No. 12881 I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A OR F F OTN 1975 STATE O M N A A F OTN, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -VS - DONALD JACK, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Frank E. B l a i r , Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Chester Lloyd Jones, County Attorney, Virginia C i t y , Montana Clayton Herron argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Larry D. Whitman argued, West Yellowstone, Montana For Amicus Curiae: Longan, Holmstrom and Vicki W. Dunaway, B i l l i n g s , Montana Vicki W. Dunaway argued, B i l l i n g s , Montana Submitted: May 6, 1975 Decided : - er M r . Chief J u s t i c e H a r r i s i o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e Court. The s t a t e of Montana a p p e a l s from an o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Madison County, g r a n t i n g summary judgment t o defendant Donald Jack. Donald. Jack i s a r e s i d e n t of t h e s t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a charged w i t h v i o l a t i n g s e c t i o n 26-909, R.C.M. 1947, ~ o n t a n a ' s Resident Guide Law, which provides: 11 Licensed o u t f i t t e r o r guide r e q u i r e d f o r n o n r e s i d e n t hunting-exception f o r landowner-waiver. (1) It s h a l l be unlawful f o r any n o n r e s i d e n t t o hunt game animals on any land w i t h i n any n a t i o n a l f o r e s t w i l d e r n e s s a r e a , n a t i o n a l game r e f u g e , o r s t a t e game range w i t h i n t h e s t a t e of Montana u n l e s s accompanied by a l i c e n s e d o u t f i t t e r , p r o f e s s i o n a l guide o r r e s i d e n t guide and t h e n o n r e s i d e n t hunting l i c e n s e must b e a r t h e s i g n a t u r e and l i c e n s e number of t h e o u t f i t t e r o r r e s i d e n t guide who accompanies him except a s noted below. "(2) A landowner o r agent may guide n o n r e s i d e n t o r r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s on land owned by, o r land l e a s e d t o him without a guide l i c e n s e ; o r he may a u t h o r i z e n o n r e s i - dent o r r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s t o hunt without a guide on land owned by, o r land l e a s e d t o , such landowner, l e s s e e o r a g e n t . The n o n r e s i d e n t h u n t e r ' s hunting l i c e n s e must b e a r t h e s i g n a t u r e of t h e r e s i d e n t landowner, l e s s e e o r agent on whose fenced p r o p e r t y he i s hunting a s evidence t h a t permission has been obtained. "(3) The Montana f i s h and game commission s h a l l have a u t h o r i t y t o waive guide requirements f o r h o l d e r s of B-2, B-5 and B-6 l i c e n s e s i n s p e c i a l d e e r and a n t e l o p e a r e a s d u r i n g t h e period B-5 and B-6 l i c e n s e h o l d e r s may hunt . II Guide requirements may n o t be waived i n a r e a s open t o a g e n e r a l hunting season on any game animal o t h e r than d e e r and a n t e l o p e . 1l Donald Jack was convicted on November 19, 1973, and f i n e d f i f t y d o l l a r s by a j u s t i c e of t h e peace. His c o n v i c t i o n was based on a s t i p u l a t i o n of f a c t s which can be summarized a s : 1. Defendant Donald Jack was a n o n r e s i d e n t of t h e s t a t e of Montana a t t h e time o f t h e o f f e n s e charged. 2. A t such time, i n Madision County, Montana, defendant was hunting b i g game w i t h i n a n a t i o n a l f o r e s t . 3. That he was, a t t h e time and p l a c e , unaccompanied by any r e s i d e n t guide. 4. Except a s may be s t a t e d above, defendant was i n compliance w i t h a l l f i s h and game laws of t h e s t a t e of Montana. Defendant's s o l e d e f e n s e a t a l l l e v e l s of t h e s e proceedings h a s taken t h e form of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e t o t h e s t a t u t e he a d m i t t e d l y offended. I n support of t h i s c h a l l e n g e he u r g e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e d e n i e s him e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e laws i n c o n t r a v e n t i o n of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment and A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 4 of t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . H e a l s o contends t h e s t a t u t e t o b e an undue burden on i n t e r s t a t e commerce, c o n t r a r y t o t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of A r t i c l e I , S e c t i o n 8 of t h e United S t a t e s Consti- tution. The q u e s t i o n of whether a s t a t u t e encroaches upon t h e p r o t e c t i o n s o f f e r e d by t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e depends d i r - e c t l y on t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h r e e b a s i c i s s u e s : 1 ) whether t h e s t a t u t e i s a l e g i t i m a t e and proper e x e r c i s e o f governmental a u t h o r i t y ; 2) t h e b a s i s of t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and an i d e n t i f i - c a t i o n of t h e persons covered t h e r e u n d e r ; and 3) t h e p r o p e r s t a n - dard of review o r scope of j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y r e g a r d i n g t h e r e l a - t i o n s h i p between t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and t h e o b j e