State v. Gould

No. 84-135

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A
F OTN

1985

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

-vs-

JAMES DAVID GOULD,

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis & C l a r k ,
The H o n o r a b l e Thomas O l s o n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

COUNSEL O RECORD:
F

For Appellant:

R o b e r t J . Emmons a r g u e d , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , K e l e n a , Montana
P a t r i c i a S c h a e f f e r argued, A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , Helena
Mike McGrath, County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana

Submitted: March 21, 1985

Decided: J u l y 1, 1985

Filed:
, I 1s "!
f985
Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

Following a one-car accident, defendant, James David

G o u l d , w a s c h a r g e d w i t h n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e and d r i v i n g u n d e r

the influence of alcohol. Gould's companion, Dawn C l o u g h ,

was killed. A Lewis and Clark County D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u r y

r e t u r n e d g u i l t y v e r d i c t s on b o t h c h a r g e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t

sentenced Gould to 3 years imprisonment on the negligent

homicide c h a r g e w i t h a l l b u t 6 months county j a i l t i m e sus-

pended and imposed a $1,000 fine. He received 30 d a y s i m -

prisonment and a $300 fine on the DUI charge. Defendant

appeals. We affirm.

The d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s :

1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g i n t o e v i -

dence the defendant's statements that he was driving the

vehicle?

2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s

p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 3 9 , a s t o w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t ' s admis-

sions w e r e competently given?

3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h

c e r t i f i c a t e which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was

a passenger i n t h e vehicle?

4. Were the defendant's admissions corroborated by

s u f f i c i e n t independent evidence?

5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s

proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 33 a n d 41, r e l a t i n g t o t h e proof

required t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i ?

6. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s

proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11, w h i c h i n s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e d t h e

j u r y t o f i n d b e y o n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was t h e

driver of the vehicle?

7. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n r e f u s i n g t o d i s m i s s

t h e c h a r g e s a t t h e c l o s e o f t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e on t h e g r o u n d s
that there was no evidence independent of defendant's admis-
sions to show he was the driver?
8. Did the District Court err in deleting a portion of
defendant's proposed instruction no. 14 relating to the use
of circumstantial evidence?
9. Did the District Court err in admitting expert
testimony regarding defendant's blood alcohol level at the
time of the accident?

10. Did the District Court err in allowing evidence of
the use of marijuana by the defendant and the decedent on the
day of the accident?

11. Are §S 45-5-104 and 45-2-101 (37), MCA, unconstitu-
tionally vague?

12. Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's

proposed instructions no. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 38, which instruct-
ed the jury in substance that a guilty verdict on negligent
homicide required a finding of "conscious" disregard of the
risk?
13. Did the District Court adequately instruct the jury
that the .10 presumption of intoxication applied only to the

DUI charge?
14. Did the District Court err in denying defendant's
post-trial motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
or a new trial?
Because of the extensive factual arguments, we will set
out the facts in some detail. On December 5 , 1982, Dawn
Marie Clough, 20 years of age, was killed in a single-vehicle
accident. The defendant's theory of this case is that Ms.
Clough was the driver of the vehicle, which was owned by
defendant, and that he was a passenger at the time of the
accident. The time and details of various circumstances are
contested. We have completed a full review of the

t r a n s c r i p t , d e p o s i t i o n s and d i s t r i c t c o u r t f i l e .

The defendant's testimony indicated the following se-

quence of e v e n t s : h e had worked t h e d a y b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t .

H e a t t e n d e d a p a r t y which l a s t e d u n t i l 2 : 30 a.m. on t h e d a y

of the accident. H e picked up M s . Clough a t h e r p a r e n t s '

home i n G r e a t F a l l s a r o u n d 10:OO a.m. and d r o v e t o w a r d H o l t e r

Lake, where t h e y planned t o go f i s h i n g . H e drank about f i v e

b e e r s between G r e a t F a l l s and Wolf Creek. They s t o p p e d a t

the Oasis Bar in Wolf Creek, where they stayed about two
hours d u r i n g which the defendant drank two o r three Black

Velvet d i t c h e s . He then drove h i s pickup t o t h e r e c r e a t i o n a l

s i t e a t t h e f a r end o f H o l t e r Lake, where t h e y s t a y e d d u r i n g

t h e afternoon. That a f t e r n o o n , he drank about five beers.

They l e f t the lake just b e f o r e d a r k , w h i c h would h a v e b e e n

b e t w e e n 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. H e d r o v e t h e 18-mile winding d i r t

r o a d b a c k t o Wolf C r e e k , w h e r e t h e y a g a i n v i s i t e d t h e O a s i s

Bar. D e f e n d a n t may h a v e h a d t h r e e B l a c k V e l v e t d i t c h e s a t

the bar. (The b a r t e n d e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e s e r v e d t h e c o u p l e

two r o u n d s , b u t M s . Clouqh d i d n o t d r i n k h e r s and t h e d e f e n -

dant drank a l l four drinks.) H e d i d n o t e a t any food d u r i n g

t h e e n t i r e day. They s t a y e d more t h a n a n h o u r a t t h e O a s i s

Bar and, in different testimony, left the bar around 7:00

p.m. Defendant l e f t t h e b a r u p s e t o v e r a n a r g u m e n t h e had

g o t t e n i n t o a b o u t a p o o l game. H e d r o v e away f r o m t h e O a s i s

B a r , b u t t h e n p u l l e d o v e r and s t o p p e d and t u r n e d t h e d r i v i n g

over t o Ms. Clough w h i l e h e t o o k a nap. H e n e x t remembers

waking up i n t h e h n s p i t a l .

While defendant testified that he remembered very few

d e t a i l s o f t h e e v e n i n g , h e s t a t e d t h a t h e was " p o s i t i v e " t h a t

he turned t h e d r i v i n g over t o Ms. Clough. When h e l e f t t h ~

bar, he was wearing a large parka and a large pair of
i n s u l a t e d b o o t s which w e r e l a c e d up and t u c k e d u n d e r h i s p a n t

legs. After the accident, h e was found without boots or

parka. D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h i s e v i d e n c e shows t h a t h e w a s

not driving the vehicle and corroborates his testimony of

s t o p p i n g and t a k i n g o f f h i s c l o t h i n g .

S c o t t O'Connell, t h e b a r t e n d e r a t t h e O a s i s B a r i n Wolf

Creek, testified as follows: t h e d e f e n d a n t and M s . Clough

a r r i v e d a t t h e b a r b e t w e e n 5 : 0 0 a n d 6:00 p.m. The d e f e n d a n t

was unable to stand well or to shoot pool very well.

OIConnell f e l t that defendant should n o t have a n y more to

drink. The d e f e n d a n t became a b u s i v e , u s i n g f o u l l a n g u a g e a n d

p i c k i n g f i g h t s , a n d a s a r e s u l t was a s k e d t o l e a v e . Several

people asked t h e defendant t o l e t t h e g i r l d r i v e . O'Connell

himself discussed with t h e defendant whether he should d r i v e ,

and t h e defendant a t one p o i n t a g r e e d t o l e t Clough d r i v e .

