[Cite as State v. Hebdon, 2013-Ohio-1729.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NOS. CA2012-03-052
CA2012-03-062
:
- vs - OPINION
: 4/29/2013
KEVIN L. HEBDON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY AREA III COURT
Case Nos. CRB110728 and CRB1101318
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Kimberly L. McManus, Government
Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
Jeremy L. Evans, 306 South Third Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-appellant
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Kevin Hebdon, appeals his conviction in the Butler County
Area III Court for sexual imposition.
{¶ 2} In May 2011, appellant was charged with two counts of sexual imposition,
misdemeanors of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.06(A)(1). The charges stemmed
from allegations that appellant had touched his stepdaughter, B.S., on her breast and
buttocks in September 2010 and April 2011.
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
{¶ 3} Prior to trial, appellant filed several motions for discovery, including a Notice of
Exculpatory Evidence and Motion for Disclosure on September 26, 2011. In his motion,
appellant requested that the state furnish two diaries belonging to B.S. During a hearing on
the motion, the prosecution argued that it had already disclosed the relevant portions of
B.S.'s diaries, and that allowing appellant to read the remaining portions of the diaries would
only result in more trauma for B.S. Conversely, the defense argued that appellant was
entitled to B.S.'s diaries in their entirety under Crim.R. 16(B). Ultimately, the trial court
conducted an in camera inspection of the diaries to determine if they contained additional
evidence requiring disclosure.
{¶ 4} After the in camera review, the court proceeded directly to a bench trial, without
allowing appellant to review the remaining portions of B.S.'s diaries. Thus, presumably, the
trial court denied appellant's motion for disclosure. See State v. Wagner, 12th Dist. No.
CA2002-07-056, 2003-Ohio-2369, ¶ 3 ("when faced with a silent record, [a reviewing court]
will presume that any outstanding motions at the conclusion of the proceeding have been
overruled").
{¶ 5} At trial, B.S. testified that she had lived with her mother, her brothers, and
appellant since she was roughly two years old. B.S. testified that in early September 2010,
when she was 14 years old, she was lying in the middle of her bed reading a book, when
appellant entered her room and laid down on the bed next to her while talking to her mother
on the phone. B.S. stated that appellant placed the phone on hold, so that her mother could
not hear the noises in B.S.'s bed. At that point, B.S. claimed that appellant placed his left
hand on her right breast. B.S. explained that appellant used his hand to cup her breast
"completely * * * including the nipple and areola." B.S. also testified that appellant would
often ask her whether her breasts were real or "fake," but she could not specifically recall
-2-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
whether appellant made any such comment that night.
{¶ 6} B.S. also explained that on numerous evenings when her mother was at work,
appellant would ask to stay in B.S.'s bed for the entire night. Further, B.S. testified that in the
months leading up to the September 2010 incident, appellant often told her that she looked
"super hot or cute," and would call her "baby * * * in an uncomfortable way." Additionally,
appellant would compare B.S.'s breast size to her mother's breast size, and told B.S. that if
he were younger and not married to her mother, that he would date her.
{¶ 7} B.S. then testified that in April 2011, she was in the family computer room doing
her homework, when appellant approached her to talk about an upcoming school dance.
Appellant gave B.S. permission to go to the dance, but B.S. told him that she did not want to
go, and that she had other plans. At that point, appellant grabbed B.S.'s hands and made
her dance with him. According to B.S., appellant first placed his hands on B.S.'s upper waist
and asked, "[i]s this how boys dance with you?" Appellant then moved his hands below her
waist, and said, "or like this?" B.S. testified that at that point, appellant lifted her up by her
buttocks and swung her around. B.S. stated that she had to hit appellant's chest to make
him let go of her, and that when he finally put her down, he left the room and appeared
upset.
{¶ 8} During cross-examination, the defense asked B.S. about two diaries that she
kept in 2010 and 2011. The defense asked B.S. about a specific entry in one of the diaries,
entitled "[T]op ten list of reasons why [I] don't like Kevin," which listed "felt me up (cleavage)"
as the number one reason. B.S. indicated that she had included this entry because
appellant's touching of her breasts was "important" to her. B.S. also testified that she
sometimes wrote in her diary to express anger and other "personal things," such as her
problems with her physical appearance and the lack of attention that people paid to her.
