No. 14848
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
F F OTN
1979
THE STATE O MONTANA,
F
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
VS .
MARK T O A NELSON,
H M S
D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable Robert Sykes, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
F i s h e r and E r i c k s o n , W h i t e f i s h , Montana
L e i f B. E r i c k s o n a r g u e d , W h i t e f i s h , Montana
H . L. G a r n a a s , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Hash, J e l l i s o n , O ' B r i e n and B a r t l e t t , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Mary B. T r o l a n d a r g u e d , A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,
H e l e n a , Montana
Ted Lympus, County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
S u b m i t t e d : November 8 , 1979
Decided: bC 1 4
T 7979
Filed:
ccc 4 IW.
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t .
~efendant
was c h a r g e d by i n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d i n t h e
~ i s t r i c C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t o f t h e
t
S t a t e o f Montana, i n and f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d , w i t h
t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t . During h i s a r r a i g n m e n t ,
defendant pleaded g u i l t y t o t h e charge. The p l e a was
accepted a t a l a t e r hearing held t o determine t h e f a c t s
which w e r e t h e b a s i s of t h e g u i l t y p l e a . Subsequently, t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e mandatory minimum two-year
s e n t e n c e p r o v i s i o n o f s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, a p p l i e d , and
t h e c r i t e r i a f o r t h e e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e mandatory two-year
s e n t e n c e found i n s e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA, had n o t been m e t .
A s e n t e n c e o f twenty y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , w i t h a l l b u t
t h r e e y e a r s suspended, w a s imposed. Defendant t h e n f i l e d a n
a p p e a l from t h e f i n d i n g t h a t t h e mandatory minimum two-year
s e n t e n c e a p p l i e d i n h i s case. Thereafter, defendant f i l e d
a motion w i t h t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e q u e s t i n g l e a v e t o w i t h -
draw h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t
and e n t e r a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y . T h i s motion was d e n i e d and
s e n t e n c e imposed. Defendant a p p e a l s from t h e judgment.
On September 1 7 , 1978, t h e d a t e o f t h e a s s a u l t , d e f e n -
d a n t began d r i n k i n g e a r l y i n t h e day. H e w a s d e p r e s s e d due
t o a f i g h t w i t h h i s g i r l f r i e n d and d u r i n g t h e day, he con-
sumed a p p r o x i m a t e l y one p i n t of 100-proof vodka and some
p r e s c r i p t i o n s l e e p i n g p i l l s w h i l e o n l y e a t i n g a hamburger.
A s a r e s u l t of t h i s combination of a l c o h o l , d r u g s and l a c k
o f f o o d , d e f e n d a n t became i n t o x i c a t e d .
Sometime d u r i n g t h e morning d e f e n d a n t was informed t h a t
a 9mm a u t o m a t i c p i s t o l he had l o a n e d t o a f r i e n d had been
r e t u r n e d t o t h e f r i e n d ' s house. H e went t o h i s f r i e n d ' s
house t o r e c o v e r t h e p i s t o l and i t s a c c e s s o r i e s , which
i n c l u d e d a 1 4 - s h o t c l i p and a s h o u l d e r h o l s t e r . For ease i n
c a r r y i n g t h e p i s t o l , h e p u t t h e s h o u l d e r h o l s t e r on and
p l a c e d t h e p i s t o l i n it. L a t e r t h a t morning he l o a d e d t h e
c l i p and went o u t t o t a k e t a r g e t p r a c t i c e . During t h i s
p r a c t i c e he f i r e d t h r e e o r f o u r s h o t s and t h e n p l a c e d t h e
weapon i n t h e h o l s t e r . Apparently, t h e p i s t o l w a s s t i l l i n
a cocked p o s i t i o n when i t w a s r e t u r n e d t o t h e h o l s t e r .
