No. 8 5 - 2 2 4
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1986
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-VS-
R. RAY HASKINS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Mineral,
The Honorable Douglas Harkin, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Stewart A. Pearce, 11, Missoula, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
John Paulson, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, Montana
M. Shaun Donovan, County Attorney, Superior, Manta-na
Submitted on Briefs: Dec. 30, 1985
Decided: February 13, 1985
Filed: FEB 13 I986
M r . J u s t i c e Frank E. Morrison, Jr., d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from a c o n v i c t i o n o f f e l o n y t h e f t i n
t h e D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l District, Mineral
County. Because defendant was denied his constitutional
r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l , w e r e v e r s e and remand w i t h i n s t r u c -
t i o n s t o dismiss t h e charge.
Defendant, R. Ray H a s k i n s , was a r r e s t e d o n O c t o b e r 1 9 ,
1982, and h e l d i n t h e M i n e r a l County J a i l u n t i l O c t o b e r 22,
1982, when he was released on bond. The State filed an
i n f o r m a t i o n November 16, 1982, charging defendant with t h e
b u r g l a r y o f t h e L.D. P o l i c h r e s i d e n c e n e a r T a r k i o , Monta.na,
and w i t h t h e t h e f t o f v a r i o u s h o u s e h o l d i t e m s belonging t o
the Polichs.
Defendant f i l e d m o t i o n s December 21, 1982, seeking t o
q u a s h h i s a r r e s t a s b e i n g i l l e g a l and t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e .
A h e a r i n g was held on t h e motions January 18, 1983. The
m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e was g r a n t e d , w h i l e t h e m o t i o n t o
q u a s h t h e a r r e s t was d e n i e d on F e b r u a r y 2 4 , 1983. Then, on
April 1, 1983, p u r s u a n t t o a m o t i o n t o amend, the D i s t r i c t
Court g r a n t e d t h e motion t o quash t h e a r r e s t .
Defendant next filed a motion on April 20, 1983, to
dismiss the information for lack of probable cause. The
m o t i o n was d e n i e d May 13, 1983, and on May 17, 1983, the
trial judge set defendant's arraignment f o r May 31, 1983.
At the arraignment, defendant entered pleas of not
g u i l t y t o b o t h c h a r g e s a n d s u b m i t t e d numerous m o t i o n s , in-
c l u d i n g a m o t i o ~ ?t o d i s m i s s f o r l a c k o f s p e e d y t r i a l . The
t r i a l jud.ge o r d e r e d b r i e f i n g on t h e s p e e d y t r i a l i s s u e and
set t r i a l for July 25, 1983. The s p e e d y t r i a l m o t i o n was
d e n i e d J u l y 1, 1 9 8 3 , a s most o f t h e d e l a y was found a t t r i b u t -
a b l e t o defendant.
On t h e m o r n i n g o f trial, t h e C o u n t y A t t o r n e y moved t o
amend t h e a l r e a d y amended i n f o r m a t i o n t o a l l e g e a d i f f e r e n t
offense date. Defendant had e a r l i e r g i v e n n o t i c e o f a n a l i b i
defense t o t h e burglary charge. Therefore, defendant object-
ed to the amendment as being substantive in nature. The
t r i a l j u d g e g r a . n t e d t h e amendment, b u t a l s o g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t
a continuance.
On J u l y 2 8 , 1 9 8 3 , a new j u d g e a c c e p t e d j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d
s e t t r i a l f o r A u g u s t 2 9 , 1983. D e s p i t e motions by defendant
to compel p r o d u c t i o n of certain evidence, to continue the
t r i a l d a t e a n d t o s e v e r t h e two c o u n t s , t r i a l w a s h a d A u g u s t
29, 1983. The j u r y f o u n d d e f e n d a n t n o t g u i l t y o f b u r g l a r y on
August 31, 1983, h u t f a i l e d t o r e a c h a v e r d i c t on t h e t h e f t
charge.
The M i n e r a l County A t t o r n e y f i l e d a m o t i o n S e p t e m b e r 7 ,
1 9 8 3 , r e q u e s t i n g t h a t a new t r i a l o n t h e t h e f t c h a r g e b e s e t .
Trial was s e t on September 9 , 1983, f o r October 24, 1983.