-3-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
{¶ 9} The defense also questioned B.S. about a text message that she received from
a friend at some point after the September 2010 incident, asking whether appellant had
"touched [her] again." B.S. explained that when appellant discovered the text message, he
confiscated her phone and gave it to her mother. Before her mother left for work the next
day, she and appellant confronted B.S. about the text message. B.S. testified that she was
not comfortable speaking with her mother in front of appellant, but that when appellant left
the room, she told her mother that appellant had touched her. However, B.S. immediately
told her mother that she was "not a hundred percent sure that anything had happened."
When the defense asked B.S. why she failed to tell her mother the whole story, B.S.
explained, "I knew she was going to work and I didn't want to start anything right then and
there since she was leaving." B.S. also testified that she did not want to start anything
because of the stress it would cause the rest of her family.
{¶ 10} Lastly, B.S. testified on cross-examination about a conversation that she had
with the police shortly after she made the allegations against appellant. B.S. admitted to
telling the police that during the September 2010 incident, appellant sat, rather than laid, on
her bed, and that prior to touching her breast, appellant said that he wanted to make sure
that her breasts were not "fake."
{¶ 11} After B.S. testified, B.S.'s grandmother, J.S., took the witness stand. J.S.
testified that on several occasions within the last year, she saw appellant approach B.S. from
behind and hug her "very tightly * * *." J.S. also stated that appellant would sometimes place
his head in B.S.'s lap while she sat on the sofa, which "creeped" J.S. out.
{¶ 12} Next, B.S.'s mother, R.H., testified for the defense. R.H. testified that she was
not alarmed by the fact that appellant had laid on B.S.'s bed in September 2010. R.H. further
testified that when she confronted B.S. about the text message from her friend, B.S. was "not
-4-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
very forthcoming with any response at all * * *." R.H. stated that before leaving for work,
I was trying to encourage [B.S.] to open up and talk to me. So I
asked her, you know, was this true? Had [appellant] touched
her? Finally, her response was yes. And then she immediately
said, I'm not sure anything really happened. So I asked her to
try to give me some specific details, you know, was she
dressed? She said that she was. Was he dressed? She said
he was, you know, was the touch just on the breast? She said
yes, but, again, she wasn't sure anything had really happened.
{¶ 13} When R.H. spoke to B.S. several weeks later, B.S. told her that she was sure
that appellant had actually touched her, and indicated that, "well, [appellant] failed [a]
polygraph test so that confirms everything." R.H. stated that this was the extent of her
conversation with B.S. about the allegations.
{¶ 14} R.H. also testified that she believed that appellant was joking when he asked
B.S. whether her breasts were "fake." According to R.H., appellant told her that he was
simply trying to ease the tension while asking B.S. whether she was being bullied for her
physical appearance at school. Appellant also told R.H. that he never touched B.S.'s breast.
As to the April 2011 incident, appellant told R.H. that he was concerned that B.S. was afraid
to attend her first middle school dance because of the provocative dancing that might occur.
Appellant told R.H. that he had placed his hands on B.S.'s buttocks simply to show what type
of contact was inappropriate.
{¶ 15} After R.H.'s testimony, appellant testified that he had always been concerned
about B.S.'s large breast size, as well as her immodest wardrobe choices, which included
low-cut shirts that showed too much cleavage. As a result, one night before school began in
September 2010, appellant sat on B.S.'s bed and asked her if she was being teased at
school for her breast size. According to appellant, at some point in the middle of the
conversation, R.H. called appellant's cell phone. Appellant explained that he placed R.H. on
hold to finish the conversation with B.S., and that, in an effort to make B.S. more
-5-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
comfortable, he said, "I can't even believe that * * * my little girl is this big. * * * * I ought to
poke you to see if it's real." Appellant stated that he reached his finger toward B.S.'s sternum
area, but that B.S. grabbed his hand and lowered it away from her chest. Appellant
explained that it was only a "stupid joke," and that he immediately tried to apologize for
making B.S. uncomfortable. Regarding the April 2011 incident, appellant admitted that he
placed his hands on B.S.'s buttocks. However, appellant stated that he only intended to
show B.S. what type of touching would be inappropriate at the middle school dance.
