NO. 81-220
I N THE SUPREME C U T O F T E STATE O M N A A
O R H F OTN
1982
STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
VS .
JOSEPH RAYMOND CARTWRIGHT,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal f r o m : D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n
Honorable R o b e r t H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appeilant:
David W. Harman a r g u e d , L i b b y , Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Mike McGrath a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
H e l e n a , Montana
b 7 i l l i a m A. Douglas, County A t t o r n e y , Libby, Montana
~ h & n Thompson a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana
Submitted: June 2 2 , 1982
Oecided :
August 25, 1982
Fiied:, , i d 3 ; ,J 3
t98L
M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
Joseph C a r t w r i g h t was c o n v i c t e d o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide and
attempted deliberate homicide following a jury trial in the
N i n e t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , S t a t e of Montana, i n and for the
County of L i n c o l n . C a r t w r i g h t was s e n t e n c e d t o t h i r t y - f i v e years
imprisonment on each c o u n t ; the sentences t o run concurrently.
From t h e f o r e g o i n g c o n v i c t i o n he a p p e a l s .
Prior to this unfortunate incident the defendant, Joseph
C a r t w r i g h t , and t h e d e c e a s e d , Pamela McCully, l i v e d t o g e t h e r f o r
almost four years. T h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e g a n to d e t e r i o r a t e , and
o n A p r i l 11, 1 9 8 0 , a n i n c i d e n t o c c u r r e d which resulted i n the
d e a t h of Pam M c C u l l y and the s e r i o u s wounding of P a t McCully.
That day, C a r t w r i g h t r e t u r n e d home t o f i n d t h a t s e v e r a l o f his
g u n s were m i s s i n g . H e l e a r n e d from a h o u s e g u e s t t h a t Pam M c C u l l y
h a d b e e n t h e r e e a r l i e r and had g a i n e d access t h r o u g h a l i v i n g -
room window. Missing were a ,308, a .30-30, a .14, a ,410
shotgun, and a . 3 5 7 magnum p i s t o l w i t h h o l s t e r . Cartwright was
a n g r y , and i n h i s a n g e r he " s l u g g e d t h e w a l l " and c r e a t e d a h o l e .
The h o u s e g u e s t t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e s t a t e d h i s i n t e n t i o n s , " t o go up
t h e r e and see i f I c a n g e t my g u n s b a c k and I a m g o i n g t o s h o o t
her."
Pamela McCully and s e v e r a l o t h e r members of h e r f a m i l y were
f i f t y m i l e s away n e a r T r e g o a t t h e r e s i d e n c e o f R e t h a McCully,
Pamela's mother. C a r t w r i g h t g o t i n h i s car and d r o v e to T r e g o .
He t o o k w i t h him a l o a d e d . 2 2 c a l i b e r s e m i - a u t o m a t i c rifle, the
o n l y gun t h a t had n o t b e e n t a k e n by P a m e l a McCully. On t h e way
to Trego, Cartwright consumed three beers. He arrived at
approximately 6:00 p.m. He pulled his car into the yard,
stopped, and left t h e motor running. He remained i n h i s car.
P a m e l a McCully came o u t o f t h e h o u s e and t h e two b e g a n t o a r g u e .
A f t e r a few m i n u t e s McCully w e n t b a c k i n t h e h o u s e to g e t some
cigarettes. She t o l d h e r m o t h e r t h a t " J o e had a gun o u t t h e r e . "
N o n e t h e l e s s s h e w e n t b a c k o u t s i d e and on t h e way to C a r t w r i g h t l s
c a r s h e p i c k e d up a b r o k e n c u e s t i c k t h a t had b e e n l a y i n g i n t h e
yard. The two continued to argue. At about this time Bud
McCully, h i s w i f e D e b b i e , and t h e i r t w o c h i l d r e n came o u t of t h e
h o u s e and w e r e p r e p a r i n g t o l e a v e . C a r t w r i g h t c a l l e d Bud McCully
o v e r t o t h e c a r and s t a t e d , "make h e r g i v e m e my s t u f f back."
Bud McCully d i d n o t r e s p o n d b u t was i r r i t a t e d b y t h e manner i n
w h i c h h i s s i s t e r Pamela was t a p p i n g t h e b r o k e n c u e s t i c k on t h e
car. H e t o l d h e r t o s t o p and walked away.
