State v. Hawkins

No. 12686

I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE STATE OF MONTANA

1974

THE STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-VS -
SHERMAN P. HAWKINS,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable R o b e r t H. Wilson, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record :

For Appellant :

S a n d a l l , Moses, Cavan and Kampfe, B i l l i n g s , Montana
D. Frank Kampfe a r g u e d , and A. C l i f f o r d Edwards
a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana

F o r Respondent :

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
John P - A t k i n s , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , a r g u e d ,
Helena, Montana
Harold F. Hanser, County A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana
C h a r l e s A. B r a d l e y , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d ,
B i l l i n g s , Montana

Submitted: September 1 3 , 1974

DecideQEC
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Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

This i s an appeal from a f i n a l judgment of conviction a f t e r
a jury v e r d i c t of g u i l t y of murder i n t h e f i r s t degree i n t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, i n connection with t h e s l a y i n g
of defendant ' s w i f e , Sandra Hawkins.
This appeal p r e s e n t s b u t one i s s u e f o r t h i s Court's review:
The r e f u s a l by t h e t r i a l judge t o give a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n s t o
t h e j u r y during i t s d e l i b e r a t i o n .
The f a c t s a r e n o t i n d i s p u t e and a p p e l l a n t agrees t h e c o u r t
properly i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y , p r i o r t o d e l i b e r a t i o n .
The j u r y r e t i r e d f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n a t 4:53 p.m.; a t 12:40

a.m., t h e c o u r t ordered t h e jury i n t o t h e courtroom and proceeded
i n t h i s manner:
"THE COURT: Ladies and Gentlemen of t h e J u r y ,
I d o n ' t want you t o i n d i c a t e t o m i n any way what
e
your vote may be a t t h i s point o r which way your
vote may be, b u t I want t o a s k you i f you t h i n k t h a t
you a r e c l o s e t o reaching a v e r d i c t a t t h i s t i m e .
"JURY F R M N Yes, Xour Honor, I t h i n k t h a t we
OE A :
a r e f a i r l y c l o s e . I mean i t i s n ' t t h a t lopsided.
"THE COURT: The reason t h a t I am asking t h i s i s
t h a t it has been a long day f o r a l l of you, I know,
and some of you probably have g r e a t endurance,
physical and otherwise, than o t h e r s because of age
and various t h i n g s , and t h i s i s what I am concerned
about, and t h i s i s why I was i n q u i r i n g a s t o whether
o r n o t you t h i n k you a r e c l o s e t o a v e r d i c t .
"JURY F RM N
OE A: May I ask a q u e s t i o n , s i r ?
"THE COURT: No, t h e law won't permit t h a t . I f you have
any questions t h e law r e q u i r e s t h a t you submit t h e
question t o m e i n w r i t i n g and I w i l l answer i t i n t h e
same way.
"JURY F RM N
OE A : W have i t i n w r i t i n g .
e
"THE COURT: Very w e l l , M r . B a i l i f f , w i l l you submit
t h e w r i t t e n question t o t h e Court?
"(Thereupon t h e B a i l i f f submitted t h e w r i t t e n
questions t o t h e Court, s a i d questions being a s
follows :
"1. D each of t h e conditions of w i l l f u l ,
o
d e l i b e r a t e and premeditated have t o be proven
by t h e S t a t e ?
"2. Does d e l i b e r a t e have anything t o do with
premeditate?
 "3. Does d e l i b e r a t e mean t h e defendant has given
thought t o more than deciding t o perform o r n o t per-
form t h e a c t i o n ?
" 4 . Does d e l i b e r a t i o n mean considering t h e con-
sequences of t h e crime before committing i t ? "
The c o u r t excused t h e j u r y u n t i l 9:00 a.m., t h e following
day and immediately met with counsel i n chambers. The c o u r t ' s f i r s t
impression, s t a t e d i n t h e record, was t h a t i f counsel agreed t h e
c o u r t would i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t h a t t h e words w e r e a l r e a d y defined
i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s and he could n o t i n s t r u c t f u r t h e r on d e f i n i t i o n .
F u r t h e r , t h e c o u r t suggested t h a t i f both counsel could agree on
any f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n t h a t would answer t h e j u r y ' s q u e s t i o n s ,
t h e c o u r t would a l s o consider t h a t a s well.
Counsel could n o t agree t o a d d i t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n . Counsel
r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e s t a t e requested t h a t no f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n be
given t h e j u r y t o prevent any f u r t h e r confusion. Counsel f o r
defendant requested t h a t question number 1 be answered, b u t t h a t
numbers 2 , 3, and 4 not be answered. Counsel f o r t h e s t a t e objected
t o t h e answering of question 1, and s t a t e d t h a t i f number 1 was
answered, then numbers 2 , 3 and 4 should a l s o be answered. In
o t h e r words, counsel disagreed about which of t h e q u e s t i o n s , i f