{¶ 16} Appellant also testified that he did not become physically aroused when he
attempted to touch B.S.'s breast, or when he touched her buttocks. Appellant also explained
that he was very affectionate with all of his children, including B.S., and that he was raised in
an "extremely physical" family where "snuggling" was normal, even as an adult. He also
stated that he would often place his head in all of his children's laps, and that they would do
the same to him. Appellant further testified that, after reading B.S.'s diary entries about her
problems with her physical appearance, he tried to be more affectionate toward her to boost
her self-esteem.
{¶ 17} During cross-examination, the prosecution asked appellant about a polygraph
test that he took before any charges were filed. During the polygraph exam, Detective Steve
Oakes of the West Chester Police Department asked appellant whether he had touched
B.S.'s breast in September 2010. Initially, appellant denied touching B.S.'s breast. However,
appellant subsequently told the detective, "I will admit that I probably * * * poked [B.S.'s]
breasts," but explained that it was nothing but a "horrible joke." Appellant later stated, "I feel
like it happened, and I convinced myself it didn't. But it did happen that I touched her
breasts." When Detective Oakes asked appellant whether he touched B.S.'s breast and
buttocks for sexual reasons, appellant responded, "[m]aybe subconsciously."
-6-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
{¶ 18} The trial court subsequently found appellant guilty of both charges and
sentenced him accordingly.
{¶ 19} Appellant timely appeals, raising three assignments of error. For ease of
analysis, we will review appellant's first and second assignments of error together.
{¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 21} THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION FOR TWO COUNTS OF SEXUAL IMPOSITION.
{¶ 22} Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 23} THE CONVICTION FOR TWO COUNTS OF SEXUAL IMPOSITION WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 24} In his first and second assignments of error, appellant argues his conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and was not supported by sufficient
evidence. Specifically, appellant claims that his conviction for sexual imposition was in error,
because there was no evidence that he touched B.S. for the purpose of sexually arousing or
gratifying either person.
{¶ 25} Manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence are quantitatively and
qualitatively different legal concepts. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction, an appellate
court examines the evidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would
support a conviction. State v. Stringer, 12th Dist. No. CA2012-04-095, 2013-Ohio-988, ¶ 27.
"The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id., quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991),
paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded on other grounds.
-7-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
{¶ 26} While the test for sufficiency requires an appellate court to determine whether
the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge examines the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side of
the issue rather than the other. Stringer at ¶ 28. In determining whether a conviction is
against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of the witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered. Id., citing State v. Cummings, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-09-224, 2007-
Ohio-4970, ¶ 12.
{¶ 27} While appellate review includes the responsibility to consider the credibility of
witnesses and weight given to the evidence, these issues are primarily matters for the trier of
fact. State v. Walker, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-04-085, 2007-Ohio-911, ¶ 26. Therefore, an
appellate court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in
extraordinary circumstances to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice, and only when the
evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at
387.
{¶ 28} "Because sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury, a finding that a
conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of
sufficiency. Thus, a determination that a conviction is supported by the weight of the
evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency." Stringer, 2013-Ohio-988 at ¶ 30,
quoting State v. Wilson, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-01-007, 2007-Ohio-2298, ¶ 35.
{¶ 29} Here, appellant was convicted of sexual imposition in violation of R.C.
2907.06(A)(1), which states:
-8-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
(A) No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the
spouse of the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the
offender, to have sexual contact with the offender; or cause two
or more other persons to have sexual contact when any of the
following applies:
(1) The offender knows that the sexual contact is offensive to the
other person, or one of the other persons, or is reckless in that
regard.
{¶ 30} Appellant claims his conviction for sexual imposition was not supported by
sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the state
failed to prove that he had "sexual contact" with B.S. According to R.C. 2907.01(B), sexual
contact means "any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation
the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the
purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person."