c t i v e s of t h e law. There i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t a s t a t e h a s t h e power t o pre- s e r v e and r e g u l a t e i t s w i l d l i f e . I n t h e n i n e t e e n t h centfry, i t was commonly h e l d t h a t t h i s power d e r i v e d from t h e common law 11 concept of s o v e r e i g n ownership". Under t h a t d o c t r i n e , t h e ownership of w i l d l i f e was h e l d by t h e s t a t e i n t r u s t f o r i t s people. McCready v. V i r g i n i a , 94 U.S. 391, 24 L.Ed 248; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 16 S.Ct.600, 40 L. Ed. 793. Under more modern t h e o r y , t h e power h a s been h e l d t o l i e w i t h i n t h e purview of a s t a t e r s p o l i c e powers. S i l z v. H e s t e r b e r g , 211 U.S. 31, 29 S.Ct. 10, 53 L. Ed. 75; Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Dept.of N a t u r a l Resources, 30 F.2d 111. Montana r e c o g n i z e s b o t h t h e d o c t r i n e o f s o v e r e i g n owner- s h i p (Rosenfeld v. Jakways, 67 Mont. 558, 216 P. 776), and t h e p o l i c e power t h e o r y ( S t a t e e x r e l . Nepstad v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689). W need n o t d e c i d e which of t h e s e e d o c t r i n e s should now p r e v a i l i n t h e s t a t e of Montana. In the a r e a of w i l d l i f e r e g u l a t i o n , i t i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e may impose such terms and c o n d i t i o n s a s i t s e e s f i t , a s long a s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s a r e n o t i n f r i n g e d . S t a t e ex r e l . V i s s e r v. F i s h and Game Comm., 150 Mont. 525, 531, 437 P.2d 373. The n e x t s t e p i s t o determine t h e b a s i s f o r t h e l e g i s - l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and determine what persons o r groups of persons a r e a f f e c t e d by i t . By drawing a d i s t i n c t i o n between r e s i d e n t and n o n r e s i d e n t sportsman, we f i n d t h e s t a t u t e d i r e c t l y a f f e c t s a t l e a s t f o u r d i s t i n c t groups of persons. First, are of c o u r s e t h e t r u e n o n r e s i d e n t s who merely e n t e r t h e s t a t e f o r t h e purpose of hunting. But t h e broad language of t h e law must a l s o be construed a s a p p l y i n g t o persons l i v i n g i n t h e s t a t e f o r a p e r i o d of time i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e l e g a l r e s i d e n c y requirements ( s e c t i o n 26-202.3, R.C.M. 1947); t o former r e s i d e n t s o f t h e s t a t e who s t i l l r e t u r n t o h u n t ; and t o persons who own land w i t h i n t h e s t a t e b u t maintain t h e i r l e g a l r e s i d e n c e s e l s e - where. Defendant i s a member of t h i s l a t t e r c l a s s , a s he a c t u a l l y owns land i n Madison County. A h e a r i n g was h e l d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o a f f o r d t h e s t a t e an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t evidence r e g a r d i n g t h e purpose of t h e s t a t u t e . On t h e b a s i s of t h a t evidence, t h e s t a t e con- t e n d s t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had t h e s e o b j e c t i v e s i n mind when t h e s t a t u t e was enacted: 1. That t h e s a f e t y o f n o n r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s i s promoted by p l a c i n g them i n t h e company of r e s i d e n t s who a r e more l i k e l y t o be f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e l o c a l t e r r a i n and weather c o n d i t i o n s . 2. That s t a t e r e g u l a t i o n s and t e r r a i n a r e more l i k e l y t o be obeyed and r e s p e c t e d on t h e assumption t h a t r e s i d e n t s a r e more f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e laws and more j e a l o u s a s t o t h e maintenance o f t h e l o c a l environment. 3. That landowners a r e b e t t e r p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t t h e improper u s e of t h e i r l a n d . 4. That t h e law a f f o r d s s t a t e o f f i c i a l s b e t t e r en- forcement c o n t r o l . F i n a l l y , we determine t h e proper s t a n d a r d of review o r scope of j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y t o be a p p l i e d . Over t h e y e a r s , t h e c o u r t s have developed two main approaches, c o n d i t i o n i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n on t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l challenge. Where t h e c h a l l e n g e extends only t o t h e more g e n e r a l l e g i s l a t i v e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s , t h e j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y must be l i m i t e d t o determining whether t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i s j u s t i f i e d by a r a t i o n a l b a s i s . Stated another way, we can determine only whether t h e law has a s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a s o n a b l e r e l a t i o n t o a proper l e g i s l a t i v e purpose s o a s n o t t o be deemed a r b i - trary. S t a t e v. Safeway S t o r e s , I n c . , 106 Mont. 182, 76 P.2d 81; Great F a l l s National Bank v. McCormick, 152 Mont. 319, 448 P.2d 991. I n connection w i t h t h i s s t a n d a r d , a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n