IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
FILED
FOR PUBLICATION
May 10, 1999
Filed: May 10, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
)
APPELLEE, ) SHELBY COUNTY
)
v. ) Hon. Joseph B. Dailey, Judge
)
ABRAHAM GALMORE, ) No. 02S01-9804-CR-00033
)
APPELLANT. )
FOR APPELLANT: FOR APPELLEE:
A. C. WHARTON JOHN KNOX WALKUP
PUBLIC DEFENDER ATTORNEY GENERAL & REPORTER
MEMPHIS
MICHAEL E. MOORE
M. MARK WARD SOLICITOR GENERAL
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
MEMPHIS MICHAEL J. FAHEY II
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
NASHVILLE
OPINION
AFFIRMED HOLDER, J.
OPINION
We granted this appeal to determine: 1) whether the State may impeach
a defendant’s credibility by referring to an unnamed felony conviction; and 2) if
not, whether a non-testifying defendant must show that he did not testify
because of the trial court's ruling. We hold that the trial court erred in permitting
the State to impeach the defendant’s credibility by referring to an unnamed
felony conviction. We further hold that the defendant was not required to
preserve his objection by stating that he would have testified in his trial but for
the trial court's ruling or by making an offer of proof as to his proposed trial
testimony. Although the ruling as to the admissibility of the prior felony was
improper, it does not mandate reversal in this case.
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 1993, James Hathaway and the defendant, Abraham
Galmore, robbed Dan and Maxine Swartz, the resident managers of a self-
storage facility in Memphis. Both victims were shot in the head, stabbed, and cut
across the throat. Mr. Swartz died as a result of his injuries. Mrs. Swartz
survived and was able to identify Hathaway, whom she knew prior to the
incident, as one of the perpetrators. Galmore admitted his involvement in the
robbery but denied having harmed either victim.
Prior to trial, the State gave written notice pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid.
609(a)(3) of its intent to impeach the defendant’s credibility with six prior burglary
convictions and one prior robbery conviction. After a hearing, the trial court
concluded that the six burglary convictions could be used for impeachment
purposes. As to the robbery conviction, the trial court stated that it was inclined
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to allow the State to use that conviction by asking the defendant, “Isn’t it true that
you are the same Abraham Galmore that was convicted of a felony on
September 1, 1992, in indictment 92-02608, and received a sentence of X
years. . . ?”1 The defendant did not testify at trial. The jury convicted the
defendant of especially aggravated robbery and criminally negligent homicide.
The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-six years.
Relying on State v. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d 272 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995),
the Court of Criminal Appeals held that admission of a prior conviction of “a
felony” without further identification would have been improper. The court,
however, concluded that the trial court’s ruling was not reversible error because
the defendant failed to demonstrate prejudice. The court noted that the
defendant neither showed that he would have testified had the unnamed felony
conviction been excluded nor made an offer of proof as to his proposed trial
testimony. The court further held that any error was harmless based on the
overwhelming evidence of guilt and the admissibility of the six burglary
convictions for impeachment purposes.
ANALYSIS
The State concedes that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant’s
credibility could be impeached by asking whether he had been convicted of an
unnamed felony. The State, however, argues that the defendant waived his right
to consideration of the issue on appeal because he: (1) failed to show that he
did not testify because of the ruling; and (2) failed to make an offer of proof as to
1
Although the record does not include a final ruling on this issue, the defendant stated
during a jury-out hearing that he understood the trial court’s ruling that the State could not ask
about the robbery conviction per se but could ask whether he had a felony conviction. The
defendant then indicated that he did not wish to testify. The record is silent as to whether the
defend ant intend ed to testify if the ro bbery co nviction we re exclu ded.
3
his proposed testimony. The defendant contends that the requirements
proposed by the State conflict with Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3), are against public
policy, and have practical problems in implementation.
I.
