IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
May 12, 1997
FOR PUBLICATION
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate C ourt Clerk
Filed: May 12, 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, ) HAMILTON CRIMINAL
)
)
Vs. ) HON. STEPHEN M. BEVIL,
) JUDGE
)
SARAH HUTTON DOW NEY, )
)
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. ) No. 03-S-01-9604-CC-00039
For Appellant/Cross-Appellee: For Appellee/Cross-Appellant:
John Knox Walkup Jerry H. Summers
Attorney General & Reporter Summers, McCrea & Wyatt
Chattanooga, Tennessee
Michael E. Moore
Solicitor General
John P. Cauley
Assistant Attorney General
Nashville, Tennessee
At trial:
Gary D. Gerbitz
District Attorney General
Charles A. Cerney, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney General
Chattanooga, Tennessee
For Amicus Curiae,
Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers:
Jonathan D. Cooper
Daniel & Oberman
Knoxville, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED. ANDERSON, J.
We granted this appeal to answer a question of first impression: whether
a sobriety roadblock at which police officers stop and question motorists whose
prior conduct is unremarkable and free from suspicion, is an unreasonable
seizure in violation of article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution?
The defendant was arrested for driving under the influence after being
stopped at a roadblock in Hamilton County, Tennessee. Prior to being stopped,
the defendant’s conduct was unremarkable and not suspicious. At trial, the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that the roadblock
was unconstitutional because it was an unreasonable seizure in violation of the
Tennessee Constitution.1 The trial court overruled the motion. On appeal, the
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the use of a roadblock is not a per se
violation of the Tennessee Constitution. But it held that the roadblock in this
case was an unreasonable seizure because there was no supervisory or
administrative authority for the roadblock, its location, or procedures. As a result,
these policy decisions were left to the unrestrained discretion of officers in the
field.
We recognize the State’s compelling interest in detecting and deterring
motorists who drive while under the influence of alcohol. The drunk driver cuts a
wide swath of death, pain, grief, and untold injury across the roads of
Tennessee. The carnage and tragedy is recorded daily in our newspapers and
on our television screens. Indeed, the Legislature at nearly every session has
strengthened the driving under the influence laws in recognition of the strong
public interest in solving the problem. No one can dispute the tragedy and
magnitude of the drunk driving problem or the State’s interest in eradicating it.
We, therefore, conclude that the use of a sobriety roadblock, although a
seizure, can be a reasonable seizure under the Tennessee Constitution,
1
The defendant specifically argued that the roadblock violated article I, sections 7 and 8
of the Tennessee Constitution, that law enforcement officers’ claim that the roadblock was for the
purpose of checking drivers’ licenses was a subterfuge for detecting motorists under the
influence, and that officers failed to follow certain administrative guidelines governing the
roadblock.
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provided it is established and operated in accordance with predetermined
operational guidelines and supervisory authority that minimize the risk of arbitrary
intrusion on individuals and limit the discretion of law enforcement officers at the
scene. As a result, we affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals for the reasons
articulated below.
In so holding, we observe that article I, section 7 of the Tennessee
Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, imposes
limits on search and seizure powers in order to prevent arbitrary interference by
the police with the privacy and personal liberty of individuals. Seizures short of
arrest may be made on lesser grounds than probable cause, but usually require
a founded suspicion based on articulable facts that the person is or has engaged
in criminal activity. A roadblock seizure, therefore, is a departure from these
fundamental constitutional principles. It permits officers to stop and question
persons whose conduct is ordinary, innocent, and free from suspicion.
In order for us to determine whether a seizure which is less intrusive than
a traditional arrest is reasonable, we must balance the public interest served by
the seizure with the severity of the interference with individual liberty. A central
concern of the United States Supreme Court, and other state courts, in this
balancing analysis “has been to assure that an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered
discretion of officers in the field . . . [and] that the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers.” Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2640, 61
L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). We agree that this is the appropriate constitutional
standard to be applied.
The decision we announce today, which upholds the constitutionality of
sobriety roadblocks, also controls our decision on an application for appeal filed
in the case of State v. Daniel G. Hampton. In that case, the issue is the same -
i.e., whether the sobriety roadblock violated the Tennessee Constitution? We
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agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the roadblock in Hampton did not
violate the Tennessee Constitution and that the conviction should be upheld.
