State v. Eiland

Attorneys for appellant:

Jeffrey A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana

James A. Garrard
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorney for Appellee

Thomas C. Allen
Fort Wayne, Indiana

IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT

STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellant (Respondent below),

v.

JANET EILAND,
Appellee (Petitioner below).

)
) Supreme Court No.
) 02S05-0002-PC-107
)
) Court of Appeals No.
) 02A05-9804-PC-210
)
)
)

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Robert J. Schmoll, Judge
Cause No. 02D04-9006-CM-17905

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

February 15, 2000

SULLIVAN, Justice.

Janet Eiland filed the petition for post-conviction relief from her
conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. The post-
conviction court granted the petition on two grounds: (1) that the trial
court had not inquired into the factual basis before accepting Eiland=s
guilty plea to the charge; and (2) the trial court had failed to inform
Eiland that she was waiving her constitutional rights by pleading guilty.

The Court of Appeals reversed the post-conviction court and remanded
the case with instructions. State v. Eiland, 707 N.E.2d 314 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), reh=g denied. In analyzing the first of the two grounds on which
the post-conviction court granted relief, the Court of Appeals addressed
the question of whether a petitioner for post-conviction relief who proves
that a factual basis for his or her guilty plea was not established must
also prove that he or she was prejudiced by this error. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that prejudice must be established before post-conviction
relief can be granted on grounds of failure to establish a factual basis
for a guilty plea. See Herman v. State, 526 N.E.2d 1183, 1185 (Ind. 1988)
(AThe [petitioner=s] efforts in the litigation below do not meet the
requisite burden. There is no showing that the trial court=s failure to
advise [the defendant] of these rights or to require a more detailed
factual basis affected [defendant’s] decision to plead guilty.@).

As the Court of Appeals pointed out, this conclusion is consistent
with our opinion in White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893 (Ind. 1986). There we
held that to be entitled to post-conviction relief from a guilty plea, a
petitioner must show prejudice resulting from a trial court=s failure to
comply with a statute that requires defendants to be advised of certain
rights before pleading guilty.[1] We noted that the statutory advisements
were not required by constitutional law and that justice would not be
served if convictions were reversed on the basis that the statutory
advisements had not been given where there was no evidence that the
advisements would have affected a defendant=s decision to plead guilty:
Routine reversal of convictions on technical grounds imposes
substantial costs on society . . . . [J]urors, witnesses, judges,
lawyers, and prosecutors may be required to commit further time and
other resources to repeat a trial which has already taken place. The
victims are caused to re-live frequently painful experiences in open
court. The erosion of memory and the dispersal of witnesses may well
make a new trial difficult or even impossible. If the latter is the
case, an admitted perpetrator will be rewarded with freedom from
prosecution. Such results prejudice society=s interest in the prompt
administration of justice, reduce the deterrent value of any
punishment, and hamper the rehabilitation of wrongdoers.

The [rule enunciated by the case White overruled] has led to
reversal in instances where the trial judge=s omission cannot
genuinely be said to have worked an injustice or, indeed, have made
any difference at all.

White, 497 N.E.2d at 905 (citation omitted).

We have the same view with respect to the requirement that a factual
basis be established before a guilty plea is accepted. This is not a
requirement of constitutional law and the same costs to our system of
justice identified in White would be imposed if convictions were reversed
on grounds that a factual basis had not been established where there is no
evidence that establishing a factual basis would have affected a
defendant=s decision to plead guilty.

We also agree with the analysis of the Court of Appeals on the second
ground upon which the post-conviction court granted relief in this case.
In that respect, the court concluded that because a petitioner=s conviction
will not automatically be vacated as a result of a trial court=s failure to
advise of his or her rights (except those rights required by Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) C the right to trial by jury, the right of
confrontation, and the right against self-incrimination), it necessarily
follows that a trial court=s failure to explain that entering a guilty plea
waives these rights will not require per se that a conviction be vacated.
Eiland, 707 N.E.2d at 318. The petitioner must also establish prejudice as
a result of the trial court=s failure to make this explanation. Id.

We also agree that a remand is appropriate for purposes of
establishing the state of the record as to the trial court=s advisements of
Eiland=s Boykin rights. See id.

We grant transfer and expressly adopt and incorporate by reference the
judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals. Ind. Appellate Rule
11(B)(3). The decision of the post-conviction court is reversed and this
case is remanded to the post-conviction court with the instructions
contained in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. See id.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, BOEHM, and RUCKER, JJ., concur.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code ' 35-35-1-2 (1993).