s n o t become a n e l e m e n t t h a t must be proved a t

t r i a l and c a n be proved a t any t i m e u n t i l s e n t e n c i n g .

T h e r e f o r e , f a i l u r e t o i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e of p r i o r c o n v i c -

t i o n s a t t r i a l d o e s n o t d e p r i v e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of j u r i s -

diction. S t a t e v . Nelson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , - Mont. ,
- 583 P.2d

435, 437-438, 35 St.Rep. 1337, 1339-1341.

Campbell c o n t e n d s h e r e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t

have j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e D . W . I . c h a r g e b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him

b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e i n t r o d u c e d no e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l p r o v i n g

p r i o r D.W.I. convictions. T h i s c o n t e n t i o n l a c k s m e r i t under

Nelson and d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e grounds t o d i s m i s s t h e D . W . I .

c h a r g e f i l e d a g a i n s t Campbell.

The t h i r d i s s u e Campbell raises c o n c e r n s t h e s e v e r a n c e

o f Count I1 of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d a g a i n s t him from Counts

I and 111. Count I1 of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g e d Campbell
w i t h d r i v i n g w h i l e adjudged a n h a b i t u a l t r a f f i c o f f e n d e r .
Count I of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i s t h e D . W . I . c h a r g e , and Count

I11 i s t h e n e g l i g e n t homicide c h a r g e . Campbell c o n t e n d s

Count I1 o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s h o u l d have been s e v e r e d from

t h e o t h e r c o u n t s based on s e c t i o n 46-11-404(4), MCA. That

section reads i n pertinent part:

" I f it appears t h a t a defendant o r t h e s t a t e
i s p r e j u d i c e d by a j o i n d e r of r e l a t e d p r o s e -
cutions ... t h e c o u r t may o r d e r s e p a r a t e
trials ... o r p r o v i d e any o t h e r r e l i e f a s
j u s t i c e may r e q u i r e . "

Campbell a s s e r t s t h a t j o i n i n g t h e h a b i t u a l o f f e n d e r c h a r g e

w i t h t h e o t h e r two c h a r g e s h e r e p r e j u d i c e d h i s c a s e and t h a t

he s h o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , have been g r a n t e d s e v e r a n c e under s e c -

t i o n 46-11-404 ( . 4 ) , MCA.

W e have s e t o u t t h r e e b a s i c k i n d s of p r e j u d i c e t h a t may
0-k%
o c c u r on t h e j o i n d e r o f s i m i l a r o f f e n s e s . S t a t e v. 4 A z b e ~ ~

( 1 9 7 6 ) l 170 Mont. 480, 489, 555 P.2d 509. The f i r s t k i n d of

p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t s when t h e j u r y c o n s i d e r s a p e r s o n f a c i n g

m u l t i p l e c h a r g e s t o be a bad man and t e n d s t o accumulate

e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t him u n t i l i t f i n d s him g u i l t y of something.

The second t y p e of p r e j u d i c e m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f when proof of

g u i l t on t h e f i r s t c o u n t i n a n i n f o r m a t i o n i s used t o con-

v i c t t h e d e f e n d a n t of a second c o u n t even though t h e proof

would be i n a d m i s s i b l e a t a s e p a r a t e t r i a l on t h e second

count. The t h i r d k i n d of p r e j u d i c e o c c u r s when t h e d e f e n -

d a n t w i s h e s t o t e s t i f y on h i s own b e h a l f on one c h a r g e b u t
oC/&fli--
n o t on a n o t h e r . O&esmI 170 Mont. a t 489, 555 P.2d a t 515.

Determining whether t h e r e h a s been p r e j u d i c i a l j o i n d e r

i n v o l v e s weighing t h e p r e j u d i c e i n c u r r e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t

b e c a u s e of a j o i n t t r i a l a g a i n s t t h e j u d i c i a l economy re-

s u l t i n g from a j o i n t t r i a l . This balancing process i s l e f t

t o t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n of t h e t r i a l judge. Absent a show-

i n g of a b u s e of t h a t d i s c r e t i o n , a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d
n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t .

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C u e s t a ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 597 F.2d 903, 919.