Accordingly, we deny the Hampton application for appeal by separate order.
BACKGROUND
On August 8, 1992, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Lt. Ronnie Hill of the
Tennessee Highway Patrol and numerous other officers set up a highway
roadblock on Hixson Pike in Hamilton County, Tennessee. Hill was assisted by
members of the Chattanooga Police Department DUI task force, the Hamilton
County DUI task force, and auxiliary officers of the Hamilton County Sheriff’s
Department. Hill did not obtain the approval of a superior officer regarding the
establishment, time or location of the roadblock.
According to Lt. Hill, the roadblock was conducted pursuant to written
guidelines established by the Department of Safety for drivers’ license checks,
which he believed applied to roadblocks for any purpose. Hill said that the
purpose of his roadblock was to check drivers’ licenses, but he admitted that the
officers assisting him were members of DUI task forces. Hill also said that he
chose the location and that there was no advance public announcement of the
existence, time or location of the roadblock.
Hill supervised the operation of the roadblock and gave instructions to the
other officers at the scene. Four to six patrol cars with flashing blue lights were
positioned on each side of the road and in the center turn lane. The lanes were
marked by existing lines on the highway. Hill testified that there was adequate
visibility to avoid accidents and congested traffic. All motorists traveling north or
south on Hixson Pike were stopped unless traffic became impeded, in which
case all traffic was permitted to pass through the roadblock until the congestion
was relieved. According to Hill, officers did not exercise discretion as to which
motorists were stopped. Over one hundred cars were stopped in the two hours
the roadblock was operated.
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The defendant was stopped at the roadblock by Hamilton County Deputy
Sheriff Robert Starnes, a member of the DUI task force. Starnes testified that
the roadblock was set up to check drivers’ licenses and other traffic violations,
but not to check for drunken drivers. He said that the defendant did nothing to
arouse his suspicion as she approached the roadblock and that she was stopped
for the same purpose and in the same manner as other motorists. He asked to
see the defendant’s drivers’ license and, after smelling the odor of alcohol and
learning that she had been drinking, instructed her to pull to the side of the road.
After sobriety testing, the defendant was arrested.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds
that the roadblock was unconstitutional because there was no suspicion that a
crime had been committed before the stop and the detention was an
unreasonable seizure. The trial court overruled the motion and found that the
roadblock had been established and supervised by Lt. Hill in accordance with
Tennessee Department of Safety General Order 410 for the purpose of detecting
unlicensed drivers.
On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that neither General
Order 410 nor any other General Order governing roadblocks was in effect at the
time of this stop.2 Moreover, the court observed that the roadblock in this case
was operated from midnight to 2:00 a.m., that a mobile breathalyser unit was on
the scene for use during the roadblock, and that virtually every officer at the
scene was a member of the City or County DUI task force. Accordingly, the
court held that the evidence preponderated against the trial court’s finding that
the roadblock was established under General Order 410 to detect unlicensed
drivers.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that the
evidence in this record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the
2
The record indicates that Lt. Hill did not identify a specific administrative order that he
was following and that a copy of General Order 410 was introduced as an exhibit by the defense.
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roadblock was established to detect unlicensed motorists. W e therefore address
the constitutionality of the stop in this case as a sobriety roadblock. 3
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
We begin our review by examining the constitutional protections
implicated when a citizen is stopped at a highway roadblock. The Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added). Similarly,
article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides:
Unreasonable searches and seizures-- General warrants.-- That
the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
possessions, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and that
general warrants, whereby an officer may be commanded to
search suspected places, without evidence of the fact committed,
or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offenses are
not particularly described and supported by evidence, are
dangerous to liberty and ought not to be granted.
(Emphasis added).
The essence of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment is to “safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions of government officials.” Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).
A similar purpose was noted in Sneed v. State, 221 Tenn. 6, 13, 423 S.W.2d
857, 860 (1968), where this Court observed that “article I, section 7 is identical in
intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment,” and that federal cases applying
the Fourth Amendment should be regarded as “particularly persuasive.” See
also State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293 (Tenn. 1992).
3
Accordingly, we do not address the specific provisions of General Order 410, nor do we
consider any provision of law that may authorize Tennessee Highway Patrol Officers to make
stops fo r the purp ose of c heck ing drivers ’ licenses. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-7-104 and
§ 55-50-351.