any, should be answered and d i d n o t make any e f f o r t t o propose
f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n a s suggested by t h e c o u r t , except i n t h i s
suggestion by defense counsel t o c a l l f u r t h e r a t t e n t i o n t o c o u r t ' s
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1;
"MR. KAMPFE: The f i r s t question b o t h e r s m e , Judge.
"THE COURT: But i t should be c l e a r l y defined.
"MR. BRADLEY: Every m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n of t h e
Information h a s t o be proved and t h e s e a r e t h e
m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s . The word w i l l f u l , premeditated
and d e l i b e r a t e a r e a l l defined.
"MR. KAMPFE: W e l l , t h e f i r s t question bothers m e because
.
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t h a t i s very p l a i n i n t h e I n s t r u c t i o n s .
"THE COURT: I t ' s i n t h e f i r s t i n s t r u c t i o n . I t h i n k t h e
f i r s t two i n s t r u c t i o n s cover t h a t , t h e f a c t t h a t they must
prove a l l of t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s a r e i n about t h r e e
o r four i n s t r u c t i o n s a l t o g e t h e r , b u t i t i s s p e c i f i c a l l y
set out what t h e s p e c i f i c a l l e g a t i o n s a r e and you can de-
f i n e w i l l f u l and premeditation.
 '?MR. KAMPFE: It would be m suggestion t o t h e Court
y
t h a t t h e f i r s t question should be answered by e i t h e r
r e f e r r i n g t o a s p e c i f i c Court i n s t r u c t i o n and an
example of t h a t would be see Court's I n s t r u c t i o n such and
such, o r i n t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , which would be answered by
saying, yes, before a conviction of f i r s t degree murder
can be rendered you must b e l i e v e beyond a reasonable
doubt t h a t each of t h e s e s e p a r a t e elements have been
proven by the S t a t e , and I make t h e a d d i t i o n a l suggestion
t h a t t h e t h r e e remaining questions should not be answered.
** *.I1 (Emphasis supplied.)
The s t a t e , a s s t a t e d h e r e t o f o r e , objected and t h e c o u r t
submitted t h e following answer t o t h e j u r y :
II
The answers t o your questions a r e contained i n t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n s given. I cannot f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t you
on t h e s e m a t t e r s and suggest t h a t you r e f e r t o t h e
written instructions on t h e law which you have i n t h e
jury room. 1I
The record does n o t i n d i c a t e any o b j e c t i o n by counsel t o t h e
method t h e judge adopted t o solve t h e problem of t h e j u r y ' s
questions.
Appellant contends t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o answer t h e
j u r y ' s questions i s an abnegation by t h e t r i a l judge of h i s
s p e c i f i c and h i s s i n g l e most important duty: t o i n s u r e a f a i r and
i m p a r t i a l t r i a l f o r t h e accused. That without an answer t o t h e
j u r y ' s question number 1, submitted t o t h e c o u r t , a p p e l l a n t main-
t a i n s t h e j u r y was s t i l l confused a s t o who had t h e burden of proof
a s t o t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s of w i l l f u l , d e l i b e r a t e and pre-
meditated. He contends he was thereby denied h i s r i g h t t o a f a i r
jury t r i a l .
It i s , however, a l s o arguable t h a t t h e r e p l y of t h e t r i a l
judge t o t h e j u r y s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r e d up t h e confusion on t h e
p a r t of t h e j u r y s o t h a t i t f u l l y comprehended who had t h e burden
of proof i n proving t h e m a t e r i a l a l l e g a t i o n s .
Section 95-1913(d), R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
'I* ** After t h e j u r y has r e t i r e d f o r d e l i b e r a t i o n ***
i f they d e s i r e t o be informed on any point of law a r i s i n g
i n t h e cause, they must r e q u i r e t h e o f f i c e r t o conduct
them i n t o c o u r t . Upon being brought i n t o c o u r t , t h e i n -
formation requested may given i n t h e d i s c r e t i o n o m
court ** n
&.I1 (Emphasis added.)
 It is therefore, in the discretion of the court whether or not
to give additional instructions to the jury. The district judge
did not abuse his discretion.
If the judge is of the opinion the instructions already given
are adequate, correctly state the law, and fully advise the jury
on the procedures it is to follow in its deliberation, his refusal
to answer a question already answered in the instructions is not error.
Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938; State v. Vaughn, 200
Ore. 275, 265 P.2d 249; State v Flett, 234 Ore. 124, 380 P.2d 634;
.
State v. Weinandt, 84 S.D. 322, 171 ~ . ~ . 2 73.
d
This is particularly true when defense has argued that the
instructions as a whole are adequate and the answer to the jury's
question number 1 "is very plain in the instruction" given. This
takes defendant's argument away from judicial discretion and into
the area of personal opinion and conjecture as to confusion, i.e.,
the five instructions presented as primarily responsible; which
questions caused confusion and if one or all should or should not
be answered, and if any confusion existed after the court's instruc-
tion to reread the instructions already given.
Defendant relies on State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P. 309,
for support. However, a close reading of Jackson will demonstrate
that these are not our facts and hence easily distinguishable from
the instant case. Jackson arose from the withdrawal of an in-
struction felt necessary by the Supreme Court, which in fact was
instructing the jury further and orally at that, when told by the
trial court to disregard the w i t h d m instruction.
The judgment of the district

Justice
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We Concur:

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Chief Justice