Before the accused in a criminal prosecution may be impeached by proof
of a prior conviction, the trial court “must determine that the conviction’s
probative value on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the
substantive issues.” Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3). In making this determination, the
trial court should (1) “analyze the relevance the impeaching evidence has to the
issue of credibility” and (2) “‘assess the similarity between the crime on trial and
the crime underlying the impeaching conviction.’” State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d
661, 674(Tenn. 1999) (quoting N. Cohen, D. Paine, and S. Sheppeard,
Tennessee Law of Evidence, § 609.9, at 376 (3d ed. 1995)).
The prior conviction at issue is robbery. 2 Robbery is a crime involving
dishonesty and may be used for impeachment purposes. State v. Caruthers,
676 S.W.2d 935, 941 (Tenn. 1984). The defendant was indicted for especially
aggravated robbery, murder during the perpetration of a robbery, and first degree
premeditated murder. Evidence of a prior conviction that is the same or similar
in nature to an offense being prosecuted is not per se inadmissible for
impeachment purposes. See State v. McGhee, 746 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Tenn.
1988); State v. Roberts, 943 S.W.2d 403, 408 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996).
Similarity between the crime on trial and the impeaching conviction, however,
2
The defendant did not challenge the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of the
six prior burglary convictions.
4
could improperly influence a jury to convict a defendant based on propensity
evidence.
In the case now before us, the trial court attempted to mitigate the
potential prejudice of the impeaching evidence by referring to the robbery
conviction only as a prior "felony conviction." Not identifying the felony, however,
would permit a jury to speculate as to the nature of the prior conviction. State v.
Barnard, 899 S.W.2d 617, 622 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). Furthermore,
instructing the jury on an unnamed felony would provide inadequate information
for a jury to properly weigh the conviction's probative value as impeaching
evidence. Summerall, 926 S.W.2d at 277. We hold that the proper application
of the balancing test under Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3) requires identification of the
prior conviction. Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling that the State could
impeach the defendant’s credibility by asking him if he had been convicted of an
unnamed felony.
II.
We shall next address the requirements for preserving the issue for
review on appeal. Tennessee Rule of Evidence 609(a)(3) provides that “[i]f the
court makes a final determination that such proof [of a prior conviction] is
admissible for impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually testify at
trial to later challenge the propriety of the determination.” This provision in Tenn.
R. Evid. 609(a)(3) is not contained in the rule’s federal counterpart. See Luce v.
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984).
In Luce, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant must
testify to raise and preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with a
5
prior conviction. 105 S.Ct. at 464. The Court reasoned that a reviewing court is
handicapped in weighing the probative value of the impeachment evidence
against its prejudicial effect when the precise nature of the defendant’s testimony
is unknowable. Id. at 463. In addition, the Court found that, because the
decision to testify seldom turns on the resolution of one factor, a reviewing court
cannot assume that the adverse ruling on admissibility of impeachment evidence
motivated the defendant’s decision not to testify. Id.
Despite Tennessee’s rejection of the Luce rule, the Court of Criminal
Appeals considered persuasive the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court. The Court of Criminal Appeals held that at least two things must occur
before a non-testifying defendant can successfully appeal the trial court’s ruling
on the admission of a prior conviction. First, it must appear from the record that
the defendant did not testify because of the adverse ruling on admissibility of a
prior conviction. Second, the defendant should make an offer of proof as to his
proposed trial testimony.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the first requirement was best
addressed by requiring the defendant to so testify outside the presence of the
jury. The court noted that the record is silent as to why the defendant did not
testify. The court expressed doubt that the proposed admissibility of the
unnamed felony conviction had any impact on the defendant’s decision not to
testify in view of the evidence and the admissibility of the six prior burglary
convictions. Although we cannot conclude that the defendant would have
testified if the unnamed felony conviction were not admitted, it is quite possible
that the adverse ruling was a factor in the defendant’s decision not to testify.