A t t h i s point the facts are conflicting. The s i t u a t i o n b e g a n
t o move rapidly. Several witnesses testified that Cartwright
threatened Pamela McCully; stating "you have got twenty-four
hours to live." Pat McCully then approached the car and
chastised Cartwright f o r talking to h i s s i s t e r t h a t way. Pat
McCully t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h e n h i t C a r t w r i g h t i n t h e j a w w i t h h i s
right fist. C a r t w r i g h t r e p o r t e d l y s a i d , " d o n ' t h i t me P a t . " The
.22 c a l i b e r r i f l e t h a t had p r e v i o u s l y b e e n p o i n t i n g toward the
f l o o r b o a r d was p o i n t i n g o u t t h e window. A s t r u g g l e ensued. Both
P a t and Pam McCully were h o l d i n g on t o t h e b a r r e l . The b a r r e l
was " t i p p e d up" and P a t McCully was s h o t i n t h e s t o m a c h . After
being shot he scrambled into the house. Then, according to
t e s t i m o n y o f R e t h a McCully, " h e [ C a r t w r i g h t ] j u s t t u r n e d t h e gun
o n Pam and s h o t h e r . " S h e was n o t h o l d i n g o n t o t h e b a r r e l when
s h e was s h o t . R e t h a McCully f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t when Pamela
was s h o t " h e r n e c k went b a c k and s h e k i n d o f s t a g g e r e d forward
a n d t h e n he s h o t a g a i n and s h e slumped down on h i s arm b e c a u s e he
had h i s arm o u t t h e window." Blood s t a i n s were found o n t h e
d e f e n d a n t ' s l e f t s h i r t s l e e v e , o n a b l a n k e t used t o c o v e r t h e c a r
s e a t , and o n t h e s i d e of the defendant's c a r door. A forensic
s c i e n t i s t t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l t h r e e b l o o d s a m p l e s were c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h Pamela M c C u l l y ' s b l o o d t y p e .
Pamela ' s d e a t h was i n s t a n t a n e o u s . The b u l l e t t r a n s e c t e d t h e
upper p o r t i o n of the spinal cord. The defendant's rifle was
loaded with .22 caliber hollow point or "dum dum" bullets.
According to testimony "a hollow p o i n t bullet, when striking
bone, t e n d s to mushroom and f r a g m e n t . . .and i n t h i s case t h e r e
was an extensive fragmentation of the bullet structure ."
A p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 f r a g m e n t s of l e a d were removed from t h e neck
area.
An i n s t a n t l a t e r , Mike McCully came o u t of t h e house w i t h a
.308 c a l i b e r r i f l e . H e aimed t h e r i f l e b u t R e t h a McCully pushed
h i s a i m i n t o t h e a i r as h e fired. A neighbor t e s t i f i e d that
a f t e r h e a r i n g o n e l o u d s h o t from a h e a v y - c a l i b e r r i f l e , he h e a r d
a n o t h e r v o l l e y of small c a l i b e r f i r e ; t h i s b e i n g C a r t w r i g h t who
s t o p p e d a t t h e c a t t l e g u a r d on h i s way o u t t o f i r e b a c k a t t h e
house. Investigators found .22 caliber shell c a s i n g s on the
ground n e a r t h e cattle guard.
The d e f e n d a n t ' s v e r s i o n of the incident varies. The d e f e n -
dant testified t h a t h e d i d n o t t h r e a t e n P a m e l a McCully w i t h t h e
statement that she had twenty-four hours to live; rather he
s t a t e d " s h e had t w e n t y - f o u r h o u r s t o g e t my r i f l e s b a c k and I was
going to t h e s h e r i f f ." Cartwright f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t when
P a t McCully a p p r o a c h e d t h e car h e had a p i s t o l i n h i s l e f t h a n d .
H e also s a i d t h a t h e saw Mike McCully w i t h a r i f l e p r i o r to t h e
shooting. C a r t w r i g h t became " s c a r e d " and h e t o l d P a m e l a t h a t h e
"was g e t t i n g t h e h e l l o u t of t h e r e ." Pamela responded, " t h e h e l l
you a r e . " Then t h e struggle for h i s .22 c a l i b e r r i f l e ensued.
The d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e a t t e m p t e d t o d r i v e away b u t t h e
c a r was s p i n n i n g i n t h e mud. He did not remember firing any
s h o t s b u t h e r e c a l l s empty c a s i n g s h i t t i n g him i n t h e f a c e . He
further testified that the s t o c k of t h e gun w a s stuck in the
s t e e r i n g w h e e l as h e was d r i v i n g n e a r t h e c a t t l e g u a r d and t w o
s h o t s went o f f .
After leaving t h e McCully r e s i d e n c e C a r t w r i g h t s t o p p e d h i s
c a r n e a r a g r a v e l p i t l o c a t e d 3/4 o f a m i l e from t h e T r e g o s t o r e .