{¶ 31} The Revised Code does not define "sexual arousal or gratification." In re
Anderson, 116 Ohio App.3d 441, 443 (12th Dist.1996). The trier of fact must determine from
the evidence presented whether the purpose of the defendant was sexual arousal or
gratification by his contact. Id.; State v. Stair, 12th Dist. No. CA2001-03-017, 2002 WL
42900, * 4 (Jan. 14, 2002). In making its decision, "the trier of fact may consider the type,
nature and circumstances of the contact, along with the personality of the defendant." State
v. Barnes, 12th Dist. No. CA2010-06-009, 2011-Ohio-5226, ¶ 88. From this evidence, the
trier of fact may infer what the defendant's motivation was in making the physical contact with
the victim. Id. "If the trier of fact determines that the defendant was motivated by desires of
sexual arousal or gratification, and that the contact occurred, then the trier of fact may
conclude that the object of the defendant's motivation was achieved." Id., quoting State v.
Gesell, 12th Dist. No. CA2005-08-367, 2006-Ohio-3621, ¶ 24.
{¶ 32} Initially, appellant claims that B.S.'s testimony regarding the type, nature, and
-9-
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
circumstances of the contact was so "fundamentally inconsistent," that it could not establish
that they had contact for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. In support of his
argument, appellant first cites B.S.'s testimony that, during the September 2010 incident, she
was lying in the middle of her bed when appellant came into her room, muted his phone, and
touched her breast without saying anything. Appellant attempts to discredit this testimony by
arguing that it was physically impossible for a six-foot-two, two-hundred-pound man to lie
next to B.S. in bed while she laid in the middle. Appellant also asks, "[w]hy would he mute
the phone if he didn't say anything to [B.S.]?" However, it is well established that the weight
to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of
fact. Walker, 2007-Ohio-911 at ¶ 26; State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph
one of the syllabus.
{¶ 33} Appellant also argues that B.S.'s testimony regarding the April 2011 incident
was unreasonable, because it was physically impossible for him to pick her up by her
buttocks in the manner she testified. Again, it was the province of the trial court, as the trier
of fact, to consider the reasonableness of B.S.'s testimony in light of the other evidence
presented at trial.
{¶ 34} Appellant also points to other "indecisive" testimony from B.S., including her
statement to the police that appellant had touched the "top" of her breast, versus her trial
testimony that he also grabbed her nipple and areola. However, during trial, B.S. clearly
explained that she considered the top of her breast to include the nipple and areola. Further,
we reject appellant's claim that B.S. was not a credible witness simply because she initially
told her mother that she was "not a hundred percent sure that anything had happened."
During trial, B.S. explained that at first, she was reluctant to tell her mother because she was
leaving for work, but that she did eventually tell her mother about appellant's behavior.
- 10 -
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
{¶ 35} Appellant also argues that the trial court failed to consider his testimony that he
was joking when he attempted to poke B.S.'s breast. Appellant further claims that, due to his
"demonstrating personality type," he felt that it was appropriate to show B.S. the proper
versus improper ways to dance with boys by placing his hands on her buttocks. Lastly,
appellant asserts that the trial court should have considered his affectionate personality in
determining whether he touched B.S. for the purposes of sexual arousal or gratification.
{¶ 36} Once again, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court
unless it is patently apparent that the court lost its way in arriving at its verdict. Here, the trial
court did not lose its way simply because it chose to believe B.S., which it was entitled to do.
B.S.'s testimony, if believed, was sufficient for the court to infer that appellant's motive was
sexual arousal or gratification of either person. As discussed above, B.S. testified that
appellant touched her breast while she was lying alone in her bed, while her mother was at
work. There was no evidence that appellant's hand was on B.S.'s breast by accident.
Additionally, appellant often compared B.S.'s breast size to her mother's breast size, and
called her "super hot or cute," and "baby," which made B.S. uncomfortable. In this context,
these statements clearly have a sexual connotation. See State v. Edwards, 8th Dist. No.