-6-
The constitutionality of sobriety roadblocks is a question of first impression
for this Court,4 and there is no settled body of state constitutional law directly on
point, although there are a number of state court cases which are instructive.
Thus, in reviewing the constitutionality of stopping motorists pursuant to a
highway roadblock, cases construing the Fourth Amendment are persuasive.
Nonetheless, because our review and our decision are based solely on the
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution, we recognize, as we have in the past,
that article I, section 7 may afford citizens of Tennessee even greater protection.
State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989); Miller v. State, 584 S.W.2d 758
(Tenn. 1979).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SOBRIETY ROADBLOCKS
We continue our analysis by examining how the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment requirement that a seizure must be
reasonable. In general, “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person” for the purpose
of Fourth Amendment analysis. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Obviously, a formal arrest is a seizure of the person and to be considered
reasonable, it must be founded upon probable cause to believe a person has
committed a criminal offense. Whether probable cause is present depends upon
whether the facts and circumstances and reliable information known to the police
officer at the time of the arrest “were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in
believing that the [individual] had committed an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).
4
The C ourt of C riminal A ppeals h as uph eld sobrie ty roadbloc ks in the f ollowing ca ses:
State v. Daniel G. Hampton, No. 03-C-01-9503-CR-00107 (Tenn. Crim. App., July 3, 1996,
Knoxv ille); State v. George E. Cunningham, No. 03C01-9112-CR-00389 (Tenn. Crim. App., Aug.
13, 1992 , Knoxv ille); State v. Matthew Manuel, No. 87-96-III (Tenn. Crim. App., Nov. 23, 1988,
Nashville). The Court of Criminal Appeals has also addressed roadblocks for the purpose of
check ing drivers ’ licenses u nder T ennes see D epartm ent of Sa fety Gen eral Ord er 410. State v.
Binion, 900 S.W .2d 702 ( Tenn . Crim. A pp. 1994 ); State v. Dayid Lynn Hagy, No. 03C01-9505-CR-
00152 (Tenn . Crim. A pp., Dec . 5, 1995, K noxville).
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The Fourth Amendment is also implicated in encounters between police
officers and citizens that do not amount to full-scale arrests. In Terry v. Ohio,
supra, for example, the Supreme Court stressed that “[i]t is quite plain that the
Fourth Amendment governs ‘seizures’ of the person which do not eventuate in a
trip to the station house and prosecution for the crime -- ‘arrests’ in traditional
terminology.” Accordingly, the Court held that in some cases, an officer may
briefly detain an individual with less than probable cause so long as he or she
has a reasonable suspicion, based on “specific and articulable facts,” that a
crime has been or is about to be committed. 392 U.S. at 16, 21, 88 S.Ct. at
1877, 1880. This so-called “investigatory stop,” which is less intrusive than a full-
scale arrest, may be made upon a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity,
which is “a less demanding standard than probable cause.” Alabama v. White,
496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).
In analyzing the reasonableness of a seizure less intrusive than a
traditional arrest in later cases, the Supreme Court, as it did in Terry, balanced
the “public interest against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual.” 392
U.S. at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
95 S. Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The balancing test cited in Terry
stemmed from Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, in which the Court weighed
three significant factors in invalidating warrantless administrative searches of
buildings to detect conditions hazardous to public health and safety: the public
interest to be achieved, the ability to achieve the public interest, and the invasion
caused to the citizen’s privacy. 387 U.S. at 534, 87 S.Ct. at 1733.
This balancing approach was applied to a fixed checkpoint stop for the
first time in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49
L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976). There, the court applied the balancing test to uphold fixed
checkpoints near the border at which all vehicles were stopped. The court
determined that these checkpoints served a strong government interest by
enabling law enforcement officers to detect illegal aliens and that the intrusions
on motorists caused by the checkpoint stop were slight. While acknowledging
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that the stops constituted “seizures,” the court concluded that the checkpoints
advanced the law enforcement interest to a greater degree than stops requiring
individualized, reasonable suspicion.