The c o u p l e w e n t o u t s i d e , b u t t h e n came b a c k i n t o l o o k for

defendant's c a r keys. A bar patron f o u n d them u n d e r d e f e n -

dant's belt. The d e f e n d a n t g o t i n t o t h e d r i v e r ' s s e a t and

drove away t o w a r d the entrance to 1-15. The a c c i d e n t o c -

curred 8 m i l e s n o r t h o f Wolf C r e e k on 1 - 1 5 . The b a r t e n d e r

was n o t a b l e t o s a y s p e c i f i c a l l y what t i m e t h e c o u p l e l e f t

the bar.

J i m Adams w a s a t t h e b a r a t t h e same t i m e a s d e f e n d a n t

and testified unequivocally that t h e couple l e f t t h e Oasis

Bar a t 6:45 or 7:00 p.m. Adams had earlier offered Ms.

C l o u g h a r i d e home t o G r e a t F a l l s i f t h e d e f e n d a n t r e f u s e d t o

let her drive.

Robert Sturm, a construction worker who was driving

n o r t h on 1-15 w i t h t w o c o - w o r k e r s o n t h e e v e n i n g o f December

5, 1982, witnessed t h e a c c i d e n t . In h i s rear-view mirror, he

saw d e f e n d a n t ' s p i c k u p e r r a t i c a l l y a p p r o a c h i n g from b e h i n d ,

traveling at about 65 to 70 m i l e s per hour. Defendant's
pickup passed so close to Sturm's vehicle that Sturm was

a f r a i d t h e y would t o u c h . However, S t u r m d i d n o t see who was

d r i v i n g b e c a u s e i t was d a r k a n d h e w a s b u s y d r i v i n g . After

defendant's pickup passed, S t u r m saw t h e v e h i c l e veer t o t h e

r i g h t a s i f t o t a k e a n o f f ramp a l t h o u g h o n e w a s n o t t h e r e .

The p i c k u p t h e n v e e r e d t o t h e l e f t a c r o s s t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e

i n t o t h e c e n t e r median, did a s o m e r s a u l t and landed i n t h e

southbound lane. Sturm d i d n o t see t h e c o u p l e t h r o w n f r o m

the vehicle. When h e a n d h i s c o - w o r k e r s ran t o t h e scene,

t h e y f o u n d t h e two o c c u p a n t s l y i n g on t h e r o a d .

K e v i n O ' C o n n e l l was t h e i n i t i a l p a s s e r b y t o r e n d e r f i r s t

aid. His first aid training consisted of a one-quarter

course at Montana State University in 1976. He testified

that the d e f e n d a n t was in shock, but came around somewhat

a f t e r h e became w a r m e r .

J a c k S h a m l e y , a d e p u t y s h e r i f f s t a t i o n e d a t Wolf C r e e k ,

was the f i r s t l a w e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r t o a r r i v e on t h e s c e n e .

H e s t a t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t r a t i o n a l a t f i r s t , b u t was

l a t e r a b l e t o answer Shamley's q u e s t i o n s a s t o where h e d i d

o r did not hurt. S h a m l e y t e s t i f i e d h e t h o u g h t d e f e n d a n t was

in shock, but found no "overwhelming evidence" of shock.

James T a n n e h i l l was t h e f i r s t highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r t o

a r r i v e a t t h e scene. H e received a c a l l a t a b o u t 7:30 p.m.

and a r r i v e d 15 m i n u t e s l a t e r . H e determined t h a t M s . Clough

was d e a d a n d f o u n d t h e d e f e n d a n t l y i n g on t h e r o a d w a y c o v e r e d

w i t h b l a n k e t s and c o a t s . D e f e n d a n t was l y i n g w i t h h i s h e a d

on M s . Clough's feet, but f a c i n g away f r o m h e r . Tannehill

asked the d e f e n d a n t who owned the vehicle. The d e f e n d a n t

r e p l i e d i t was h i s . Tannehill t h e n asked t h e defendant i f h e

was driving the vehicle. The defendant answered yes.

Tannehill testified that these are routine investigative

q u e s t i o n s asked a t t h e scene of an a c c i d e n t .
 Highway P a t r o l O f f i c e r Gene T i n s l e y a r r i v e d a t t h e s c e n e

shortly a f t e r Tannehill. H e was d i r e c t e d t o stay with the

victims while T a n n e h i l l conducted t h e a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

T i n s l e y was w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t i n u o u s l y f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y

30 t o 35 m i n u t e s . During t h a t t i m e , he conversed constant3y

with the defendant in order to keep the defendant awake.

T i n s l e y a s k e d t h e d e f e n d a n t whose v e h i c l e it w a s a n d who was

driving. The d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d i t was h i s v e h i c l e a n d h e was

driving. T i n s l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t seemed a b l e t o

understand his questions and to respond appropriately.

Tinsley testified that he did not believe the defendant's

condition impaired h i s a b i l i t y t o communicate, although he

agreed t h a t defendant appeared "a l i t t l e confused."

O f f i c e r T i n s l e y t r e a t e d Gould f o r s h o c k a s s u c h a c c i d e n t

victims are routinely treated. In Gould's case, Tinsley

observed no g r o s s symptoms o f shock and found no i n j u r i e s .

Tinsley noted that t h e d e f e n d a n t was f a c i n g away from M s .

Clough and d i d n o t change h i s p o s i t i o n before being loaded

into the ambulance. Defendant's position is significant

because he a r g u e s t h a t h i s l a c k o f competence i s demonstrated

by t h e f a c t t h a t h e w a s l y i n g w i t h h i s h e a d on M s . Clough's

f e e t , b u t was u n a w a r e o f w h e r e s h e w a s .

The ambulance arrived at the scene around 8:15 p.m.

Donald Fleming, ambulance attendant and certified medical

t e c h n i c i a n , r o d e w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e ambulance from t h e

s c e n e t o G r e a t F a l l s and checked h i s v i t a l s i g n s . When t h e

d e f e n d a n t was i n i t i a l l y placed in t h e ambulance, h i s blood

p r e s s u r e was 1 0 0 and h i s p u l s e was 6 0 , which i s w i t h i n t h e

normal ra n g e . I n o r d e r t o complete h i s forms, Fleming asked

t h e d e f e n d a n t who was d r i v i n g . Fleming phrased t h e q u e s t i o n s

in a couple of different ways. The defendant responded

consistently that he was driving. Fleming also testified
that the defendant's physical condition and neurological

r e s p o n s e s w e r e good. The d e f e n d a n t h a d f a i r l y good r e c a l l .

