The trial judge granted a motion to suppress because of an improper stop. We reverse.
Defendant was charged by information with trafficking in cocaine. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, an officer with the Florida Marine Patrol testified that he was eastbound on 1-595 when he saw a Chevrolet vehicle in front of him traveling with two flat tires. As he observed that vehicle, a BMW automobile came close to it and the Chevrolet swerved,
The order on the motion determined that the officer had no “reasonable basis” to stop the Chevrolet, that the defendant had standing to raise the motion “because the satchel searched was found and searched outside the vehicle,” and that the initial stop was improper since the marine patrol officer was acting outside the jurisdiction of that department in a civil traffic matter which formed the basis for the initial stop.
At the time of the hearing the case of State v. Stember, 565 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), holding that the Florida Marine Patrol does not have authority to detain and cite drivers for noncriminal traffic infractions, was the law. Shortly after the trial court ruled, the supreme court decided State v. Parsons, 569 So.2d 437 (Fla.1990), which held that the Florida Marine Patrol did have such authority. [See also State v. Stember, 568 So.2d 1274 (Fla.1990), which quashed this court’s Stember opinion, relying on Parsons.]
The defendant concedes that these cases control. Also, the state correctly points out that no evidence on standing was taken at the hearing because of defendant’s objection to the officer testifying about anything occurring after he had made the stop. We therefore find the trial court’s pronouncement on standing unsupported by the evidence. We further hold that the evidence showed that the officer had a reasonable basis for the stop.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.