State v. Isom

No. 81-18

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN

1981

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

HOWARD MICHAEL ISOM,

D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lewis and C l a r k
Honorable P e t e r Meloy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For Appellant:

Leo G a l l a g h e r a r g u e d , H e l e n a , Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
John Maynard a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
C h a r l e s G r a v e l e y , County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana
S t e v e G a r r i s o n a r g u e d , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , H e l e n a , Montana

Submitted: September 1 7 , 1 9 8 1

Decided : 21 U)BZ
JAN 2 1 1982
Filed:

Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .

D e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h p o s s e s s i o n

of dangerous drugs with intent to sell, as provided in

section 49-9-103(1), MCA. He pleaded not guilty. His

m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s was d e n i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f the

First Judicial District, L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y . After a

j u r y t r i a l d e f e n d a n t was f o u n d g u i l t y o f felony possession

of dang e ro u s d r u g s , a l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e of p o s s e s s i o n

with i n t e n t t o s e l l . On O c t o b e r 1 5 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e d e f e n d a n t was

sentenced t o f i v e years i n t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n , with

two y e a r s s u s p e n d e d . Defendant a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n .

Based on i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m a n i n f o r m a n t , t h e L e w i s and

C l a r k County S h e r i f f ' s Department p l a c e d under s u r v e i l l . a n c e

t h e r e s i d e n c e l o c a t e d a t 1014 E l m S t r e e t , Helena, Montana.

About noon o n J a n u a r y 11, 1 9 8 0 , two d e p u t y s h e r i f f s o b s e r v e d

a man later identified a s John Stemple, a suspected drug

dealer, leave the Elm S t r e e t residence. H e was c a r r y i n g a

l a r g e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag which h e p u t i n t o a t o o l box i n t h e

back o f h i s p i c k u p t r u c k pa r k e d i n f r o n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e .

S t e m p l e went back into the residence. A brown F o r d

s t a t i o n wagon pulled up. A man later identified as the

d e f e n d a n t g o t o u t of the s t a t i o n wagon and went into the

residence. S t e m p l e t h e n l e f t t h e r e s i d e n c e and d r o v e away

in h i s pickup, f o l l o w e d by t h e two d e p u t i e s i n an unmarked

car.

According to the deputies, Stemple made evasive

maneuvers by turning several corners sharply. They lost

s i g h t o f S t e m p l e and c a l l e d f o r t h e a i d o f a t h i r d o f f i c e r .

The third officer stopped Stemple within a matter of

minutes.
 The o f f i c e r s s e a r c h e d S t e m p l e ' s t r u c k b u t cou1.d n o t

f i n d t h e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag t h a t S t e m p l e had p l a c e d in the

t o o l box. Because of a r e c e n t s n o w f a l l t h e o f f i c e r s were

a b l e t o r e t r a c e t h e t r a c k s of t h e pickup. The t r a c k s l e d t o

a n a l l e y b e h i n d a g a s s t a t i o n where t h e y f o u n d a l a r g e g r e e n

g a r b a g e bag which a p p a r e n t l y had b e e n pl.aced t h e r e r e c e n t l y

s i n c e i t was n o t c o v e r e d w i t h snow. The d e p u t i e s l o o k e d

i n s i d e t h e bag and f o u n d i t f u l l o f m a r i j u a n a c o n t a i n e d i n

small p l a s t i c bags.

An o f f i c e r w e n t t o g e t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t f o r t h e E l m

S t r e e t r e s i d e n c e and f o r a maroon C h r y s l e r Cordoba p a r k e d i n

f r o n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e which t h e o f f i c e r s b e l i e v e d had b e e n

used t o t r a n s p o r t n a r c o t i c s . A search warrant f o r both t h e

r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r was i s s u e d by a j u s t i c e of t h e p e a c e .

The warrant application contained the above information,

e x c e p t t h e r e was no m e n t i o n o f t h e s u r v e i l l a n c e b e i n g b a s e d

on an i n f o r m a n t ' s t i p and no m e n t i o n t h a t J o h n S t e m p l e was a

suspected drug d e a l e r .

At least eight officers and the county attorney

executed t h e search warrant. When t h e o f f i c e r s a r r i v e d a t

the Elm S t r e e t residence, they noticed t h a t t h e motor was

r u n n i n g on t h e C h r y s l e r . A couple of o f f i c e r s stayed with

the car, while the others went to search the residence.