Be was able to answer simple questions such as his name,

a d d r e s s a n d t e l e p h o n e number. About 1 5 m i n u t e s a f t e r d e f e n -

d a n t was p l a c e d i n t h e ambulance, h i s b l o o d p r e s s u r e was 120

and h i s p u l s e was 8 2 . These v i t a l s i g n s remained s t a b l e f o r

t h e rest o f t h e t r i p , which t o o k a b o u t 4 5 m i n u t e s . When t h e y

w e r e a b o u t 10 m i n u t e s f r o m G r e a t F a l l s , F l e m i n g a g a i n a s k e d

t h e d e f e n d a n t who was d r i v i n g . The d e f e n d a n t s a i d t h a t h e

was driving and that he never let anyone else drive his

pickup. Fleming t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n t e r i o r o f t h e ambulance

was h e a t e d a n d t h a t w h a t a p p e a r e d t o h a v e b e e n s h o c k symptoms

could have been the r e s u l t of t h e defendant l y i n g on c o l d

pavement.

The defendant's competency a t the time he made the

a d m i s s i o n s was disputed in the suppression hearing and a t

trial. On a p p e a l , defendant emphasizes a d d i t i o n a l evidence

of h i s condition. This evidence includes defendant's s t a t e -

ments t h a t t h e r e w e r e t h r e e r a t h e r than two p e r s o n s i n t h e

vehicle. The d e f e n d a n t p i c k e d C l o u g h u p a t 5 : 3 0 p.m. rather

t h a n 10 o ' c l o c k . D e f e n d a n t w a n t e d t o w a l k home. The g u y who

caused t h e a c c i d e n t b e t t e r h i d e o u t . And e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d b e

okay i f t h e a m b u l a n c e a t t e n d a n t g a v e him a b e e r . In addi-

tion, some o f t h e witnesses characterized t h e defendant a s

not responding t o questions, unable t o converse r a t i o n a l l y ,

mumbling, c o n f u s e d and in a s t a t e of shock. The d e f e n d a n t

contends h e h a s no r e c o l l e c t i o n o f a n y o f t h e s e e v e n t s and

t h a t h e w a s t o o d i s o r i e n t e d t o l e g i b l y w r i t e h i s name on t h e

blood alcohol consent form. Defendant testified at trial

t h a t he a c t u a l l y lets o t h e r people d r i v e h i s truck. Counsel

e m p h a s i z e s t h a t none o f t h e w i t n e s s e s a s k e d d e f e n d a n t , "Were

you d r i v i n g - -e-i - - t h e a c c i d e n t . "
a t th t m e of Counsel contends
t h e d e f e n d a n t may n o t h a v e known t h e q u e s t i o n m e a n t a t t h e

t i m e of the accident.

The State presented expert testimony through William

Newhouse, a f o r e n s i c s c i e n t i s t f r o m t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f J u s t i c e

crime laboratory, on the subject of blood alcohol content

m e a s u r e m e n t a n d t h e symptoms a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v a r i o u s l e v e l s .

A blood s a m p l e t a k e n f r o m t h e d e f e n d a n t a t 9:30 p.m. on t h e

night of t h e a c c i d e n t showed a b l o o d a l c o h o l c o n t e n t o f .29

percent. A s a m p l e t a k e n a t 9:45 p.m. showed a b l o o d a l c o h o l

content of .26 percent. Based upon t h i s e v i d e n c e and t h e

evidence of the circumstances l e a d i n g up to the accident,

Newhouse t e s t i f i e d t h a t a h y p o t h e t i c a l p e r s o n would h a v e h a d

t o d r i n k a p p r o x i m a t e l y 22 d r i n k s t o r e a c h a .26 a t 9 : 4 5 p.m.,

a n d w o u l d h a v e had a b l o o d a l c o h o l c o n t e n t o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y

. 1 0 t o .11 a t a r o u n d 7:30 p.m. Newhouse i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e s e

l e v e l s w e r e a p p r o x i m a t i o n s and t h a t t h e r e c o u l d b e v a r i a t i o n

among i n d i v i d u a l s .

Dr. Pfaff, a forensic pathologist, was called as a

w i t n e s s by t h e defense. H e s t a t e d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t it was

impossible t o c a l c u l a t e t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s blood a l c o h o l a t t h e

t i m e of the accident. Pfaff d i d estimate t h a t t h e average

p e r s o n would h a v e a level of .15 p e r c e n t under s i m i l a r cir-

cumstances. During cross-examination, Pfaff stated that

based upon what he knew about the defendant's condition,

d e f e n d a n t was n o t i n s h o c k when h e e n t e r e d t h e h o s p i t a l . He

stated that defendant's symptoms were probably

alcohol-related.

Pfaff also testified r e g a r d i n g a n a u t o p s y c o n d u c t e d on

Ms. C l o u g h ' s body. No a u t o p s y w a s p e r f o r m e d u n t i l t h e b o d y

was exhumed on m o t i o n o f d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . P f a f f c o n d u c t e d an

autopsy to determine whether any of Ms. Clough's physical

i n j u r i e s t e n d e d t o i n d i c a t e w h e t h e r C l o u g h was t h e d r i v e r o r
t h e passenger i n t h e vehicle. P f a f f ' s a u t o p s y d i s c l o s e d no

indications whether she was the driver or the passenger.

Pfaff also examined the medical records of defend3nt and

concluded t h e y d i d n o t d i s c l o s e any p h y s i c a l i n j u r y i n d i c a t -

i n g w h e t h e r h e was t h e d r i v e r o r t h e p a s s e n g e r . The r e c o r d

c o n t a i n s no o t h e r p h y s i c a l o r d i r e c t e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t i n g who

t h e d r i v e r was.

O December 29,
n 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a -

t i o n w i t h n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e f o r t h e d e a t h o f Dawn Clough on

December 5 , 1 9 8 2 , o p e r a t i n g a m o t o r v e h i c l e u n d e r t h e i n f l u -

ence of alcohol or drugs, and failing to have liability

insurance. The d r u g - r e l a t e d portion of t h e DUI c h a r g e was

later dismissed. The c h a r g e o f f a i l i n g t o have liability

i n s u r a n c e was s e v e r e d f o r s e p a r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

On January 19, 1983, d e f e n d a n t moved to suppress all

e v i d e n c e o f s t a t e m e n t s made a t t h e s c e n e o f t h e a c c i d e n t on

t h e g r o u n d s t h a t h e was i n shock and n o t m e n t a l l y c o m p e t e n t

t o i n t e l l i g e n t l y answer t h e q u e s t i o n s . A suppression hearing

was h e l d on August 1 8 , 1983. The h e a r i n g i n c l u d e d t e s t i m o n y

by numerous witnesses and the deposition of Dr. Pfaff.

Post-hearing briefs were submitted by both parties. The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t found by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t

defendant's statements w e r e voluntary. The c o u r t t o o k i n t o

account the totality of the circumstances, including the

considerable length of t i m e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was o b s e r v e d by

highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r s and emergency m e d i c a l p e r s o n n e l , and

the fact that his statements t h a t h e was the driver were

consistent throughout. The court denied the motion to

suppress.

