State v. Lance

No. 82-206
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1982

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs .
JOHN FESLER LANCE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Ravalli
Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presidinq.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Koch & McKenna, Hamilton, Montana
Thomas P. Koch, Hamilton, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Robert B. Brown, County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana

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Submitted on briefs: Seotember 10, 1982
Decided:. October 4, 1982

Filed: ocl' 6 - 1982
Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.

Defendant-appellant was c h a r g e d w i t h t h e crime of custodial
interference arising out of an incident which took place on

August 1 3 , 1979. On December 1 8 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e d a t e s e t f o r t r i a l ,
d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d a p l e a o f g u i l t y to t h e c h a r g e w h i l e a t a con-
f e r e n c e i n t h e judges chambers. On F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t

moved t o w i t h d r a w h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d
d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n and d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s .
P u r s u a n t t o a d e c r e e of d i v o r c e e n t e r e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t

o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t of t h e S t a t e of M o n t a n a , s i x - y e a r
o l d , Brad L a n c e , w a s p l a c e d i n t h e l e g a l c u s t o d y of Dale L a n c e ,
defendant's ex-wife. Prior to August 13, 1979, the ~istrict
Court had issued a restraining order enjoining defendant from
i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h Dale L a n c e ' s c u s t o d y of t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n and
f r o m d i s t u r b i n g t h e p e a c e o f Dale L a n c e and t h e m i n o r c h i l d r e n .

On A u g u s t 13, 1979, defendant removed Brad L a n c e who w a s
s l e e p i n g i n a t e n t i n t h e y a r d of Dale L a n c e . D e f e n d a n t removed
Brad Lance w i t h p r o t e s t from Dale L a n c e . Later i n t h e day of

August 13, 1979, defendant was located and arrested in the
parking l o t of Tremper I s Shopping C e n t e r i n Missoula , Montana.

Brad Lance was returned to Dale Lance by Missoula police.

D e f e n d a n t was a r r a i g n e d and p l e d " n o t g u i l t y " t o t h e c h a r g e of
custodial i n t e r f e r e n c e on September 21, 1979. T r i a l was s c h e -
duled f o r December 18, 1979. Thomas P . Koch was a p p o i n t e d by

J u d g e Gordon R . B e n n e t t to r e p r e s e n t d e f e n d a n t , b u t s i n c e defen-
dant refused M r . Kochls s e r v i c e s , the trial c o u r t a s k e d him t o
a p p e a r as " s t a n d b y c o u n s e l . "
On December 13, 1979, t h e county a t t o r n e y , Douglas H a r k i n ,
J u d g e B e n n e t t , t h e d e f e n d a n t and M r . Koch m e t i n c h a m b e r s t o con-
s i d e r preliminary motions. The c o u n t y a t t o r n e y made a m o t i o n i n

limine to exclude a letter written by d e f e n d a n t a d d r e s s e d to

J u d g e B e n n e t t d a t e d December 1 4 , 1 9 7 9 . Defendant s t a t e d t h a t the

r e a d i n g o f t h e l e t t e r would c o n s t i t u t e h i s d e f e n s e t o t h e c h a r g e
of custodial interference. The t r i a l court granted t h e county

a t t o r n e y ' s motion to e x c l u d e t h e l e t t e r , h o l d i n g t h a t a m a j o r i t y
of i t s c o n t e n t s were irrelevant to t h e case before the court.
A f t e r c o n v e r s i n g w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t , d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d to a v o i d

f o r c i n g h i s s o n t o t e s t i f y and t o s a v e t i m e he would p l e a d g u i l t y

t o t h e c h a r g e a s t h e l e t t e r was t h e o n l y d e f e n s e he was g o i n g to

present. Whereupon, t h e p r o c e e d i n g was moved from t h e chambers to
t h e c o u r t r o o m w h e r e t h e j u d g e opened t h e m a t t e r f o r t r i a l , r e a d
d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a i n t o t h e r e c o r d and d i s m i s s e d t h e j u r y . On J u n e

27, 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t was s e n t e n c e d t o t e n y e a r s in prison, with

a l l t i m e suspended e x c e p t t h a t a l r e a d y served.
On F e b r u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 8 2 , d e f e n d a n t , appearing p r o se, f i l e d a

motion t o w i t h d r a w h i s p l e a of g u i l t y . On F e b r u a r y 2 3 , 1982,
J u d g e B e n n e t t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n and e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and
conclusions of law in s u p p o r t of h i s o r d e r on March 8, 1982.
Defendant a p p e a l s t h e o r d e r denying h i s motion to w i t h d r a w t h e
p l e a of g u i l t y .
Defendant r a i s e s t h r e e i s s u e s f o r review:
1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by a c c e p t i n g t h e g u i l t y

plea without informing d e f e n d a n t of a possible defense to the
c h a r g e v i a s e c t i o n 45-5-304 ( 3 ) , MCA.

2. Whether the guilty p l e a was a c c e p t e d i n open c o u r t as
r e q u i r e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 46-16-105 (1) a ) , MCA.
(
3. Whether the District Court erred in determining that
undue d e l a y j u s t i f i e d t h e d e n i a l .
S e c t i o n 45-5-304, MCA, states:
"Custodial interference. ( 1 ) A p e r s o n com-
m i t s t h e o f f e n s e of c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e i f ,
knowing t h a t he h a s no l e g a l r i g h t t o do so,
h e t a k e s , e n t i c e s , or w i t h h o l d s from l a w f u l
c u s t o d y any c h i l d , incompetent p e r s o n , or
o t h e r p e r s o n e n t r u s t e d by a u t h o r i t y of l a w to
t h e c u s t o d y of a n o t h e r p e r s o n o r i n s t i t u t i o n

" ( 3 ) A p e r s o n who h a s n o t l e f t t h e s t a t e d o e s
n o t c o m m i t a n o f f e n s e u n d e r t h i s s e c t i o n i f he
v o l u n t a r i l y r e t u r n s s u c h p e r s o n t o law£ u l
c u s t o d y p r i o r to a r r a i g n m e n t."
Here, d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d a t t h e s h o p p i n g c e n t e r and h i s

- 3 -
s o n was r e t u r n e d t o d e f e n d a n t ' s e x - w i f e by t h e M i s s o u l a p o l i c e .

I t does not appear defendant was given an opportunity to v o l u n -
t a r i l y r e t u r n t h e c h i l d t o the mother. The C o m m i s s i o n ' s comments

t o s e c t i o n 45-5-304, MCA, state:
" [ o l n e s h o u l d be e s p e c i a l l y c a u t i o u s i n p r o -
viding penal sanctions applicable t o estranged
p a r e n t s s t r u g g l i n g o v e r the c u s t o d y of t h e i r
c h i l d r e n , s i n c e s u c h s i t u a t i o n s are b e t t e r
r e g u l a t e d b y c u s t o d y o r d e r s e n £o r c e d t h r o u g h
contempt proceedings " .
W e a g r e e w i t h t h e Commission's comments. Here, d e f e n d a n t ' s

taking of the child in violation of the custody order could
p o s s i b l y have been grounds f o r a contempt c h a r g e . However, t h i s

C o u r t w i l l n o t c o n d o n e c h a r g i n g a n e s t r a n g e d husband or w i f e w i t h
c u s t o d i a l i n t e r f e r e n c e j u s t b e c a u s e t h e y w a n t to s p e n d t i m e w i t h

t h e i r n a t u r a l c h i l d , when t h e y d o n o t a t t e m p t to h i d e or s e c r e t

s u c h c h i l d from t h e o t h e r p a r e n t . The r e c o r d shows d e f e n d a n t was
a r r e s t e d e x a c t l y w h e r e he t o l d t h e m o t h e r he would b e . W are
e
aware t h a t d e f e n d a n t would h a v e b e e n b e t t e r r e p r e s e n t e d had he

chosen to a v a i l himself of the a d v i c e of legal counsel. The
r e c o r d is v o i d o f a n y i n d i c a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t was aware of t h e
a v a i l a b l e d e f e n s e as c o n t a i n e d i n sect i o n 45-5-304, MCA. Section

46-16-105, MCA, s t a t e s when a p l e a of g u i l t y may be a c c e p t e d :
" ( 1 ) B e f o r e o r d u r i n g t r i a l , a p l e a of g u i l t y
may be a c c e p t e d when:
" ( a ) t h e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r s a p l e a of g u i l t y i n
o p e n c o u r t ; and
" ( b ) t h e c o u r t h a s i n f o r m e d t h e d e f e n d a n t of
t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of h i s p l e a and o f t h e maxi-
mum p e n a l t y p r o v i d e d b y l a w w h i c h may b e
imposed upon a c c e p t a n c e of s u c h a p l e a .
" ( 2 ) A t a n y t i m e b e f o r e or a f t e r judgment t h e
c o u r t may, f o r good c a u s e shown, p e r m i t t h e
p l e a o f g u i l t y to he w i t h d r a w n and a p l e a of
not guilty substituted."
The s t a n d a r d b y w h i c h t h e v a l i d i t y o f a g u i l t y p l e a is judged is

whether the plea r e p r e s e n t s a v o l u n t a r y and i n t e l l i g e n t choice

among t h e a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s o f a c t i o n o p e n t o t h e d e f e n d a n t a s

a f f i r m a t i v e l y d i s c l o s e d by t h e r e c o r d . S c h a n t l e v. C r i s t ( 1980 ) ,

Mont . , 6 1 2 P.2d 6 7 3 , 37 S t . R e p . 1053; Yother v. S t a t e

(1979 1I Mont . -- - -- - - , 5 9 7 P.2d 7 9 , 36 St.Rep. 1192. While
i t is c l e a r t h a t c o u r t s a r e n o t r e q u i r e d to articulate specific

r i g h t s when a c c e p t i n g a g u i l t y p l e a , a n i n d e p t h e x a m i n a t i o n by

the court i s d e s i r a b l e and m a n d a t o r y i n cases w h e r e t h e r e c o r d
r e q u i r e s it. Yother , supra.

Here, t h e d i s c u s s i o n i n chambers between t h e c o u r t , standby

c o u n s e l and d e f e n d a n t was as f o l l o w s :
"THE COURT: NOW, e v e n t h o u g h you h a v e n ' t
a s k e d , c o n s e n t e d f o r him t o be y o u r a t t o r n e y ,
I would l i k e t o a s k M r . Koch i f you b e l i e v e
t h i s p l e a i s now b e i n g e n t e r e d v o l u n t a r i l y
w i t h f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t ' s i n v o l v e d ?
"MR. KOCH: I b e l i e v e t h a t he h a s y o u r h o n o r .

"THE COURT: And you c a n s a y t h a t --
"MR. KOCH: I ' m not sure t h a t I believe t h a t
i t is wise, b u t I b e l i e v e h e knows w h a t h e i s
doing.
"THE COURT: Very w e l l . Can you s a y that
you're entering t h i s plea voluntarily?
"MR. LANCE: Y e s , Your H o n o r .

"THE COURT: W i t h f u l l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f w h a t ' s
involved? A l l right. I ' l l a c c e p t your p l e a
o f g u i l t y , and t h a t c o n c l u d e s t h e f u n c t i o n o f
the jury " .
Here, it was n o t a n i n t e l l i g e n t c h o i c e f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t to e n t e r

a p l e a o f g u i l t y when t h e r e was a n a v a i l a b l e d e f e n s e i n t h e s t a -

tute. The meaning and c o n s e q u e n c e s of s e c t i o n 4 5 - 5 - 3 0 4 ( 3 ) , MCA,

s h o u l d have been e x p l a i n e d to t h e d e f e n d a n t and the record is

s i m p l y empty as t o a n y d i s c u s s i o n i n t h a t r e g a r d . We therefore

hold the District Court erred in accepting defendant's plea
without fully informing him of the available defense to the
charge.
Although defendant waited over three years to move to

withdraw his plea, considering the facts of this case, undue
delay did not justify the denial. As we have already found
r e v e r s i b l e error as t o t h e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e g u i l t y p l e a , w e w i l l
n o t comment upon w h e t h e r t h e p l e a w a s a c c e p t e d i n o p e n c o u r t a s

r e q u i r e d u n d e r s e c t i o n 46-16-105 (1) a ) , MCA.
(

Judgment is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the

District Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings with d i r e c t i o n s to allow
t h e a p p e l l a n t to withdraw h i s p l e a .

We concur:

Chief, Justice
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