Defendant answered t h e d o o r of t h e r e s i d e n c e . The o f f i c e r s

h a n d e d him t h e s e a r c h w a r r a n t a s t h e y e n t e r e d . Defendant

was o n l y w e a r i n g a p a i r of b l u e j e a n s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e

was half-dressed because he was getting ready to take a

shower. D e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d t o s i t on t h e c o u c h and n o t

t o l e a v e t h e room.

D e f e n d a n t was t h e o n l y o c c u p a n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e when
the officers entered. He was a guest of his uncle who

rented the residence. He had b e e n s l e e p i n g on t h e c o u c h i n

t h e l i v i n g room and had s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s i n t h e l i v i n g

room and i n a bedroom.

The officers searched the entire house, finding

marijuana residue and drug paraphernalia in nearly every

room, i n c l u d i n g t h e l i v i n g room, b a t h r o o m and k i t c h e n . A

s m a l l p l a s t i c bag o f m a r i j u a n a was f o u n d i n t h e bedroom o f

defendant's uncle.

One u n i f o r m e d o f f i c e r was t o l d t o s t a y w i t h d e f e n d a n t

and w a t c h him w h i l e t h e o t h e r s completed the search. He

a s k e d d e f e n d a n t i f h e owned t h e c a r p a r k e d i n f r o n t o f the

residence. Defendant said he did not own the car. In

response t o f u r t h e r questioning, defendant s a i d he d i d n o t

know who d i d own t h e c a r and d i d n o t know where t h e k e y s t o

t h e c a r ' s t r u n k were l o c a t e d . D e f e n d a n t was n o t a r r e s t e d

prior t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s and had n o t been g i v e n a Miranda

warning.

The officers searched the car. Upon finding the

glove compartment and the trunk locked, they forced the

g l o v e compartment open, and i n s i d e i t t h e y f o u n d a key t o

open t h e t r u n k . I n s i d e t h e t r u n k t h e o f f i c e r s found s e v e r a l

l a r g e g r e e n g a r b a g e b a g s which contained approximately

e i g h t y t o n i n e t y pounds of m a r i j u a n a . After t h e search of

t h e r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r , d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d .

A t the suppression hearing, defendant introduced
evidence to show that he owned the car in which the

m a r i j u a n a was found .
T h i s c a s e may be resolved by looking at the three

primary i s s u e s presented:
 1. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e

legality of the search of the residence where he was an

overnight guest;

2. Whether t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e

s e a r c h o f . h i s c a r and t h e g a r b a g e b a g s f o u n d i n i t s t r u n k

when he denied ownership of the car at the time of the

s e a r c h ; and

3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n i t s d e n i a l o f

defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from the

r e s i d e n c e and t h e c a r .

With r e s p e c t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s standing t o contest the

s e a r c h of t h e house, t h e S t a t e would h a v e t h i s C o u r t a d o p t

the perspective and reasoning of the most recent United

States Supreme Court decisions which have overruled the

automatic standing r u l e of Jones v. United States (1960),

362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697. See, United

S t a t e s v. S a l v u c c i ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 83, 100 S . C t . 2547, 65

L.Ed.2d 619, and R a w l i n g s v . Kentucky ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 448 U.S. 98,

100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633.

Jones had set down two alternative holdings: (1)

when t h e f r u i t s o f a s e a r c h a r e p r o p o s e d t o b e u s e d a g a i n s t

a defendant at the trial, he has "automatic standing" to

c o n t e s t t h e l e g a l i t y o f t h e s e a r c h ; and ( 2 ) a n y o n e " l e g i t i -

m a t e l y on t h e p r e m i s e s where a s e a r c h o c c u r s may c h a l l e n g e

i t s l e g a l i t y by way o f a m o t i o n t o s u p p r e s s " . Jones, 362

U.S. a t 267. The p u r p o s e o f t h e a u t o m a t i c s t a n d i n g r u l e was

t o quash t h e " v i c e of prosecutorial self-contradiction" in

which t h e S t a t e c o u l d c h a r g e a p e r s o n w i t h p o s s e s s i o n a s a

crime, and a t t h e same t i m e c l a i m t h a t t h e p o s s e s s i o n was