A jury trial was held before Judge Thomas Olson on

September 6 through September 9 , 1983. The jury returned

verdicts of guilty on both the negligent homicide and
operating an automobile under the influence of alcohol charg-
es. Judgment was entered January 26, 1984. Defendant
appea 1s .

Did the District Court err in admitting into evidence

the defendant's statements that he was driving the vehicle?
The defendant contends that his statements that he was
driving the vehicle were not competent, and the District
Court erred in admitting them into evidence. The defendant
argues that he was in shock and so intoxicated both at the
scene of the accident and in the ambulance that he was inca-

pable of making a voluntary statement.

The defendant and the State essentially agree as to
legal standards governing the admissibility determination.

Section 46-13-301, MCA, in pertinent part provides:
" (1) A defendant may move to suppress as
evidence any confession or admission
given by him on the ground that it was
not voluntary. .. .

" (4) [T]he prosecution must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the
confession or admission was voluntary.

" (5) The issue of the admissibility of
the confession or admission may not be
submitted to the jury. If the confession
or admission is determined to be admissi-
ble, the circumstances surrounding the
making of the confession or admission may
be submitted to the jury as bearing upon
the credibility or the weight to be given
to the confession or admission."
The standard to be applied in our review of this issue is
whether there is substantial credible evidence to support the
District Court's finding. As stated in State v. Grimestad
(1-979),183 Mont. 29, 37, 598 P.2d 198, 203:
"Smith and Lenon make it clear that the
standard to be applied by the trial judge
on a suppression question is 'preponder-
ance of the evidence' but when the same
 q u e s t i o n comes t o u s on a p p e a l t h e c r e d i -
b i l i t y o f t h e w i t n e s s e s and t h e w e i g h t t o
be given t h e i r testimony i s f o r t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d o u r review i s
limited t o determining whether t h e r e is
s u b s t a n t i a l credible evidence supporting
t h e District Court's findings."

An admission is competent and admissible where the

d e f e n d a n t i s f o u n d c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g and r e s p o n d i n g i n

a n i n t e l l i g e n t manner. T h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s b a s e d upon t h e

totality of t h e circumstances, which i n c l u d e s c o n s i d e r a t i o n

o f t h e " d e f e n d a n t ' s demeanor, coherence, articulateness, his

c a p a c i t y t o make f u l l use of his faculties, h i s memory a n d

his overall intelligence." United S t a t e s v . Hollis (D.De1.

1975), 387 F.Supp. 21.3, 220; Annotation, 69 A.L.R.2d 361.

The d e g r e e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e

a d m i s s i o n s d o e s n o t a l o n e d e t e r m i n e t h e competence o r admis-

s i b i l i t y of an admission. See S t a t e v. Emerson ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 169

Mont. 285, 546 P.2d 509. Thus, even where t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s

blood a l c o h o l a t t h e t i m e o f t h e admission i s extremely h i g h ,

the statements are admissible i f the evidence shows the

d e f e n d a n t was c a p a b l e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g i n a n

i n t e l l i g e n t manner. See S t a t e v. Chapman (Wash. 1 9 7 4 ) , 526

P.2d 64 (blood a l c o h o l level . 2 7 ) . Additionally, t h i s Court

has previously considered a s a relevant f a c t o r t h e trustwor-

t h i n e s s o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s a s i n d i c a t e d by t h e " c o n t e n t o f t h e

[statements] o r evidence of s u b s e q u e n t e v e n t s which c o n f i r m

the reliability of t h e statements." Emerson, 1 6 9 Mont. at

288-89, 546 P.2d a t 511.

The s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g t e s t i m o n y a s a w h o l e i n d i c a t e s

t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s l y i n g on t h e c o l d p a v e m e n t a n d a p p a r e n t l y

unconscious when help first arrived. Defendant did not

respond to questions. Kevin OIConnelI. and others at the

scene covered the defendant with blankets. By the time

Deputy S h e r i f f Shamley a r r i v e d , t h e d e f e n d a n t had begun t o
warm u p a n d w a s able to respond to a request t o move his

feet. While Shamley was w i t h t h e defendant, t h e defendant

was a b l e t o r e s p o n d t o i n q u i r i e s a b o u t w h e r e h e h u r t . After

Highway Patrol Officer Tannehill arrived, T a n n ~ h i l l and

o t h e r s p l a c e d b l a n k e t s u n d e r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o k e e p him o f f

t h e c o l d ground. O I C o n n e l 1 t e s t i f i e d t h a t d e f ~ n d a n twarmed

up and began talking a f t e r t h e blankets w e r e placed under

him. Generally, the testimony indicates that defendant

became more c o h e r e n t and a w a r e a s h e warmed u p .

The testimony of the officers at the scene and the

ambulance d r i v e r who t r a n s p o r t e d defendant t o the hospital

was t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s c o h e r e n t a n d a b l e t o c a r r y on a

rational conversation. O f f i c e r T a n n e h i l l d i d n o t observe any

gross symptoms of shock. He believed the defendant's re-

s p o n s e s w e r e l o g i c a l and r a t i o n a l . O f f i c e r T i n s l e y s p e n t 30

t o 4 5 m i n u t e s c o n v e r s i n g w i t h t h e d e f e n d a n t and o b s e r v e d t h a t

t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o c a r r y on a n o r m a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h

no delay in responses. He testified t h a t defendant's re-

s p o n s e s w e r e c l e a r and u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . Donald F l e m i n g , the

ambulance a t t e n d a n t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a b l e t o

respond to questions regarding h i s i n j u r i e s . Fleming a l s o

t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s b l o o d p r e s s u r e and p u l s e w e r e

within a normal range, and t h e d e f e n d a n t responded consis-

t e n t l y when a s k e d w h e t h e r h e was d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e .

While several witnesses testified that defendant may

have been i n shock, D r . Pfaff t e s t i f i e d t h a t symptoms w h i c h

could have been p e r c e i v e d a s shock by l a y p e r s o n s w e r e more

l i k e l y alcohol-related. W i l l i a m Newhouse, t h e S t a t e ' s f o r e n -

sic expert, testified that i f a person with a .20 blood

alcohol level could r e c i t e h i s name, birth date, residence

and o t h e r s i m p l e d a t a , then the alcohol l e v e l had p r o b a b l y

n o t i m p a i r e d h i s i m m e d i a t e memory. The a m b u l a n c e a t t e n d a n t
testified that defendant recited his rlame, birth date and
residence in a consistent manner.
In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the District

Court stated that it found by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant's statements were voluntary. The court
took into account the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing the observations of highway patrol officers and emergency
medical personnel. The court noted that defendant's state-

ments that he was the driver of the vehicle were consistent
throughout the period leading up to defendant's hospitaliza-
tion. Our review of the suppression hearing transcript
indicates that there was conflicting evidence on this issue

and that the trial court resolved this conflict in favor of
admissibility of the statements.
We conclude the transcript contains substantial evidence

to support the findings and conclusions of the trial court on
this issue. We hold the District Court did not err in admit-
ting evidence of defendant's statements that he was driving

the vehicle.