Later, Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 2485, 110
L.Ed.2d 412 (1990), was the first case where the United States Supreme Court
specifically applied the balancing analysis and held that a state’s use of a
highway sobriety checkpoint does not per se violate the Fourth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. The roadblock challenged in that case was
established pursuant to a sobriety checkpoint pilot program developed by the
Michigan Department of State Police. As provided under the guidelines, all
vehicles passing through the checkpoint were stopped and their drivers briefly
examined for signs of intoxication. In cases where a checkpoint officer detected
signs of intoxication, the motorist was directed to a location out of the traffic flow
where an officer checked the motorist’s drivers’ license and registration and, if
warranted, conducted further sobriety tests and made an arrest. All other drivers
were permitted to resume their journey. The checkpoint was operated for 75
minutes, during which 26 vehicles were stopped. The average delay was 25
seconds for each vehicle. Two motorists were detained for field sobriety testing
and one was arrested. Id.
After observing that the roadblock stop was a “seizure” under the Fourth
Amendment, the Sitz court reviewed the three-part balancing analysis applied in
Brown v. Texas, supra, and other earlier cases. The court said that the
reasonableness of a seizure which is less intrusive than a traditional arrest
depends on a balancing of “the gravity of the public concerns served by the
seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the
severity of the interference with individual liberty.” Id., 443 U.S. at 50-51, 99
S.Ct. at 2640. The Brown court explained the basis for the balancing test:
A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in a
variety of settings has been to assure that an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.
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[Citations omitted]. To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires
that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating
that society’s legitimate interests require the seizure of the
particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers.
Id.
Applying the public interest test to sobriety roadblocks, the Sitz court
emphasized the magnitude of the drunk driving problem and the states’ strong
interest in solving it. Reviewing the second part of the analysis - the degree to
which the seizure advanced the public interest - the court stressed that the
empirical data showed 1.6% of the motorists stopped at the Michigan checkpoint
had been arrested for driving under the influence. The court also observed that
an expert witness had testified that studies of checkpoints used in other states
revealed that about 1% of all motorists stopped were arrested for drunk driving.
Id., 496 U.S. at 455, 110 S.Ct. at 2487-2488.5
Finally, with regard to the individual liberty analysis, the court, stressing
that the checkpoints were selected pursuant to guidelines and that uniformed
police officers stopped every car, concluded that “the measure of the intrusion on
[law abiding] motorists stopped briefly at sobriety checkpoints is slight.” Id., 496
U.S. at 451-453, 110 S.Ct. at 2486-2487. Dissenting in Sitz, Justices Brennan
and Stevens argued that the majority failed to analyze whether sobriety
checkpoints advance the public interest to any degree greater than traditional
stops based on suspicion and, therefore, the state had failed to show that
sobriety checkpoint seizures were reasonable. Id.
SOBRIETY ROADBLOCKS -- STATE JURISDICTIONS
A majority of state courts have followed the balancing analysis and have
concluded that roadblocks may survive constitutional scrutiny if they are
5
It was partly on this basis that the court distinguished Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). In Prouse, the court invalidated the practice of using
random, roving stops to check for unlicensed drivers because there was no evidence that such a
practice would be effective. Moreover, the use of such stops would involve “standardless and
uncon strained” discretion . Id., 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400.
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operated under guidelines which minimize intrusiveness and limit officers’
discretion.6
A minority of jurisdictions, however, including Michigan after the United
States Supreme Court’s remand in Michigan v. Sitz, supra, have invalidated
roadblocks under state constitutional provisions. Sitz v. Dept. of State Police,
506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993). These courts, while stopping short of holding that
all roadblocks are per se unconstitutional, have compared the effectiveness of
roadblocks with less intrusive law enforcement methods and have concluded that
the state’s interest in detecting drunken driving does not outweigh the intrusion
on individual liberty or justify departure from traditional stops requiring individual
suspicion. See State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d 1057 (Idaho 1988); State v.
Church, 538 So.2d 993 (La. 1989); Ascher v. Commissioner of Public Safety,
519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994); State v. Koppel, 499 A.2d 977 (N.H. 1985); State
v. Blackburn, 620 N.E.2d 319 (Ohio Mun. 1993); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755
P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988). One state court has held that roadblocks are per se
unconstitutional under its state constitution. Pimental v. Dept. of Transportation,
561 A.2d 1348 (R.I. 1989).
Whether upholding or invalidating a sobriety roadblock, nearly every court
has used the balancing analysis discussed in Brown v. Texas, supra. Moreover,
the courts universally recognize the state’s significant interest in attempting to
alleviate the often tragic consequences of drunk driving. All courts have
recognized that there is a very strong societal interest in dealing effectively with
the problem of drunk driving.