not s u f f i c i e n t t o give t h e person standing t o challenge t h e
legality of the search or seizure. See, Brown v. United
States (1973), 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208.
In overruling the automatic standing rule in Jones,
both Salvucci and Rawlings relied heavily upon the earlier
case of Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct.
421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387.
In Rakas, the Court stated that the Jones test of
"legitimately on the premises" cannot be taken in its full
sweep beyond the facts of that one case. Rather, said the
Court, the true test of whether a Fourth Amendment right has
been violated is found in Katz v. United States (1967), 389
U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, in which the Supreme
Court said that the capacity to claim the protection of the
Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the
invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Fourth Amendment ---legitimate
has a
expectation of privacy in the invaded place. Katz, 389 U.S.
at 353; Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143.
Notwithstanding the limitations placed on Jones, the
Court in Rakas, and again in Salvucci, emphasized that
ownership is not a key element in determining standing. The
test for standing is not to be based on distinctions out of
property and tort law: "In defining the scope of that
interest, we adhere to the view expressed in Jones and
echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions in property
and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the
like ought not to control." See Jones, 362 U.S. at 266;
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143; Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91; and
Rawlinqs, 448 U.S. at 105. The controlling view, then,
seems to be that expressed in Mancusi v. DeForte (1968), 392
U.S. 3 6 4 , 88 S . C t . 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1.154, i n which t h e C o u r t

said that the Katz test of "'legitimate expectation of

privacy' makes it clear that capacity to claim the

protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a

property right i n t h e invaded p l a c e , but upon w h e t h e r t h e

- was- i n
a r e a- o n e w h i c h t h e r e was a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n o f

freedom from governmental i n t r u s i o n . " S e e M a n c u s i , 392 U.S.

a t 368. (Emphasis added.)

Following the rationale that ownership is not the

controlling factor in the determination of standing,

a l t h o u g h i t i s o n e f a c t o r t o c o n s i d e r , t h e Supreme C o u r t h a s

pointed out that the actual holding in Jones was not

overruled. In Rawlings, the Court referred to parts of

R a k a s which e x p l a i n e d why t h e d e f e n d a n t i n J o n e s would s t i l l

have s t a n d i n g under t h e r e c e n t narrow tests for standing.

The C o u r t i n Rakas r e a s o n e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i n J o n e s , who

was u s i n g a n a p a r t m e n t w i t h t h e t e n a n t ' s p e r m i s s i o n , would

c o n t i n u e t o have s t a n d i n g under t h e r e c e n t t e s t s b e c a u s e t h e

defendant "had complete dominion and control over the

apartment and could exclude others from i t . " Rakas, 439

U.S. at 149. The C o u r t in Rakas also reasoned that the

d e f e n d a n t i n K a t z , who was i n a phone b o o t h , had s t a n d i n g t o

c o n t e s t a s e a r c h o f t h e b o o t h b e c a u s e h e had a n e x p e c t a t i o n

o f p r i v a c y when h e " s h u t t h e d o o r b e h i n d him t o e x c l u d e a l l

o t h e r s and p a i d t h e t o l l . " R a k a s , 439 U.S. a t 149.

In S t a t e v. Allen (1980), - Mont. -, 612 P.2d
199, 37 St.Rep. 919, this Court quoted extensively from

Rakas, acknowledging t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s between Rakas, Jones

and K atz . S e e , A l l e n , 612 P.2d a t 201-202.

Here, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t made two f i n d i n g s o f fact
t h a t r e l a t e t o d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of

the residence: ( 1 ) t h a t d e f e n d a n t was an o v e r n i g h t g u e s t a t

t h e r e s i d e n c e which was r e n t e d by h i s u n c l e ; and (2) that

defendant had stored clothing, luggage and o t h e r personal

p r o p e r t y i n l i m i t e d a r e a s of the residence, none o f w h i c h

i n c l u d e d t h e a r e a s where t h e c o n f i s c a t e d e v i d e n c e was f o u n d .

Based on the above findings, the District Court

c o n c l u d e d a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t " t h e d e f e n d a n t , b e i n g a n

o v e r n i g h t g u e s t i n t h e r e s i d e n c e w i t h items s t o r e d o n l y i n a

limited area therein, had no reasonable expectation of

p r i v a c y i n t h e a r e a s where t h e i t e m s were f o u n d , t h e r e f o r e ,

h a s no s t a n d i n g t o o b j e c t t o t h e i r a d m i s s i o n . "

The f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a n o v e r n i g h t g u e s t

s h o u l d n o t c o n t r o l t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of standing, although

it is one f a c t o r t o consider. A s was noted i n t h e above

discussion, protection from unreasonable searches and

seizures does not depend upon a property right in the

invaded p l a c e , b u t r a t h e r upon w h e t h e r t h e a r e a was o n e i n

which t h e r e was a reasonable e x p e c t a t i o n of freedom from

governmental i n t r u s i o n . S e e , A l l e n , 612 P.2d a t 202.