Moreover, we agree with the defendant that this pro forma requirement could
only penalize the unsophisticated or ill-advised defendant who is unaware that
6
he can later decide not to testify if the prior conviction is excluded. See State v.
Whitehead, 517 A.2d 373, 377 (N.J. 1986). Therefore, we conclude that the
defendant is not required to show that he did not testify because of the adverse
ruling on impeachment evidence.
While recognizing that the making of an offer of proof as to the
defendant’s proposed trial testimony can be a time-consuming procedure for the
already overburdened trial courts, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that
such a procedure was necessary for an appellate court to properly assess the
impact of the trial court’s ruling. The few states that have declined to adopt the
Luce rule appear to be equally split between requiring an offer of proof, see
Wickham v. State, 770 P.2d 757 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); Saucier v. State, 562
So.2d 1238 (Miss. 1990); State v. McClure, 692 P.2d 579 (Or. 1984); but see
Hickson v. State, 697 So.2d 391, 397 (Miss. 1997) (holding that proffer of
defendant’s testimony was not required when it would have added nothing to
record that included testimony of defendant’s alibi witnesses); and placing no
such restriction on the defendant’s right to appellate review. See Whitehead,
517 A.2d at 377; People v. Moore, 548 N.Y.S.2d 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989);
Commonwealth v. Richardson, 500 A.2d 1200 (Pa. Super. 1985). As noted by
the New Jersey Supreme Court, there are significant problems associated with
requiring an offer of proof:
Likewise, the requirement that a defendant outline his
testimony through an offer of proof is beset with pitfalls. Aside from
the potential unconstitutionality of requiring a defendant to make an
advance offer of proof, see United States v. Cook, supra, 608 F.2d
at 190 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part), the
requirement is unmanageable. As noted by the United States
Supreme Court, a defendant’s proffer of testimony is inappropriate
because “his trial testimony could, for any number of reasons, differ
from the proffer.” Luce v. United States, supra, 469 U.S. at 41 n. 5,
105 S.Ct. at 463 n. 5, 83 L.Ed.2d at 447 n. 5. The nature and
scope of the proffer, as well as the prosecutor’s use of the
7
defendant’s proffered testimony, if he testifies, for impeachment
purposes at trial, raise thorny questions about the extent to which
the state can cross-examine the defendant and use the
defendant’s testimony at trial. United States v. Toney, supra, 615
F.2d at 282. Moreover, requiring the defendant to make an offer of
proof exposes him to the tactical disadvantage of prematurely
disclosing his testimony. See United States v. Luce, supra, 713
F.2d at 1241 n. 4; United States v. Cook, supra, 608 F.2d at 1190
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
Whitehead, 517 A.2d at 377.
Furthermore, the requirement of an offer of proof is inconsistent with
Tenn. R. Evid. 609(a)(3). Rule 609(a)(3) requires the trial court to determine,
prior to the testimony of the accused, whether a prior conviction’s probative value
on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive issues.
The trial court must perform this balancing without the benefit of knowing the
defendant’s proposed trial testimony. The rule then allows the accused to raise
the issue on appeal without actually testifying at trial. There is no requirement in
Rule 609(a)(3) that the defendant make an offer of proof.
We also find persuasive the distinction in Tenn. R. Evid. 103 between a
ruling that admits evidence and one that excludes it. Rule 103 provides in
pertinent part:
(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. -- Error may not be predicated upon
a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial
right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. -- In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the
specific ground of objection if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context; or
(2) Offer of Proof. -- In case the ruling is one excluding evidence,
the substance of the evidence and the specific evidentiary basis
supporting admission were made known to the court by offer or
were apparent from the context.
8
The issue here is the effect of an erroneous ruling on the admissibility of
impeachment evidence. Under Rule 103(a)(1), no offer of proof is required.
The State’s reliance on State v. Baxter, 938 S.W.2d 697 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1996), is misplaced. In that case, the trial court erroneously ruled that the
defendant’s prior incest conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes.
