NO. 80-324
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
, 3
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
PHILMON LARSON,
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Charles Graveley, County Attorney, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
Bernard Everett, Anaconda, Montana
Submitted on Briefs; November 26, 1980
~ecided:EB1-7 IE:
Filed: F L b j , , . ,
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
The S t a t e a p p e a l s from a f i n a l judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t of the F i r s t Judicial District, County of L e w i s and
Clark, dismissing with prejudice the information charging
defendant with arson. The d i s m i s s a l was b a s e d on a d e p r i v a -
t i o n of d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o a speedy t r i a l
and due p r o c e s s o f law.
On September 29, 1978, defendant's home in Helena,
Montana, was d e s t r o y e d by f i r e . The c a u s e o f t h e f i r e was
suspicious. Therefore, the f i r e marshal1 f o r the C i t y of
Helena and the State f i r e marshall's office conducted an
investigation. They d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e f i r e was c a u s e d by
a r s o n on O c t o b e r 11, 1 9 7 8 .
On A p r i l 1 3 , 1 9 7 9 , o v e r s e v e n m o n t h s a f t e r t h e home was
d e s t r o y e d by fire, the c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e f o r Lewis
and C l a r k County f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n J u s t i c e C o u r t c h a r g i n g
d e f e n d a n t w i t h a r s o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . A s a r e s u l t of
t h e complaint, t h e J u s t i c e Court issued a warrant f o r defen-
dant's arrest.
Defendant's known r e s i d e n c e was i n B u t t e , Montana, so
immediately a f t e r t h e w a r r a n t was issued t h e county a t t o r -
ney's office sent it to the Silver Bow County sheriff's
office. The w a r r a n t , however, was n o t s e r v e d on d e f e n d a n t
u n t i l November 2 7 , 1 9 7 9 . The r e a s o n g i v e n f o r t h e d e l a y i n
serving the warrant was that defendant was not always
present a t t h e address given a s h i s residence.
Following h i s a r r e s t d e f e n d a n t was b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e
Justice Court for his initial appearance. A preliminary
h e a r i n g was s e t f o r December 1 8 , 1 9 7 9 , b u t was c o n t i n u e d a t
t h e r e q u e s t of d e f e n d a n t b e c a u s e h e had no a t t o r n e y . The
c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e was i n f o r m e d l a t e r i n December t h a t
d e f e n d a n t had o b t a i n e d h i s p r e s e n t c o u n s e l .
No further a c t i o n was taken by the county attorney's
office until April 23, 1980, when i t moved the District
Court for leave t o f i l e an information charging defendant
w i t h f e l o n y a r s o n and f e l o n y c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . L e a v e was
g r a n t e d and d e f e n d a n t was o r d e r e d t o a p p e a r b e f o r e t h e c o u r t
on May 1, 1 9 8 0 , f o r h i s i n i t i a l a p p e p a r a n c e .
Following defendant's initial appearance, the county
a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e moved t h e c o u r t f o r s u b s t i t u t i o n o f j u d g e .
On May 5, 1980, defendant was arraigned before the
D i s t r i c t Court, t h e Honorable P e t e r G. Meloy p r e s i d i n g , on
t h e c h a r g e s f i l e d a g a i n s t him. The c o u r t s e t J u n e 9 , 1980,
as the t r i a l date.
On May 2 1 , 1 9 8 0 , d e f e n d a n t made a a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s
for denial of his constitutional r i g h t s t o a speedy t r i a l
and d u e p r o c e s s o f law. A f t e r a h e a r i n g on t h e m a t t e r t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d t h e m o t i o n and d i s m i s s e d t h e i n f o r -
mation with p r e j u d i c e .
The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
erred in dismissing the i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t the
d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right to a speedy
trial.
The right to a speedy trial is a federal and state
constitutional guarantee. U. S. Const., Amend. VI; 1972
Mont. C o n s t . , A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n 24.
When presented with a speedy trial inquiry, it is
necessary to examine the issue under the balancing test
s u g g e s t e d i n B a r k e r v. Wingo ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407 U.S. 5 1 4 , 92 S . C t .
