State v. Dickens

No. 81-412

I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
H F F

1982

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

-vs-

MICHAEL A A DICKENS,
L N

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f C a s c a d e , The H o n o r a b l e
J o h n M. McCarvel, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l of Record:

For Appellant:

M i c h a e l S . S m a r t t , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana

F o r Respondent :

Bon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
J . F r e d Bourdeau, County A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s ,
Montana

Submitted on B r i e f s : March 5 , 1982

Decided: J u n e 2 4 , 1982

Filed: JUN 2 4 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly delivered t h e O p i n i o n o t t h e C o u r t .

Michael Alan Dickens (hereinafter referred to as

appellant) was charged before the District Court of the

E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t o f t h e S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r

t h e County o f C a s c a d e , w i t h t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p -

p i n g , a f e l o n y , and o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , a

felony. A j u r y t r i a l was h e l d o n A p r l l 2 8 , 1 9 8 1 , and a f t e r

four days of trial, the jury r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on

both counts.

On June 3, 1981, the court sentenced appellant to

twenty years for the crime of sexual intercourse without

c o n s e n t ; f o r t h e u s e o f a d a n g e r o u s weapon, h e was g i v e n a n

additional (consecutive) ten years; and, f o r t h e crime o f

a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , h e was s e n t e n c e d t o t h i r t y y e a r s ( t o

be s e r v e d c o n c u r r e n t l y ) o f c o n £ i n e m e n t i n t h e Montana S t a t e

Prison. A p p e l l a n t was found t o b e a n o n d a n g e r o u s o f f e n d e r

f o r parole e l i g i b i l i t y purposes.

A p p e l l a n t ' s motlon f o r a new t r i a l was d e n i e d , and

t h l s appeal followed.

On New Y e a r ' s Eve, 1 9 8 0 , t h e v i c t i m , a c c o r d i n g t o h e r

t e s t i m o n y , was a b d u c t e d a t k n i f e p o i n t from a c i t y s t r e e t i n

Great F a l l s , Montana, and f o r c e d into appellant's vehicle.

She was t h e n t a k e n t o a n a r e a n e a r G i a n t S p r i n g s where t h e

appellant forced her, a t knife point, t o engage In v a r i o u s

sexual a c t s including sexual intercourse. After the acts

had b e e n c o m p l e t e d , h e p u l l e d h e r from t h e v e h i c l e and g a v e

her a choice of either being knifed or thrown over the

nearby c l l f f s i n t o the r i v e r . A s t r u g g l e ensued, and the

v l c t i m managed t o e s c a p e t h e a p p e l l a n t by k i c k i n g him i n t h e

groin. 'Though naked e x c e p t f o r h e r socks, s h e managed to
make h e r way t o Malmstroin A i r Force Base about two m i l e s

away. Soon thereafter, s h e was rescued by base security

personnel.

The sheriff's d e p a r t m e n t was n o t i f i e d , and t h e v l c t i m

was taken to a local hospital for treatment. At the

h o s p i t a l s h e was examined by a D r . M i l l e r , who d i s c o v e r e d ,

and later testified, that there was motil semen in her

vagina and an a b r a s i o n on the labial a r e a of her vaginal

opening.

Within several days the victim had identified the

a p p e l l a n t from a p h o t o g r a p h and a t a n i n f o r m a l l i n e u p i d e n -

tlflcatlon.

In contrast, the appellant testifled that he p i c k e d

up t h e v i c t i m who was h i t c h h i k i n g . H testified
e t h a t she

made advances towards him and suggested they go to Giant

Springs "to bring in the New Year." Appellant testified

t h a t t h e y went t o G l a n t S p r i n g s , p a r k e d , g o t i n t h e b a c k s e a t

of his car and had a sexual encounter, including sexual

intercourse. Thereafter, according to appellant's testi-

mony, t h e v i c t i m became upset, got o u t of t h e c a r and r a n

off. A p p e l l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r c o n d u c t a n g e r e d him and

t h a t a f t e r w a i t i n g a s h o r t t i m e he d r o v e o f f .
The S t a t e p r e s e n t e d numerous w i t n e s s e s who t e s t i f i e d

about c e r t a i n circumstances surrounding the incident. The

most damaging testimony to appellant's defense was the

testimony of h i s roommate and t h e m e d i c a l t e s t i m o n y o f Dr.