I1

Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's
proposed instruction no. 39 as to whether defendant's admis-
sions were competently given?
Defendant's refused instruction no. 39 stated:
"Evidence has been admitted concerning a
statement allegedly made by the Defen-
dant. Before you consider such statement
for any purpose, you must determine that
the statement was given competently. In
determining whether the statement was
competently given, you should consider if
the defendant had the capacity to be
conscious of the events which occurred at
the time of the alleged negligent homi-
cide, whether he could retain those
events in his memory, and whether he
could recall them with reasonable
accuracy " .
Under S 46-13-301 ( 5 ) , MCA, the jury i s a 1 lowed t o c o n s i d e r

t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e making o f t h e a d m i s s i o n a s

b e a r i n g upon the c r e d i b i l i t y o r weight t o be given t o the

admission. The proposed instruction incorrectly addresses

t h e q u e s t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s competence r a t h e r t h a n t h e w e i g h t

or c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e evidence. This inappropriately s h i f t s

the issue of admissibility t o the jury. In addition, in-

s t r u c t i o n no. 8 i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury a s t o i t s r o l e i n d e t e r -

mining t h e weight and c r e d i b i l i t y t o b e accorded d e f e n d a n t ' s

admissions. I t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t it w a s t h e e x c l u s i v e j u d g e

whether the s t a t e m e n t s w e r e t r u e i n whole o r i n p a r t . It

a l s o i n s t r u c t e d t h e m t o view t h e a d m i s s i o n s w i t h c a u t i o n . In

S t a t e v. Lapp (Mont. 1983), 658 P.2d 400, 40 St.Rep 120,

almost identical i n s t r u c t i o n s were considered. This Court

rejected the defendant's contention that an instruction

s i m i l a r t o no. 39 s h o u l d h a v e b e e n g i v e n t o t h e j u r y .

W e h o l d t h e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err i n r e f u s i n g

d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 39.

I11

Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n a d m i t t i n g t h e d e a t h cer-

t i f i c a t e which c o n t a i n e d a s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e d e c e a s e d was a

passenger i n t h e vehicle?

The d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g p o r t i o n of t h e

d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e should have been e x c i s e d b e f o r e admission:

" D e c e d e n t was p a s s e n g e r i n a p i c k - u p
t r u c k which l e f t t h e roadway and o v e r -
turned. S h e was ejected from the
vehicle. "

The certificate was admitted during the testimony of the

C o u n t y C o r o n e r who p r e p a r e d it i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s o f f i c i a l

duties. The d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e w a s a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e

death of Ms. Clough under Rule 803(9), M.R.Evid. and

S 50-15-109 (4), MCA. Admission into evidence for that
purpose does n o t r e q u i r e t h e admission of the e n t i r e death

certificate.

The coroner was extensively cross-examined by defense

c o u n s e l a s t o t h e s o u r c e o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t a i n e d on t h e

d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e with regard t o t h e decedent being a passen-

ger. The c o r o n e r ' s t e s t i m o n y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t h e b a s e d t h e

conclusion that Ms. Clough was a passenger upon hearsay

s t a t e m e n t s a s t o d e f e n d a n t b e i n g t h e d r i v e r of t h e v e h i c l e .

No p r o p e r f o u n d a t i o n w a s l a i d f o r t h e a d m i s s i o n o f t h a t p a r t

of the death certificate.

W e c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t on the certificate that

d e c e d e n t was a p a s s e n g e r should have been e x c i s e d p r i o r t o

admission. While t h a t was n o t done, we conclude t h a t t h e
f a i l u r e d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e error. The t e s t i m o n y

by t h e b a r t e n d e r and o t h e r w i t n e s s e s e s t a b l i s h e d a s u b s t a n -

tial basis for concluding that decedent was a passenger.

While t h e s t a t e m e n t i n t h e d e a t h c e r t i f i c a t e was o b j e c t i o n -

able, it confirmed in an insignificant way other evidence

before the court.

W e h o l d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t commit r e v e r s -

i b l e error i n admitting t h e death c e r t i f i c a t e .

IV

Were t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions corroborated by suffi-

c i e n t independent evidence?

The d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e S t a t e m u s t e s t a b l i s h t h e

c o r p u s d e l i c t i by e v i d e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a d m i s s i o n s on

the part of t h e defendant. The d e f e n d a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t

the bartender's t e s t i m o n y t h a t h e saw t h e d e f e n d a n t d r i v i n g

away f r o m t h e Wolf Creek Bar s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e a c c i d e n t i s

i n s u f f i c i e n t b e c a u s e it f a i l s t o show t h a t h e was d r i v i n g a t

the t i m e of the accident. The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e d e f e n -
d a n t l s admissions w e r e s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d and t h a t t h e

c o r p u s d e l i c t i was e s t a b l i s h e d b y i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e .

Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e testimony e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e

defendant left the bar a t 6:00 to 6:15 p.m. This leaves

s u b s t a n t i a l t i m e unaccounted f o r p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t , which

t o o k p l a c e a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 7:00 p.m. While t h e e v i d e n c e i s

n o t f r e e o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n on t h e m a t t e r o f t i m e , t h e record

substantiates findings that the defendant left the bar a t

6 : 4 5 t o 7:00 p.m. The a c c i d e n t h a p p e n e d s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r ,

and t h e f i r s t law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r was c o n t a c t e d a t a b o u t

Defendant also contends that the evidence regarding

p l a c e m e n t o f h i s b o o t s a n d p a r k a i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o show t h a t

h e was n o t d r i v i n g . That evidence does n o t i n f a c t appear t o

be significant. It certainly does not prove conclusively

that the defendant turned the driving over t o Ms. Clough.

The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t § 45-5-111, MCA, is applicable.

That s t a t u t e s t a t e s :

" I n a homicide t r i a l , b e f o r e an e x t r a j u -
d i c i a l c o n f e s s i o n may b e a d m i t t e d i n t o
e v i d e n c e , t h e s t a t e must i n t r o d u c e inde-
pendent evidence tending t o e s t a b l i s h t h e
d e a t h a n d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e a t h was
caused by c r i m i n a l agency." (emphasis
added)

I t i s c l e a r from t h e s t a t u t e t h a t c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i s

s u f f i c i e n t f o r corroboration of a confession.