6
See Hagood v. Town of Town Creek, 628 So .2d 1057 (Ala. Crim . App. 199 3); Mullinax v.
State , 920 S.W .2d 503 ( Ark. Ap p. 1996) , aff’d , 938 S.W .2d 801 (A rk. 1997 ); Ingersoll v. Palmer,
743 P.2 d 1299 (Cal. 198 7); People v. Rister, 803 P.2d 483 (C ol. 1990); State v. Jones, 483 So.2d
433 (Fla . 1986); O’Kelley v. Sta te, 436 S.E .2d 760 ( Ga. Ap p. 1993) ; State v. Loyd , 530 N.W.2d
708 (Iow a 1995 ); State v. Barker, 850 P.2d 885 (Ka n. 1993) ; Kinslow v. Com ., 660 S.W.2d 677
(Ky. Ct. App . 1983); State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d 116 (M e. 1988) ; Little v. State , 479 A.2d 903 (Md.
1984); Com. v. Anderson, 547 N.E .2d 1134 (Mass . 1989); State v. Welch , 755 S.W.2d 624 (Mo.
Ct. App . 1988); State v. Mazurek, 567 A.2d 277 (N .J. Supe r. 1989); State v. Bates, 902 P.2d 1060
(N.M. A pp. 1995 ); People v. Scott , 483 N.Y .S.2d 64 9, 473 N .E.2d 1 (1 984); City of Bismarck v.
Uhden, 513 N.W .2d 373 ( N.D. 19 94); Com. v. Tarb ert, 535 A.2d 1035 (P a. 1987) ; Crand ol v. City
of Newport News, 386 S.E .2d 113 ( Va. 198 9); Carte v. Cline, 460 S.E .2d 48 (W .Va. 199 5).
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Courts disagree, however, over whether the state interest is effectively
served by the use of roadblocks. In this regard, courts upholding roadblocks
generally refrain from analyzing whether roadblocks are more effective in
advancing the state’s interest in eradicating drunk driving than less intrusive
means.7 Instead, these courts recognize that roadblocks are effective tools for
use in detecting impaired drivers. Those views are expressed by Professor
LaFave:
[I]t is certainly arguable that mere patrol and stoppings based upon
the Terry standard do not produce what the Camara Court referred
to as ‘acceptable results.’ For one thing, even if a patrolling officer
is fortunate enough to be in the vicinity where a drunk driver is
operating his vehicle, it does not necessarily follow that the driver
will at that particular time drive his car in such a fashion as to
create a reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. And the chances of
such observation in the first place are rather slight, given the
substantial number of intoxicated drivers on the road.
4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, (3rd
ed. 1995), at 692. Moreover, courts have stressed that roadblocks further the
state’s interest not only by detecting drunk drivers but also by deterring such
behavior, particularly when the roadblock is accompanied by advance publicity.
In State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 663 P.2d 992, 1001 (Ariz. 1983), the
Court noted:
The efficacy of a deterrent roadblock is heightened by publicity in
the media. . . . Such publicity would warn those using the highways
that they might expect to find roadblocks designed to check for
sobriety; the warning . . . should certainly have a considerable
deterring effect by either dissuading people from taking ‘one more
for the road,’ persuading them to drink at home, or inducing them to
take taxicabs. Any one of these goals, if achieved would have the
salutary effect of interfering with the lethal combination of alcohol
and gasoline. Advance notice would limit intrusion upon personal
dignity and security because those being stopped would anticipate
and understand what was happening.
7
By contrast, courts that have invalidated roadblocks have questioned whether
roadblocks are the least intrusive means through which to advance the state’s interest in curbing
drun ken drivin g. As the L ouis iana S upre me Cou rt said , “the e ffec tivene ss o f roa dbloc ks is
questionable, especially when weighed against other measures less intrusive on individual
privacy, such as roving patrols which act only when there is an articulable basis for a stop.” State
v. Church, 538 So .2d at 997 ; see also State v. Henderson, 756 P.2d at 1060 (“the efficacy of
roadblo cks is q uestiona ble”); Pimental v. Dept. of Transportation, 561 A.2d at 1352 (“less intrusive
means exist to address the drunk driving problem ”).