I n s t r i k i n g t h e b a l a n c e between p r e j u d i c e t o a d e f e n -

d a n t and j u d i c i a l economy, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f j u d i c i a l economy

e x e r t s t r o n g p r e s s u r e i n f a v o r of j o i n t t r i a l s . United

S t a t e s v . Dohm ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 597 F.2d 535, 540. The

f a c t o r s t h a t provide t h e b a s i s f o r t h e predisposition f o r

j o i n t t r i a l s i n c l u d e e x p e d i t i o n of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of

justice, r e d u c t i o n i n t h e c o n g e s t i o n of t r i a l d o c k e t s ,

c o n s e r v a t i o n of j u d i c i a l t i m e , r e d u c t i o n of burden on c i t i -

zens who s e r v e on j u r i e s i n terms of t i m e and money s a c r i -

f i c e d , and a v o i d a n c e of t h e n e c e s s i t y of r e c a l l i n g w i t n e s s e s

who would o t h e r w i s e have t o t e s t i f y o n l y once. United

S t a t e s v . Brady ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 579 F.2d 1121, 1128, c e r t .

d e n i e d , 439 U.S. 1074, 99 S.Ct. 849, 59 L.Ed.2d 41.

F u r t h e r , t h e burden of showing p r e j u d i c e rests on t h e
0 A v -
d e f e n d a n t . Qskeyi, 170 Mont. a t 489, 555 P.2d a t 515. In

showing p r e j u d i c e , i t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t

p r o v e some p r e j u d i c e o r t h a t a b e t t e r chance of a c q u i t t a l

e x i s t s i f separate t r i a l s a r e held. Rather, the defendant

must show t h e p r e j u d i c e was s o g r e a t a s t o p r e v e n t a f a i r

trial. Dohm, 597 F.2d a t 539; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . M a r t i n e z

(1st C i r . 1 9 7 3 ) , 479 F.2d 824, 828. Given t h i s h i g h s t a n -

d a r d of proof and t h e d e f e r e n c e a f f o r d e d t h e d i s c r e t i o n o f

t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s judgment on b a l a n c i n g p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t

j u d i c i a l economy, r e v e r s a l of a d e c i s i o n n o t t o s e v e r c r i m i -

n a l c h a r g e s i s seldom g r a n t e d . Brady, 579 F.2d a t 1127;

United S t a t e s v. Barrett ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 7 4 ) , 505 F.2d 1091,

1106, c e r t . d e n i e d , 421 U.S. 964, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 4 4 L.Ed.2d

Under t h i s s t a n d a r d o f review, w e must now c o n s i d e r t h e
od*.r2---
d i f f e r e n t k i n d s of p r e j u d i c e l i s t e d i n t o determine
the merits of Campbell's severance claim. The first type of
prejudice--prejudice resulting from the jury believing the
defendant to be a bad man because of multiple charges--has
seldom been found sufficient to warrant severance.
o
Qsbwa,
A
170 Mont. at 489, 555 P.2d at 514-515. In fact, it has been
specifically held that the prejudice incurred by a defendant
from being held out to the jury as an "habitual offender" is
not alone sufficient to entitle the defendant to separate
trials. Pummill v. United States (8th Cir. 1961), 297 F.2d
34, 36; see also Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure S222

We agree that the mere inclusion of an habitual offender
count in an information is insufficient to automatically
require severance of that charge from other charges. It
would be contrary to the considerations of judicial economy
set out above to require separate trials whenever one count
of an information charges a party with being an habitual
offender. That would be especially true in this case where
all the charges stemmed from the same incident and the main
fact in issue as to all the charges was whether or not
Campbell was driving. To grant severance would require
essentially the same evidence about the same occurrence to
be introduced at two different trials. We, therefore, do
not find the District Court abused its discretion in holding
Campbell's motion for severance should not have been granted
because the jury considered him a bad man.
The second kind of prejudice from joinder is present
when the jury uses proof of guilt on one count in an informa-
tion to convict a defendant on another count in the informa-
tion even though the proof would have been inadmissible at a
separate trial on the second count. No prejudice of this
n a t u r e w i l l be found when t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t a j o i n t

t r i a l i s s i m p l e and d i s t i n c t . Commonwealth v. P e t e r s o n

( 1 9 7 3 ) , 453 Pa. 187, 307 A.2d W , 271; D r e w v . U n i t e d
sw
S t a t e s (D.C. Cir. 1 9 6 4 ) , 331 F.2d 85, 91. This r u l e i s

based on t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t when t h e c h a r g e s a r e few and t h e

e v i d e n c e s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d , t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o assume t h e

j u r y w a s confused and c o u l d n o t keep t h e r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e

separate. United S t a t e s v . Jamar ( 4 t h C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) , 561 F.2d

1103, 1107-1108; P e t e r s o n , 307 A.2d a t 271, c i t i n g U n i t e d

S t a t e s v . L o t s c h (2nd C i r . 1 9 3 9 ) , 102 F.2d 35, 36, c e r t .

d e n i e d , 307 U.S. 622, 59 S.Ct. 793, 83 L.Ed. 1500. See

a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Luna (1st C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 585 F.2d 1, 5,

c e r t . d e n i e d , 439 U.S. 852, 99 S.Ct. 1 6 0 , 58 L.Ed.2d 157.