Mlller. The a p p e l l a n t ' s roommate t e s t i f i e d t h a t on t h e d a t e

f o l l o w i n g t h e a t t a c k t h e a p p e l l a n t s t a t e d he had a b d u c t e d a

woman t h e n i g h t b e f o r e , had t a k e n h e r t o G i a n t S p r i n g s and

had threatened to rape her or throw h e r over the cliffs.
Dr. Miller, a s p e c i a l i s t i n o b s t e t r i c s and g y n e c o l o g y , who

also had done approximately f ift-y examinations of rape

victims over a ten-year p e r i o d , was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y t h a t

from h i s c l i n i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , t h e v i c t i m had b e e n r a p e d .

Appellant r a i s e s numerous i s s u e s o f e r r o r on a p p e a l

and t h e s e c a n be summarized a s f o l l o w s :

1. Was the appellant. denied his right to a fair

trial?

2. Was t h e r e s u f f i c i e n t j u r y misconduct p r e s e n t to

warrant. a r e v e r s a l ?

3. Was t h e t r i a l c o u r t committing r e v e r s i b l e error

when it a l l o w e d t h e p h y s i c i a n t o v o i c e afi o p i n i o n a s t.o t h e

ultimate issue?

4. Was t h e a p p e l l a n t d e n i e d a f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e t h e

S t a t e r e f used t o s t i p u l a t - e ?

A p p e l l a n t . c o n t e n d s t h a t he was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t to a

f a i r t r i a l b e c a u s e t h e t r i a l c o u r t made a n i m p r o p e r comment

on the evidence; impaired the cross-examination of a key

p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s ; d i s p l a y e d a nonj u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e toward

defense counsel; and, improperly rest-ricted the length of

closing argument. These contentions a r e not supported by

t h e r e c o r d o r by t h e l a w .

The alleged improper comments by the trial court

occurred when, during d i r e c t examinat-ion of one of appel-

l a n t ' s witnesses, the court stated that, " a l l t h i s l i n e of

t e s t i m o n y is i r r e l e v a n t , " and, " [i]
t.'s a b o u t t i m e " when t h e

prosecution objected. F i r s t . , t h e r e i s no i n d i c a t i o n i n t h e

record of the court ever stating, " [ i ]t's about time."

Counsel r e f e r s t o a page i n t h e t r a n s c r i p t where t h e remark

is a l l e g e d t o h a v e o c c u r r e d , b u t i t i s c o u n s e l ' s own r e m a r k .
S e c o n d , when t h e c o u r t s t a t - e d , " a l l t h i s l i n e of t.estimony

is irrelevant," i t was r u l i n g o n a l i n e o f test-imony t h a t

was indeed irrelevant. Appellant's counsel was asking a

w i t n e s s , t h a t had had s e x u a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h a p p e l l a n t i n t h e

past, whether other women became upset with appellant.

b e c a u s e he f a i l e d t.o c a r r y on r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h them. This

was clearly an improper line of questioning. Rule 402,

.
Mont R. E v i d . ; R u l e 602, Mont. R. E v i d . F u r t h e r , t h e "comment"

was h a r m l e s s e r r o r and d o e s n o t p r o v i d e s u f f i c i e n t g r o u n d s

for a reversal. S t a t - e v. Bier (1979), - Mont . ,
- 591
P.2d 1 1 1 5 , 36 S t . K e p . 466; S t a t e v . LaMere ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - Mont.

,
- 621 P.2d 462, 37 S t . R e p . 1936.

Appellant contends t h a t t h e c o u r t impaired t h e cross-

examination of a key prosecution witness by interrupt.ing

counsel on several occasions. A review of the record

r e v e a l s t h a t t h e " i n t - e r r u p t i o n s " were merely a c t - i o n s by t h e

t r i a l c o u r t t o k e e p t-he t - r i a l r u n n i n g smoot.hly and t o p r e -

vent counsel from engaging in frequent. s o j o u r n s into side

issues. The court has a duty to conduct t.he trial in a

s p e e d y and f a i r manner and h a s a g r e a t amount o f d i s c r e t - i o n

i n s o doing. S t a t e v . LaMere, s u p r a ; S t a t e v . P i p p i ( 1 9 2 1 ) ,

59 Mont.. 1 1 6 , 1 2 3 , 1 9 5 P. 556, 558-559.

It i s a r g u e d by a p p e l l a n t t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i s -

played a n o n j u d i c i a l a t t i t u d e toward d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . This

a t t i t u d e i s a l l e g e d t.o h a v e d i s p l a y e d i t s e l f d u r i n g s e v e r a l

instances, beginning with voir dire and ending with the

trial court's ordering defense counsel to return to the

defense t a b l e during examination of the appellant. Again,

t h e record does n o t support. t h e c o n t e n t i o n s .