2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. S e e S t a t e v. Freeman (1979),
Mont. , 599 P.2d 368, 36 S t . R e p . 1 6 2 2 ; S t a t e v. Puzio
(1979 1 , Mont . , 595 P.2d 1163, 36 S t . R e p . 1004;
S t a t e v. Tiedemann ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 3 9 4 , 584 P.2d 1 2 8 4 , 35
St.Rep. 1705.
Four f a c t o r s t o be c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r the analysis are:
(1) l e n g t h of delay; ( 2 ) reason for delay; ( 3 ) t h e defen-
dant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant. B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 530. I t m u s t be remembered,
h o w e v e r , none o f t h e f o u r f a c t o r s i s r e c o g n i z e d a s e i t h e r a
necessary or sufficient condition to a finding that the
r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l h a s been d e p r i v e d . Rather, they a r e
related factors and m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d t o g e t h e r with such
other circumstances as may be relevant. The Court must
s t i l l e n g a g e i n a d i f f i c u l t and s e n s i t i v e b a l a n c i n g p r o c e s s .
S e e B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 533.
As to the first factor of consideration, length of
d e l a y is t h e t r i g g e r i n g d e v i c e . T h e r e i s no need t o e x a m i n e
o t h e r f a c t o r s u n l e s s some d e l a y h a s o c c u r r e d which is pre-
sumptively p r e j u d i c i a l . Barker, 407 U.S. a t 530; accord,
Tiedemann, 584 P.2d at 1287; S t a t e v. Keller ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170
Mont. 372, 377, 553 P.2d 1 0 1 3 , 1016-1017.
I n determining l e n g t h of d e l a y , the S t a t e argues t h a t
the clock only begins to run at the time defendant was
arrested. Defendant contends t h a t the speedy t r i a l clock
s t a r t e d t o r u n when t h e c o m p l a i n t i n J u s t i c e C o u r t was f i l e d
and t h e a r r e s t w a r r a n t was issued. W concur w i t h defen-
e
dant's position.
The r i g h t t o a s p e e d y t r i a l is guaranteed t o an "ac-
c u s e d " by t h e Montana and U n i t e d S t a t e s c o n s t i t u t i o n s . Con-
sequently, the protection afforded by the guarantee is
a c t i v a t e d when a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n h a s begun and e x t e n d s
t o t h o s e p e r s o n s who h a v e been f o r m a l l y a c c u s e d o r c h a r g e d
i n t h e c o u r s e of t h a t prosecution, whether t h a t a c c u s a t i o n
be by a r r e s t , t h e f i l i n g o f a c o m p l a i n t , o r by i n d i c t m e n t o r
information.
kqn.a~3*178
S e e W i l l i a m s v . D a r r ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 4 *.2d 3934, 603
P.2d 1021; S t a t e v. L i n d s a y ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 96 I d a h o 474, 5 3 1 P.2d
236; U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Marion ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 404 U.S. 307, 92 S . C t .
455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468; People v. Love ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 39 I 1 1 . 2 d 436,
235 N.E.2d 819; L u c a s v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 6 6 ) , 363
F.2d 500.
I n t h i s S t a t e a c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n may be commenced
by a c o m p l a i n t , information or indictment. S e e s e c t i o n 46-
11-101, MCA. All t h r e e methods f o r m a l l y c h a r g e an i n d i v i -
d u a l w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r c r i m e and " a c c u s e s " t h a t p e r s o n w i t h
t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e . S e e s e c t i o n s 46-1-201(1) and
46-11-401, MCA. The S t a t e c h o s e t o i n s t i t u e i t s p r o s e c u t i o n
a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t by f i l i n g a c o m p l a i n t on A p r i l 13, 1979,
c h a r g i n g him w i t h f e l o n y a r s o n and c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f . Having
been c h a r g e d w i t h t h e p a r t i c u l a r c r i m e s , d e f e n d a n t i s r e c o g -
n i z e d a s a n a c c u s e d on t h i s d a t e whereupon t h e s p e e d y t r i a l
clock begins t o run.