81351, 2003-Ohio-998, ¶ 24 (evidence that defendant touched the victim's breasts while the
victim was alone in her mother's bedroom and said "you are mine" was sufficient to prove
that defendant's motive was sexual arousal or gratification); State v. Bragg, 2d Dist. No.
19491, 2004-Ohio-659 (trial court did not err in finding purpose of sexual gratification, where
father touched his daughter's breasts and said "titty twister," despite father's claim that he
was "joking or playing around"); State v. Franklin, 4th Dist. Nos. 05CA20, 05CA21, 2006-
Ohio-6369.
{¶ 37} As for the incident when appellant touched B.S.'s buttocks, B.S. testified that
- 11 -
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
appellant refused to let go until she began to hit his chest, at which point he released her and
became visibly upset. Further, it is difficult to believe appellant's testimony that he touched
B.S.'s buttocks for the legitimate purpose of showing her how not to dance with boys, when
B.S. specifically told appellant that she had no intentions of going to the dance.
{¶ 38} Upon review, we find that there was ample evidence that appellant touched
B.S.'s breast and buttocks for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.
{¶ 39} Appellant does not argue that the state failed to prove the remaining essential
elements of sexual imposition, and having reviewed the evidence, we find that appellant's
conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See State v. Collins, 8th
Dist. No. 82200, 2003-Ohio-4817, ¶ 19-26.
{¶ 40} Having found that the weight of the evidence supports appellant's conviction,
any issues concerning sufficiency of the evidence must be similarly disposed of. See
Stringer, 2013-Ohio-988 at ¶ 30.
{¶ 41} Appellant's first and second assignments of error are overruled.
{¶ 42} Assignment of Error No. 3:
{¶ 43} THE DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED IN HIS ABILITY TO PRESENT A
REASONABLE DEFENSE DUE TO NONCOMPLAINCE WITH THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
[sic.]
{¶ 44} In his third assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court violated his due
process rights when it failed to order the state to disclose the remaining portions of two
diaries belonging to B.S. Appellant also claims the trial court erred in conducting an in
camera inspection of the diaries in order to determine whether additional disclosure was
necessary.
{¶ 45} During discovery, the state disclosed an entry in one of B.S.'s diaries, stating
- 12 -
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
that appellant had "felt [B.S.] up" in her cleavage area. However, appellant sought disclosure
of B.S.'s diaries in their entirety, because he believed that they contained exculpatory
evidence. As a result, the trial court reviewed B.S.'s diaries in camera, in order to determine
whether they contained additional discoverable material. Although the trial court did not
issue a written decision on the matter, it is clear that the court ultimately denied appellant's
motion for disclosure.
{¶ 46} The granting or overruling of discovery motions in a criminal case rests within
the sound discretion of the court. State v. Blake, 12th Dist. No. CA2011-07-130, 2012-Ohio-
3124, ¶ 14. Abuse of discretion is more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the
trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Id., citing State v.
Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).
{¶ 47} Crim.R. 16 governs discovery in criminal cases. Appellant claims he had a right
to review B.S.'s diaries in their entirety pursuant to Crim.R. 16(B)(5) or (7). Crim.R. 16(B)(5)
requires the state to disclose any evidence "favorable to the defendant and material to guilt
or punishment * * *." Crim.R. 16(B)(7) requires the disclosure of "[a]ny written or recorded
statement by a witness in the state’s case-in-chief, or that it reasonably anticipates calling as
a witness in rebuttal."
{¶ 48} However, Crim.R. 16 permits a prosecuting attorney to decline to disclose the
requested evidence, so long as the prosecutor certifies that the nondisclosure is for one of
the five reasons enumerated in Section (D), which states:
(D) Prosecuting Attorney’s Certification of Nondisclosure. If the
prosecuting attorney does not disclose materials or portions of
materials under this rule, the prosecuting attorney shall certify to
the court that the prosecuting attorney is not disclosing material
or portions of material otherwise subject to disclosure under this
rule for one or more of the following reasons:
(1) The prosecuting attorney has reasonable, articulable grounds
- 13 -
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
to believe that disclosure will compromise the safety of a
witness, victim, or third party, or subject them to intimidation or
coercion;
(2) The prosecuting attorney has reasonable, articulable grounds
to believe that disclosure will subject a witness, victim, or third
party to a substantial risk of serious economic harm;
(3) Disclosure will compromise an ongoing criminal investigation
or a confidential law enforcement technique or investigation
regardless of whether that investigation involves the pending
case or the defendant;
(4) The statement is of a child victim of sexually oriented offense
under the age of thirteen;
(5) The interests of justice require non-disclosure.