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the non-testifying defendant did not
make an offer of proof to preserve the issue for appeal. Id. at 703. The lack of
an offer of proof, however, was just one reason for the court’s finding of no
prejudice. Id. Moreover, the holding with regard to the requirement of an offer of
proof is not supported by the authority cited. See Tennessee Law of Evidence,
§ 609.9, at 377 (“If the accused does not testify, it may be wise to make an offer
of proof so that the appellate court could have a record to use in assessing the
impact of the trial court’s ruling.”); see also State v. Martin, 642 S.W.2d 720, 724
(Tenn. 1982) (a pre-Rule 609 case holding that it was error to deny defendant’s
request to make an offer of proof “because such proof may be relevant and
necessary to a determination by the appellate court of whether the trial judge has
abused his discretion in refusing to rule on prior convictions before defendant’s
election to take the stand”).
In light of Tenn. R. Evid. 103(a)(1) and 609(a)(3) and the problems
associated with requiring a defendant to outline his proposed trial testimony, we
conclude that a defendant is not required to make an offer of proof. Our holding
does not preclude a defendant from making a proffer of the substance of his
contemplated testimony. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of a
case, an offer of proof may be the only way to demonstrate prejudice. However,
neither an offer of proof nor a showing that the defendant would have testified
9
but for the trial court’s ruling is required in order to preserve for review a claim of
an erroneous ruling on admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment
purposes.
III.
Finally, we must decide whether the error in this case affirmatively or more
probably than not affected the judgment to the defendant’s prejudice. See Tenn.
R. Crim. P. 52(a); Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). To resolve this issue, we must
examine the theory of defense.
The defendant presented no evidence. During closing argument, defense
counsel emphasized the lack of both physical evidence and identification
evidence tying the defendant to the killing. Defense counsel argued that Mrs.
Swartz was confused when she testified that the man who was with James
Hathaway shot and stabbed her husband. Defense counsel also reminded the
jury that the defendant had cooperated with police by giving a statement about
what happened.
The defendant contends that the trial court’s ruling on admissibility of the
impeachment evidence effectively precluded him from taking the stand3 and
refuting the alleged confession in which he admitted his involvement in the
robbery but denied having harmed either victim. The defendant’s assertion that
he would have refuted the confession, however, is not supported by the record.
Although the defendant initially filed a motion to suppress claiming that the
confession had been obtained illegally, he waived his right to have the motion
3
Because the defendant was free to testify despite the trial court’s ruling, this case does
not involve th e depriva tion of a fun dam ental con stitutional right. See Luce, 105 S.Ct. at 464
(concluding that erroneous decision unde r Rule 609 does not reach constitutional dimension).
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heard.4 Regarding this waiver, the defendant stated on the record: “That’s the
statement that I gave. That’s what I want. That’s what I said.” He also testified
that he freely and voluntarily gave the statement to the police. The defendant
has not specified and we are unable to determine how he intended to refute his
confession. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the
trial court’s erroneous ruling allowing impeachment by reference to an unnamed
felony conviction was harmless.
CONCLUSION
We hold that the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant’s credibility
could be impeached by asking whether he had been convicted of an unnamed
felony. We decline to adopt a rule that requires a non-testifying defendant to
state that he would have testified had the prior conviction been excluded and to
make an offer of proof as to his proposed trial testimony in order to obtain
appellate review. These requirements are inconsistent with Tenn. R. Evid.
609(a)(3). We hold that the record is adequate to permit meaningful review of
the impeachment issue and that the error was harmless in this case.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. It
appearing that the defendant is indigent, costs of this appeal shall be taxed to
the State.
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
4
The defendant’s decision not to challenge the admissibility of the confession was made
eight months before the trial court ruled on the admissibility of prior convictions for impeachment
purposes.
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CONCURRING:
Anderson, C.J.
Drowota, Birch, and Barker, J.J.
12