A f t e r t h e t a r g e t p r a c t i c e defendant drove t o h i s trailer
home l o c a t e d on L a S a l l e Road a c r o s s from a C i r c l e K s t o r e t o
t a k e a nap. He s l e p t u n t i l l a t e a f t e r n o o n and upon waking,
decided t o call h i s g i r l f r i e n d . Having no phone i n h i s
t r a i l e r , he walked a c r o s s t h e s t r e e t t o t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e
t o make t h e c a l l . H e w a s still carrying the p i s t o l i n the
shoulder h o l s t e r .
By t h e t i m e d e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e C i r c l e K s t o r e , i t had
become d a r k . A s h e w a s r e c r o s s i n g L a S a l l e Road t o r e t u r n t o
h i s t r a i l e r , a p i c k u p t r u c k approached t r a v e l i n g s o u t h . At
t h i s p o i n t t h e r e a r e two d i f f e r i n g v e r s i o n s o f t h e f a c t s
t h a t occurred.
The f i r s t v e r s i o n i s t h a t of t h e d r i v e r of t h e p i c k u p
t r u c k , Harold K e l l e r . Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t he w a s d r i v i n g
h i s p i c k u p s o u t h on L a S a l l e Road n e a r t h e C i r c l e K when a
man, l a t e r i d e n t i f i e d a s d e f e n d a n t , wandered a c r o s s t h e
street i n f r o n t of h i s truck. Keller s t o p p e d h i s t r u c k t o
a l l o w t h e man t o c r o s s i n f r o n t of him. K e l l e r maintains
d e f e n d a n t w a s s w e a r i n g and waving h i s arms and pounded on
t h e hood o f t h e v e h i c l e . K e l l e r proceeded t o d r i v e away
when d e f e n d a n t s t a r t e d y e l l i n g and s w e a r i n g . K e l l e r stopped
h i s t r u c k and looked t h r o u g h t h e back window a t d e f e n d a n t
who w a s j u s t behind t h e t r u c k . K e l l e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t defen-
d a n t r e a c h e d i n t o h i s p o c k e t , p u l l e d o u t a gun and f i r e d .
A s t h e gun f i r e d , d e f e n d a n t f e l l o v e r backwards and t h e gun
s l i d o f f t h e road. K e l l e r t h e n sped o f f and c a l l e d t h e
police. Keller t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h o u g h t d e f e n d a n t was
e i t h e r drunk o r o u t o f h i s mind.
A t t h e t i m e of t h e shooting, defendant w a s about t e n
f e e t away from where K e l l e r was s i t t i n g i n h i s t r u c k .
However, t h e s l u g d i d n o t s t r i k e t h e p i c k u p n o r d i d i t
i n j u r e anyone, n o r w a s i t found.
D e f e n d a n t ' s v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s o n l y d i f f e r s on a few
key p o i n t s . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t K e l l e r y e l l e d and swore a t
him a s h e went by and t h a t h e f i r s t t h o u g h t t h e r e w e r e two
people i n t h e truck. When t h e p i c k u p s t o p p e d he t h o u g h t he
was i n d a n g e r . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he p u l l e d o u t t h e p i s t o l
t o show t h e p e o p l e i n t h e t r u c k t h a t he had something w i t h
which t o p r o t e c t h i m s e l f . I n t h e a c t o f p u l l i n g it o u t , he
dropped t h e gun and b e i n g i n a cocked p o s i t i o n , i t f i r e d on
h i t t i n g t h e ground. H e t e s t i f i e d h e had n o t i n t e n d e d t o
s h o o t t h e gun a t a l l when p u l l i n g it o u t and t h e d i s c h a r g e
w a s accidental.