Thereafter, on September 14, 1983, d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a motion
r e q u e s t i n g s u b s t i t u t i o n o f a new j u d g e . Judge Harkin a c c e p t -
ed j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c a s e September 2 0 , 1 9 8 3 , a n d o n Sep-
t e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 8 3 , reset t r i a l f o r November 1 4 , 1 9 8 3 .
Because d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a l r e a d y ha.d a trial scheduled
f o r t h a t d a t e , he requested t h e t r i a l d a t e be continued u n t i l
the week of December 12, 1983. The trial judge granted
d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a i v e h i s
r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l f o r t h e t i m e p e r i o d commencing Novem-
ber 14, 1983, until the court could schedule a new t r i a l
date. D e f e n d a n t w a i v e d h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l o n Novem-
b e r 1 0 , 1983, s t a t i n g :
I N MOVING f o r c o n t i n u a n c e o f h i s r e - t r i a l
t o - s p r i n g , 1984, J u r y t e r m , Defendant
- the
waives h i s r i g h t t o speedy t r i a l from t h e
period 14-November-83 t o early 1984,
while reserving a l l objections f o r t h e
period 19-October-82 to 14-November-83.
(emphasis supplied)
On January 16, 1984, defendant's trial was set to begin
September 4, 1984. Practically the only activity between
January 1984 and the trial was a motion filed by defendant on
May 16, 1984, requesting any evidence obtained hy the prose-
cution since the last trial. No response was made to the
motion.
Finally, on August 31, 1.984, defendant filed numerous
pre-trial motions, including a motion alleging the denial of
defendant's right to a speedy trial. Trial commenced as
scheduled, with the trial judge reserving his ruling on the
speedy trial motion until after trial-. Defendant was con-
victed of theft on September 10, 1984. On November 20, 1984,
after denying d.efendantlsspeedy trial motion from the bench,
the trial judge gave defendant a three-year deferred sen-
tence, predicated on defendant serving six months in the
Mineral County Jail, paying restitution to the Polichs and
obeying a.11 conditions imposed by the Department of Institu-
tions' Division of Adult Probation and Parole.
Defendant appeals, raising numerous issues. However, we
find the issue of whether defendant was denied his constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial to be dispositive.
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to all crimi-
nal defendants by the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article 11, 5 24 of the Montana Constitution
(1972). The factors to be used in determining whether this
right has been abridged were originally set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407
U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. They are:
1) length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the
defendant's timely assertion of his right; and 4) the
prejudice s u f f e r e d by defendant. We have repeatedly used
t h e s e same f a c t o r s f o r d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r P40ntana1s c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l has been denied. However,
no i n d i v i d u a l factor is dispositive. See S t a t e v. Britton
(Mont. 1984), 689 P.2d 1256, 1258, 4 1 St.Rep. 2018, 2019.
The l e n g t h o f t h e delay j.s t h e t e s t by which a s p e e d y
t r i a l inquiry is triggered. The del-ay must b e or' a s u f f i -
c i e n t l e n g t h t o b e deemed " p r e s u m p t i v e l y p r e j u d i c i a l , " e l s e
there is no need to inquire into the remaining factors.
S t a t e v . Chavez (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 691 P.2d 1 3 6 5 , 1369, 4 1 S t . R e p .
2219, 2222. The l e n g t h o f t i m e between d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t on
October 19, 3 982, a n d t h e s t a r t o f d e f e n d a n t 1s s e c o n d t r i a l
on September 4 , 1984 (686 d a y s ) , c l e a r l y c o n s t i t u t e s "pre-
sumptive p r e j u d i c e . " So d o e s t h e l e n g t h o f t i m e b e t w e e n t h e
f i r s t t r i a l , which ended August 3 1 , 1 9 8 3 , i n a hung j u r y on
t h e t h e f t c h a r g e , a n d September 4 , 1 9 8 4 , th.e s t a r t o f d e f e n -
d a n t ' s second t r i a l (370 d a y s ) . S e e S t a t e v . Ackley (1982) ,
201 Mont. 252, 653 P.2d 851. W e t h e r e f o r e confine our analy-
s i s t o t h e second t i m e frame.
Though d e f e n d a n t w a i t e d u n t i l August 3 1 , 1 9 8 4 , t o r a i s e
the s p e e d y t r i a l i s s u e , t h e a s s e r t i o n o f h i s r i g h t was t i m e l y
b e c a u s e it was made p r i o r t o t h e s t a r t o f t r i a l .