It. w a s stated in S t a t e v. Cassil (1924), 70 Mont.
 " I t w i l l n o t s e r v e any u s e f u l purpose t o
enter i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r discussion of these
alleged errors. I n view o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n
reached with r e s p e c t t h e r e t o , of t h e c o r r e c t -
n e s s o f w h i c h w e h a v e no d o u b t w h a t e v e r , w e
s h a l l content ourselves with saying t h a t
w h i l e we d o n o t a p p r o v e o f a n y o f t h e com-
m e n t s o r r e m a r k s made by t h e j u d g e , w h i c h a r e
complained o f , w e do n o t f i n d t h a t any o f
them, o r a l l o f them c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r ,
worked p r e j u d i c e t o a n y s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f
t h e d e f e n d a n t s , o r probably could have done
SO. "

Here, as in Cassil, there e x i s t s no basis for concluding

t h a t the r i g h t of a p p e l l a n t t o a f a i r t r i a l was i n a n y way

denied or impeded by t h e action of the t-rial court. See

also: St.at.e v. McKenzie ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 608 P.2d

428, 458, 37 S t . R e p . 325; S t a t - e v . M e t c a l f ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 3 Mont..

369, 376-377, 457 P.2d 453; S t a t e v. P o k i n i (Haw. 1 9 7 4 ) , 526

Appellant also contends that his right to a fair

t r i a l was affected when t h e c o u r t l i m i t e d t h e t i m e f o r h i s

c l o s i n g argument t o one-half hour. While it is t r u e that

t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n f o n n e d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h a t h e would o n l y

a l l o w t h i r t y minutes t o conclude h i s c l o s i n g argument, i t is

a l s o t r u e t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l had a l r e a d y b e e n t - a l k i n g f o r

o n e h o u r and s e v e n m i n u t e s . The t r i a l c o u r t . d i d n o t abuse

its discretion by limiting counsel to a closing argument

t h a t was o n e h o u r and t h i r t y - s e v e n minutes long. S t a t e v.

LaMere , s u p r a .

The second major issue raised by the appellant

concerns certain allegations of j ury misconduct. This

a l i e g e d m i s c o n d u c t o c c u r r e d i n two f o r m s : first, t h e r e was

a p o s s i b i l i t - y t h a t s e v e r a l j u r o r s may h a v e b r i e f l y c o n v e r s e d

with prosecution wit-nesses; second, t h e b a i l i f f ' s statements
t o the jurors. A review of t h e r e c o r d and a p p l i c a b l e c a s e

law r e v e a l s t h a t no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r t o o k p l a c e .

The f i r s t i n s t a n c e o f a l l e g e d m i s c o n d u c t t o o k p l a c e ,

according to t-he a p p e l l a n t . , d u r i n g t.he t . r i a l when several

members o f the jury were seen, by several of appellant's

witnesses, facing some o f the prosecutior,'~ witnesses and

moving their mouths. It is not clear from the record

w h e t h e r any c o n v e r s a t i o n was a c t - u a l l y h e a r d , b u t t h e a p p e l -

l a n t . ' ~witnesses did testify during t h e motion for a new

t r i a l t h a t i t " a p p e a r e d " some c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o o k p l a c e .

If there had indeed been communications of an

improper n a t u r e between s e v e r a l of the jurors and some o f
t.he prosecution's witnesses during the t.rial, defense

c o u n s e l had an o b l i g a t i o n a t t h a t t i m e t o inform t h e c o u r t
of the matter. D i s c i p l i n a r y Rule 7 - 1 0 8 ( F ) , Montana Code o f

Professional Responsibility. F u r t h e r , t h i s t y p e o f communi-

cation, a possibility a t best, is n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e v e r s i b l e

error. In Turner v. Louisiana (1965), 379 U.S. 466, 85

S.Ct. 546, 1 3 L.Ed.2d 424, a case cited a s c o n t r o l l i n g on

this issue by appellant, the United States Supreme Court

h e l d t h a t a v e r d i c t c a n be r e v e r s e d i f i t c a n be shown t h a t

communications of a dubious nat-ure takes place between

p r o s e c u t - i o n w i t n e s s e s and j u r o r s . A review of the facts in

Turner reveals that what consisted of reversible error

t h e r e is a f a r c r y f r o m what. t r a n s p i r e d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e .