On November 27, 1978, d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d i n ~ i s t r i c t
C o u r t w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t i n v i o l a t i o n o f
s e c t i o n 9 4 - 5 - 2 0 2 ( 1 ) ( c ) , R.C.M. 1947 (now s e c t i o n 45-5-
202 (1)( c ) , MCA) , by f i r i n g a p i s t o l a t Harold K e l l e r . The
d e f e n d a n t w a s a r r a i g n e d on J a n u a r y 22, 1979. A t that time
h e s t a t e d h e wished t o p l e a d g u i l t y . The t r i a l judge, on
f i n d i n g t h a t a f a c t u a l b a s i s was n e c e s s a r y p r i o r t o accep-
t i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a , q u e s t i o n e d him a s t o t h e e v e n t s
culminating i n t h e aggravated a s s a u l t charge. ~efendant
r e p l i e d t h a t h i s memory o f e v e n t s w a s u n c l e a r b e c a u s e o f h i s
l e v e l of i n t o x i c a t i o n a t t h e t i m e of t h e c r i m e . He did
s t a t e , however, t h a t he had been c a r r y i n g a gun on t h e n i g h t
i n q u e s t i o n and t h a t t h e weapon had been d i s c h a r g e d .
The t r i a l judge a t t h a t p o i n t d e c l i n e d f i n a l a c c e p t a n c e
o f d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t y p l e a u n t i l a more a d e q u a t e f a c t u a l
b a s i s c o u l d be e s t a b l i s h e d . O F e b r u a r y 1 6 , 1979, t h e
n
a r r a i g n m e n t was c o n t i n u e d . A t t h a t t i m e Harold K e l l e r
t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s version of t h e i n c i d e n t . Defendant
d e c l i n e d t o cross-examine K e l l e r and d i d n o t p r e s e n t e v i -
dence.
The t r i a l judge a c c e p t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t y p l e a ,
f i n d i n g t h a t t h e r e w a s s u f f i c i e n t f a c t u a l b a s i s f o r such
action. The judge a l s o made r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e
g u i l t y p l e a w a s e n t e r e d i n accordance w i t h a p l e a bargain
a r r a n g e m e n t whereby t h e S t a t e a g r e e d t o d r o p c e r t a i n c h a r g e s
i n j u s t i c e c o u r t i n r e t u r n f o r t h e e n t r y of t h e p l e a t o t h e
aggravated a s s a u l t charge.
On May 29, 1979, a h e a r i n g was h e l d f o r e v i d e n c e i n
a g g r a v a t i o n and m i t i g a t i o n of s e n t e n c e . During t h i s h e a r i n g
defendant, f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , revealed h i s version of t h e
incident. I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e testimony of defendant, of
d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r w i t n e s s e s , and of t h e v i c t i m , t h e
t r i a l judge a l s o had b e f o r e him, a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g ,
a p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t and a n e v a l u a t i o n r e p o r t from t h e s t a t e
p r i s o n where d e f e n d a n t had been g i v e n a 45-day e v a l u a t i o n .
Based on t h i s e v i d e n c e , t h e t r i a l judge s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t
t o twenty y e a r s i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n , a l l b u t t h r e e s u s -
pended. I n d o i n g s o , t h e judge s p e c i f i c a l l y found t h a t
d e f e n d a n t w a s s u b j e c t t o t h e mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e o f
t h e aggravated a s s a u l t s t a t u t e .
On J u l y 11, 1979, a h e a r i n g w a s h e l d on d e f e n d a n t ' s
motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a of g u i l t y and e n t e r a p l e a o f
not guilty. The motion w a s based on t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e
p l e a was i n v a l i d b e c a u s e d e f e n d a n t had n o t a d m i t t e d t h e
f a c t s of t h e crime a s a s s e r t e d by t h e v i c t i m . The t r i a l
judge d e n i e d t h e motion r u l i n g t h e r e was a n a d e q u a t e f a c t u a l
b a s i s f o r a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e p l e a based on d e f e n d a n t ' s and
t h e v i c t i m ' s testimony a t t h e arraignment. Defendant ap-
p e a l s b o t h h i s s e n t e n c e and t h e d e n i a l o f h i s motion t o
withdraw h i s p l e a o f g u i l t y .
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r review:
1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n a c c e p t i n g t h e g u i l t y
p l e a e n t e r e d by d e f e n d a n t ?
Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e
mandatory two-year sentence provision f o r aggravated a s s a u l t
under s e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, a p p l i e d under t h e f a c t s o f
t h i s case?