The l e n g t h of d e l a y f r o m t h e time d e f e n d a n t became a n
accused u n t i l t h e d a t e t h e information w a s f i l e d i n D i s t r i c t
C o u r t on A p r i l 2 3 , 1980, i s 376 d a y s . The p e r i o d o f time
b e t w e e n a r r e s t and t h e s c h e d u l e d t r i a l on J u n e 9 , 1980, is
423 d a y s . Such a p e r i o d o f d e l a y i s l o n g enough t o t r i g g e r
a further inquiry i n t h i s matter.
The first delay in this matter occurred between the
f i l i n g of t h e c o m p l a i n t and t h e a c t u a l a r r e s t o f d e f e n d a n t
on November 27, 1979 ( a period of 228 days). The State
m a i n t a i n s i t was u n a b l e t o c o n t a c t o r l o c a t e t h e d e f e n d a n t ,
and, thus, the delay is j u s t i f i e d . Such a p o s i t i o n , how-
e v e r , is hard t o a c c e p t i n l i g h t of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e prose-
c u t i o n had i n f o r m a t i o n a s t o d e f e n d a n t ' s r e s i d e n c e and knew
o f v a r i o u s s p o t s i n B u t t e where d e f e n d a n t c o u l d be f o u n d .
A f t e r d e f e n d a n t was f i n a l l y a r r e s t e d , t h e n e x t d e l a y i n
p r o s e c u t i o n o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n s e r v i c e o f t h e w a r r a n t and when
t h e i n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on A p r i l 2 3 ,
1980 ( a p e r i o d o f 148 d a y s ) . During t h i s period of time a
p r e l i m i n a r y h e a r i n g was s c h e d u l e d f o r December 1 8 , 1 9 7 9 , b u t
canceled a t defendant's request in that he was no longer
r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l . D e f e n d a n t , however, p r o c u r e d l e g a l
counsel later that month, and the prosecution was so in-
formed. The d e l a y i n t h i s r e g a r d was m i n i m a l .
After defendant obtained counsel, the State contends
that any further delay in filing the i n f o r m a t i o n was the
r e s u l t of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s f a i l u r e t o inform t h e prosecu-
t i o n of w h e t h e r o r n o t d e f e n d a n t was g o i n g t o w a i v e a p r e -
liminary examination. A s a r e s u l t of t h i s delay, the State
a s s e r t s t h a t a w i t n e s s needed f o r t h e f i l i n g of t h e informa-
t i o n became u n a v a i l a b l e u n t i l A p r i l 1 9 8 0 .
W n o t e t h e S t a t e ' s c o n t e n t i o n s b u t must c o n c l u d e t h a t
e
t h e r e a s o n s advanced f o r t h e d e l a y i n f i l i n g t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
are insufficient t o j u s t i f y its length. The a d m i t t e d u n d e r -
s t a n d i n g between t h e p a r t i e s was that t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was
going t o apply d i r e c t l y t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r permis-
sion to f i l e the information, -------- o r n o t d e f e n d a n t
whether
waived the preliminary examination. It is apparent that
defendant's i n t e n t i o n s regarding t h e waiver were o f little
importance t o t h e prosecution. With t h i s being t h e case,
t h e S t a t e c a n n o t now r e l a y on d e f e n d a n t ' s failure in this
regard to justify its delay i n f i l i n g . Furthermore, it is
n o t t h e d u t y of d e f e n d a n t t o b r i n g h i m s e l f t o t r i a l . Thus,
the State cannot rely upon defendant's failure to act in
f u r t h e r a n c e of h i s own p r o s e c u t i o n .
Had t h e S t a t e d i l i g e n t l y pursued the charges against
defendant in District Court as originally intended, any
d e l a y would have b e e n m i n i m a l and i t s " n e e d e d " w i t n e s s would
h a v e been a v a i l a b l e . The e x t e n d e d d e l a y m u s t be deemed a t -
tributable t o the State.