I n Turfier, the t.wo key prosecution witnesses were deputy

s h e r i f f s who were a l s o i n c h a r g e o f the jurors. The C o u r t

noted :

". . . W e deal here not with a brief
e n c o u n t e r , b u t w i t h a c o n t i n u o u s and i n t i m a t e
a s s o c i a t i o n throughout a three-day t r i a l - - a n
a s s o c i a t i o n which g a v e t h e s e w i t n e s s e s a n
 o p p o r t u n i t y , a s Simmons ( o n e o f t h e d e p u t - i e s )
put. i t , t o renew o l d f r i e n d s h i p s and make new
a c q u a i n t a n c e s among t h e members o f t h e j u r y " .
85 St.Ct.. a t 550.

There is a distinction drawn by t.he United Stat-es

Supreme C o u r t b e t w e e n a "brief encounter" and a n " i n t i m a t e

association" and that distinction is a p p l i c a b l e h e r e . At

best, the record reflects some i n n o c u o u s t-ype o f conversa-

tion. A p p e l l a n t d i d n o t i n f o r m t h e c o u r t when t h e i n s t a n c e s

took place and did not complain until the verdict was

e n t e r e d ; n o r was t h e r e a n y a t ~ t e m p t t o s u b m i t a f f i d a v i t s f r o m

jurors. T h e r e was, q u i t e simply, not. enough e v i d e n c e p r e -

s e n t e d by a p p e l l a n t t o w a r r a n t a new t - r i a l . C h a r l i e v . Foos

( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. 403, 503 P.2d 538.

The second occurrence of alleged misconduct trans-

p i r e d when t h e b a i l i f f i n f o r m e d t h e j u r y t h a t he was h a v i n g

some p r o b l e m s f i n d i n g t-hem a p l a c e t o s t a y o v e r n i g h t . How-

ever, t-he record reveals that the bailiff informed the

jurors shortly thereafter t h a t he had p r o c u r e d them rooms.

Also, t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e j u r o r s informed t h e b a i l i f f

t h a t d e s p i t e the hour, i t was a f t e r 1 : 0 0 a.m., they did not

want t o break but i n s t e a d wanted to continue deliberating.
It cannot. b e s e e n where any t y p e o f prejudice resulted to

t h e a p p e l l a n t from t h e b a i l i f f ' s c o n d u c t .

It is further contended by the appellant that the

trial c o u r t c o m m i t t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r when it allowed t h e

physician t o t e s t i f y a s t o the ultimate issue. The testi-

mony i n q u e s t i o n was a s f o l l o w s :

"(2. [Prosecution] Did you p e r f o r m a n y t y p e
o f c l i n i c a l i m p r e s s i o n o f t h i s womac? A.
[Physician] M o v e r a l l i m p r e s s i o n was t h a t
y
s h e was r a p e d . "

Appellant argues t h a t t h i s testimony is inadmissible because
it goes to t h e u l t i m a t e i s s u e of whether o r n o t t h e prosecu-

t r i x was r a p e d and i s , t h e r e f o r e , i n v i o l a t i o n o f R u l e s 7 0 2 ,

704 and 7 0 5 , Mont.R.Evid.

T h i s C o u r t r e v i e w e d a s i m i l a r i s s u e i n a r e c e n t case.

In S t a t e v. Howard ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 637 P.2d 1 5 , 38

St.Rep. 1980, w e h e l d :

"Under R u l e 7 0 4 t h e t e s t i m o n y m u s t b e ' o t h e r -
wise a d m i s s i b l e . ' The a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f e x p e r t
t e s t i m o n y i s g o v e r n e d by R u l e 7 0 2 , Montana
Rules of Evidence:

" ' I f s c i e n t i f i c , t e c h n i c a l , o r o t h e r spe-
c i a l i z e d knowledge w i l l assist t h e trier o f
f a c t to u n d e r s t a n d t h e e v i d e n c e o r to d e t e r -
mine a f a c t i n i s s u e , a w i t n e s s q u a l i f i e d a s
a n e x p e r t by k n o w l e d g e , s k i l l , e x p e r i e n c e ,
t r a i n i n g , o r e d u c a t i o n may t e s t i f y t h e r e t o i n
t h e form o f a n o p i n i o n o r o t h e r w i s e . '

"According t o t h i s r u l e , Dr. E l l i o t t was
c l e a r l y q u a l i f i e d to t e s t i f y as t o t h e n a t u r e
and e x t e n t o f t h e v i c t i m ' s i n j u r i e s . Whether
he c o u l d t-hen e x t r a p o l a t e from t h i s d a t a and
g i v e an o p i n i o n i s d e t e r m i n e d by w h e t h e r t h e
o p i n i o n would a s s i s t t h e t-rier o f f a c t .
S t a t e d a n o t h e r way, t h e t e s t i s :
I1 I
. .. w h e t h e r t h e s u b j e c t . is o n e o f s u c h
common k n o w l e d g e t h a t men o f o r d i n a r y e d u c a -
t i o n c o u l d r e a c h a c o n c l u s i o n as i n t e l l i -
g e n t l y a s t h e w i t n e s s , or w h e t h e r t h e m a t t e r
i s s u f f i c i e n t l y beyond common e x p e r i e n c e t h a t .
t h e o p i n i o n o f a n e x p e r t would a s s i s t t h e
trier of f a c t . ' S t a t e v. Campbell ( 1 9 6 5 ) ,
1 4 6 Mont. 251, 258, 405 P.2d 978, 983.

"Dr. E l l i o t t i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e n a t u r e o f t h e
i n j u r i e s t h a t t h e p e r s o n who i n f l i c t e d t h e m
d i d s o w i t h an intent. t o murder. W find
e
t h a t . u n d e r t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h i s case,
t h e j u r y was as q u a l i f i e d a s t h e d o c t o r t o
draw an i n f e r e n c e from t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e a s t o i n t e n t , and t h e r e f o r e t h e
d o c t o r ' s o p i n i o n on i n t e n t w a s i n a d m i s s i b l e
u n d e r R u l e 7 0 2 , Mont.ana R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e .

"We f u r t h e r f i n d t h a t , f o r a number o f r e a -
s o n s , t h e e r r o r was h a r m l e s s u n d e r b o t h t h e
Montana and t h e f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e s t s .
Montana s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e t h a t n o c a u s e o f
a c t i o n s h a l l be reversed by reason of any
e r r o r c o m m i t t e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t u n l e s s t h e
r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e e r r o r was p r e j u d i c i a l ,
s e c t i o n 46-20-701, MCA; a n d t h a t a n y e r r o r
 which does not a f f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s
s h a l l be d i s r e g a r d e d , s e c t i o n 46-20-702, MCA.
The f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t e s t f o r h a r m l e s s
e r r o r is whether t h e r e is a r e a s o n a b l e possi-
b i l i t y t h a t t h e evidence complained of might
h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n , Fahy v .
C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 375 U . S . 85, 84 S . C t .
2 2 9 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1 7 1 ; or w h e t h e r t h e r e v i e w -
1
ing court can declare a b e l i e f t h a t the e r r o r
was h a r m l e s s b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .
Chapman v . C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U . S . 1 8 , 87
S.Ct. 824, 1 7 L.Ed.2d 705." 637 P.2d a t
17-18.

The circumstances in this case are indeed quite

similar to those presented i n Howard, with one important

difference. The p h y s i c i a n i n Howard was a s k e d t o g i v e an

opinion as to the intent. of the defendant. Here, the

p h y s i c i a n was m e r e l y a s k e d t o g i v e h i s " c l i n i c a l i m p r e s s i o n "

of t h e v i c t i m b a s e d upon h i s e x p e r i e n c e a s a s p e c i a l i s t i n

o b s t e t - r i c s , g y n e c o l o g y and a s an expert t h a t h a s d o n e ap-

proximately f i f t y examinations of rape victims. There is a

definite difference in the content of t.he testimony. In

t h i s case, i n t e n t was n o t p a r t . o f t h e q u e s t i o n , so t h e phy-

s i c i a n could properly t e s t i f y a s to h i s c l i n i c a l impression

and give an opinion based upon h i s varied e x p e r i e ~ c e and

f irst-hand observation. F u r t h e r , a s i n Howard, t h e t e s t i m o n y

was not prejudicial and was therefore not sufficient. t o

constitute reversible error.