The f i r s t i s s u e t o be r e s o l v e d i s whether t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s
g u i l t y plea.
General p r i n c i p l e s governing t h e withdrawal of a g u i l t y
p l e a are w e l l s e t t l e d . A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n s 2 4 and 26, 1972
Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o t e c t t h e r i g h t o f a c r i m i n a l
d e f e n d a n t t o a t r i a l by j u r y .
S e c t i o n 46-12-204, MCA, states i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" (1) The d e f e n d a n t s h a l l e n t e r a p l e a of g u i l t y
o r n o t g u i l t y t o t h e indictment, information
o r complaint. I f t h e defendant r e f u s e s t o
p l e a d t o t h e i n d i c t m e n t , i n f o r m a t i o n , o r com-
p l a i n t , a p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y must be e n t e r e d .
" ( 2 ) The c o u r t may r e f u s e t o a c c e p t a p l e a of
g u i l t y and s h a l l n o t a c c e p t t h e p l e a o f g u i l t y
without f i r s t determining t h a t t h e p l e a is
voluntary with an understanding of t h e charge."
Further, section 46-16-105(2), MCA, provides:
"At any time before or after judgment the
court may, for good cause shown, permit the
plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of
not guilty substituted."
There is no precise rule which can be relied upon in
any given case to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Lewis
(1978) Mont. , 582 P.2d 346, 352, 35 St.Rep.
1089, 1096. Each case must be examined on its own record.
State v. Griffin (1975), 167 Mont. 11, 21, 535 P.2d 498,
503. We must rely on the discretion of the trial court.
". . . That discretion is subject to review only upon the
showing of an abuse of discretion." State v. Lewis, supra,
"'A plea of guilty will be deemed involuntary
where it appears that the defendant was labor-
ing under such a strong inducement, fundamental
mistake, or serious mental condition that the
possibility exists he may have plead guilty to
a crime of which he is innocent.' ...
"If, however, there is any doubt that a plea is
not voluntary, the doubt should be resolved in
the defendant's favor. On application to
change a plea, all doubts should be resolved
in favor of a trial on the merits." State v.
Huttinger (1979) Mont. , 595 P.2d
363, 367, 36 St-Rep. 945. (Citations omitted.)
In Huttinger this Court held that there are three
important considerations involved in a criminal defendant's
attempt to withdraw a previously entered plea of guilty:
". . . (1) the adequacy of the interrogation by
the District Court of the defendant at the
entry of the guilty plea as to the defendant's
understanding of the consequences of his plea,
(2) the promptness with which the defendant
attempts to withdraw the prior plea, and (3)
the fact that the defendant's plea was appar-
ently the result of a plea bargain in which
the guilty plea was given in exchange for dis-
missal of another charge. . ."
595 P.2d at
366.
Here, w e a r e o n l y concerned w i t h t h e f i r s t f a c t o r a s
d e f e n d a n t ' s motion t o withdraw h i s p l e a w a s t i m e l y and t h e
c o u r t r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t t h e p l e a b a r g a i n agreement when
presented t o the court.
While t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n h e r e w a s more complete t h a n i n
H u t t i n g e r , d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t admit t h a t he had comrni t t e d
a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , n o r d i d he d e c l a r e t h e f a c t s upon which
h i s p l e a of g u i l t y w a s based. Here, t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n by
t h e judge c o n c e r n i n g t h e i n c i d e n t went a s f o l l o w s :
"THE COURT: You a r e aware o f t h e n a t u r e of t h i s
c h a r g e a g a i n s t you and t h a t i t c o u l d be up t o 2 0
y e a r s a t hard l a b o r i n t h e S t a t e Prison?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: A r e you s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e s e r v i c e s
r e n d e r e d by your a t t o r n e y , M r . B a r t l e t t ?
"THE DEF,ENnANT: Y e s j . sir.
"THE COURT: M r . B a r t l e t t , a r e you s a t i s f i e d
t h a t t h e Defendant i s e n t e r i n g t h i s p l e a volun-
tarily?