Moreover, although the order of the District Court

must be presumed correct upon appeal, State v. District

Court (1978), 176 Mont. 257, 577 P.2d 849, the record

clearly does not support the finding that confiscated

e v i d e n c e was not found in the areas where defendant had

stored h i s personal belongings. Uncontradicted testimony a t

t h e s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g showed t h a t d e f e n d a n t s l e p t on t h e

l i v i n g room couch w h i l e he was t h e g u e s t o f h i s u n c l e and

t h a t h e s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s i n t h e l i v i n g room and i n h i s

nephew's bedroom. Although evidence at the suppression
h e a r i n g showed t h a t h i s u n c l e ' s bedroom was t h e o n l y a r e a

where a s m a l l bag o f m a r i j u a n a was s e i z e d , i t was made c l e a r

a t t h e t r i a l t h a t e v i d e n c e was s e i z e d f r o m t h e l i v i n g room

table, from t h e l i v i n g room f i r e p l a c e , b e s i d e a w a l l i n t h e

l i v i n g room, and f r o m t h e l i v i n g room c l o s e t .

D e f e n d a n t was t h e s o l e o c c u p a n t o f t h e house a t t h e

t i m e t h e s e a r c h was made. L i k e t h e d e f e n d a n t s i n J o n e s and

Katz, defendant could exclude a l l o t h e r s except h i s uncle

and f a m i l y a n d had d o m i n i o n and c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p r e m i s e s a t

the t i m e the o f f i c e r s entered the residence.

In summary, the District Court's conclusion that

defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the

p r e m i s e s m u s t be r e v e r s e d on t h e f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d s : (1) t h e

f a c t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was a n o v e r n i g h t g u e s t s h o u l d n o t

control a determination of his standing to contest the

legality of a search of the residence; (2) the record

shows t h a t c o n f i s c a t e d e v i d e n c e was f o u n d i n a r e a s w h e r e t h e

d e f e n d a n t s l e p t and where h e s t o r e d h i s b e l o n g i n g s ; and ( 3 )

the record supports a finding that the d e f e n d a n t was the

s o l e o c c u p a n t o f t h e r e s i d e n c e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e s e a r c h and

had c o n t r o l a n d d o m i n i o n o v e r i t t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f o t h e r s .

The S t a t e u r g e s t h i s C o u r t t h a t t h e n e x t i s s u e w h i c h

must be discussed is whether defendant had standing to

contest the search of his car. The State claims that

b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t d e n i e d h i s ownership of t h e c a r , he waived

h i s F o u r t h Amendment rights i n i t and i n t h e g a r b a g e b a g s

found i n i t s t r u n k .

The State argues that section 46-5-103(1), MCA,

d e p r i v e s t h e d e f e n d a n t of s t a n d i n g t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h o f

h i s car and t h e s e a r c h o f t h e garbage bags found in its
trunk. S e c t i o n 46-5-103(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s :

"No s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e , w h e t h e r w i t h o r
w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , s h a l l be h e l d i l l e g a l a s t o
a defendant i f :

" ( 1 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s d i s c l a i m e d any r i g h t
t o or interest in the place or object
searched or the instruments, a r t i c l e s , or
things seized;"

The State's argument fails for two reasons: the

d i s c l a i m e r s t a t u t e m u s t be i n t e r p r e t e d i n l i g h t o f t h e F i f t h

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; and, a

disclaimer of a car does not necessarily operate as a

disclaimer of the closed containers i n the c a r .

A l t h o u g h i t h a s been h e l d t h a t t h e owner o f a c a r o r

a container w i l l lose h i s standing t o object t o the search

of it if he a b a n d o n s i t p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of the search,

United S t a t e s v. Anderson (5th Cir. 1 9 7 4 ) , 500 F.2d 1311;

United S t a t e s v. Colbert (5th Cir. 1 9 7 3 ) , 474 F.2d 1 7 4 ; and

United S t a t e s v. Miller (1st C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , 589 F.2d 1117, a

mere d i s c l a i m e r o f o w n e r s h i p i n a n e f f o r t t o a v o i d making a n

incriminating statement in response to police questioning

s h o u l d n o t a l o n e be deemed t o c o n s t i t u t e abandonment. See,

LaFave, S e a r c h and S e i z u r e , Vol. 3 at 581. Given the

position that a defendant does not otherwise have to

i n c r i m i n a t e h i m s e l f t o p r e s e r v e h i s F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t s ,

as in Simmons v . United States ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 390 U.S. 377, 88

S.Ct. 967, 1 9 L.Ed.2d 1247, it is d i f f i c u l t t o understand

how a r e f u s a l t o make i n c r i m i n a t i n g a d m i s s i o n s i n r e s p o n s e

t o p o l i c e i n t e r r o g a t i o n c a n be h e l d t o d e p r i v e a p e r s o n o f

F o u r t h Amendment s t a n d i n g .