S e c t i o n 45-5-111, MCA, was e n a c t e d i n 1 9 7 3 , w i t h amend-

ments to the somewhat stricter provisions of § 94-2510,

R.C.M. 1947. Even u n d e r t h e f o r m e r s t a t u t o r y s t a n d a r d , t h i s

Court has held t h a t t h e establishment o f t h e corpus d e l i c t i

need n o t b e proven by i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e o f i t s e l f s u f f i -

c i e n t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . This Court s t a t e d i n S t a t e

v. Ratkovich (1940), 111 Mont. 19, 25, 1 0 5 P.2d 679, 682:
 " T h e r e m u s t b e some i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e
e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t i , b u t it
need n o t o f i t s e l f b e s u f f i c i e n t beyond a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s , once t h e indepen-
dent evidence i s given, t h e confession
may b e c o n s i d e r e d w i t h t h e f a c t s and
circumstances i n evidence i n determining
whether the corpus delicti is
established. .. " (emphasis added)
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e r e w a s s u b s t a n t i a 1

e v i d e n c e beyond t h e a d m i s s i o n s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a l o n e . The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e w a s t o b e viewed

in a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e S t a t e . The j u d g e r e f e r r e d

t o t h e t e s t i m o n y o f b a r t e n d e r O ' C o n n e l l , who t e s t i f i e d a s t o

h i s observations of defendant's seriously intoxicated s t a t e ,

his discussions with the defendant regarding defendant's

inability to drive, and finally his observatinns that the

defendant nonetheless drove the pickup away from the Wolf

Creek Bar. W i t h p a r t i c u l a r r e g a r d t o d r i v i n g away f r o m t h e

bar i t s e l f , the bartender t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e defendant f i r s t

w a n t e d t o d r i v e a n d , a f t e r some d i s c u s s i o n , a g r e e d t o l e t M s .

Clough d r i v e . L a t e r h e c h a n g e d h i s mind a n d i n s i s t e d t h a t h e

would d r i v e e v e n t h o u g h h e h a d t o l d t h e b a r t e n d e r h e would

not drive. The b a r t e n d e r saw t h e d e f e n d a n t d r i v e t h e p i c k u p

away f r o m t h e b a r . An a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s o b s e r v e d t h e d e f e n -

d a n t ' s t r u c k b e i n g d r i v e n i n a e x t r e m e l y c a r e l e s s and t h r e a t -

e n i n g manner.

We hold t h a t t h e defendant's admissions with regard to

d r i v i n g t h e v e h i c l e w e r e c o r r o b o r a t e d by s u f f i c i e n t indepen-

dent evidence.

Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's

proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 33 and 41, r e l a t i n g t o t h e proof

required t o e s t a b l i s h t h e corpus d e l i c t i ?
 The d i s c u s s i o n r e g a r d i n g c o r p u s d e l i c t i i n t h e p r e c e d i n g

issue is applicable here. The i n s t r u c t i o n s p r o p o s e d b y t h e

defendant were:

"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e
independent evidence of the corpus
d e l i c i t t o c o r r o b o r a t e an a d m i s s i o n , and
i n a c a s e o f N e g l i g e n t Homicide, a s h e r e ,
such independent evidence must b e proven
beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " Proposed
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 3 3

"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n a c a s e o f
N e g l i g e n t Homicide, t h e r e must b e i n d e -
pendent evidence o f t h e corpus d e l i c t i
and s u c h i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e must b e
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
P r o p o s e d I n s t r u c t i o n No. 4 1

These instructions are not correct statements of the law.

As previously mentioned, Ratkovich established that

i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e need n o t b e s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h e

c o r p u s d e l i c t i beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . Both i n s t r u c t i o n s

require that independent evidence must be proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t refused the instruc-

t i o n s b e c a u s e it concluded t h a t t h e c o r p u s d e l i c t j . i s n o t a

q u e s t i o n t o be decided by t h e j u r y , b u t i s a t h r e s h o l d ques-

tion for determination by the court. That is essentially

c o r r e c t a s t h e D i s t r i c t Court must f i r s t determine i f t h e r e

is sufficient corroborative evidence before ruling on the

a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e confession o r admission.

We conclude that the District Court did not err in

r e f u s i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n s 33 a n d 41.

Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's

p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11, w h i c h i n s u b s t a n c e r e q u i r e d t h e

j u r y t o f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was t h e

driver of the vehicle?

The i n s t r u c t i o n w a s r e p e t i t i v e . The j u r y w a s a d e q u a t e l y

instructed on reasonable doubt in other instructions. We
hold that no error was committed in refusing defendant's

p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 11.

VII

Did t h e District Court err i n refusing t o dismiss t h e

charges at the close of the State's case on grounds that

t h e r e was no e v i d e n c e i n d e p e n d e n t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s admissions

t o show h e was t h e d r i v e r ?

A s discussed a t length i n I V above, t h e r e was s u b s t a n -

t i a l evidence i n d e p e n d e n t o f d e f e n d a n t ' s a d m i s s i o n s t o show

that he was driving. No further discussion is required.

T h e r e c l e a r l y was n o t a factual basis for the dismissal of

the charges on this theory at the close of the State's

ca se-in-chief.

VIII

Did the District Court err in deleting a portion of

d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 14 r e l a t i n g t o t h e u s e

of circumstantial evidence?

The p o r t i o n o f t h e p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n w h i c h t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t d e l e t e d a n d t o which t h e d e f e n d a n t o b j e c t s i s a s

follows:

"However, you a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t y o u a r e
n o t p e r m i t t e d on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l evidence
a l o n e t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f any
crime c h a r g e d a g a i n s t him u n l e s s t h e
proved c i r c u m s t a n c e s n o t o n l y a r e c o n s i s -
t e n t w i t h t h e hypothesis t h a t t h e defen-
d a n t i s g u i l t y o f t h e crime, b u t a r e
c o n s i s t e n t [ s i c ] w i t h any o t h e r r a t i o n a l
conclusion."

In S t a t e v. Bean ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 5 Mont. 1 3 5 , 337 P.2d 930, this

Court determined that the s i m i l a r proposed i n s t r u c t i o n was

properly rejected. Such instruction is appropriate only

where all of the evidence in the case is circumstantial.

Here, t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l d i r e c t e v i d e n c e . W e hold t h a t t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t err i n d e l e t i n g a p o r t i o n o f d e f e n -

d a n t ' s p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n no. 14.
 IX

Did the District Court err in admitting expert testimony
regarding defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the
accident?
In substance, the defendant contends that because of the
conflict in the evidence between Dr. Pfaff and Dr. Newhouse,
Dr. Newhouse was not qualified as an expert to express an
estimate of the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time
of the accident. The State points out that Dr. Newhouse's
opinions were given in response to hypothetical questions as
an aid to the jury. The State argues that Newhouse was
qualified as an expert and points out that the court in-
structed the jury during the Newhouse testimony that expert
witnesses may give opinions, but the jury is not bound to
accept those opinions. In addition, there was substantial
cross-examination of Newhouse by defendant's counsel.
As we review the transcript, it appears that both ex-
perts were testifying as to hypothetical averages, which
would result from drinking a certain amount of alcohol under
certain conditions. The hypothetical questions were within
the scope of the evidence presented. The court instructed
the jury that they could reject an expert's opinion. The
District Court did not err in admitting the expert testimony.
X

Did the District Court. err in allowing evidence of the
use of marijuana by the defendant and the decedent on the day
of the accident?