The f i n a l c o n t e n t - i o n o f t h e a p p e l l a n t i s t h a t h e w a s

denied a fair trial because the prosecution refused to

stipulate, and, therefore, t h e r e w a s an improper admission

of prejudicial evidence. He contends that because he

a d m i t t e d t.o numerous f a c t s t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was b a r r e d from

p r e s e n t i n g a n y e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g t h o s e admi t t . e d f a c t s .

The p r o s e c u t i o n was u n d e r no d u t y t o s t i p u l a t e , a n d

no e r r o r r e s u l t e d f r o m i t s r e f u s a l t o d o so. S t a t e v. A d l e r
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 Wash.App. 459, 5 5 8 P.2d 817, 821. In S t a t e v.

W i l s o n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 2 1 5 Kan. 2 8 , 523 P.2d 337, t h e Kansas Supreme

Court s t a t e d :

". . . i t is a n e s t a b l i s h e d r u l e of law t h a t
an a d m i s s i o n by a d e f e n d a n t d o e s n o t p r e v e n t
t h e s t a t e from p r e s e n t i n g s e p a r a t e and inde-
pendent proof of t h e f a c t admitted. (Bizup
v. P e o p l e , 1 5 0 C o l o . 2 1 4 , 3 7 1 P.2d 7 8 6 , c e r t .
d e n . 3 7 1 U.S. 873, 83 S.Ct. 1 1 4 , 9 L.Ed.2d
112; and P a r r v. United S t a t e s [ 5 t h C i r .
1 9 5 8 1 , 2 5 5 F.2d 8 6 , c e r t . d e n . 3 5 8 U.S. 8 2 4 ,
7 9 S . C t . 4 0 , 3 L.Ed.2d 6 4 . )

"The p r e v a i l i n g r u l e i n t h i s r e g a r d i s s t a t e d
i n W h a r t o n ' s C r i m i n a l E v i d e n c e [ 1 2 t h Ed. 1 9 7 2
C u m u l a t i v e S u p p . ] , C o n f e s s i o n s a n d Admis-
s i o n s , $ 399:

" ' T h e making o f a n a d m i s s i o n by t h e d e f e n d a n t
d o e s n o t b a r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n from p r o v i n g t h e
f a c t i n d e p e n d e n t l y t h e r e o f a s t h o u g h no
a d m i s s i o n had b e e n made, p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e
f a c t s when v o l u n t a r i l y a d m i t t e d o f t e n l o s e
rauch o f t h e i r p r o b a t i v e f o r c e i n t h e e y e s o f
the jury.' (p. 63.)

"To t h e same e f f e c t t h e r u l e i s s t a t e d i n 31A
C.J.S. E v i d e n c e 5 299:

"'A p a r t y i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o a c c e p t a j u d i -
c i a l a d m i s s i o n o f h i s a d v e r s a r y , b u t may
i n s i s t on p r o v i n g t h e f a c t . ' (p. 766.)

" I n t h e r e c e n t c r i m i n a l c a s e of A r r i n g t o n v.
S t a t e ( F l a . 1 9 7 0 ) , 233 S o . 2 d 6 3 4 , t h e S u p r e m e
C o u r t of F l o r i d a p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a n o f f e r t o
s t i p u l a t e remains merely an o f f e r unless
a c c e p t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . The F l o r i d a
c o u r t d e c l a r e d i t s p o s i t i o n on t h e s u b j e c t by
a d o p t i n g l a n g u a g e q u o t e d f r o m The P e o p l e v .
S p e c k , 4 1 I 1 1 . 2 d 1 7 7 , 242 N.E.2d 2 8 8 , a s f o l -
lows :

" ' I t h a s n e v e r been h e l d t h a t t h e s t a t e is
b a r r e d from proving a f a c t because t h e
d e f e n d a n t o f f e r s t o a d m i t i t , b u t , on t h e
c o n t r a r y , t h e r u l e i s t h a t when a t r i a l i s
upon a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y , t h e s t a t e i s
p e r m i t t e d t o go a h e a d and i n t r o d u c e i t s f u l l
proof of the crime charged in the
indictment.' ( 2 3 3 So.2d p p . 6 3 6 , 6 3 7 . )

" S e e , a l s o , The P e o p l e v . Sckieck, 356 I l l .
56, 198 N.E. 1 0 8 , 9 1 A.L.R. 1472, and 73
A m . J u r . 2 d r S t i p u l a t i o n s , S 1 8 , p. 5 5 7 . " 523
P.2d a t 341.
Also, the California Supreme Court held in People v.