However, d e l a y o f a s s e r t i o n o f t h e r i g h t
t o s p e e d y t r i a l i s n o t measured s i m p l y by
m e a s u r i n g t h e l a p s e o f t i m e from t h e t i m e
o f t h e charge u n t i l t h e t i m e t h e motion
i.s made. Rather, t h e s o l e inquiry i s
w h e t h e r d e f e n d a n t h a s moved b e f o r e t r i a l
t o d i s m i s s on t h e ground t h a t h e h a s b e e n
denied a speedy t r i a l . The U n i t e d S t a t e s
Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d i n B a r k e r 5 Wingo,
s u p r a , t h a t " [ t ] h e r e i s no f i x e d p o i n t i n
t h e c r i m i n a l p r o c e s s when t h e S t a t e c a n
p u t t h e defenda.nt t o t h e c h o i c e o f e i t h e r
e x e r c i s i n g o r waiving t h e r i g h t t o a
speedy t r i a l . " 407 U.S. a t 521, 92 S.Ct.
a t 2187. FJe a d o p t t h i s same p o s i t i o n
when i n t e r p r e t i n g o u r own C o n s t i t u t i o ~ .
S t a t e v . B r i t t o n , 6 8 9 P.2d a t 1260, 4 1 St.Rep. a t 2022.
Since defendant was presumptively prejud-iced by the
delay i n h i s t r i a l , the S t a t e h a s t h e burden o f rebutting
t h i s p r e j u d i c e by p r o v i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d
by t h e d e l a y a n d / o r by p r o v i d i n g a r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y which
outweighs t h e p r e j u d i c e t o t h e d e f e n d a n t . S t a t e v. Chavez,
6 9 1 P.2d a t 1370, 4 1 St.l?ep. a t 2223.
In its brief, the S t a t e contends defendant made o n l y
vague a l l e g a t i o n s of p r e j u d i c e and t h a t p u r s u a n t t o S t a t e v .
Chavez, s u p r a , d e f e n d a n t "may n o t rest merely on t h e presump-
t i o n o f p r e j u d i c e under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " P r e j u d i c e can
be shown i n many ways, primarily: 1) o p p r e s s i v e p r e - t r i a l
incarceration; 2) anxiety and c o n c e r n o f t h e accused while
a.waiting t r i a l ; and 3 ) impairment o f t h e defense. Barker,
4 0 7 U.S. a t 532, 9 2 S.Ct. a t 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d a t 118. Defen-
dant obviously d i d not s u f f e r oppressive p r e - t r i a l incarcer-
ation. H e was in t h e Mineral County J a i l f o r only t h r e e
days. However, defendant alleges that he suffered severe
anxiety while awaiting final disposition of the charges
a g a i n s t him. He e x p e r i e n c e d b o t h p e r s o n a l b a n k r u p t c y and t h e
bankruptcy of his logging business. Testimony by several
character witnesses a t the t r i a l supports defendant's allega-
t i o n t h a t h i s r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e community was r u i n e d . These
a r e a l l r e a s o n s f o r g r e a t a n x i e t y and s u f f i c i e n t a l l e g a t i o n s
t o p l a c e t h e burden o f p r o v i n g no r e s u l t a n t p r e j u d i c e on t h e
State. See S t a t e v . B r i t t o n , supra. The S t a t e h a s n o t m e t
i t s burden.
Finally, and most importantly, we note the lack of
r e a s o n s o f f e r e d by t h e S t a t e f o r t h e d e l a y between November
14, 1983, and September 4 , 1984. The o n l y r e a s o n o f f e r e d by
the S t a t e was that no t r i a l s were held i n Mineral County
d u r i n g t h e 1984 s p r i n g c a l e n d a r . This reason i s inadequate
in light of the waiver signed by defendant and quoted above,
specifically waiving his right to a speedy trial until early
1984. Given the presumption against waivers of constitution-
al rights, State v. Ackley, 201 Mont. at 257, 653 P.2d at
854, we refuse to extend defendant's waiver past the Spring
There is no indication the State attempted to reschedule
the trial for an earlier time or to ascertain why an earlier
date would not be possible. Granted, the delay is an "insti-
tutional delay" and therefore should not be weighed against
the State as heavily as an intentional "dragging of the feet1'
by the State. However, it is the responsibility of the State
to bring defendant to trial. It is not the responsibility of
the defendant to ensure that he is prosecuted. State v.
Britton, 689 P.2d at 1261, 41 St.Rep. at 2023.
Reversed.
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