Here t h e c h a r g e s a r e few and t h e e v i d e n c e s t r a i g h t -

forward. Only t h r e e c h a r g e s w e r e b r o u g h t a g a i n s t Campbell

a t the trial. The main f a c t i n i s s u e c o n c e r n i n g a l l t h r e e

was whether Campbell was d r i v i n g a t t h e t i m e t h e a c c i d e n t

occurred. Proof t h a t Campbell w a s d r i v i n g w a s a n e l e m e n t of

a l l t h e c r i m e s charged by t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . Thus, e v i d e n c e

p e r t a i n i n g t o t h a t f a c t would have been a d m i t t e d even i f t h e

t r i a l s on t h e d i f f e r e n t c o u n t s had been s e p a r a t e d . The

o t h e r e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d a t t h e t r i a l , s u c h a s proof o f

Campbell's blood a l c o h o l c o n t e n t and t h e f a c t t h a t Campbell

had been adjudged a n h a b i t u a l o f f e n d e r a t t h e t i m e t h e

a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d , w a s n e i t h e r voluminous n o r complex.

Under t h e s e f a c t s , w e c a n n o t assume t h e j u r y was c o n f u s e d

and d i d n o t c o n s i d e r o n l y t h e r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e i n r e a c h i n g

a v e r d i c t on each c o u n t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n . Therefore, w e

f i n d any p r e j u d i c e o f t h i s n a t u r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o h o l d t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Campbell's

motion f o r s e v e r a n c e .
 The t h i r d t y p e of p r e j u d i c e o c c u r s when t h e d e f e n d a n t

w a n t s t o t e s t i f y on h i s own b e h a l f on one c h a r g e b u t n o t on

the others. Campbell s t a t e d i n t h i s c a s e t h a t he wanted t o

t e s t i f y as t o t h e D . W . I . and n e g l i g e n t homicide c h a r g e s , b u t

n o t t h e h a b i t u a l offender charg .
0 Y u . h
As w e p o i n t e d o u t i n &WXYFTQ e f e d e r a l c o u r t s have
th

o n l y c o n s i d e r e d t h i s t y p e of p r e j u d i c e where t h e a l l e g e d

o f f e n s e s were t o t a l l y s e p a r a t e a s t o t i m e , p l a c e and e v i -

dence. 170 Mont. a t 489, 555 P.2d a t 515. I t h a s a l s o been

h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t c a n n o t c l a i m t h i s t y p e of p r e j u d i c e

when t h e s t a t e d o e s n o t e x p l o i t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t

t a k e s t h e s t a n d by cross-examining t h e d e f e n d a n t a s t o t h e

c h a r g e a b o u t which t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t want t o t e s t i f y .

B r a d l e y v . U n i t e d S t a t e s (D.C. Cir. 1 9 6 9 ) , 433 F.2d 1113,

1123.

Here Campbell f a i l s t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e under

e i t h e r of t h e s e c r i t e r i a . The c h a r g e s a l l stemmed from o n e

i n c i d e n t t h a t o c c u r r e d a t t h e same t i m e and p l a c e , and t h e

e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d t o p r o v e a l l t h e c h a r g e s was s i m i l a r .

F u r t h e r , Campbell d i d t a k e t h e s t a n d and t e s t i f i e d t h a t he

was n o t d r i v i n g t h e c a r when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d . The

S t a t e on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n l i m i t e d i t s q u e s t i o n s mainly t o

C a m p b e l l ' s a c t i v i t i e s on t h e day of t h e a c c i d e n t . The S t a t e

d i d n o t q u e s t i o n Campbell a b o u t h i s h a b i t u a l o f f e n d e r s t a t u s .

Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , w e do n o t f i n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n denying Campbell's motion f o r

s e v e r a n c e based on t h i s t y p e of p r e j u d i c e .

Under t h e above a n a l y s i s , Campbell d i d n o t d e m o n s t r a t e

any of t h e k i n d s of p r e j u d i c e n e c e s s a r y t o r e q u i r e t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o r d e r s e p a r a t e t r i a l s on t h e c h a r g e s

contained i n t h e information. Therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t Court

d i d n o t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o g r a n t C a m p b e l l ' s motion t o sever.
 The f i n a l i s s u e Campbell r a i s e s c o n c e r n s t h e s u f f i -

c i e n c y of t h e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t . It is

t h e d u t y of t h e j u r y t o h e a r t h e e v i d e n c e and t o d e c i d e i f

t h e evidence presented i s s u f f i c i e n t t o support a conviction

on t h e c h a r g e s b r o u g h t a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t . This Court w i l l

n o t d i s t u r b t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e j u r y a s t o t h e s u f f i c i e n c y

of t h e evidence i f t h e record contains s u b s t a n t i a l evidence

t o support the decision. Deshner, 158 Mont. a t 191, 489

P.2d a t 1290.