"MR. BARTLETT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Now, even though you have t h e r i g h t
t o remain s i l e n t , a s I s t a t e d , I w o n ' t a c c e p t a
p l e a of g u i l t unless t h e r e i s a f a c t u a l b a s i s
j u s t i f y i n g s u c h p l e a , s o I ' m g o i n g t o a s k you,
d i d you, on September 1 7 , 1978, d i s c h a r g e a
Smith & Wessons Model 59 p i s t o l a t a Harold
Keller?
"THE DEFENDANT: I w a s h i g h l y i n t o x i c a t e d a t t h e
t i m e , your Honor, and I ' m n o t s u r e - - I d o n ' t re-
c a l l t h e a c t u a l e v e n t s t h a t happened.
"THE COURT: Did you have a p i s t o l w i t h you?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And was i t d i s c h a r g e d ?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, s i r .
"THE COURT: Now, p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e , I assume
t h a t your a t t o r n e y knew of--had access t o t h e
County A t t o r n e y ' s f i l e a s t o t h e p o l i c e i n v e s t i -
gation?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: What had you been drinking at the
time?
"THE DEFENDANT: Vodka and orange juice.
"THE COURT: And how long?
"THE DEFENDANT: About 12, 14 hours.
"THE COURT: Now, who else was there, do you
recall?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, just myself.
"THE COURT: Do you know where the gun was dis-
charged from?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And where was it?
"THE DEFENDANT: On LaSalle Road.
"THE COURT: And why was it discharged, do you
know?
"THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Who is Allen Baker?
"THE DEFENDANT: I have no idea, sir.
"THE COURT: Harold Keller?
"THE DEFENDANT: I don't know him either.
"THE COURT: You have never met him before?
THE DEFENDANT: No.
"THE COURT: But this was the person involved
with the discharge of the gun?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Well, under these circumstances, at
the time of the hearing, I think that Mr. Keller
should be here in order that the circumstances
be more fully known to the Court. . ."
The court at this time properly refused to accept
defendant's guilty plea. It did, however, accept it without
further interrogation of defendant after hearing the testi-
mony of the victim on March 8, 1979.
While this case involves an aggravated assault, it has
the same problems and defects that were pointed out in State
v. Azure (1977), - Mont. , 573 P.2d 179, 34 St.Rep.
1569, and reiterated in Huttinger.
Here, defendant was not made aware of the differing
elements of assault as set forth in sections 45-5-201 and
45-5-202, MCA. The District Court had before it evidence
indicating the defendant was under the influence of a com-
bination of drugs and alcohol and was possibly suffering
from mental distress or instability. These mitigating
circumstances may have prevented the defendant from being
able to commit an aggravated assault as defined by statute.
" ' * * * Real notice and understanding by a defen-
dant of the true nature of the charge against
him is the first and most universally recognized
requirement of due process * * * understanding
of the nature of the charge is indispensable to
a valid plea of guilty * * * ' " State v. Azure,
supra, 573 P.2d at 183.
The transcripts indicate defendant actually remembered
the facts surrounding the alleged assault. From statements
made by his original counsel, it appears defendant testified
contrary to these facts because of his mistaken interpreta-
tion of counsel's advice that he was to advise the court he
was too intoxicated to remember the details surrounding the
alleged assault. It appears that defendant, who was a
newcomer to the criminal justice system, clearly misunder-
stood not only the advice of counsel, but the ramifications
of failing to tell the truth. The attorney, however, should
have taken steps to protect his client from a situation of
this kind, if not immediately, at least before the second
hearing.
Matters were further complicated, however, when defen-
dant's original attorney became ill and one of his associ-
ates, who was unfamiliar with the facts, assumed the case
shortly before the second hearing. At the second hearing,
no e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o c o n t r a d i c t
t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e v i c t i m , a l t h o u g h d e f e n d a n t c l e a r l y had
a d i f f e r e n t v e r s i o n of t h e i n c i d e n t . The judge a c c e p t e d t h e
p l e a without ever hearing defendant's version.