That evidence was admissible because the defendant
initially was charged with driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, even though the drug charge was subsequent-
ly dismissed.
 In addition, the evidence was properly admitted as a

part of the res g e s t a e , a s inseparably intertwined in the

events leading t o t h e accident. See S t a t e v. Trombley ( ~ o n t .

1 9 8 0 ) , 620 P.2d 3 6 7 , 37 S t . R e p . 1871. The d e f e n d a n t h a s n o t

a r g u e d t h e o t h e r crimes r u l e , b u t h a s m e r e l y s t a t e d t h a t t h e

e v i d e n c e was p r e j u d i c i a l . W e note t h a t a f t e r t h e evidence

was a d m i t t e d , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g a v e a n e x c e l l e n t c a u t i o n a r y

i n s t r u c t i o n , e m p h a s i z i n g t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was o n l y t o show

t h e f l o w o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h a t t h e j u r y s h o u l d n o t con-

c l u d e d e f e n d a n t was a b a d p e r s o n .

W e hold t h a t t h e admission o f t h e evidence r e g a r d i n g t h e

u s e o f m a r i j u a n a was n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .

A r e §§ 45-5-104 and 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 ( 3 7 ) , MCA, u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l -

l y vague?

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e a s

applied to negligent homicide is unconstitutiona1ly vague.

In p e r t i n e n t p a r t , t h e code s e c t i o n s provide:

"Negligent homicide. (1) C r i m i n a 1 homi-
c i d e c o n s t i t u t e s n e g l i g e n t h o m i c i d e when
it is committed negligently."
§ 45-5-104 ( I ) , MCA.

" ' N e g l i g e n t l y ' -- a p e r s o n a c t s n e g l i -
g e n t l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o a r e s u l t or t o a
circumstance described by a statute
d e f i n i n g a n o f f e n s e when h e c o n s c i o u s 1
disregards a risk that t h r result w i l y
occur o r t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s o r
when h e d i s r e q a r d s a - k o f w h i c h
ris -
should-be - a w a r e t h a t t h e r e s u l t w i n
occur or t h a t t h e circumstance e x i s t s .
The risk m u s t b e o f s u c h a n a t u r e and
d e g r e e t h a t t o d i s r e g a r d it i n v o l v e s a
g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n d a r d o f
c o n d u c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would
observe i n t h e a c t o r ' s s i t u a t i o n . 'Gross
deviation' means a d e v i a t i o n t h a t i s
considerably greater than lack of ordi-
nary care. R e l e v a n t t e r m s s u c h a s 'neg-
l i g e n t ' and ' w i t h n e g l i g e n c e ' have t h e
same meaning. " 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MA
C
(emphasis added).
 D e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e g l i g e n c e a s

applied to negligent homicide i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague,

relying upon a statement by this Court in State v. Bier

( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 1 Mont. 27, 32, 591 P.2d 1 1 1 5 , 1118. I n B i e r , we

stated that "although somewhat nehul o u s in concept, gross

negligence i s g e n e r a l l y considered t o f a l l s h o r t of a reck-

less d i s r e g a r d f o r c o n s e q u e n c e s and i s s a i d t o d i f f e r from

o r d i n a r y negligence only i n degree, n o t i n kind."

Defendant further argues that the statute is vague

because, a s a p p l i e d by t h e C o u r t , i t d i d n o t r e q u i r e a con-

s c i o u s d e v i a t i o n from a known r i s k , and b e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e

f a i l s t o a p p r i s e a person o f t h e standard o f conduct r e q u i r e d

by the statute. Defendant also argues that the standard

c a n n o t b e a s t a n d a r d d e t e r m i n e d by a j u r y , b u t must b e d e -

f i n e d by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . F i n a l l y , defendant contends t h a t

jury i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 5 ( a ) would a l l o w t h e j u r y t o convict

defendant for criminal negligence even though the blood

a l c o h o l l e v e l was l e s s t h a n .lo.
The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e h o l d i n g by t h i s C o u r t t h a t

the tort concept of gross negligence i s somewhat n e b u l o u s

d o e s n o t i n a n y way s u p p o r t t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s a r e

unconstitutionally vague. The State points out that the

s t a n d a r d i s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e must b e s p e c i f i c enough t o g i v e

f a i r n o t i c e o f t h e c o n d u c t p r o h i b i t e d and t o p r o v i d e a mean-

i n g f u l d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n between c u l p a b l e and i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t .

The S t a t e p o i n t s o u t t h a t it i s n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o l e a v e t o

t h e j u r y t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f g r o s s d e v i a t i o n from t h e s t a n -

d a r d o f c o n d u c t t h a t a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n would o b s e r v e i n t h e

actor's situation.

The S t a t e a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s t o b e

made by t h e j u r y taking into consideration the t o t a l i t y of

d e f e n d a n t 1s conduct, including the speed of the vehicle,
d i s r e g a r d o f w a r n i n g s t h a t h e was t o o d r u n k t o d r i v e , a s w e l l

as any evidence of intoxication. In Ketchum v. Ward

(W.D.N.Y. 1976), 422 F.Supp. 934, aff'd, 556 F.2d 557 (2d

Cir. 1977), t h e court upheld a negligent homicide statute

s i m i l a r t o S 45-5-104(1), MCA. W e agree with t h e holding i n

Ketchum that the inability of an attorney t o predict the

outcome o f t h e j u r y d e l i b e r a t i o n s on t h e q u e s t i o n o f n e g l i -

gence i s n o t a s u f f i c i e n t b a s i s f o r a f i n d i n g o f u n c o n s t i t u -

t i o n a l vagueness. W e a l s o adopt t h e view e x p r e s s e d by t h e

U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n U n i t e d S t a t e v . Ragen (1942),

314 U.S. 5 1 3 , 523:

"The mere f a c t t h a t a p e n a l s t a t u t e i s s o
framed a s t o r e q u i r e a j u r y upon o c c a s i o n
t o determine a question of reasonableness
i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o make i t t o o v a q u e t o
afford a p r a c t i c a l guide t o permissible
conduct. "

A s w e c o n s i d e r t h e s t a t u t e s set f o r t h above, w e c o n c l u d e

t h a t t h e r e i s no i n d e f i n i t e n e s s o n t h e f a c e o f t h e s t a t u t e s

s u f f i c i e n t t o require a holding of unconstitutionality. We

a l s o conclude t h a t t h e r e i s no b a s i s for f i n d i n g t h e same

unconstitutional as applied to present fact circumstances.