C a r t w r i g h t t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e s t o p p e d b e c a u s e he had t o "go to t h e
bathroom real bad." The S t a t e o f f e r e d a n o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n f o r
the stop a t the gravel p i t ; t h a t the defendant stopped t o shoot
h i s own car i n a n a t t e m p t t o c o n f u s e t h e i s s u e s . The d e f e n d a n t ' s
car s u s t a i n e d a s h a t t e r e d f r o n t p a s s e n g e r window and a h o l e in
the left rear section of the roof. Two ballistics experts
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e h o l e i n t h e r o o f was c a u s e d by a .22 c a l i b e r
bullet. F u r t h e r m o r e , two s p e n t .22 c a l i b e r c a r t r i d g e s were f o u n d
by t h e g r a v e l p i t . T e s t i n g showed t h a t t h e s e had b e e n f i r e d from
Cartwrightls rifle.
A small p i l e o f g l a s s was f o u n d a b o u t 3/4 o f a m i l e from t h e
gravel pit. I t was a n a l y z e d and compared t o g l a s s s a m p l e s t a k e n
from the window and interior of Cartwrightls car. The two
samples had identical chemical and physical properties. The
S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t C a r t w r i g h t l e f t t h e g r a v e l p i t , went f u r t h e r
down t h e r o a d and s h o t h i s own window o u t . N o g l a s s was f o u n d a t
t h e McCully r e s i d e n c e .
S h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t t h e defendant turned himself over
t o t h e Eureka p o l i c e ; he was " s c a r e d " and t h o u g h t t h e M c C u l l y s
w o u l d be coming a f t e r him. A t the police s t a t i o n the defendant
made a t a p e d s t a t e m e n t t o D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y Shaun Thompson
and Detective Rodney Deboer. Prior t o making the statement,
C a r t w r i g h t was i n f o r m e d o f h i s "Miranda r i g h t s , " s i g n e d a w a i v e r ,
and answered q u e s t i o n s f o r t h e i n v e s t i g a t o r s .
The d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s : (1) w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o s u p p r e s s s t a t e m e n t s made t o i n v e s t i g a -
tors s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e i n c i d e n t ; ( 2 ) whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court
e r r e d by r e f u s i n g the defendant's offered jury i n s t r u c t i o n s on
self-defense; and ( 3 ) whether it was proper for the District
C o u r t t o r e f u s e o f f e r e d c h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e of t h e v i c t i m and h e r
f arnily.
The defendant claims that certain portions of the tape-
r e c o r d e d s t a t e m e n t made by him s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g s h o u l d
n o t h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d t o impeach h i s t e s t i m o n y . Apparently the
S t a t e was c o n c e r n e d o f p o s s i b l e M i r a n d a v i o l a t i o n s . I n Miranda
v. A r i z o n a ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 436, 8 6 S.Ct. 1 6 0 2 , 1 6 L.Ed.2d 694,
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r u l e d t h a t i f a n a c c u s e d a s k s to
c o n s u l t w i t h an a t t o r n e y , p o l i c e q u e s t i o n i n g must s t o p . In this
case it is u n c l e a r w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t e f f e c t i v e l y a s s e r t e d h i s
r i g h t t o c o u n s e l d u r i n g t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n ; and i f h e d i d , it is
equally unclear whether or not he waived that right. At a
s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g o n t h i s matter, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d t h a t
t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t e f f e c t i v e l y assert h i s r i g h t to c o u n s e l ,
and "assuming arguendo t h a t the defendant e f f e c t i v e l y asserted
h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l , he w a i v e d h i s r i g h t to c o u n s e l by d e s i r i n g
to proceed with the interview." However, we need n o t a d d r e s s
these i s s u e s because the taped s t a t e m e n t was n o t used f o r the
prosecution's case-in-chief. V a r i o u s p o r t i o n s were u s e d b u t o n l y
f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s . T h i s is a c r i t i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n which
w i l l become e v i d e n t s h o r t l y . First, it is n e c e s s a r y t o show how
t h e t a p e d s t a t e m e n t was u s e d .
The defendant testified that he did not recall when the
passenger window of his car was shattered. The prosecution
played the £01-lowing portion of the taped statement:
"A. I w a s t a k i n g o f f a s it h a p p e n e d and I had
my .22 a u t o m a t i c l i k e t h i s , and I g r a b b e d l i k e
t h a t , and I t u r n e d and t h a t ' s when my window
went out."
Testiinony of the defendant indicated t h a t Mike McCully came
o u t of t h e house w i t h a r i f l e d u r i n g the struggle for his .22
caliber rifle. Two p o r t i o n s o f t h e t a p e d s t a t e m e n t were p l a y e d
which showed t h a t h e was f i r s t aware o f Mike McCully w i t h t h e
r i f l e when he w a s l e a v i n g , a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g had taken place.