T h i s i s an u n f o r t u n a t e c h a i n o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s which
s h o u l d n o t happen i n o u r c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e system. I f the
m a t t e r was p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d by t h e judge i n t h e f i r s t
i n s t a n c e , i t i s c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t t h e judge would n o t have
a c c e p t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a , t h e r e b e i n g r e a l q u e s t i o n s con-
c e r n i n g whether o r n o t a n a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t was a c t u a l l y
committed.
The second i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t i s whether t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h a t t h e mandatory two-
y e a r s e n t e n c e p r o v i s i o n f o r a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t under s e c t i o n
45-5-202(2), MCA, must a p p l y h e r e .
S e c t i o n 45-5-202(2), MCA, states:
"A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t s h a l l
be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r a t e r m
o f n o t less t h a n 2 y e a r s o r more t h a n 20 y e a r s ,
e x c e p t a s p r o v i d e d i n 46-18-222."
S e c t i o n 46-18-222, MCA, p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" A l l mandatory minimum s e n t e n c e s p r e s c r i b e d by
t h e laws o f t h i s s t a t e . . .
do n o t apply i f :
" ( 2 ) t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s mental c a p a c i t y , a t t h e
t i m e of t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e f o r which
h e i s t o be s e n t e n c e d , was s i g n i f i c a n t l y i m p a i r e d ,
a l t h o u g h n o t s o i m p a i r e d a s t o c o n s t i t u t e a de-
fense t o the prosecution;
" ( 5 ) where a p p l i c a b l e , no s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y
w a s i n f l i c t e d on t h e v i c t i m . "
Both p a r t i e s a g r e e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d and
t h a t t h e exemptions enumerated above a p p l y .
The t r a n s c r i p t s are r e p l e t e w i t h t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e
d e f e n d a n t w a s v e r y drunk on t h e n i g h t o f t h e i n c i d e n t . This
t e s t i m o n y , however, may be viewed d i f f e r e n t l y by r e a s o n a b l e
men a s i t c o n c e r n s i n t e n t . Y e t , whether d e f e n d a n t c o u l d o r
c o u l d n o t form t h e n e c e s s a r y i n t e n t i s of no consequence
h e r e , a s t h e e x c e p t i o n i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 5 ) above enumerated i s
applicable. Although a l o a d e d weapon was i n v o l v e d and
a l t h o u g h s e c t i o n 46-18-221(1), MCA, p r o v i d e s f o r a minimum
s e n t e n c e f o r c r i m e s committed w i t h a f i r e a r m , t h i s s e c t i o n
i s a l s o s u b j e c t t o t h e e x c e p t i o n s o f s e c t i o n 46-18-222.
I n t h e l a s t l e g i s l a t i v e s e s s i o n , s e c t i o n 46-18-222(5)
was amended s o t h a t t h e e x c e p t i o n i n v o l v i n g a b s e n c e of
s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i s i n a p p l i c a b l e i f a weapon i s used i n
t h e c r i m e , even i f no s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d .
C h a p t e r 396, S e c t i o n 1, Laws of Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) . T h i s amend-
ment, however, d i d n o t become e f f e c t i v e u n t i l J u l y 1, 1979,
and t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t be r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l i e d t o p e r s o n s
committing c r i m e s p r i o r t o t h a t d a t e . S t a t e v . Azure,
s u p r a , 587 P.2d a t 1297.
T h e r e f o r e , on t h e f a c t s and t i m e frame o f t h i s c a s e ,
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g s e c t i o n 46-18-222(5)
inapplicable.
The judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s r e v e r s e d , and t h e
s e n t e n c e imposed on t h a t judgment v a c a t e d and s e t a s i d e . The
c a u s e i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s t o
p e r m i t d e f e n d a n t t o withdraw h i s p r e v i o u s l y e n t e r e d p l e a o f
g u i l t y and e n t e r h i s p l e a o f n o t g u i l t y t o t h e crime c h a r g e d .
We concur:
';t
Chief Justice