To say t h a t there i s no F i f t h Amendment violation

b e c a u s e t h e d e f e n d z n t c o u l d have s i m p l y chosen t o be s i l e n t

is to ignore the whole line of principles set down in
Miranda and its progeny. irliranda v. Arizona (1966), 384
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
The point of the Miranda warning was to provide a
safeguard against the coercive pressures of in-custody
interrogation by police, when those pressures are so great
as to undermine an individual's will, compelling him to
speak when he would not otherwise do so. 384 U.S. at 467.
"Custodial interrogation" was found to be inherently
coercive. The Miranda Court defined "custodial interroga-
tion" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."
384 U.S. at 444.
Clearly, the Miranda limitations should apply to
disclaimers when the State uses them to deprive a person of
Fourth Amendment standing.
Here, the totality of the circumstances suggests that
the disclaimer resulted from "custodial interrogation." The
defendant was told to sit on the couch and not leave. A
uniformed officer was ordered to watch the defendant and
stay with him while five other officers searched the house.
The defendant was not free to walk around the house. The
disclaimer was elicited from defendant by direct police
questioning. Given this coercive atmosphere and the
questioning, the State cannot be allowed to use such
statements to deprive defendant of his Fourth Amendment
rights.
Notwithstanding the Fifth Amendment limitations on
section 46-5-103(1), MCA, and assuming that the disclaimer
could be construed to deprive the defendant of standing to
contest the search of the car, in light of Kobbins v.
California ( 1981) , U.S. -, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69
L.Ed.2d 744, the disclaimer could not be construed to
deprive the defendant of standing to contest the search of
the garbage bags found in the trunk of the car.
In Robbins, the Court held that while police may have
conducted a lawful search of an automobile under the auto-
mobile exception, they must nevertheless secure a warrant
for any container found in the trunk of the car. The Court
recognized that the expectation of privacy in a closed
container taken from a car is not necessarily less than the
privacy expectation in closed pieces of luggage found
elsewhere.
Following a similar reasoning, it cannot be said that
the defendant lost his expectation of privacy in the opaque
garbage bags when he disclaimed ownership of the car. While
it is arguable that the disclaimer weakened the defendant's
expectation of privacy in the car, it cannot be said to have
affected his expectation of privacy in the garbage bags.
The disclaimer, therefore, in no way affected defendant's
standing to contest the search of the garbage bags.
The next issue which must be discussed is whether the
District Court properly denied defendant's motion to
suppress. As many cases in Montana have held, when a search
warrant has been issued, the determination of probable cause
must be made solely from the information given to the
impartial magistrate and from the four corners of the search
warrant application. See, Art. 11, Sec. 11, 1972 Mont.
Const.; Thomson v. Onstad (1979), 182 Mont. 119, 594 P.2d
1137, 36 St.Rep. 910; State v. Olson (1979), 181 Mont. 323,
589 P.2d 663, 36 St.Rep. 146; State v. Leistiko (1978), 176
Mont. 434, 578 P.2d 1161; State ex rel. Townsend v. District
Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 543 P.2d 193; Application of
Gray (1970), 155 Mont. 510, 473 P.2d 532.
Here the evidence is uncontradicted that the only
information given to the justice of the peace was the
information contained in the search warrant and the search
warrant application. Nevertheless, the District Court, in
its order denying the motion to suppress, did not 1-ook to
the validity of the search warrant and the sufficiency of
the information before the neutral magistrate. Rather, the
District Court looked to whether the officers had probable
cause to search the residence and the vehicle parked in
front of the residence. The District Court made the
following conclusions of law:
"The officer's observation of John Stemple
leaving the duplex with a garbage bag later
found to contain marijuana,- when joined with
the with - r i o rknowledae of his d r u a sale
4
~
- --. .--
- -d- - -
involvement, and the information that--
------------ the
officers had received regarding the incoming
marijuana shipment, gave the officers
probable cause to believe that danqerous
drugs or evidence of its possession woild be
found in the premises searched and in the
vehicle searched." Conclusion of Law No. 3.
(Emphasis added.)
"The search of the automobile was also justi-
fiable under the automobile exception to the
search warrant requirements since there was
both probable cause and exigent circum-
stances. The fact that evidence of dangerous
drugs were found in the residence added to
and enhanced the probable cause had by the
officers for the subsequent Carroll search of
the automobile." Conclusion of Law No. 4.
From these conclusions of law, it is clear the
District Court, in making its determination of probable
cause for the searches of the residence and the car, looked
beyond the four corners of the search warrant application
and was thereby in error. In the above conclusions, the
District Court looked to evidence that John Stemple was a
known drug dealer and evidence of an informant's tip,
neither of which were contained in the search warrant or the
warrant's application.
Moreover, the District Court's reliance upon the
information received from the informant was error since
there was nothing in the record to satisfy the two-pronged
test of Aguilar v. Texas (1964), 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct.
1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, and Spinelli v. United States (1969),
393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637. There was
nothing in the record which showed "some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were," and there was
nothing in the record showing "the underlying circumstances
from which the officer concluded that the informant . . .
was 'credible' or his information was 'reliable'." Aquilar,
378 U.S. at 114. See also, Leistiko, 578 P.2d at 1163.
The District Court's determination of probable cause
must, therefore, be vacated, and a new determination of
probable cause must be made by looking to the four corners
of the search warrant application itself.
It is well established in this state what type of
facts must be contained in a search warrant application:
. . . Affidavits relied upon for the issu-
I1 1