H e r e t h e main e v i d e n t i a r y q u e s t i o n was whether Campbell

was d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d . The e v i d e n c e on

t h i s q u e s t i o n i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l was c o n f l i c t i n g . Campbell

introduced t h e following evidence t o support h i s a s s e r t i o n

t h a t he w a s n o t d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d : (1) H i s

testimony t h a t he w a s n o t d r i v i n g ; ( 2 ) Manuel Moreno's

t e s t i m o n y a t t r i a l t h a t V i n c e n t Moreno w a s d r i v i n g when t h e

accident occurred; ( 3 ) t h e e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y of p h y s i c i s t D r .

Mark Jacobson t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a r would have been

thrown from t h e c a r c o u p l e d w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t Campbell

remained i n t h e c a r on i m p a c t ; and ( 4 ) t e s t i m o n y t o r e f u t e

t h e t h e o r y advanced by Patrolman Wood t e n d i n g t o show Campbell

w a s d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d .

The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d t h e f o l l o w i n g e v i d e n c e t o t h e j u r y

t o show Campbell was d r i v i n g when t h e a c c i d e n t happened:

(1) A s t a t e m e n t by Manuel Moreno a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t b u t

b e f o r e V i n c e n t Moreno d i e d t h a t Campbell was d r i v i n g when

t h e accident occurred; ( 2 ) t h e e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y of Highway

Patrolman Harold Wood t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e c a r would have

remained i n t h e c a r on i m p a c t , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e t e s t i m o n y
t h a t Campbell was found i n t h e c a r a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t ; (3)

t e s t i m o n y t o r e f u t e t h e t h e o r y advanced by D r . Jacobson
tending to show Campbell was not driving when the accident
occurred; (4) testimony by Sandra Bryant concerning the

accident during which Moreno asked Campbell, "Why did you do
that?" to which Campbell replied, "You told me to see if I
couldn't hit him."
Presented with the conflicting evidence, the jury
concluded Campbell was driving when the accident occurred.
While evidence to prove the contrary conclusion is present
in the record, the evidence introduced by the State is
substantial and does support the conclusion that Campbell
was driving when the accident occurred. Therefore, we will
not disturb the jury's verdict.
Affirmed.

*

We concur:
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, concurring specially:

I concur in the result foregoing.

I want to point out that any person who operates a
motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is
deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of his
blood if arrested by a peace officer for driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. Section 61-8-402(1),
MCA. A person who is unconscious or who is otherwise in a
condition rendering him incapable of refusal, is deemed not
to have withdrawn his consent. Section 61-8-402(2), MCA.
Campbell's implied consent to the blood test is not considered
withdrawn here because Campbell fits within the narrow
exceptions set forth in Mangels, supra, that an arrest is
not necessary where a person qualifies as an unconscious or
incapable person under section 61-8-402(2), MCA.
I want my position regarding the second issue, the District
Court's jurisdiction of the offense of driving while under
the influence of alcohol, to be clear.
In section 61-8-401, MCA, it is provided that driving
under the influence is unlawful and punishable as provided
in section 61-8-714(1), MCA.
Section 61-8-714(1), MCA provides that a first conviction
of driving while intoxicated shall be punished by a fine of

not less than $100 or more than $500. On a second conviction,
the driver is punished by a fine of not less than $300 or
more than $500 to which may be added in the discretion of
the court imprisonment for 30 days. On a third or subsequent
conviction, the driver is punished by imprisonment of not
less than 30 days or more than 1 year, to which may be added
in the court's discretion, a fine of not less than $500 or
more than $1,000.
 The difference in the penalties for the successive con-
victions becomes important when one considers whether the
jurisdiction of the District Court or the justice court
applies.
Under section 3-5-302(1), MCA, the District Court is
given original jurisdiction in all felony criminal cases
and "all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for."
The justice court, on the other hand, is given criminal
jurisdiction of all misdemeanors punishable by a fine not
exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or
both. Section 3-10-303 (1), MCA.
From the statutes, therefore, District Courts have no
jurisdiction of a misdemeanor involving a first conviction
or a second conviction of driving while intoxicated. On the
other hand, the District Court would have exclusive criminal
jurisdiction of driving while intoxicated charges involving
3 or more convictions. Since Campbell was charged with a
sixth offense of driving while intoxicated, the District
Court had exclusive jurisdiction of this count.

Justice

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissents and will file a written
dissent later.