"A. I t h i n k Pam was h a n g i n g o n t o t h e window
p a r t -- y e a h , my window p a r t ; my window was
r o l l e d down and s h e was h a n g i n g o n t h e r e . I
f i r e d o n c e or twice t h e n when I was l e a v i n g ,
a n d I w e n t down and I s e e n t h e o t h e r b r o t h e r
come o u t w i t h a r i f l e w i t h a s c o p e on and I
f i r e d o n c e o r t w i c e a g a i n t h a t way.
"Q. H i s name is P a t ? A. Pat.
"Q. And -- A. B l o n d - h a i r e d g u y , and t h e
o t h e r b r o t h e r ' s name is Mike, and Mike, h e r a n
b a c k t o t h e h o u s e and h e -- a s I was g o i n g
down t h e h i l l f r o m t h e h o u s e , h e come o u t w i t h
a r i f l e w i t h a scope o n i t c a u s e I l o o k e d l i k e
t h a t and h e ' s g o i n g l i k e t h i s . "
The d e f e n d a n t a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he heard a loud s h o t j u s t
a f t e r h e s a w Mike McCully w i t h t h e r i f l e . The f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n
was u s e d i n r e b u t t a l .
"Q. Which b r o t h e r ? A. Mike.
"Q. O t h e r t h a n y o u r r i f l e b e i n g f i r e d , d o you
r e c a l l a n y o t h e r weapons b e i n g f i r e d ? A.
NO. 'I
Finally, the defendant testified t h a t he d i d not honk his
h o r n when h e d r o v e i n t o t h e y a r d . The f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n of the
taped statement indicates otherwise.
"Q. When you p u l l e d up, d i d you beep y o u r
h o r n o r s o m e t h i n g ? A. Right.
"Q. You b e e p e d y o u r h o r n ? A. Yes.
"Q. About how many t i m e s d i d you b e e p y o u r
horn? A. T h r e e -- a b o u t t w o t i m e s . "
After t h e p r e c e d i n g p o r t i o n s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t were a d m i t t e d
t h e e n t i r e s t a t e m e n t was p l a y e d t o t h e j u r y a t t h e r e q u e s t of t h e
defense. The r e c o r d makes c l e a r t h a t t h e o b j e c t i o n of t h e d e f e n -
d a n t was l i m i t e d t o o n l y t h o s e p o r t i o n s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s e t o u t
above.
T h i s C o u r t h a s f o l l o w e d t h e r u l e of t w o U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme
C o u r t cases. First, i n H a r r i s v. New York ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 4 0 1 U.S. 222,
9 1 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1, t h e C o u r t h e l d t h a t although evi-
d e n c e is i n a d m i s s i b l e i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f because
of Miranda violations, such evidence is not barred for all
purposes. I n Harris, t h e d e f e n d a n t had made s t a t e m e n t s to t h e
police after being taken into custody. A transcript of the
s t a t e m e n t shows t h a t h e w a s n o t i n f o r m e d o f h i s r i g h t t o c o u n s e l .
The p r o s e c u t i o n conceded t h e Miranda violation but s t i l l used
t h e s t a t e m e n t f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s . The C o u r t i n u p h o l d i n g
the conviction stated :
" M i r a n d a b a r r e d t h e p r o s e c u t i o n from making
i t s case w i t h s t a t e m e n t s of a n a c c u s e d made
w h i l e i n c u s t o d y p r i o r to having o r e f f e c -
t i v e l y waiving counsel. I t does not f o l l o w
from Miranda that evidence inadmissible
a g a i n s t a n a c c u s e d i n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s case-
i n - c h i e f is b a r r e d f o r a l l p u r p o s e s , p r o v i d e d
o f c o u r s e t h a t t h e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of t h e e v i -
dence s a t i s f i e s l e g a l standards." Harris, 401
U.S. a t 224.
There is a v e r y good reason f o r such a r u l e . The M i r a n d a
shield should not allow a n a c c u s e d t o commit perjury. As the
Court noted: " [elv e r y c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t is p r i v i l e g e d t o t e s t i f y
i n h i s own d e f e n s e , o r r e f u s e t o do so. B u t t h a t p r i v i l e g e can-
not be construed to include the right to commit perjury."
H a r r i s , 4 0 1 U.S. a t 225.
T h u s Harris a l l o w s t h e u s e o f s t a t e m e n t s made by a n a c c u s e d
f o r impeachment p u r p o s e s n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g M i r a n d a v i o l a t i o n s . Of
course there is a danger here. What is to prevent police
i n v e s t i g a t o r s from w i l l f u l l y v i o l a t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s of Miranda,
knowing t h a t e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d c a n s t i l l be used f o r i m p e a c h m e n t ?