ance of search warrants in both federal and
state prosecutions must contain sufficient
facts to enable an impartial commissioner or
magistrate to determine whether probable
cause exists under the Fourth Amendment
. . . 1 11
State ex rel. Garris v. Wilson
(1973), 162 Mont. 256, 511 P.2d 15, 17,
quoting Application of Gray (1970), 155 Mont.
510, 473 P.2d 532.
Probable cause exists when the facts and circum-
s t a n c e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e m a g i s t r a t e would w a r r a n t a n h o n e s t

belief i n t h e mind o f a r e a s o n a b l e and p r u d e n t man t h a t t h e

offense has been, or is being, committed and "that the

property sought e x i s t s a t t h e place desiqnated." See, S t a t e

v. Robinette (S.D. 1 9 7 8 ) , 270 N.W.2d 573, 577. In other

words, the search warrant a p p l i c a t i o n must recite the

u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s f r o m which t h e m a g i s t r a t e

c a n d e t e r m i n e t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e a f f i a n t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t

c e r t a i n evidence e x i s t s a t a p a r t i c u l a r premises. Nathanson

v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 290 U.S. 41, 54 S . C t . 11, 78 L.Ed.

159; see also, Aguilar, supra; United S t a t e s v. Ventresca

( 1 9 6 5 ) , 380 U.S. 102, 85 S . C t . 741, 1 3 L.Ed.2d 684; and

G i o r d e n e l l o v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 8 ) , 357 U.S. 480, 78 S . C t .

1 2 4 5 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1503.

Were the f a c t s given to the justice of the peace

sufficient to indicate that marijuana was located at the

residence or i n t h e c a r parked i n f r o n t of the residence?

W e think not.

S t e m p l e ' s mere t a k i n g o f a n o p a q u e g r e e n g a r b a g e bag

out of a residence and the finding of a similar green

g a r b a g e bag i n an a l l e y near the s p o t where the deputies

lost s i g h t of S t e m p l e ' s t r u c k were the f a c t s presented to

the justice of the peace. Such facts do not establish

probable cause for the search of the residence. The

connection between the bag found in the alley and the

r e s i d e n c e is tenuous a t b e s t .

Likewise, t h e search warrant a p p l i c a t i o n f a i l s t o s e t

out any underlying facts or circumstances that establish

probable cause to search the car parked in front of the

residence. The only reference to the car in the search
w a r r a n t is:

". . . t h a t t h e r e s i d e n t of t h e above
d e s c r i b e d d u p l e x u n i t i s t h e owner and was
t h e d r i v e r o f t h e d e s c r i b e d c a r when i t
arrived a t the described residence e a r l y i n
t h e m o r n i n g o f J a n u a r y 11, 1980 and y o u r
a f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h a t s a i d v e h i c l e was u s e d
t o convey t h e m a r i j u a n a a n d o t h e r d a n g e r o u s
d r u g s t o t h e- i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d .
res I1

(Emphasis added.)

A mere affirmance of belief or suspicion by a police

o f f i c e r , a b s e n t any u n d e r l y i n g f a c t s o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , d o e s

not e s t a b l i s h probable cause for the i s s u a n c e of a search

warrant. S e e , A p p l i c a t i o n o f G r a y , s u p r a , 473 P.2d a t 536;

Nathanson, s u p r a .