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(Feldman, J., concurring). Accordingly, the effectiveness of roadblocks to detect
and to deter drunk driving has led the majority of courts to favor their use.
Finally, with regard to the intrusiveness of the roadblock, the majority of
courts have stressed that roadblocks must be set up in accordance with neutral,
objective criteria and operated in a manner that minimizes intrusiveness and the
discretion afforded to individual officers. In Michigan v. Sitz, supra, for example,
the United States Supreme Court placed emphasis on the fact that the roadblock
was operated under written guidelines setting forth procedures governing
checkpoint operation, site selection, and publicity that left virtually no discretion
to individual officers at the scene, and in Brown v. Texas, supra, the court
required a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of
individual officers. As suggested by one commentator, a “police procedure is
less threatening to [constitutional] values when the discretionary authority of the
police (and thus the risk of arbitrary action) is kept at an absolute minimum.”
Moreover, “a police procedure constitutes less of an imposition on [constitutional]
interests if that procedure has an appearance of regularity to it and is undertaken
with sufficient advance notice” not only to the public but also to the approaching
motorist. LaFave, supra, at 696, 702-704.
Several state courts have developed guidelines that govern the questions
of minimizing intrusiveness and limiting discretion. Among them are Iowa,
California, and Kansas. See State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1995);
Ingersoll v. Palmer, 743 P.2d 1299 (Cal. 1987); State v. Deskins, 673 P.2d 1174
(Kan. 1983). The guidelines include supervisory authority which carefully targets
the time and location of roadblocks and establishes neutral procedures for their
operation. They also include adequate warnings, advance publicity, minimizing
length and nature of detention, adequate safety precautions, and the availability
of less intrusive methods for combating the problem.
A list of relevant factors, obviously, can take any length or form. Not every
factor must weigh in favor of the state to uphold a given roadblock, nor is any
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single one dispositive of the issue. Instead, the overriding question is whether
the roadblock was established and operated in a constitutionally reasonable
manner that minimized the intrusion on individuals and limited the discretion
afforded to officers at the scene.
ANALYSIS UNDER THE TENNESSEE CONSTITUTION
As previously noted, the use of sobriety roadblocks is a question of first
impression for this Court and there is no settled body of state constitutional law
on the issue. We therefore adopt the balancing test outlined in Michigan v. Sitz,
supra, as the appropriate constitutional standard, so that when a seizure occurs,
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary
invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field, and the
seizure is carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
the conduct of individual officers.
We recognize the State’s compelling interest in detecting and deterring
motorists who drive while under the influence of alcohol. The statistics are
overwhelming. As the court noted in Sitz, more deaths and injuries have
resulted from such motor vehicle accidents on our nation’s highways than from
all the wars this country has fought. 496 U.S. at 456, 110 S.Ct. at 2488
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
We, therefore, join the majority of jurisdictions who have concluded that
the use of a sobriety roadblock may be used to advance the State’s compelling
interest provided it is established and operated in a manner that minimizes
intrusion and limits discretion. In this regard, we observe that the criteria
delineated in Loyd, Ingersoll, and Deskins provide the necessary framework for
analysis.
We are convinced that roadblocks are effective tools in advancing the
State’s interest in solving a serious public danger. We agree with the Sitz Court
that we should not determine which among reasonable law enforcement
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approaches is the most effective. W e leave that decision to politically
accountable public officials who are responsible for limited public resources.
In the present case, as the Court of Criminal Appeals observed, some
aspects of the roadblock were consistent with constitutional standards. For
example, the officers stopped all cars traveling in both directions; when the traffic
became congested, motorists were permitted to pass through the roadblock.
The discretion of the individual officers at the scene, therefore, was limited as to
what motorists were to be stopped. Similarly, safety measures were apparently
taken to warn approaching motorists of the roadblock. The roadblock was set up
in a safe and visible area and consisted of uniformed officers and marked patrol
cars with flashing blue lights.