{¶ 49} It would appear from recent case law that, as long as the reason for the
nondisclosure satisfies one of the factors listed in Crim.R. 16(D), an oral certification during a
hearing before the parties is sufficient. See State v. Thompson, 6th Dist. Nos. L-08-1208, L-
09-1214, 2011-Ohio-5046, ¶ 128 (finding that "at the hearings on witness certifications, the
state provided [sufficient] reasons for requesting witness protection on the record and
evidence that the witnesses bore an undue risk of harm is their identities"); State v. Collins,
8th Dist. No. 89529, 2008-Ohio-578 (the state satisfied nondisclosure certification
requirement during a hearing).
{¶ 50} During the hearing on appellant's motion to disclose, the prosecution clearly
explained its reasons for the nondisclosure, stating, "we've given over the relevant portions *
* * [and] if these allegations are true, I think it would just be more trauma for this girl to have
this man reading her diary." With this, the prosecution demonstrated reasonable, articulable
grounds to believe that additional disclosure would subject B.S. to intimidation or coercion by
appellant, in accordance with Crim.R. 16(D)(1). Arguably, the nondisclosure would have also
served the interests of justice. Crim.R. 16(D)(5).
- 14 -
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
{¶ 51} Once the state properly certified its reason for withholding the remaining
portions of B.S.'s diaries, the onus was on appellant to invoke the review process under
Crim.R. 16(F), which states:
Upon motion of the defendant, the trial court shall review the
prosecuting attorney’s decision of nondisclosure * * * for abuse
of discretion during an in camera hearing conducted seven days
prior to trial, with counsel participating.
{¶ 52} Here, appellant did not request the trial court to review the state's certification of
nondisclosure. Because appellant failed to invoke the review process under Crim.R. 16(F), it
appears that the trial court did what it felt was most appropriate under the circumstances in
order to rule on appellant's motion for disclosure. Under the facts of this case, we cannot say
that the trial court's decision to conduct an in camera inspection outside the presence of the
parties, while somewhat unconventional, prejudiced appellant in any way.
{¶ 53} Even if the state failed to properly certify its reason for nondisclosure, we would
reject appellant's argument that he was entitled to B.S.'s diaries under either Crim.R. 16(B)(5)
or (7). In order to require discovery under these subsections, appellant first had to
demonstrate that the remaining portions of B.S.'s diaries were "related to the particular case
indictment, information, or complaint, and * * * [were] material to the preparation of a
defense, or [were] intended for use by the prosecuting attorney as evidence at the trial, or
were obtained from or belong to the defendant * * *." Crim.R. 16(B).
{¶ 54} Here, there is no indication that appellant requested to have copies of B.S.'s
diaries sealed and placed in the record to preserve this issue for appellate review. Because
the diaries were not included in the record, we cannot find that the evidence requested was
related to the particular case, indictment, or complaint, or that it was material to the
preparation of appellant's defense. See State v. Darrah, 12th Dist. No. CA2006-09-109,
2007-Ohio-7080, ¶ 29. Further, during the hearing on appellant's motion for disclosure, the
- 15 -
Butler CA2012-03-052
Butler CA2012-03-062
prosecution made it clear that it did not intend to use the remaining portions of B.S.'s diaries
during trial. Lastly, appellant cannot claim that the diaries were obtained from or belonged to
him.
{¶ 55} In sum, without the diaries, it is impossible for appellant to show that he was
entitled to the remaining portions under Crim.R. 16(B)(5) or (7), or that he was prejudiced by
the trial court's decision to deny his motion for disclosure.
{¶ 56} Accordingly, appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 57} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL and M. POWELL, JJ., concur.
- 16 -