"Second, t h e r e is a s t r o n g p o l i c y a g a i n s t
d e p r i v i n g t h e s t a t e ' s c a u s e of i t s persua-
s i v e n e s s a n d f o r c e f u l n e s s by f o r c i n g t h e
prosecutor to accept s t i p u l a t i o n s t h a t soften
t h e impact of t h e evidence i n its e n t i r e t y ,
'Parties, a s a general rule, are e n t i t l e d t o
prove t h e e s s e n t i a l facts--to p r e s e n t t o t h e
j u r y a p i c t u r e of t h e e v e n t s r e l i e d o n . ' (53
Am.Jur., S 105.) I n P e o p l e v . P o l l o c k , 25
Cal.App.2d 448, 77 P.2d 8 8 5 , t h e c o u r t h e l d
t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y i n a r z p e c a s e was
not obligated to accept the defendant's o f f e r
t o s t i p u l a t e t h a t t h e r e had been i n t e r c o u r s e .
' E x c e p t a s o r d a i n e d by l a w , t h e d i s t r i c t
a t t o r n e y , i n connection with t h e performance
o f an o f f i c i a l a c t , i s n o t r e q u i r e d t o a c c e p t
t h e judgment o f a s t r a n g e r t o t h e o f f i c e . '
( I d . a t p. 444, 77 P.2d a t p. 8 8 7 . ) " 457 P.2d
a t 877.

W e f i n d no g r o u n d s f o r r e v e r s a l i n a n y o f a p p e l l a n t ' s

contentions; therefore, t h e judgment i s a f f i r m e d ,

W concur :
e
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., concurring:
I concur in the result but not in everything that is
said.
The majority opinion treats the issue of whether expert
testimony on "rape" was proper. Reliance is placed upon
State v. Howard (1981), Mont. , 637 P.2d 15, 38
St.Rep. 1980. In my opinion Howard is clearly distinguishable.
The court in Howard found it was error for a physician
to give the following testimony:
"A. Well, yeah, I have an opinion. I think
that somebody tried to murder her. You know,
I just can't believe that you can sustain that
much trauma with any other intent."
This testimony was found to be harmless error in light
of the fact that:

(1) The jury did not rely on the doctor's opinion
because it returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of
aggravated assault and kidnapping rather than guilty of
attempted deliberate homicide.
(2) The evidence was overwhelming that the defendant
purposefully or knowingly inflcited bodily injury on the
victim with a weapon.
In the case now before the Court, the issue was whether
defendant's sexual intercourse with the victim was had with
consent. The jury resolved that issue contrary to defendant's
position. The testimony here in question was as follows:
"Q. [Prosecution] Did you perform any type of
clinical impression of this woman?
"A. [Physician] My overall impression was
that she was raped."
The answer here given could have influenced the jury's
verdict since the answer is consistent with the guilty
finding of the jury. Therefore, this case is distinguishable
from Howard where the expert witness testified that the
assailant intended to murder the victim but the jury aquitted
on that charge.
Under the state of the record before us I would affirm
but not rely upon Howard. The only objection made to the
answer here given was that the testimony went to the ultimate
issue of fact. Under Rule 704, Montana Rules of Evidence,
testimony in the form of an opinion is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue.
The answer here was not responsive to the question
asked. Furthermore, the answer appears to be vague. If
proper foundation is Paid,: a physician may express an
opinion about whether force was used to accomplish penetration.
The physician could not give an opinion about the mental
state of the defendant having never conducted an examination
of the defendant, nor having any other adequate foundation
to draw such a conclusion. Neither could the physician make
legal conclusions. The physician's use of the word "raped"
is somewhat unclear in that he may only have been giving a
medical diagnosis or, on the other hand, he may have been
drawing legal conclusions and conjecturing about the state
of defendant's mind. The former is permissible. The latter
is not.
The objection made was not sustainable. The answer
given is unresponsive and vague. However, I do not feel
that the answer is sufficiently prejudicial to require a new
trial. Therefore, I concur in affirming the verdict.