All of the remaining evidence, however, indicated that this roadblock was
not established and operated in a manner that was consistent with article I,
section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. First and foremost, the decision to set
up a roadblock was made by an officer in the field. Likewise, the site selected
for the roadblock and the procedure to be used in operating the roadblock were
matters left to the discretion of an officer in the field. No supervisory authority
was sought or obtained, and no administrative decisions were made with regard
to these critical factors. The State maintains on appeal that the absence of
formal, supervisory participation was of “little weight” since Lt. Hill supervised the
roadblock at the scene. We disagree. Virtually every court has emphasized the
importance of limiting the discretion of police officers at the scene. We agree
with the observation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that
the possibility of arbitrary roadblocks can be significantly curtailed
by the institution of certain safeguards. First the very decision to
hold a drunk-driver roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time
and place, should be matters reserved for prior administrative
approval, thus removing the determination of those matters from
the discretion of police officers in the field. . . . Additionally, the
question of which vehicles to stop at the roadblock should not be
left to the unfettered discretion of police officers at the scene, but
instead should be in accordance with objective standards prefixed
by administrative decision.
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Com. v. Tarbert, 535 A.2d at 1043. Lt. Hill’s concessions that supervisory and
administrative authority was not sought makes it crystal clear that proper
measures were not taken to prevent the unfettered discretion of officers at the
scene.
The lack of administrative or supervisory decision making was also
evidenced by the absence of publicity surrounding the roadblock. 8 We believe
advance publicity furthers the deterrence rationale for the use of a sobriety
roadblock. One state court has observed: “It is the publicity about roadblocks
[that] is the chief means of deterring driving while intoxicated.” State v. Koppel,
499 A.2d at 982. The State’s contention that advanced publicity was
unnecessary because the roadblock was well-marked at the scene completely
ignores the deterrence rationale. Accordingly, this omission in the present case
likewise weighs against the reasonableness of the roadblock used to stop the
defendant.
Finally, the absence of supervisory or administrative decision-making in
this case may have contributed to creating an issue as to the purpose of the
roadblock. The testimony in the record is that officers set up this roadblock for
the purpose of checking drivers’ licenses in accordance with General Order 410
of the Department of Safety. All the remaining evidence in the record, however,
indicates that the actual purpose was the detection of alcohol-impaired motorists.
We do not decide whether the roadblock was a “subterfuge” or a “pretext” for
investigating drunk drivers, or address the implications that might follow such a
finding. 9 Instead, this discrepancy in the proof is a reflection of the overall failure
by law enforcement officers to establish this roadblock in a manner consistent
with administrative and supervisory oversight. We conclude, therefore, that this
8
The dissent labels this conclusion “merely speculation,” and conjectures that
“administrative officials legitimately could have decided that an unpublicized roadblock wo uld have
a greater deterrent effect.” We merely stress that the presence or absence of publicity is a factor
in assessing the reasonablene ss of the roadblock. The a bsence of evidence in this record
regarding the publicity or lack of publicity surrounding this roadblock, we believe, is indicative of
the State’s overall failure to show th at this road block w as esta blished in a ccorda nce with
superv isory and a dmin istrative stan dards.
9
We observe, however, that General Order 410 specifically stated that a roadblock
“canno t be used as a su bterfuge to searc h for othe r crime s.”
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likewise is a factor that weighs against the reasonableness of this particular
roadblock.
The dissent agrees with the constitutional principles we have cited but
disagrees with the result we have reached. The primary objection is to our
conclusion that the absence of supervisory and administrative authority weighed
against the reasonableness of this roadblock. The dissent instead infers from
the gathering of county and city law enforcement officers at the scene that the
roadblock was conducted with administrative oversight.
We respectfully disagree. There is no evidence in this record as to the
supervisory and administrative procedures to be followed in establishing a
roadblock. Moreover, Lt. Hill did not testify that he sought or obtained any type
of approval from any supervisory officer; had he done so, he could simply have
testified as to the authority he was given and the procedures he followed.
Instead, his testimony is clear that he alone made the decision to set up this
roadblock; he alone determined the manner of its operation; and he alone, as an
officer in the field, supervised it with unrestrained discretion. That he apparently
was able to persuade city and county personnel to assist in the operation is not,
in our view, probative of the overall supervisory oversight and administrative
procedure. Accordingly, the evidence in the record simply does not support the
attenuated inference drawn by the dissent.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that a highway roadblock which is established and operated
in accordance with predetermined guidelines and supervisory authority that
minimize the risk of arbitrary intrusions on individuals and limit the discretion of
law enforcement officers at the scene is valid under the Tennessee Constitution.