having some r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s does n o t deny e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n merely because i t i s n o t made w i t h p r e c i s e mathematical n i c e t y o r r e s u l t s i n some i n e q u a l i t y , One who a t t a c k s t h e l e g i s l a t i o n has t h e burden of proving t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n t o be a r b i t r a r y . Lindsley v. N a t u r a l Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S.61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 8 1 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L. Ed.2d 393. But when t h e c h a l l e n g e extends t o c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s which 11 a f f e c t "fundamental r i g h t s " o r c e r t a i n suspect c r i t e r i a " t h e scope of j u d i c i a l i n q u i r y i s correspondingly i n c r e a s e d . The I1 purposes of t h e law must s e r v e a compelling governmental i n t e r e s t 1 ' and a heavy burden i s placed on t h e s t a t e t o j u s t i f y i t s c l a s s i - fication. Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F.Supp. 1175. Defendant a l l e g e s and argues t h a t t h e s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n i n f r i n g e s upon h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t r a v e l i n an e f f o r t t o persuade us t o apply t h e s t r i n g e n t "compelling governmental interest" test. And, i t i s t r u e t h e r e c o r d tends t o i n d i c a t e t h e c o s t s of h i r i n g a r e s i d e n t guide a r e q u i t e h i g h , and t h a t many more n o n r e s i d e n t h u n t e r s e n t e r t h e s t a t e each y e a r than could be reasonably accommodated by t h e e x i s t i n g number o f licensed professional guides. While we recognize a p o s s i b i l i t y t h e r e s i d e n t guide law a f f e c t s t h e r i g h t t o i n t e r s t a t e t r a v e l , we do not base our d e c i s i o n on t h o s e grounds. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n o t e 21, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L ed.2d 600. The s t a t u t e does n o t appear t o be p a t e n t l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l on i t s f a c e , But i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e f e c t s a r e r e v e a l e d when reviewed i n l i g h t of i t s p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n . The s t a t u t e was a l l e g e d l y designed t o promote s a f e t y f o r h u n t e r s , yet it i s an e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t t h a t t h e requirements of t h e law have been waived a s t o d e e r and a n t e l o p e , i n t h o s e hunting d i s t r i c t s com- p r i s i n g t h e e a s t e r n one t h i r d of t h i s s t a t e . While t h e r e may b e a marked d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e t e r r a i n i n t h e two g e n e r a l a r e a s , we f i n d no reason t o assume t h a t one a r e a i s l e s s dangerous than t h e o t h e r . F u r t h e r , t h e dangers i n h e r e n t t o hunting a n t e - l o p e o r d e e r would c e r t a i n l y n o t d e c r e a s e a s t o t h o s e who might hunt e l k o r moose. The s t a t u t e p u r p o r t s t o promote adherence t o t h e game laws and r e s p e c t f o r t h e environment, b u t no r e a - sonable connection has been e s t a b l i s h e d between t h i s g o a l and the legislative classification. Even assuming t h e e x i s t e n c e of such a connection, i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r purpose be- comes more remote when a p p l i e d t o former Montana r e s i d e n t s and n o n r e s i d e n t landowners, as defendant. The s t a t e f u r t h e r contends t h e law f o s t e r s b e t t e r p r o t e c - t i o n f o r p r i v a t e landowners and more e f f e c t i v e law enforcement. Yet t h e evidence completely f a i l s t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t more non- r e s i d e n t s than r e s i d e n t s a r e found t o b e i n v i o l a t i o n of t h e law, o r t h a t h u n t e r s a s a group a r e l e s s law a b i d i n g than fishermen o r o t h e r outdoor sportsmen. Even i f t h e s t a t u t e d i d o p e r a t e to promote t h e s e g o a l s , c e r t a i n l y t h e people i n t h e e a s t e r n one t h i r d of t h e s t a t e a r e a s deserving of t h i s p r o t e c t i o n a s a r e our western c i t i z e n s . Certainly a l l nonresident hunters a r e * s u b j e c t t o j u d i c i a l s a n c t i o n and l i a b i l i t y f o r v i o l a t i o n s and t o r t s committed w i t h i n t h e s t a t e . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s t a t u t o r y c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and i t s l e g i t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s i s tenuous and remote, and t h e r e f o r e i n s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y t h e i n e q u i t i e s i t has engendered. The judgment i s a f f i r m e d . I , 4 .' % "' ,$ . -' ** 1 ad *' --;dd2-dz&~~+&--k*-L---~~---*---k-x--2%~ Chief ~ u L t i c e W Concur: e Justices.
State v. Jack
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Date filed: 1975-08-19
Citations: 539 P.2d 726, 167 Mont. 456
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion