State v. Klein

No. 12781

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A
OTN

1975

STATE O MONTANA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-vs -
CLAYTON KLEIN ,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t ,

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable C . B. Sande, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record :

For Appellant :

W i l l i a m F i t z g e r a l d a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana

F o r Respondent:

Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y Genera 1, Helena,
Montana
Thomas A , Budewitz, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
a r g u e d , Helena, Montana
Harold F. Hanser, County A t t o r n e y , a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s ,
Montana

Submitted: November 7 , 1975
i
, kJ
Decided :

Filed :
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

Defendant, Clayton Henry K l e i n , a p p e a l s from a judgment
o f c o n v i c t i o n of robbery e n t e r e d on a j u r y v e r d i c t i n t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t , Yellowstone County.
By Information, f i l e d January 7, 1974, Klein was charged
w i t h one count each o f robbery, i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-5-401(1) ( b ) ,
R.C.M. 1947; b u r g l a r y , i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 94-6-204, R.C.M.
1947; and c r i m i n a l possession of dangerous d r u g s , i n v i o l a t i o n of
s e c t i o n 54-133, R.C.M. 1947. The Information l i s t e d t e n w i t n e s s e s
f o r t h e s t a t e , s i x were B i l l i n g s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . The a f f i d a v i t
i n support of t h e Information, s t a t e d :
" A t about 10:OO p.m. on January 1, 1974, t h e defendant
e n t e r e d t h e Montana Bar Cafe l o c a t e d a t 2624 Minnesota
Avenue, B i l l i n g s , Montana, and ordered a bowl o f stew
which he a t e and p a i d f o r . A s t h e w a i t r e s s was c l e a r i n g
away t h e d i s h e s and c l e a n i n g t h e c o u n t e r , t h e defendant
p u l l e d o u t a p i s t o l , pointed i t a t t h e w a i t r e s s and s a i d
' I ' m going t o - r o b you; g i v e m your money, I She gave
e
him approximately $85.00 from t h e c a s h r e g i s t e r and he
r a n o u t t h e west- door and west up t h e a l l e y .
"After t h e r e s t a u r a n t was c l o s e d , and about 3:10 A.M.
on January 2, 1974, two w a i t r e s s e s and t h e o p e r a t o r o f
t h e c a f e were l e a v i n g t h e a r e a by c a r when they saw t h e
defendant b r e a k i n t o t h e o f f i c e of t h e Yellow Cab garage
l o c a t e d a t 2611 Minnesota Avenue, B i l l i n g , Montana, e n t e r
and then l e a v e by t h e broken door. Taken was about $12.00
i n cash. The w i t n e s s e s have p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e
defendant a s t h e person involved i n both t h e robbery and
burglary.
"After d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t a t t h e pool h a l l a c r o s s t h e
s t r e e t from t h e Yellow cab garage w i t h i n a few minutes
a f t e r defendant came o u t of t h e garage, and when searched,
defendant had one (1) yellow c a p s u l e i n h i s pocket which
t e s t e d p o s i t i v e f o r b a r b i t u r a t e , which defendant admitted
he bought f o r p l e a s u r e purposes. I t
A t h i s arraignment, def enda,nt pled n o t g u i l t y t o a l l
t h r e e counts and t r i a l was scheduled f o r February 25, 1974. Before
t r i a l , defendant withdrew h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y on t h e c r i m i n a l
possession o f dangerous drugs c o u n t , and went t o t r i a l only on t h e
robbery and b u r g l a r y counts.
On February 20, 1974, t h e p r o s e c u t i o n moved t o endorse

s i x a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s n o t named on t h e Information. The c o u r t
on February 22, g r a n t e d t h e motion t o add t h e s i x w i t n e s s e s . Only
f o u r of t h e s i x a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s were c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y a t t h e
trial. Defendant o b j e c t e d t o t h e testimony o f two of t h e w i t n e s s e s
b u t only a f t e r d i r e c t and cross-examination was had and then h i s
o b j e c t i o n was t o s t r i k e t h e testimony on grounds t h a t t h e s t a t e
knew of t h e s e w i t n e s s e s when t h e Information was f i l e d on January

A t t h e c l o s e of t h e second day of t r i a l , t h e prosecution
moved t o endorse t h e names of f o u r w i t n e s s e s n o t p r e v i o u s l y d i s c l o s e d .
Two of t h e s e w i t n e s s e s were B i l l i n g s p o l i c e o f f i c e r s who had
i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e b u r g l a r y , one was t h e owner-manager of t h e Yellow
Cab Co., and t h e f o u r t h was an employee of t h e cab company.
The s t a t e claimed i t d i d n o t know t h a t t h e testimony would
be r e q u i r e d u n t i l d u r i n g t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e
r e g a r d i n g some e v i d e n t i a r y m a t t e r s i n connection w i t h t h e b u r g l a r y
count. Defendant o b j e c t e d t o t h e a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s . The objec-
t i o n was based on t h e grounds t h a t t h e y were known t o t h e p r o s e c u t i o n
a t t h e time t h e Information was f i l e d ; they should have been included
on t h e l n f o r m a t i o n l s l i s t of w i t n e s s e s ; and t o allow them t o be
endorsed a t t h i s s t a g e of t h e t r i a l would be p r e j u d i c i a l . The
c o u r t asked, "DO you want a continuance?" Defense c o u n s e l responded,
II
I am n o t a s k i n g f o r a continuance." The c o u r t then s t a t e d "Well,
t h e c o u r t would g r a n t you one p o s s i b l y , i f you asked f o r one. II

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t allowed t h e motion by t h e s t a t e t o endorse t h e
w i t n e s s e s and two of t h e f o u r t e s t i f i e d .
The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of n o t g u i l t y on t h e b u r g l a r y
charge and g u i l t y on t h e charge of robbery. Based on a motion t o
i n c r e a s e punishment pursuant t o s e c t i o n 95-1506, R.C.M. 1947,
which had been p r e v i o u s l y f i l e d , defendant was sentenced t o 30 y e a r s
a t Montana s t a t e p r i s o n . Defendant pled g u i l t y t o t h e c r i m i n a l
possession of dangerous drugs charge and was sentenced t o one
y e a r a t t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , t o run c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h t h e 30 y e a r
robbery sentence.
 Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e f i n a l judgment and p r e s e n t s
t h r e e i s s u e s f o r review.
1 ) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n allowing t h e S t a t e t o
endorse a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s ?
2) Whether t h e u s e of t h e word innocent i n a j u r y i n -
s t r u c t i o n was e r r o r ?

3) Whether t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y
a s t o t h e i n t e n t r e q u i r e d f o r a c o n v i c t i o n of t h e crime of robbery?
Section 95-1503, R.C.M. 1947,provides:
"A charge s h a l l : ***

"(d) I f t h e charge i s by information o r i n d i c t m e n t ,
i t s h a l l i n c l u d e endorsed t h e r e o n , t h e names o f t h e
w i t n e s s e s f o r t h e s t a t e , i f known."
Section 95-1803, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d e s :

" ( a ) L i s t of Witnesses: (1) For t h e purpose o f n o t i c e
only and t o prevent s u r p r i s e , t h e prosecution s h a l l
f u r n i s h t o t h e defendant and f i l e w i t h t h e c l e r k of
t h e c o u r t a t t h e time of arraignment, a l i s t o f t h e
w i t n e s s e s intended t o be c a l l e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n .
The prosecution may, any time a f t e r arraignment, add
t o t h e l i s t t h e names o f any a d d i t i o n a l w i t n e s s e s , upon
a showing of good cause. * * *.
"

With s e c t i o n 95-1803, R.C.M. 1947, appears t h i s Revised
Commission Comment:
" F u r t h e r , t h i s p r o v i s i o n a l l o w s t h e a d d i t i o n of names
n o t only p r i o r t o t r i a l , b u t a f t e r t h e t r i a l has
commenced. A s t h e t r i a l p r o g r e s s e s , t h e showing which
i s necessary t o e s t a b l i s h 'good c a u s e ' should be more
s t r i n g e n t . A t any time, t h e judge may a l l o w a con-
tinuance ( s e c t i o n 95-1708) i f i t should appear n e c e s s a r y
i n t h e i n t e r e s t of j u s t i c e . 11
I n S t a t e v. R o z z e l l , 157 Mont. 443, 450, 486 P.2d 877,
t h i s Court reviewed s e c t i o n 95-1803(a) (1) and s t a t e d :
11 IGood c a u s e ' has been d e f i n e d a s a ' s u b s t a n t i a l
r e a s o n ' , one t h a t a f f o r d s a l e g a l excuse. I I
The c o u r t should f i r s t determine whether t h e need f o r t h e a d d i t i o n a l
w i t n e s s e s and t h e reason f o r t h e i r n o t b e i n g d i s c l o s e d e a r l i e r i s a
" s u b s t a n t i a l reason", I t should then determine whether t h e r e i s
p r e j u d i c e based on s u r p r i s e and whether t h i s s u r p r i s e can be
overcome by t h e g r a n t i n g of a continuance. I f t h e s u r p r i s e element
can be overcome by a continuance, then t h e w i t n e s s e s should be
endorsed and t h e continuance g r a n t e d . The s p i r i t and i n t e n t o f t h e
law i s t h a t names and a d d r e s s e s of p o t e n t i a l w i t n e s s e s should be
d i s c l o s e d a s soon as they a r e known.
Here, defendant d i d n o t make a proper o r t i m e l y o b j e c t i o n
t o t h e w i t n e s s e s endorsed p r i o r t o t r i a l and f u r t h e r claimed no
s u r p r i s e n o r d i d defendant r e q u e s t a continuance. A s t o the
w i t n e s s e s endorsed d u r i n g t r i a l , t h e defendant d i d n o t c l a i m s u r -
p r i s e and d e c l i n e d a continuance o f f e r e d by t h e c o u r t . Additionally,
defendant was a c q u i t t e d on t h a t count. Therefore, we f i n d no
prejudice o r error.
Defendant o b j e c t s t o c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. I. In-
s t r u c t i o n No. 1 i s taken from Montana J u r y I n s t r u c t i o n s Guide
Criminal, which i n t u r n i s taken from CALJIC (3d ed) No. 1.00.
I t i s e n t i t l e d "Cautionary I n s t r u c tion-Omnibus ~ ~ ~ e The . language
' '
objected t o reads:
II
You must n o t s u f f e r yourselves t o b e b i a s e d a g a i n s t
a defendant because of t h e f a c t t h a t he has been
a r r e s t e d f o r t h i s o f f e n s e , o r because an information
has been f i l e d a g a i n s t him, o r because he has been
brought b e f o r e t h e Court t o s t a n d t r i a l . None o f t h e s e
f a c t s i s evidence of h i s g u i l t , and you a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d
t o i n f e r o r t o s p e c u l a t e from any o r a l l of them t h a t
he i s more l i k e l y t o be g u i l t y than innocent." (Emphasis
added. )
Defendant p r e s e n t s an argument, w i t h o u t a u t h o r i t y , based
only on semantics t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t "innocent" would confuse a
II
j u r y where t h e term n o t g u i l t y " would n o t . W a r e n o t moved by
e
t h i s discussion. I n s t r u c t i o n N o . 1, as s t a t e d above, i s a c a u t i o n a r y
i n s t r u c t i o n t o e s t a b l i s h t h e presumption of innocence and r e a d
with! t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s t h a t followed, p r o p e r l y placed t h e burden of
proof on t h e s t a t e t o e s t a b l i s h g u i l t beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt.
Defendant next a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s concerning
s p e c i f i c i n t e n t , were n o t s u f f i c i e n t ; t h a t t h e j u r y must c o n s i d e r
1I
i n t e n t 1 ' i n a d d i t i o n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of "knowingly" o r "pur-
posely". Defendant c i t e s a s e r r o r t h e c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l of e i g h t
defense i n s t r u c t i o n s i l l u s t r a t i v e of t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n . First,
f o u r of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e n o t b e f o r e t h e Court a s they p e r t a i n
t o t h e b u r g l a r y count of which defendant was a c q u i t t e d . W do
e
n o t a g r e e t h e r e f u s a l of t h e remaining f o u r was e r r o r .
Defendant was convicted of t h e crime of robbery a s
d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 94-5-401, R.C.M. 1947, which r e a d s :

" ( I ) a person commits t h e o f f e n s e o f robbery i f ,
i n t h e c o u r s e of committing a t h e f t , he:
" ( a ) i n f l i c t s b o d i l y i n j u r y upon a n o t h e r ; o r

"(b) t h r e a t e n s t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y upon
any person o r purposely o r knowingly p u t s any person
i n f e a r of immediate b o d i l y i n j u r y ; o r
"(c) commits o r t h r e a t e n s immediately t o commit
any f e l o n y , . o t h e r than t h e f t . 11

The proscribed conduct under s e c t i o n 94-5-401 (1) (b) ,
is I1
t h r e a t e n s t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y upon any person o r ***
1I
p u t s any person i n f e a r of immediate b o d i l y i n j u r y . However,
such conduct i s c r i m i n a l o n l y i f done "purposely o r knowingly".
Therefore, the s p e c i f i c i n t e n t required before a conviction f o r
t h e crime of robbery may be had i s t h a t t h e accused must have
II
acted e i t h e r purposely o r knowingly".
c o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n s No. 5 and No. 6 , d e f i n e d purposely
and knowingly, r e s p e c t i v e l y , a s p e r s e c t i o n 94-2-101(28),(53).
Helpful i n determining t h e meaning of t h e code p r o v i s i o n i s t h e
following a n n o t a t o r ' s n o t e appearing i n t h e "Montana Criminal Code,
1973, Annotated", by Prof. William F. Crowley a s produced by t h e
Montana Criminal Law Commission, under s e c t i o n 94-2-101(53) a t
page 7 3 . There i t was s a i d :
"A major problem of p r i o r Montana c r i m i n a l law was
t h e use i n t h e code of numerous terms a f f e c t i n g
c u l p a b i l i t y t h a t were l a r g e l y undefined. Under t h e
new Code, t h e mental s t a t e s r e q u i r e d f o r v a r i o u s
degrees of c u l p a b i l i t y a r e d e f i n e d c a r e f u l l y i n a
hierarchy. 'Purposely' i s t h e most c u l p a b l e mental
s t a t e anh i m p l i e s a design. This term r e p l a c e s a term
f r e q u e n t l y used i n t h e o l d code, ' i n t e n t i o n a l l y . '
 I t should b e noted t h a t a person need n o t a c t
toward a p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t ; he need a c t only
w i t h t h e o b j e c t t o engage i n c e r t a i n conduct.
Although a p e r s o n ' s i n t e n t i o n s may b e c o n d i t i o n a l , ,
h i s mental s t a t e i s s t i l l c u l p a b l e under t h i s
d e f i n i t i o n , unless t h e condition negates t h e s p e c i f i c
i n t e n t r e q u i r e d by s t a t u t e , Completing t h e h i e r a r c h y
of mental s t a t e s i n t h e new Code a r e t h e terms 1 knowinglyt
and ' n e g l i g e n t l y , ' each d e f i n e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n . "
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
It i s c l e a r t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e intended t h e words
'1
purposely" and "knowingly" would s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e word
"felonious" ( i . e . , i n t e n t i o n a l l y ) a s used i n t h e o l d code.
See: S e c t i o n 94-4301, R.C.M. 1947, r e p e a l e d . )
The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t co

,

W Concur:
e