It is difficult to imagine that conduct, which included

d r i n k i n g b o t h b e e r and w h i s k y o v e r many h o u r s , disregarding

warnings from s e v e r a l p e o p l e t h a t h e was t o o i n t o x i c a t e d t o

drive, and then g e t t i n g behind t h e wheel of a v e h i c l e and

d r i v i n g down t h e highway a t a s p e e d c o n s i d e r a b l y i n e x c e s s o f

t h e speed l i m i t , could not be classed a s a gross deviation,

meaning a deviation that is considerably greater than the

lack of ordinary care. We conclude that the statutes in

question a r e not unconstitutional.

D e f e n d a n t a r g u e s t h a t i n s t r u c t i o n no. 15 ( a ) allowed t h e

j u r y t o c o n v i c t f o r c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e m e r e l y o n some d e g r e e

of intoxication. That i s not an accurate statement of t h e
instruction. Instruction no. 15 c l e a r l y r e q u i r e s that any

intoxication relied upon must c o n s t i t u t e a g r o s s d e v i a t i o n
from t h e s t a n d a r d o f care a s defined i n other instructions.

A s t h i s Court held i n S t a t e v. Cooke (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 645 P.2d

1367, 39 St.Rep. 1026, criminal negligence can arise as a

r e s u l t of driving a c a r while intoxicated. W e conclude t h a t

i n s t r u c t i o n no. 1 5 ( a ) i s n o t improper.

W e h o l d t h a t §§ 45-5-104 and 45-2-201(37), MCA, are not

u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y vague.

XI1

Did the District Court err in refusing defendant's

proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 and 3 8 , which i n s t r u c t e d

the jury in substance that a guilty verdict on negligent

homicide r e q u i r e d a finding of "conscious" disregard o f t h e

risk?

Defendant s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 5 and 38 r e f e r r e d

t o t h e necessity o f t h e defendant a c t i n g with a mental s t a t e

a s an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e . Such i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e improp-

er. This Court has previously decided t h a t mental s t a t e is

n o t a n i s s u e i n n e g l i g e n t homicide c a s e s . S t a t e v. K i r k a l d i e

(1978), 1 7 9 Mont. 283, 587 P.2d 1298. See a l s o , S t a t e v.

Cook (Mont. 1982), 645 P.2d 1367, 1369, 39 St.Rep. 1026,

1029.

D e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n s no. 6 , 7 and 8 r e l a t e d

to the t e r m "conscious," a s used i n the f i r s t part of the

definition of negligence in S 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA. As to

i n s t r u c t i o n s 6 and 7 , t h e D i s t r i c t Court concluded t h a t t h e

word " c o n s c i o u s l y " w a s a common word i n t h e E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e

and required no definition. That follows the holdings of

this Court that words of common language need not be ex-

plained. S t a t e v. Camitsch (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 626 P.2d 1250, 38
St.Rep. 563. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n

i n making t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

With r e s p e c t t o proposed i n s t r u c t i o n no. 8, it i n s e r t s

t h e word " c o n s c i o u s l y " w h e r e i t i s n o t a p p l i c a b l e .

W e t h e r e f o r e conclude t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t err

i n r e f u s i n g i n s t r u c t i o n s n o . 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 a n d 38.

XI11

Did t h e D i s t r i c t c o u r t a d e q u a t e l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t

the .10 p re s u m p t i o n o f i n t o x i c a t i o n a p p l i e d on1.y t o t h e D U I

charge?

The defendant argues that the instruction should have

included a c a u t i o n a r y statement t h a t t h e presumption t h a t a

person i s under t h e i n f l u e n c e o f a l c o h o l i f t h e blood a l c o h o l

c o n t e n t i s .10 o r g r e a t e r could n o t b e a p p l i e d t o t h e n e g l i -

gent homicide charge. I n s t r u c t i o n no. 19 r e f e r r e d t o the

"blood a l c o h o l l e v e l o f .lo" a s t h e p h r a s e i s used i n Count

11, t h e charge of d r i v i n g under the influence of alcohol.

The record established that the prosecution did not

a r g u e t o t h e j u r y t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n a p p l i e d i n a n y manner

to the negligent homicide charge. The District Court so

observed in discussing the same with counsel outside the

presence of t h e jury. There i s nothing i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

to tie the .10 presumption to the charge of negligent

homicide.

It i s important t o note t h a t t h e evidence of defendant's

i n t o x i c a t i o n went f a r beyond that pertaining to his blood

alcohol level. T h e r e was ample and significant additional

evidence of the defendant's intoxication, including defen-

d a n t ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t h e was " p r e t t y much i n t o x i c a t e d " a t t h e

b a r i n t h e evening.

We conclude that the court adequately instructed the

jury with regard to the .10 presumption of intoxication.
 XIV

Did the District Court err in denying defendant's
post-trial motions for a finding of not guilty or a new

trial?
Our discussion of previous issues clearly establishes
that in light of the evidence presented, there was no basis
for a finding by the judge of not guilty or for the granting

of a new trial.
We affirm.

~
Justic J
We concur:
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting in part and concurring
in part:

I would hold that S 45-1-104(1.), MCA, which describes

the crime of negligent homicide, is unconstitutionally vague,
when considered with the definition of "negligently" set out
in § 45-2-101 ( 3 7 ) , MCA.
The statute leaves the determination of criminal conduct
to a iury's perception of the standard of conduct that a
"reasonable" person would have observed in the actorsr
situation, and then the jury's perception of what involves a
"gross deviation" from that standard. The statutory scheme
is too uncertain to be upheld. We may well disapprove of the
defendant's conduct on the day in question, but his
conviction for criminal negligent homicide is based on
formless and indistinct statutes which inadequately describe
what constitutes a crime. On their face, the statutes defy
containment.
7: further disagree with the holding of the majority
respecting the instruction on circumstantial evidence. If we
regard the statements of the defendant that he was driving as
direct evidence (I do not since they are at most admissions),
the corroboration for those statements exists only in
circumstantial evidence. There is no other direct evidence.
To be truly corroborative, the circumstantial evidence should
be consistent only with the hypothesis that he was guilty of
a crime, and not consistent with any other rational
conclusion. The jury should have been so instructed, by the
court, if the instruction offered by the defendant was not
accurately stated. Th.e majority reliance on State v. Bean,
supra, is faulty on two bases: such an instruction was not
offered in Bean, and, if Bean is interpreted as the majority
interprets it, the holding is incorrect.
Whether the State undertakes to prove the guilt of the
defendant by direct evidence, or indirect (circumstantial)
evidence, or by a combination of direct and indirect
evidence, the facts and circumstances in evidence produced by
the State should be consistent with each other and with the
guilt of the defendant, and. inconsistent with any reasonable
theory of the defendant's innocence. That is merely another
way of saying that the State must prove its case against the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
I have other problems with the majority opinion, but

these will suffice. 1 would reverse the conviction of
criminal homicide against the defendant, and sustain his
conviction of driving under the influence of intoxicating
liquor.

Justice