Defendant, having filed a motion t o dismiss prior to
t r i a l which a s s e r t e d a d e n i a l o f a s p e e d y t r i a l , i s deemed
t o have f u l f i l l e d t h i s e l e m e n t of t h e speedy t r i a l a n a l y s i s .
See State v. Puzio, supra; State v. Steward ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168
Mont. 3 8 5 , 543 P.2d 1 7 8 .
P r e j u d i c e i n a s p e e d y t r i a l c o n t e x t i s t o be a s s e s s e d
in light of the interests of defendants which the speedy
t r i a l r i g h t was d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t . I n t h i s regard, defen-
dants' interests have been identified as: " ( i ) t o prevent
oppressive p r e t r i a l incarceration; ( i i ) t o minimize a n x i e t y
and c o n c e r n o f t h e accused; and (iii) t o l i m i t the possi-
b i l i t y t h a t t h e d e f e n s e w i l l be i m p a i r e d . " B a r k e r v. Wingo,
407 U . S . a t 532.
Of the three identified interests, t h e most important
is t h e l a s t because " t h e i n a b i l i t y of a defendant adequately
t o p r e p a r e h i s c a s e skews t h e f a i r n e s s o f t h e e n t i r e sys-
tem." B a r k e r , 407 U.S. a t 532.
Defendant contends that as a result of the delay in
p r o s e c u t i n g t h e c h a r g e s h e is now u n a b l e t o a d e q u a t e l y p r e -
pare h i s a l i b i defense. In particular, defendant a s s e r t s
t h a t he no l o n g e r remembers t h e v a r i o u s p e o p l e i n B u t t e who
saw him on the night of the fire. Moreover, defendant
points out that a.ny p h y s i c a l evidence supportive of his
defense was no longer discoverable in that t h e h o u s e had
a l r e a d y been t o r n down and removed by t h e t i m e h e was a r -
rested.
As to defendant's assertion that he was unable to
locate potential witnesses, the S t a t e argues t h a t the record
h e r e i s b a r e of any s u p p o r t i v e e v i d e n c e n e e d e d t o e s t a b l i s h
actual prejudice. W note
e t h i s l a c k of evidence b u t must
acknowledge that what has been forgotten can rarely be
shown; consequently, l o s s o f memory c a n n o t a l w a y s be fully
reflected i n the record. S e e B a r k e r , 4 0 7 U.S. a t 532.
Due to the l e n g t h of delay (over twelve months), an
i n a b i l i t y t o r e c a l l and r e c o n s t r u c t t h e e v e n t s o f t h e d a y o f
the offense with specificity is a plausible claim. Its
deleterious effect on the ability of the defendant to
p r e p a r e a n a d e q u a t e d e f e n s e i s more t h a n o b v i o u s . Being a
claim t h a t s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t s a d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y t o defend
h i m s e l f a t t r i a l , p r e j u d i c e t o d e f e n d a n t c a u s e d by t h e d e l a y
i s deemed e s t a b l i s h e d .
As t o t h e lack of p h y s i c a l evidence a g a i n , due t o t h e
length of delay and the fact that the house no longer
exists, defendant asserts a plausible claim of prejudice.
It i s t r u e t h a t t h e S t a t e h a s made a v a i l a b l e t o d e f e n d a n t
a l l evidence within its possession; however, t o now f o r c e
defendant t o prepare a defense, some f o u r t e e n m o n t h s a f t e r
the fact, based solely on the prosecution's own p h y s i c a l
evidence, v i o l a t e s t h i s Court's sense of f a i r play.
After considering the circumstances in light of the
f a c t o r s e s t a b l i s h e d by B a r k e r , we m u s t c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e
h a s b e e n e x c e s s i v e d e l a y i n p r o s e c u t i o n w i t h no v i a b l e j u s -
tification; that defendant's assertion of the right to a
s p e e d y t r i a l was p r o p e r and t i m e l y ; and t h a t p r e j u d i c e to
t h e d e f e n d a n t d i r e c t l y r e s u l t e d from t h e d e l a y .
The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .
W concur:
e
Chief J u s t i c e
C'J4h+Ywustices
his c a u s e was s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o J a n u a r y 5 , 1981.