State v. Gopher

                                No. 80-276
              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                    1981


THE STATE OF MONTANA,
                                Plaintiff and Respondent,
         VS   .
THANE GOPHER,
                                Defendant and Appellant.


Appeal from:          District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
                      In and for the County of Cascade.
                      Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
    For Appellant:
           Donovan and Anderson, Office of Public Defender, Great
            Falls, Montana
    For Respondent:
           Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
           J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana


                                  Submitted   on briefs: June 10, 1981
                                               Decided:     @p 1 4 ifdl
Filed:   s! i'    i   rlr>r-r
                      tybl


     oi;F,,p**d                            Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B .         Daiy d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

             Defendant        Thane       Gopher         was   charged        on     October      16,

1959, with aggravated a s s a u l t , s e c t i o n 45-5-202(1)(d),                              MCA,

by     an    information f i l e d             i n Cascade County D i s t r i c t C o u r t .

The         information          alleged          that      defendant           purposely          or

k n o w i n g l y c a u s e d b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a p e a c e o f f i c e r by k i c k i n g

nim i n the leg.             Defendant e n t e r e d a p l e a of n o t g u i l t y .

             On A p r i l 1, 1 9 8 0 , a j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y

anci    tne court sentenced defendant t o t h r e e years                                   in    the

Montana        S t a t e Prison,          with     all    of     the    sentence       suspended

except for            t h e f i r s t s i x months which was t o be s e r v e d                    in

the     Cascade         County       jail.          On    June      23,      1980,    the    court

e x c u s e d d e f e n d a n t from s e r v i n g a n y f u r t h e r t i m e i n j a i l         on

the     requirement            that       he     complete         certain      conditions          of

employment.            Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n .

             On t h e morning of               October 5,         1979, an a u t o m o b i l e i n

w h i c h d e f e n d a n t was a p a s s e n g e r        was     stopped      for    "erratic"

driving.              The    deputy        sheriff        requested          the     operator's

l i c e n s e of      the driver      ,   d e f e n d a n t ' s b r o t h e r , who was u n a b l e

t o produce one.               Af t e r   receiving         the necessary information

from t h e d r i v e r ,       the deputy s h e r i f f            issued     a c i t a t i o n and

inquired         as     to   the      identities          of     the      passengers.            Upon

learning         the     names     of     the     passengers,          the    deputy      sheriff

checked w i t h t h e s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t o a s c e r t a i n i f t h e r e were

a n y o u t s t a n d i n g w a r r a n t s on t h e p a s s e n g e r s .    When t h e d e p u t y

s h e r i f f was i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e r e was a n o u t s t a n d i n g b u r g l a r y

war r a n t f o r " J a y Thane G o p h e r , "            he approached t h e v e h i c l e

and     asked         the    passengers            which       one     was    Thane      Gopher.

Defendant          hesitated        but     identified           himself      and e x i t e d     the

v e h i c l e upon t h e d e p u t y ' s r e q u e s t .         He was t h e n i n f o r m e d by
t h e d e p u t y t h a t h e was u n d e r a r r e s t f o r b u r g l a r y .

           B e f o r e d e f e n d a n t was p l a c e d i n t h e p a t r o l v e h i c l e , h e
was p a t t e d     down     and      handcuffed.            At    this      time     defendant
became v e r b a l l y a b u s i v e and v e r b a l l y t h r e a t e n e d t h e d e p u t y
sheriff.         Defendant a l s o refused t o g e t i n t o t h e backseat of

t h e p a t r o l c a r and p h y s i c a l l y r e s i s t e d t h e d e p u t y s h e r i f f by
k i c k i n g him i n t h e l e g j u s t         above t h e knee.                 Thereafter,

defendant         fell     back      into the patrol              car     and c o n t i n u e d    to
r e s i s t t h e d e p u t y s h e r i f f by k i c k i n g a t him.            Finally,         the
deputy,         with     assistance            from      another          officer,        pushed
d e f e n d a n t i n t o t h e c a r f a r enough t o g e t t h e d o o r c l o s e d .

           The b a s i s     for      t h e c h a r g e of     a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t was
t h e "bodily injury"               t h a t t h e deputy s h e r i f f         received       from

the defendant's k i c k t o the deputy's leg.                               When q u e s t i o n e d
about      the     nature       and     degree      of     the      injury,         the    deputy
sheriff      t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s l e g was d i s c o l o r e d and s o r e f o r
a b o u t a week b u t t h a t t h e i n j u r y d i d n o t r e q u i r e a n y m e d i c a l

treatment whatsoever.

           The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w a r e :
           1.      Whether,         by r e f u s i n g t o i n c l u d e a n o f f e r e d i n -

s t r u c t i o n on   resisting         arrest,       the     trial       court      committed
reversible error?
           2.      Whether t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d        s u f f i c i e n t evidence

t o s u p p o r t a v e r d i c t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ?
           3.     Whether t h e t r i a l j u d g e had p r o p e r j u r i s d i c t i o n ?
           Defendant         contends        that     the      trial       court      committed
reversible         error       by     not     instructing          the       jury     that        the
o f f e n s e o f r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t was a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f
aggravated a s s a u l t .          I t is a b a s i c r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t

the    trial      court's       i n s t r u c t i o n s must      cover     every      issue or
theory       having           support     in    the     evidence.                State       v.    Buckley

( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont.        238, 557 P.2d 283.                 T h i s Court i n S t a t e v.

Ostwald          (1979), --              Mont.             ,      591       P.2d       646,       651,     36

St.Rep.          442,     448,        stated      that,        ".       .    .    a        defendant       is

e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s on l e s s e r     i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s i f any

e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d which would p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o

rationally            f i n d him g u i l t y o f       a lesser            o f f e n s e and a c q u i t

him    of    a     greater."            See a l s o S t a t e v.             Baugh          ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174

Mont.       456,       571 P.261        779;     State       v.     Bouslaugh               (1978),       176

Mont. 7 8 , 576 P.2d 261; S t a t e v . R a d i ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 176 Mont. 451,

578 P.2d          1169.         Further,         t h i s Court       i n S t a t e v.             Hamilton

(1980)t      - Mont .                    ,   605 P.2d      1 1 2 1 , 1 1 2 9 , 37 S t . R e p .           70,
77, emphasized t h a t ,               " [w]e h a v e c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d t h a t s u c h
a n i n s t r u c t i o n is r e q u i r e d where t h e r e i s some e v i d e n c e t o

support the lesser offense."

            The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n

refusing         to     instruct the jury               on t h e o f f e n s e o f             resisting

arrest        because           the     offenses          of      resisting                 arrest       and

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t a r e n o t i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d and t h i s C o u r t

should adopt t h e " i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p "               test t o determine

i f t h e two o f f e n s e s a r e i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d .

            The        "inherent        relationship"             test        is       a    product        of

several       United           States        Supreme     Court       cases            culminating          in

K e e b l e v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 412 U.S.              205, 93 S . C t .           1993,

36    L.Ed.2d          844.      I n Keeble t h e Court held t h a t                         ". . .       the

d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c t i o n s on a l e s s e r                included

offense,         if     evidence        would      permit         the       jury       rationally          to

f i n d him g u i l t y o f t h e l e s s e r o f f e n s e and a c q u i t him o f t h e

greater     ."        412 U.S.        a t 208.        I n o t h e r words,            t h e t e s t t o be

applied          is,     if     the     lesser        offense       is       supported             by     the
e v i d e n c e and i s " i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d " t o t h e g r e a t e r o f f e n s e ,

t h e n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d be g i v e n t o t h e j u r y .

           T h i s t e s t d o e s n o t d i f f e r i n a n y a p p r e c i a b l e way f r o m

t h e s t a n d a r d t h a t h a s been u s e d i n t h i s s t a t e .          See S t a t e v.

Ostwald       (1979),                Mont.             ,    5 9 1 P.2d     646,     36 S t . R e p .

442.      Therefore,         t h e r e i s no r e a s o n t o a d o p t t h e " i n h e r e n t

relationship" test.

           The S t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t c a n n o t

p o s s i b l y be a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t

is erroneous.            The b a s i s f o r i t s c o n t e n t i o n i s t h a t t h e two

sections, 45-5-202(1)(d),                   MCA ( a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ) , a n d 4 5 -

7-301,     MCA ( r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t ) , p r o t e c t two t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t

interests        i n our       society.          It    argues t h a t        the    aggravated

a s s a u l t s e c t i o n p r o t e c t s t h e p h y s i c a l s a f e t y of p e a c e o f f i -

c e r s w h i l e t h e y p e r f o r m t h e i r d u t i e s and t h a t t h e r e s i s t i n g

arrest       section       protects        society's          interest        in    preventing

suspects        from t h w a r t i n g    an     arrest.         Therefore,          the    State

concludes,         there      is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p between
the    two     sections        to     require         the    lesser      included        offense

instruction.

           The r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 45-7-301,          MCA,

provides:

           "A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f r e s i s t i n g
           a r r e s t i f h e knowingly p r e v e n t s o r a t t e m p t s
           t o p r e v e n t a p e a c e o f f i c e r from e f f e c t i n g an
           a n a r r e s t by:

           " ( a ) using or threatening t o use physical
           f o r c e or violence a g a i n s t t h e peace o f f i c e r
           or another; or

           " ( b ) u s i n g any o t h e r means which c r e a t e s a
           r i s k of c a u s i n g p h y s i c a l i n j u r y t o t h e p e a c e
           o f f i c e r or another. "

           The     testimony         of    the    deputy        sheriff       was     that      the

defendant        verbally threatened                  the deputies,          kicked        one of
them i n t h e l e g , and c o n t i n u e d t o k i c k u n t i l b o t h o f f i c e r s

forced defendant i n t o the backseat.                            C l e a r l y , t h i s is s u f f i -

cient      evidence          to    satisfy       the     elements            of    the    resisting

a r r e s t s t a t u t e ; t h a t is, the defendant did use "threatening"

language        to     the    peace      officers           and     he     did     use     "physical

force"       against         the   peace       officers.             The     testimony of          the

d e f e n d a n t ' s a c t i o n s was n o t e v e n c o n t r a v e r t e d by d e f e n d a n t .

            Further,         under     t h e p e r t i n e n t p a r t of          the aggravated

a s s a u l t s t a t u t e , i t i s s t a t e d : "A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e

of     aggravated        assault        if   he p u r p o s e l y o r         knowingly c a u s e s

b o d i l y i n j u r y t o a peace o f f i c e r . "             I t is a p p a r e n t from t h e

f a c t s t h a t t h e r e was a q u e s t i o n f o r t h e t r i e r o f f a c t a s t o

whether        defendant           "purposely          or    knowingly             caused       bodily

injury"       t o the deputy s h e r i f f .                Again,       when t h e f a c t s a r e

a p p l i e d t o t h e s t a t u t e s , t h e y would be s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y

the    necessary elements                for     either       offense.             Finally,       from

t h e l a n g u a g e of O s t w a l d , i . e . ,    " [ a ] d e f e n d a n t is e n t i t l e d t o

instructions           on     lesser        included        offenses          if    any e v i d e n c e
e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d which would p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o r a t i o n -

a l l y f i n d him g u i l t y o f a l e s s e r o f f e n s e and a c q u i t him o f a

greater     ," 5 9 1    P.2d 6 5 1 , i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on

r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t s h o u l d h a v e been p r e s e n t e d t o t h e j u r y .

           Under f e d e r a l c a s e l a w t h e r e s u l t i s a l s o t h e same.

The two f e d e r a l c a s e s t h a t b e s t i l l u s t r a t e how t h e " i n h e r e n t

r e l a t i o n s h i p " t e s t works a r e United S t a t e s v. Whitaker                      (7th

Cir.    1 9 7 1 ) , 447 F.2d         34,     and U n i t e d S t a t e s v .        Johnson       (9th

Cir.     1980),        637    F.2d      1224,        1233.         In    Johnson          the   court

a n a l y z e d t h e i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p t e s t u s e d by t h e U n i t e d

States      Supreme C o u r t          in    Keeble,         by     utilizing         a    two-part

test.         First,         the     court      stated       that        a    lesser        included
o f i e n s e m u s t be i d e n t i t i e d , and s e c o n d , a r a t i o n a l j u r y m u s t

be a b l e t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h e i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e

b u t i n n o c e n t of t h e g r e a t e r o f f e n s e . H e r e , a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e i s i d e n t i f i a b l e and a j u r y ,      if the resisting a r r e s t

i n s t r u c t i o n is given, could reasonably find defendant g u i l t y

of r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t and a c q u i t on a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t .

           The J o h n s o n c o u r t a p p r o a c h i s b a s e d upon i t s r e a d i n g

of    Rule     3 1 ( c ) , Fed.R.Crim.P.             (synonymous w i t h           s e c t i o n 46-

1 6 - 6 0 3 ( 3 ) , MCA),     which r e g u l a t e s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f when a

lesser       included       offense          instruction        s h o u l d be g i v e n .      The

c o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t , " [ t l h e p u r p o s e o f t h i s r u l e is t o a v o i d

t h e s i t u a t i o n i n which t h e j u r y ,          convinced t h a t t h e defen-

d a n t i s g u i l t y o f some c r i m e ,         i s t e m p t e d t o c o n v i c t him o f
t h e charged o f f e n s e s . "           637 F.2d      1233.        From t h e f a c t s ,     as

t h e y have been p r e s e n t e d          in t h i s case,        the jury        could have

been f o r c e d t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y - - t h a t      is, the jury
may     not     have      wanted        to     let     the     defendant's            action      go

unpunished,          s o t h e y c h o s e t o f i n d him g u i l t y of a g g r a v a t e d

a s s a u l t b e c a u s e t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e was a c q u i t t a l .

           The      question          as     to   whether          the    State       presented

s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t a v e r d i c t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e

d o u b t d o e s n o t r e q u i r e d i s c u s s i o n s i n c e t h e c a s e is b e i n g

r e v e r s e d on o t h e r grounds.

            Defendant's           argument         that      the     trial       judge       lacked

j u r i s d i c t i o n is without merit.              T h i s C o u r t r u l e d on F e b r u a r y

1 4 , 1 9 8 0 , t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s "Motion and A s s i g n m e n t o f J u d g e "

to    hear      disqualification              proceedings           was     moot,         and   that

order s t i l l stands.

            The judgment           of   t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is r e v e r s e d ,     and

the sentence           is v a c a t e d .      The c a u s e i s remanded f o r a new
triai consistent with this opinion.




W e concur:


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