Harris t o u c h e d o n t h i s p r o b l e m w i t h the language: " p r o v i d e d of
c o u r s e t h a t t h e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s of t h e e v i d e n c e s a t i s £ ies l e g a l
standards." H a r r i s , 4 0 1 U.S. a t 224. The Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d
t h e i s s u e i n t h e l a t e r case of Oregon v. Hass ( 1 9 7 5 ) r 4 2 0 U.S.
714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 4 3 L.Ed.2d 570. There the Court r e s t a t e d
t h e r u l e o f H a r r i s and w e n t on t o s a y " [ i l f , i n a g i v e n c a s e , t h e
officer's conduct amounts to abuse, that case, like those
i n v o l v i n g c o e r c i o n o r d u r e s s , may be t a k e n care o f when i t a r i s e s
measured by the traditional standards for evaluating volun-
tariness and trustworthiness." Hass, 420 U.S. a t 723. Thus,
Hass r e f i n e d Harris by e m p h a s i z i n g t h e safeguard. The r u l e of
H a r r i s w i l l n o t allow c o e r c i o n o r d u r e s s on t h e p a r t of police
investigators.
As noted above, this Court has adopted the rationale of
H a r r i s and Hass and is n o t p e r s u a d e d t o c h a n g e a sound r u l e . In
S t a t e v. S m i t h ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 9 3 , 5 4 1 P.2d 3 5 1 , we c i t e d and
a g r e e d w i t h b o t h Harris and Hass. We reaffirmed our position i n
the l a t e r case of S t a t e v. B u c k l e y ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 238, 557
P.2d 283, where we upheld the use of testimony a t a p r e t r i a l
suppression hearing to impeach the defendant at trial.
The d e f e n d a n t claims t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s g i v e n s h o r t l y a f t e r
the shooting did not meet standards of trustworthiness for
several reasons; "the defendant had just arrived from the
McCullys. He had b l o o d o n h i s s h i r t . H e had glass splattered
o v e r h i m s e l f and h i s car and h e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e McCullys would
be coming after him." However, these facts do not suggest
pressure "greater than that on a n y p e r s o n in like custody o r
u n d e r i n q u i r y by a n y i n v e s t i g a t i n g o f f i c e r . " Hass, 4 2 0 U.S. at
723. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e a r e no f a c t s i n t h i s case t o s u g g e s t any
coercion o r duress. The d e f e n d a n t came w i l l i n g l y to t h e E u r e k a
police station. He was read h i s Miranda rights and signed a
waiver. He agreed t o make a statement. H e was t o l d t h a t he
c o u l d s t o p a t any t i m e . The investigating o f f i c e r s were v e r y
careful to make sure that he understood his rights.
The defendant seems to be placing primary emphasis on a
r e c e n t case w h i c h h o l d s t h a t o n c e a s u s p e c t i n v o k e s h i s r i g h t to
counsel , questioning must stop. This case is Edwards v.
Arizona (1981), U.S. , 1 0 1 S.Ct. 1 8 8 0 , 6 8 L.Ed.2d 378.
In Edwards the d e f e n d a n t was arrested, taken to police head-
q u a r t e r s , and i n f o r m e d o f h i s M i r a n d a r i g h t s . H e agreed t o sub-
mit to questioning and learned that another suspect had
implicated him. He then gave a taped s t a t e m e n t denying any
involvement. Then h e s o u g h t t o make a d e a l . N e g o t i a t i o n s broke
down and Edwards r e q u e s t e d a n a t t o r n e y b e f o r e a n y d e a l was made.
The n e x t m o r n i n g , a f t e r l i s t e n i n g t o t h e t a p e d s t a t e m e n t of the
s u s p e c t who had i m p l i c a t e d him, Edwards a d m i t t e d involvement i n
t h e crime. The t r i a l c o u r t a d m i t t e d t h e c o n f e s s i o n as e v i d e n c e
a n d Edwards was c o n v i c t e d . The A r i z o n a Supreme C o u r t u p h e l d t h e
conviction finding that the waiver and c o n f e s s i o n were v o l u n -
tarily and knowingly made. The United States Supreme Court
reversed.
The d e f e n d a n t ' s r e l i a n c e on Edwards is i l l - f o u n d e d . The case
does not c r e a t e a new rule to c a s t d o u b t on the h o l d i n g s of
H a r r i s and Hass. Edwards r e s t a t e s t h e r u l e of M i r a n d a ; that if
an individual requests an attorney, q u e s t i o n i n g must s t o p . The
case g o e s on t o a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of w a i v e r , h o l d i n g t h a t " a
v a l i d w a i v e r o f t h a t r i g h t c a n n o t be e s t a b l i s h e d by showing o n l y
t h a t he responded t o f u r t h e r c u s t o d i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n even i f he
h a s been advised of his rights." Edwards, 1 0 1 S.Ct. a t 1884.