We, however, agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the roadblock in this
case was not conducted in accordance with such restrictions and constituted an
unreasonable seizure under article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed. Costs of
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the appeal are taxed one-half to the State of Tennessee and one-half to the
defendant/cross-appellant, Sarah Hutton Downey.
________________________________
E. RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE
Concur:
Birch, C.J.
Reid, J. and O'Brien, Sp.J.
Drowota, J., concurring and dissenting - see separate Concurring/Dissenting
Opinion
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
May 12, 1997
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) FOR PUBLICATION
)
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Filed: May 12, 1997
Appellate C ourt Clerk
)
v. ) HAMILTON CRIMINAL
)
SARAH HUTTON DOW NEY, ) Hon. Stephen M. Bevil
) Judge
)
Appellee/Cross-Appellant. )
)
) No. 03S01-9604-CC-00039
)
CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION
The majority holds that a sobriety roadblock is valid under the Tennessee
Constitution so long as it is established and operated in accordance with
predetermined guidelines and supervisory authority that minimize the risk of
arbitrary intrusions on individuals and limit the discretion of law enforcement
officers at the scene. According to the majority, matters which must be
determined by prior administrative action to validate a sobriety roadblock include,
the decision to hold the roadblock, the selection of the time and place for the
roadblock, and the designation of which vehicles will be stopped. Considering
those factors, the majority concludes that the sobriety roadblock in this case was
constitutionally infirm because an officer in the field, rather than administrative
personnel, made the decision to set up the roadblock and selected the site and
time for its operation.
I agree with the majority as to the general principles of law governing a
sobriety roadblock. To be constitutionally valid, a sobriety roadblock must be
established and conducted in accordance with a prefixed, objective plan which
limits unfettered police discretion and minimizes the risk of arbitrary intrusions. I
write separately to express my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that
the roadblock in this case lacked administrative oversight and, therefore, was
constitutionally infirm.
The facts of this case are permeated with administrative oversight.
Although he may have been on patrol that day, Lt. Hill was not simply an officer in
the field who arbitrarily decided to have a roadblock. That Lt. Hill had obtained
prior administrative approval to conduct a roadblock on August 8, 1992, at 12:00
a.m., on Hixson Pike, in Hamilton County, Tennessee, is evidenced by the fact
that, in addition to the Tennessee Highway Patrol, three different law enforcement
agencies participated in the roadblock - - the Chattanooga Police Department DUI
task force, the Hamilton County DUI task force, and auxiliary officers of the
Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department. Certainly, it was advance planning and not
mere coincidence which brought four different groups of law enforcement officials
together on the same day, at the same time, and at the same location to conduct
a roadblock. The majority characterizes the absence of publicity surrounding this
roadblock as evidence of the lack of administrative or supervisory decision
making. While it is feasible to conclude, as did the majority, that prior publicity of
a sobriety roadblock is a deterrent to potential drunk drivers, another equally
feasible conclusion is that the risk of being arrested at an unpublicized sobriety
roadblock is also a deterrent to potential drunk drivers. Such being the case, the
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majority’s characterization of absence of prior publicity as evidence of a lack of
administrative decision making is merely speculation, since administrative officials
legitimately could have decided that an unpublicized roadblock would have a
greater deterrent effect.10
The majority opinion acknowledges that the roadblock otherwise complied
with constitutional standards. The officers stopped all cars traveling in both
directions; when the traffic became congested, motorists were permitted to pass
through the roadblock; the discretion of individual officers at the scene was
limited; safety measures were taken to warn approaching cars of the roadblock;
the site selected for the roadblock was visible; and the procedure used for the
roadblock was safe, involving uniformed police officers and marked patrol cars,
with flashing blue lights. Because the facts of this case support the conclusion
that Lt. Hill had obtained prior administrative approval to conduct the roadblock,
and because this roadblock was conducted in a manner which limited unfettered
police discretion and minimized arbitrary intrusions, the roadblock, in my view,
complied with constitutional standards.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision and would
reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment and affirm the trial court’s denial
of the defendant’s motion to suppress.
10
W hile the m ajority conc ludes tha t prior publicity adv ances the deterr ent goal o f sobriety
roadblo cks, I do not unde rstand th e ma jority to hold that p ublicity is cons titutionally required to
sustain the validity of a roadblock.
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______________________________
FRANK F. DROWOTA III,
JUSTICE
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