A b s e n t p r o b a b l e c a u s e , t h e s e a r c h e s o f t h e h o u s e and

car were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and the

evidence resulting from these searches is not admissible

against the defendant. Mapp v . Ohio ( 1 9 6 1 ) , 367 U.S. 643,

81 S.Ct. 1 6 8 4 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.

Clearly, the introduction into evidence of the

marijuana seized from the house and car constitutes

reversible error since such evidence contributed to the

c o n v i c t i o n of the defendant. S t a t e v. Langan ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 151

Mont. 558, 445 P.2d 565; S t a t e v. West (1980), Mont.

, 617 P.2d 1298, 37 St.Rep. 1772. Since no other

e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l would s u p p o r t a c o n v i c t i o n , a

new t r i a l c a n n o t be g r a n t e d .

The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t Court is reversed and

t h e cause dismissed.
W e concur:

Chief Justice

Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell concurring:
I concur in the result.

7 A - a 4.w-4
Chief Justice

Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring:

I concur in the result.
Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d i s s e n t s :

I would h o l d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t does n o t have s t a n d i n g

t o c o n t e s t t h e s e a r c h of h i s c a r and t h e o b j e c t s i n s i d e t h e

car. A r e v i e w o f t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e p r o v i s i o n s of o u r

code i s e n l i g h t e n i n g . S e c t i o n 46-5-101, MCA, describes the

b a s i s f o r a s e a r c h and s e i z u r e and a p p l i e s where a s e a r c h i s

made i n c i d e n t t o a l a w f u l a r r e s t , by t h e a u t h o r i t y of a

v a l i d s e a r c h w a r r a n t , under t h e a u t h o r i t y of a r i g h t of

l a w f u l i n s p e c t i o n , and o f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t h e r e , " w i t h t h e

c o n s e n t of t h e a c c u s e d . . ." Here, s e c t i o n 46-5-101 is not

a p p l i c a b l e i n any way. Note t h a t i f t h e d e f e n d a n t had

c o n s e n t e d t o t h e s e a r c h of h i s a u t o m o b i l e , t h e code s e c t i o n

would have been a p p l i c a b l e . S e c t i o n 46-5-102, MCA, d e s c r i b e s

t h e manner i n which a p e a c e o f f i c e r may s e a r c h f o l l o w i n g a

l a w f u l a r r e s t , and a g a i n , t h i s s e c t i o n i s n o t d i r e c t l y

applicable. Next, s e c t i o n 46-5-103, MCA, t h e s e c t i o n quoted

i n t h e majority opinion, provides i n p a r t :

"No s e a r c h and s e i z u r e , whether w i t-o r w i t h -
-h -
o u t w a r r a n t , s h a l l be h e l d t o be i l l e s a l a s
t o a defendant i f :

" ( 1 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s d i s c l a i m e d any r i g h t t o
o r interest i n the . . . o b j e c t searched o r
t h e instruments, a r t i c l e s , o r things seized."
(Underscoring added.)

S e c t i o n 46-5-103, MCA, i s a c o d i f i c a t i o n of t h e r u l e e s t a b l i s h e d

by t h i s C o u r t i n S t a t e v . Nelson ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 130 Mont. 466, 304

P.2d 1 1 1 0 . The C o u r t a f f i r m e d t h e r e f u s a l of t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e s e i z e d i n a s e a r c h of a n a u t o m o b i l e

w i t h o u t a s e a r c h w a r r a n t , where t h e d e f e n d a n t Nelson had

d i s c l a i m e d any ownership o r r i g h t t o p o s s e s s i o n of t h e c a r

o r of any p r o p e r t y t a k e n t h e r e f r o m . T h i s C o u r t q u o t e d from

a n e a r l i e r Montana c a s e and s t a t e d :
 "What w a s s a i d by t h i s c o u r t i n S t a t e ex r e l .
Teague v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t [ 1 9 2 5 ] , 73 Mont. 438,
4 4 1 , 236 [ P . ] page 257, 258, r u l e s t h i s c a s e
s o f a r a s t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s i s concerned.
There t h i s c o u r t s a i d :

" ' A l t h o u g h t h e a c t s of t h e o f f i c e r s i n s e a r c h -
i n g t h i s t u n n e l and s e i z i n g t h e s t i l l and mash
found i n i t may have been u n l a w f u l a s t o t h e
p o s s e s s o r s of t h e t u n n e l , s i n c e r e l a t o r d i s -
c l a i m e d t h e r i g h t of p o s s e s s i o n of b o t h t h e
t u n n e l and i t s c o n t e n t s , he i s n o t i n a p o s i -
t i o n t o complain, a s a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own s t a t e -
ments, h e had no r i g h t i n them and t h e a c t s of
t h e o f f i c e r s t h e r e f o r e were n o t u n l a w f u l a s
t o him. I t i s hardly necessary t o c i t e authori-
t i e s t o s u s t a i n t h i s determination, but refer-
e n c e i s made t o D r i s k i l l v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 8
C i r . , 281 F. 146, and K e i t h v . Commonwealth,
197 Ky. 362, 247 S.W. 42. I n e a c h of which a
l i k e r e s u l t was r e a c h e d under a n a l o g o u s f a c t s . '