Thus the i n t e r r o g a t i o n must cease "unless the accused himself
i n i t i a t e s f u r t h e r communication, exchanges o r c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h
the police." E d w a r d s , 1 0 1 S.Ct. a t 1885.
It is c l e a r that t h e United States Supreme C o u r t d i d not
i n t e n d t o c h a n g e t h e r u l e of H a r r i s or Hass, r a t h e r t h e y i n t e n d e d
t o d e v i s e and d e f i n e a t e s t c o n c e r n i n g w a i v e r of the right to
counsel. The q u e s t i o n b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t is n o t a w a i v e r q u e s t i o n
and w e do n o t i n t i m a t e a n answer to any such q u e s t i o n . Edwards
is of no h e l p . Harris and H a s s and o u r own c a s e s of S m i t h and
B u c k l e y a r e on p o i n t . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err by a l l o w i n g
p o r t i o n s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t f o r impeachment.
N e x t t h e d e f e n d a n t claims h e was e n t i t l e d to jury instruc-
t i o n s on s e l f - d e f e n s e . Defendant c o r r e c t l y cites t h e fundamental
rule found i n Buckley, t h a t "the d i s t r i c t court s instructions
must cover e v e r y i s s u e or t h e o r y having s u p p o r t i n t h e e v i d e n c e ,
and t h e i n q u i r y o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t m u s t o n l y be w h e t h e r o r n o t
any e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d t o w a r r a n t an i n s t r u c t i o n . . .I1
Buckley, 1 7 1 Mont. at 242, 557 P.2d at 285; S t a t e v. Gopher
(1981) , Mont . , 6 3 3 P.2d 1 1 9 5 , 38 S t . R e p . 1 5 2 1 ; S t a t e v.
Sorenson ( 1 9 8 0 ) , ---- Mont . ---- , 619 P.2d 1 1 8 5 , 37 S t . R e p .
1 8 3 4 ; S t a t e v. B o u s l a u g h ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 6 Mont. 7 8 , 5 7 6 P.2d 2 6 1 . The
Montana l e g i s l a t u r e h a s s t a t u t o r i l y a d o p t e d r u l e s f o r t h e d e f e n s e
of s e l f d e f e n s e or more a c c u r a t e l y , j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e . As
a general rule,
"A p e r s o n is j u s t i f i e d i n t h e u s e of f o r c e or
t h r e a t t o u s e f o r c e a g a i n s t a n o t h e r when and
t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t he r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t
s u c h c o n d u c t i s n e c e s s a r y to d e f e n d h i m s e l f or
a n o t h e r a g a i n s t s u c h o t h e r ' s i m m i n e n t u s e of
unlawful force. However, h e is j u s t i f i e d i n
t h e use of f o r c e l i k e l y t o c a u s e d e a t h or
s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm o n l y i f h e r e a s o n a b l y
b e l i e v e s t h a t s u c h f o r c e is n e c e s s a r y to p r e -
v e n t i m m i n e n t d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm t o
h i m s e l f o r a n o t h e r o r to p r e v e n t t h e com-
m i s s i o n of a forcible felony." Section
45-3-102, MCA.
However t h e u s e o f f o r c e d e s c r i b e d a b o v e is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o
an aggressor. If an individual is a n a g g r e s s o r the following
rule applies.
"The justification described in 45-3-102
t h r o u g h 45-3-104 is n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a p e r s o n
who :
" ( 1 ) is a t t e m p t i n g to commit, c o m m i t t i n g , or
e s c a p i n g a f t e r t h e c o m m i s s i o n of a f o r c i b l e
f e l o n y ; or
" ( 2 ) p u r p o s e l y or k n o w i n g l y p r o v o k e s t h e u s e
of force a g a i n s t himself, unless;
"(a) s u c h f o r c e is s o g r e a t t h a t he
r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s t h a t h e is i n i m m i n e n t
d a n g e r o f d e a t h o r s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm and
t h a t h e h a s e x h a u s t e d e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e means
t o e s c a p e s u c h d a n g e r o t h e r t h a n t h e u s e of
f o r c e w h i c h is l i k e l y t o c a u s e d e a t h o r
s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm to t h e a s s a i l a n t ; o r
" ( b ) i n good f a i t h , he w i t h d r a w s from p h y s i -
c a l c o n t a c t w i t h t h e a s s a i l a n t and i n d i c a t e s
c l e a r l y t o t h e a s s a i l a n t t h a t h e d e s i r e s to
w i t h d r a w and t e r m i n a t e t h e u s e o f f o r c e b u t
t h e a s s a i l a n t c o n t i n u e s or r e s u m e s t h e u s e of
force." S e c t i o n 45-3-1051 MCA.
The C o m m i s s i o n ' s comments to 45-3-105 make it c l e a r t h a t " t h e
p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n s of t h i s c h a p t e r h a s assumed t h a t t h e p e r s o n
using force. . .has n o t o t h e r w i s e provoked such f o r c e . T h i s sec-
t i o n c o n c e r n s t h e much more l i m i t e d r i g h t which a p e r s o n h a s to
defend himself, when h e h a s c o m m i t t e d a n u n l a w f u l a c t or o t h e r -
w i s e p r o v o k e d t h e u s e of f o r c e ."
The f a c t s i n t h i s case c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
was a n a g g r e s s o r . A f t e r f i n d i n g h i s g u n s had b e e n t a k e n h e d r o v e
f i f t y m i l e s w i t h a l o a d e d .22 c a l i b e r r i f l e . B e f o r e l e a v i n g he
t o l d a h o u s e g u e s t t h a t " h e w a s g o i n g t o go up t h e r e and g e t h i s
guns and shoot her." While at the McCully residence he
t h r e a t e n e d Pamela McCully by s t a t i n g "you h a v e 24 h o u r s to l i v e . "
These f a c t s c e r t a i n l y e s t a b l i s h t h e d e f e n d a n t as a n a g g r e s s o r ,
c o n s e q u e n t l y t h e a £ f i r m a t i v e d e f e n s e o f j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e
would a p p l y o n l y i n t w o s i t u a t i o n s . First, i f s u c h f o r c e w a s so
g r e a t t h a t h e r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e d h e w a s i n d a n g e r of death o r
s e r i o u s b o d i l y harm and h e e x h a u s t e d e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e means of
escape. Here the defendant stayed i n h i s c a r with t h e motor
running. H e was p a r k e d f o r a n e a s y e x i t . Even i f w e assume t h e
d e f e n d a n t was i n f e a r of his life o r being seriously injured,
which seems d o u b t f u l i n view of t h e f a c t t h a t when Pamela McCully
was s h o t , a t m o s t s h e was armed w i t h a b r o k e n c u e s t i c k , it is
c l e a r t h a t he d i d n o t e x h a u s t h i s means of e s c a p e . P r i o r to t h e
a c t u a l s h o o t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t had ample o p p o r t u n i t y to l e a v e . In
his own words he was "scared" even before arriving at the
M c C u l l y s , y e t d u r i n g t h e t e n t o f i f t e e n m i n u t e s he w a s t h e r e he
made n o a t t e m p t t o l e a v e .
Second, the defense would have been available if i n good
f a i t h he w i t h d r a w s from p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t and c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s a
d e s i r e t o t e r m i n a t e t h e u s e of f o r c e . C l e a r l y the f a c t s w i l l not
support the defendant's withdrawal. A f t e r P a t McCully was s h o t ,
he could have devoted all of his energies to escape and
w i t h d r a w a l from t h e f i g h t , r a t h e r h e t u r n e d t h e gun on Pamela and
fired. Furthermore, when h e r e a c h e d t h e c a t t l e guard he f i r e d
s e v e r a l more s h o t s a t t h e h o u s e . Such a c t i o n s a r e c e r t a i n l y n o t
indicative of an intent to withdraw. We find no error i n the
trial court's refusal t o a l l o w a n i n s t r u c t i o n on s e l f - d e f e n s e .
F i n a l l y the defendant appeals the trial court's refusal to
a l l o w e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h r e a t s made by t h e v i c t i m s and t h e i r
family. The d e f e n d a n t ' s o f f e r of proof shows t h e i n t e n t i o n to
introduce the following :
1. T h a t Pamela McCully made t h r e a t s toward the defendant,
s t a t i n g t h a t s h e was g o i n g t o k i l l him;
2. T h a t h e had s e e n Mike and P a t McCully f i g h t i n g , t h a t P a t
was k i c k i n g Mike i n t h e head and P a t had to be r e s t r a i n e d from
f u r t h e r a c t s of violence; and that at that time Pat actually
s t e p p e d on P a m ' s f o o t and t w i s t e d h e r f o o t t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e you
could h e a r a snap i n t h e f o o t a r e a ;
3. T h a t a n i n c i d e n t o c c u r r e d i n a b a r and b o t h P a t and Mike
were p r e s e n t , t h a t Mike made p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t
and made the comment "some day Joe, some day;"
4. T h a t t h e d a y b e f o r e t h e s h o o t i n g i n c i d e n t , Pamela McCully
had f o l l o w e d him w i t h a g u n , s h e was i n h e r c a r and s h e was b r a n -
d i s h i n g a gun a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ; and
5. T h a t r e c e n t l y R e t h a McCully had t h r e a t e n e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
saying t h a t if s h e e v e r c a u g h t t h e d e f e n d a n t w i t h Pamela a g a i n
she would blow h i s head off o r have o n e of the boys do it.