" T h i s i s t h e r u l e t h r o u g h o u t t h e c o u n t r y , see
a n n o t a t i o n s i n 24 A . L . R . , page 1425; 32 A . L . R . ,
page 415; 4 1 A . L . R . , page 1151; 52 A . L . R . , page
487; 88 A . L . R . , page 365; e t s e q . ; 134 A.L.R.,
page 831; 150 A . L . R . , page 577." S t a t e v.
Nelson, 130 Mont. a t 471, 304 P.2d a t 1113.

T h i s d e c i s i o n h a s n o t been o v e r r u l e d o r m o d i f i e d .
E lledy- YL
The same view i s e x p r e s s e d in- v. United S t a t e s

(9th C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 359 F2d. 4 0 4 , i n which t h e C o u r t of Appeals

d e n i e d t h e motion t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e , where, i n r e s p o n s e

t o a n o f f i c e r ' s q u e s t i o n a s t o what was i n a package, t h e

d e f e n d a n t had s a i d , " I d o n ' t know. I t ' s n o t mine." The

court stated i n part:

"Such d i s c l a i m e r of ownership by t h e a p p e l l a n t
i s a n a l o g o u s t o abandonment. Cf. Abel v .
U n i t e d S t a t e s , 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683,
4 L.Ed.2d 668 ( 1 9 6 0 ) . I n b o t h c a s e s t h e same
message, by a c t o r word, i s d e l i v e r e d t o t h e
o f f i c e r : t h a t a s t o t h e a c t o r o r speaker t h e r e
i s no i n t e r e s t which would be invaded by s e a r c h
o r s e i z u r e . Lack of w a r r a n t d o e s n o t under
t h e s e circumstances render search o r s e i z u r e
unreasonable a s t o t h e a c t o r o r speaker."
G e l l e d g e v. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 359 F.2d a t 405.

I n a s i m i l a r manner, i n Rakas v . I l l i n o i s ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 439 U.S.

1 2 8 , 134, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 395, t h e C o u r t

stated:
 "A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search
and seizure only through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search - -a
of
third person's premises or property has not
had any of his Fourth Amendment riqhts in-
-
fringed." (Underscoring added.)
An extended discussion of cases with similar holdings
does not appear appropriate. We do note that Wayne LaFave,
a leading authority on search and seizure, distinguishes
between abandonment and disclaimer of ownership. LaFave
takes the position that disclaimer of ownership should not
be held tantamount to a waiver of Fourth Amendment protecc' o n ,
~l
but notes that a number of courts have so held. W. LaFave,
3 Search and Seizure 511.3 (1978, Supp. 1981).
Recent United States Supreme Court cases involving
the question of standing to challenge the legality of searches,
have emphasized the importance of a defendant's legitimate
or reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises or
objects searched. Rakas, supra; United States v. Salvucci (1980,
448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619; Rawlings v. Kentucky
(1980), 448 U.S. 98, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed. 2d 633. I am
unable to see how the defendant could have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in opaque bags in the trunk of a car,
when he had stated he did not own the car, he did not
know who did own the car, and he did not know where the keys
to the car's trunk were located.
The unfortunate result of the majority opinion is that,
once again, reliable evidence establishing a clear basis for
conviction is suppressed. The majority's broad application
of the exclusionary rule has again exacted a substantial
social cost. As stated in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at
137, 99 S.Ct. at 427, 58 L.Ed.2d at 397:
 "Each t i m e t h e e x c l u s i o n a r y r u l e i s a p p l i e d
it e x a c t s a s u b s t a n t i a l s o c i a l c o s t f o r t h e
v i n d i c a t i o n of F o u r t h Amendment r i g h t s . Rele-
v a n t and r e l i a b l e e v i d e n c e i s k e p t from t h e
t r i e r of f a c t and t h e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h a t t r i a l
is deflected. (Citations omitted)."

I would h o l d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y d e n i e d t h e

d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o s u p p r e s s t h e e v i d e n c e o b t a i n e d from

t h e s e a r c h of t h e c a r .