A r e c e n t c a s e is d i r e c t l y on p o i n t . I n S t a t e v. B r e i t e n s t e i n
( 1 9 7 9 ) r 1 8 0 Mont. 5 0 3 , 5 9 1 P.2d 233, w e had a s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n .
The d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d o f aggravated a s s a u l t f o r drawing a
. 2 2 c a l i b e r p i s t o l and threatening t o b l o w t h e v i c t i m " f u l l of
holes l i k e a sieve." Long b e f o r e t h i s i n c i d e n t , the defendant
and victim had been on poor terms. The defendant wanted to
i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e of past t h r e a t s made by t h e v i c t i m and h i s
mother-in-law. The t r i a l c o u r t r e j e c t e d t h e e v i d e n c e f o r l a c k of
foundation. We affirmed. The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e o f evidence is
R u l e 4 0 4 ( a ) (2), Mont.R.Evid., which s t a t e s :
"(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence
of a person's character or t r a i t o f h i s
c h a r a c t e r is n o t a d m i s s i b l e f o r t h e p u r p o s e of
p r o v i n g t h a t he a c t e d i n c o n f o r m i t y t h e r e w i t h
on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion, except:
" ( 2 ) C h a r a c t e r o f V i c t i m . E v i d e n c e of a p e r -
t i n e n t t r a i t of c h a r a c t e r of t h e v i c t i m of t h e
crime o f f e r e d by a n a c c u s e d , o r by t h e p r o s e -
c u t i o n t o r e b u t t h e same, or e v i d e n c e of a
c h a r a c t e r t r a i t o f p e a c e f u l n e s s of t h e v i c t i m
o f f e r e d b y t h e p r o s e c u t i o n i n a h o m i c i d e case
o r i n a n a s s a u l t c a s e where t h e v i c t i m is
i n c a p a b l e of t e s t i f y i n g to r e b u t e v i d e n c e t h a t
t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r ."
The comments to the rules are more succinct: " [ u ]n d e r
Montana case l a w t h e a c c u s e d m u s t f i r s t l a y a f o u n d a t i o n t h a t h e
acted in self defense b e f o r e he c a n i n t r o d u c e e v i d e n c e of the
v i o l e n t c h a r a c t e r of the victim." An i n d i s p e n s i b l e component to
the foundation of self-defense was stated in State v. Logan
( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 6 Mont. 4 8 , 6 5 , 4 7 3 P.2d 8 3 3 , 8 4 2 : " [ u l n t i l such t i m e
a s d e f e n d a n t t o o k t h e s t a n d and a d m i t t e d t h e k i l l i n g , the issue
o f s e l f d e f e n s e was n o t j o i n e d a t t h e t r i a l . Thus, no f o u n d a t i o n
e x i s t e d f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n of t h e t e s t i m o n y . " I n t h i s case t o o ,
t h e p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n was a b s e n t . The d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t a d m i t
the killing, r a t h e r h e s t a t e s t h a t h e d o e s n o t remember f i r i n g
a n y s h o t s , o n l y empty c a s i n g s h i t t i n g him i n t h e f a c e . The t r i a l
court did not err i n refusing t h e offered c h a r a c t e r evidence.
For the reasons stated herein, we a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s
judgment.
W e concur:
u Justice
8 d 8 . ~4
Chief J u s t i c e
/ Justices
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., specially concurring:
I concur in the result but not with the entire rationale
of the majority opinion.
With respect to Issue No. 2, concerning whether it was
error to deny defendant's offered instruction on self-
defense, I would reach the same result, but for a different
reason. The defendant here did not rely upon self-defense.
Defendant's version of the incident was that the gun accidently
discharged. Under these circumstances, it was not error for
the District Court to refuse the self-defense instruction.
I take issue with the majority's position that the
defendent was not entitled to a self-defense instruction
because defendant was shown to be the aggressor. Under
defendent's version of the facts, he was not the aggressor
and would be entitled to an instruction on his theory.
However, because he did not rely upon self-defense it was
not error for the trial court to refuse to give such an
instruction.
I would affirm.
I join in the specially concurring opinion of Justice
Morrison: