[Cite as State v. Pore, 2012-Ohio-3660.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUDGES:
STATE OF OHIO : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
:
-vs- :
: Case No. 2011-CA-00190
CHARLES ROSS PORE :
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Stark County
Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2011-
CR-0354
JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part; reversed in part;
Remanded
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 13, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO JOHN N. MACKEY
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 306 Market Avenue North
BY: RONALD MARK CALDWELL Suite 1012
110 Central Plaza, S., Ste. 510 Canton, OH 44702
Canton, OH 44702
[Cite as State v. Pore, 2012-Ohio-3660.]
Gwin, J.,
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Charles R. Pore [“Pore”] appeals from his convictions
and sentences in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas on one count of Rape with a
sexually violent predator specification and repeat violent offender specification, one
count of Kidnapping with a sexually violent predator specification, a sexual motivation
specification and repeat violent offender specification, one count of Aggravated
Burglary, with a repeat violent offender specification and one count of Notice of Change
of Address; Registration of New Address. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} Without being employed or having money, Pore approached his victim,
E.T. at her residence, which was for sale. Pore had ascertained that E.T. lived there
with a roommate, A. B. Pore inquired about the house, and E.T. told him to talk with
A.B. since she was the true owner of the house. When Pore called A.B., she told him to
go through the realtor, who was Deb McCracken. Pore called McCracken and gave her
a fake name (Mike Davis), and feinted interest in buying the house.
{¶3} On February 27, 2011, Pore came to the house in mid-afternoon and
found E.T. home alone. Pore told her that he wanted to leave some contact information,
so she let him into the house and led him to the kitchen, where Pore could write on a
table. Pore then asked her for a tissue as he had a runny nose, so she turned to get a
tissue. Pore then pull a steak knife, which he took from his girlfriend's kitchen, and
ordered E.T. to do what he told her to do and she would not get hurt.
{¶4} Pore next marched E.T. into a bedroom and ordered her to take off her
clothes and get naked. Once she complied, Pore marched her to the front door of the
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 3
residence and had her lock the front door. Pore then led her back to the bedroom armed
with his knife. Pore then had E.T. get on the bed doggie-style first, and then on her
back, as he attempted to penetrate her vaginally with his penis. Before trying to enter
her, Pore used his finger to stimulate E.T.'s vagina in order to make entry easier.
According to Pore, however he was still unable to enter her, in part because E.T.
allegedly would not keep still. E.T. also kept asking Pore why he was doing this, and
asking him to leave. Pore claimed that he reassured the frightened woman by telling her
that he was not going to hurt her. After some 30 minutes, Pore finished and left the
home. He later threw away all of his clothing and the knife in a dumpster in the
neighborhood.
{¶5} According to the lab report prepared by a forensic scientist of the Canton-
Stark County Crime Laboratory, a semen sample was obtained from the rape kit
performed at Aultman Hospital. The results of a comparison analysis revealed:
DNA typing was performed on the DNA samples prepared from the
semen stained vaginal swabs and the dried blood standard of [E.T.]. The
results were compared to the DNA profile of [E.T.].
A mixture of DNA profiles from [E.T.] and a male individual was
obtained from the vaginal swabs. The male DNA profile (semen source)
could be distinguished at fifteen (15) STR loci. The probability of selecting
an unrelated individual at random having the same fifteen (15) locus DNA
profile as the male individual is approximately 1 in
82,000,000,000,000,000.
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 4
To a reasonable degree of certainty (excluding identical twins),
Charles R. Pore is the source of the semen on the vaginal swabs.
{¶6} Pore was indicted on April 11, 2011. He was charged with one count of
Rape with a sexually violent predator specification and a repeat violent offender
specification; one count of Kidnapping with a sexual motivation specification, a sexually
violent predator specification and a repeat violent offender specification; one count of
Aggravated Burglary with a repeat violent offender specification; and one count of
Notice of Change of Address; Registration of New Address. Pore pled guilty as charged
on July 21, 2011 and was sentenced on August 3, 2011 as follows:
{¶7} Rape 10 years, sexually violent predator specification 15 years to life,
consecutive to Rape; repeat violent offender specification 8 years consecutive to Rape;
{¶8} Kidnapping 10 years, consecutive to Rape; sexual motivation specification
15 years to life-merged with the sexually violent predator specification (Rape); repeat
violent offender specification 8 years, consecutive to the Kidnapping and merged with
the repeat violent offender specification (Rape);
{¶9} Aggravated Burglary 10 years consecutive (Rape and Kidnapping); repeat
violent offender specification 8 years, consecutive to the Aggravated Burglary and
merged with the repeat violent offender specification (Rape);
{¶10} Notice of Change of Address, 2 years consecutive to Rape, Kidnapping
and Aggravated Burglary.
{¶11} The Court further imposed a sanction of 2 years for the violation of post-
release control to be served consecutive to all other counts.
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 5
{¶12} Thus, the aggregate sentenced imposed is a total period of incarceration
of fifty-seven (57) years to life imprisonment. Pore was further designated as a Tier III
offender pursuant to R.C. 2950.01(G). Finally, Pore was ordered to serve mandatory
periods of post release control.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶13} Pore raises four assignments of error,
{¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT SENTENCED MR. PORE TO
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES ON COUNTS 1, 2 AND 3 OF THE INDICTMENT IN
VIOLATION OF R.C. 2941.25 - ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT- AND THE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES OF THE OHIO AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS.
{¶15} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING MR. PORE TO A
SENTENCE OF 57 YEARS TO LIFE IN VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SECTION 9, ARTICLE I OF
THE OHIO CONSTITUTION, WHICH PROHIBITS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT.
{¶16} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MR.
PORE TO 57 YEARS TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN VIOLATION OF MR. PORE'S
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION.
{¶17} “IV. THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE STATE OF OHIO.”
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 6
I.
{¶18} In Pore’s first assignment of error, he argues that his sentences for Rape,
Aggravated Burglary and Kidnapping are contrary to law, as the crimes are allied
offenses of similar import, pursuant to R.C. 2941.25.
{¶19} R.C 2941.25, Multiple counts states:
(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or
information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant
may be convicted of only one.
(B) Where the defendant's conduct constitutes two or more
offenses of dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain
counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of
them.
{¶20} In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d
1061, the Ohio Supreme Court revised its allied-offense jurisprudence. The Johnson
court overruled State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699(1999), “to the extent
that it calls for a comparison of statutory elements solely in the abstract under R.C.
2941.25.” The Court was unanimous in its judgment and the syllabus, “When
determining whether two offenses are allied offenses of similar import subject to merger
under R.C. 2941.25, the conduct of the accused must be considered. (State v. Rance
(1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699, overruled.)” However, the Court could not
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 7
agree on how the courts should apply that syllabus holding. The Johnson case lacks a
majority opinion, containing instead two plurality opinions, and a separate concurrence
in the judgment and syllabus only. State v. Helms, 7th Dist. No. 08 MA 199, 2012-Ohio-
1147, ¶71 (DeGenaro, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
{¶21} Justice Brown’s plurality opinion sets forth a new two-part test for
determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25.
The first inquiry focuses on whether it is possible to commit both offenses with the same
conduct. Id. at ¶ 48, 710 N.E.2d 699. It is not necessary that the commission of one
offense will always result in the commission of the other. Id. Rather, the question is
whether it is possible for both offenses to be committed by the same conduct. Id.,
quoting State v. Blankenship, 38 Ohio St.3d 116, 119, 526 N.E.2d 816(1988).
Conversely, if the commission of one offense will never result in the commission of the
other, the offenses will not merge. Johnson at ¶ 51.
{¶22} If it is possible to commit both offenses with the same conduct, the court
must next determine whether the offenses were in fact committed by a single act,
performed with a single state of mind. Id. at ¶ 49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio
St.3d 447, 895 N.E.2d 149, 2008-Ohio-4569, ¶ 50 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in
judgment only). If so, the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and must be
merged. Johnson at ¶ 50. On the other hand, if the offenses are committed separately
or with a separate animus, the offenses will not merge. Id. at ¶ 51.
{¶23} Under Justice Brown’s plurality opinion in Johnson, “the court need not
perform any hypothetical or abstract comparison of the offenses at issue in order to
conclude that the offenses are subject to merger.” Id. at ¶ 47, 942 N.E. 2d 1061. Rather,
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 8
the court simply must ask whether the defendant committed the offenses by the same
conduct. Id.
{¶24} Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion advocates that the proper inquiry
under R.C. 2941.25(A) is not whether the two offenses can be committed with the same
conduct, but whether the convictions “arose from the same conduct that involves similar
criminal wrongs and similar resulting harm.” Johnson at ¶ 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in judgment.) The O'Connor plurality also notes that this determination should be aided
by a review of the evidence adduced at trial. Id. at ¶ 68–69, 942 N.E.2d 1061. State v.
Helms, 2012-Ohio-11467, ¶ 79.
{¶25} Justice O'Donnell's separate concurrence, joined by Justice Lundberg
Stratton, sets forth a slightly different analysis,
[T]he proper inquiry is not whether the elements align in the
abstract as stated in Rance but, rather, whether the defendant's conduct,
i.e., the actions and behavior of the defendant, results in the commission
of two or more offenses of similar or dissimilar import or two or more
offenses of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a
separate animus as to each. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009)
336 (“conduct” defined as “[p]ersonal behavior, whether by action or
inaction”).
Johnson at ¶ 78 (O'Donnell, J., separately concurring.) State v. Helms, 2012-Ohio-
11467, ¶ 80-81.
{¶26} As Judge DeGenaro from the Seventh District Court of Appeals has noted,
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 9
While all three opinions focus on the conduct of the defendant,
there are notable distinctions between them. The Brown plurality is still
somewhat hypothetical in nature. The determination of “whether it is
possible to commit one offense and commit the other with the same
conduct,” still appears to require an abstract comparison. Johnson at ¶ 48
(emphasis added). The O'Connor plurality directs the focus of the analysis
back to the evidence adduced at trial, while also leaving open the
possibility for some comparison of the elements of the offenses: “Rance,
inasmuch as it requires a comparison of the elements of the offenses
solely in the abstract, should be overruled.” Johnson at ¶ 68–69, 942
N.E.2d 1061 (emphasis added). Justice O'Connor also returns to the
language of the statute, parsing out the meaning of several key terms:
“allied offenses” and “of similar import.” Id. at ¶ 65–68, 942 N.E.2d 1061.
The O'Donnell concurrence emphasizes the importance of removing
abstract comparisons from the merger analysis and shifts the focus of the
test onto whether the two offenses were committed separately or with a
separate animus. Johnson at ¶ 78–83, 942 N.E.2d 1061.
State v. Helms, 2012-Ohio-11467, ¶ 82 (DeGenaro, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
{¶27} We find that in the case at bar, the analysis utilized by the O’Donnell
concurrence to be the most appropriate. In fact, the O’Donnell concurrence utilized the
following illustration,
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 10
Consider the crimes of rape and kidnapping, for example. The
elements of each are different. Rape, as defined in R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), is
committed when a defendant engages in sexual conduct with another and
the defendant purposefully compels the other person to submit by force or
threat of force. Kidnapping, as defined in R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), is committed
when by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a victim under the
age of 13 or mentally incompetent, by any means, a defendant removes
another from the place where the other person is found or restrains the
liberty of the other with the purpose to engage in sexual activity with the
victim against the victim's will.
Inevitably, every rapist necessarily kidnaps the victim, because the
conduct of engaging in sexual conduct by force results in a restraint of the
victim's liberty. Thus, in those circumstances, the conduct of the defendant
can be construed to constitute two offenses—rape and kidnapping—and
an indictment may contain counts for each, but the defendant may be
convicted of only one.
In a different factual situation, however, if the state presented
evidence that a defendant lured a victim to his home by deception, for
example, and then raped that victim, an indictment may contain separate
counts for the rape and for the kidnapping. In this hypothetical, different
conduct—the luring of the victim by deception and the separate act of
rape—results in two offenses being committed separately; therefore, the
indictments may contain counts for both offenses and the defendant may
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 11
be convicted of both. See, e.g., State v. Ware (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 84,
17 O.O.3d 51, 406 N.E.2d 1112 (the defendant could be convicted of both
kidnapping and rape because he lured the victim to his home by deception
before raping her).
State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶81-
81(O’Donnell concurring in judgment and syllabus)(Footnotes omitted).
{¶28} In the case at bar, Pore was charged with Rape, as defined in R.C.
2907.02(A)(2), Kidnapping as defined in R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) and Aggravated Burglary
as defined in R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). In the case at bar we must determine whether the
actions and behavior of Pore results in the commission of two or more offenses of
similar or dissimilar import or two or more offenses of the same or similar kind
committed separately or with a separate animus as to each.
{¶29} More than three decades ago, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that Rape
and Kidnapping are allied offenses of similar import. State v. Donald, 57 Ohio St. 2d 73,
386 N.E.2d 1391(1979), syllabus; State v. Henderson, 10th Dist. No. 06AP–645. The
Supreme Court laid out the requirements in order to determine what constitutes a
separate animus for Kidnapping and a related offense. Specifically, the Court stated:
In establishing whether kidnapping and another offense of the
same or similar kind are committed with a separate animus as to each
pursuant to R.C. 2941.25(B), this court adopts the following guidelines:
(a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely
incidental to a separate underlying crime, there exists no separate animus
sufficient to sustain separate convictions; however, where the restraint is
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 12
prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the movement is substantial so
as to demonstrate a significance independent of the other offense, there
exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate
convictions;
(b) Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the
victim to a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from
that involved in the underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to
each offense sufficient to support separate convictions.
State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d 1345(1979), syllabus.
{¶30} In the case at bar, Pore armed himself with a knife and deceptively gained
entrance to E.T.’s home. Threatening E.T. with the knife, Pore moved E.T. from the
kitchen to the bedroom. He then ordered E.T. to remove her clothes. At that point, Pore
moved E.T. at knifepoint from the bedroom to the living room in order to lock the front
door. Pore then forced E.T. at knifepoint to return to the bedroom where the assault
occurred.
{¶31} With respect to the charge of Aggravated Burglary, we find this crime was
complete when Pore deceptively gained entrance into the home. This act was separate,
distinct from the subsequent Rape and Kidnapping. Accordingly, under the facts of this
case Aggravated Burglary is not an allied offense of either Rape or Kidnapping. Thus,
Pore can be convicted and sentenced for Aggravated Burglary.
{¶32} In State v. Logan, the Supreme Court found no separate animus to sustain
separate convictions for rape and kidnapping. 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d
1345(1979). In Logan, after the victim refused to accept some pills, the “defendant
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 13
produced a knife, held it to her throat, and forced her into an alley. Under such duress,
she accompanied him down the alley, around a corner, and down a flight of stairs,
where he raped her at knifepoint.” 60 Ohio St.2d. at 127, 397 N.E.2d 1345.
{¶33} In State v. Price, the appellant asked the victim if she wanted to engage in
sexual intercourse. 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772(1979). The victim refused and
returned to the car. Id. The appellant pulled the victim from the backseat of the vehicle
to a nearby area where the appellant raped the victim. Id. “The force by which [the]
appellant removed [the victim] from the car to behind a nearby bush to engage in sexual
conduct, as required under the rape statute, is indistinguishable from the force by which
[the] appellant restrained [the victim] of her liberty, as required under the kidnapping
statute.” Id. at 143, 398 N.E.2d 772. The Supreme Court held the restraint and
asportation of the victim necessary to substantiate the kidnapping offense were not
distinct from the rape, either in time or function. Price at 143, 398 N.E.2d 772.
{¶34} In State v. Ware, the victim was unable to find a telephone to request a
ride home from a party. 63 Ohio St.2d 84, 406 N.E.2d 112(1980). The appellant offered
the victim to use his telephone at his residence. Id. The victim accepted appellant's
invitation, and they began walking toward his home. After walking several blocks, they
hitchhiked a ride from a passing motorist, who dropped them off within a block of
appellant's residence. Shortly after they arrived, appellant laughed and stated that he
did not have a telephone, and began making advances toward the victim. When she
resisted, appellant picked her up, carried her upstairs to a bedroom and, under threats
of death, forced her to submit to vaginal and anal intercourse. Appellant thereafter
accompanied the victim back to her girlfriend's residence, a few blocks from where he
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 14
was subsequently apprehended by the police. Id. The Supreme Court began its analysis
by reviewing the decision in State v. Price,
Price observes that the defendant's forcible asportation of his victim
was to an area within close proximity of the initial confrontation, and was
for the purpose of moving her to a place where the rape could be
accomplished without detection. In essence, the court found the distance
to be spatially insubstantial and the movement purely incidental to the
singular purpose of committing a rape.
The victim in the cause at bar was forcibly moved from the lower
level of appellant's residence into the upstairs bedroom, and, if these were
the only facts before the court, it could be necessary to reverse appellant's
kidnapping conviction. However, R.C. 2941.25(B) provides for conviction
for both kidnapping and rape where these “same or similar” offenses are
committed separately.
Under the facts at bar, we conclude that there was an act of
asportation by deception which constituted kidnapping, and which was
significantly independent from the asportation incidental to the rape itself.
The two crimes were committed separately.
63 Ohio St.2d 84, 86-87, 406 N.E.2d 112(1980)(Citations omitted).
{¶35} We are constrained to find Pore’s commission of the Kidnapping was
merely incidental to the Rape. The restraint and movement had no significance apart
from facilitating the Rape. No evidence exists in the record of substantial movement,
prolonged restraint, or secretive confinement. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 397 N.E.2d
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 15
1345, at syllabus. We find the restraint did not subject the victim to a substantial
increase in the risk of harm separate from that involved in the underlying Rape.
Accordingly, we find it was plain error not to find the offenses of Rape and Kidnapping
to be allied offenses of similar import.
II, III, IV
{¶36} In light of our disposition of Pore’s first assignment of error, we find that
Pore’s second, third and fourth assignments of error are premature.
CONCLUSION
{¶37} In accordance with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 25, we remand this case
to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with that opinion. This decision in no
way affects the guilty verdicts issued by the court. It only affects the entry of conviction
and sentence. All of Pore's convictions are affirmed.
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 16
{¶38} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in
part; reversed in part; and the case is remanded for further proceedings to resentence
Pore in accordance with the law and this Opinion.
By Gwin, J., and
Hoffman, J., concur;
Delaney, P.J., dissents
_________________________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
_________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
WSG:clw 0720
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 17
Delaney, J., dissenting
{¶39} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
{¶40} While there is no dispute that rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02 (A)(2), and
kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), may be allied offenses in some cases as
defined under the Johnson test, the critical issue is whether the crimes were committed
separately or with a separate animus for each offense. R.C. 2941.25.
{¶41} At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from the state and defense
counsel, and reviewed both the victim’s and Pore’s recorded statements and medical
records. The majority opinion sets forth a recitation of those facts. Based upon these
facts, the trial court determined the crimes of aggravated burglary, kidnapping and rape
were committed with a separate animus.
{¶42} Upon appeal, we review de novo the issue of whether Pore’s convictions
for rape and kidnapping merge as allied offenses of similar import. In Logan, supra, the
Ohio Supreme Court set forth the following guidelines to establish whether a kidnapping
and an offense of the same or similar import are committed with separate animus. I
disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, in applying the Logan guidelines, the
kidnapping in this case was merely incidental to the rape.
{¶43} I would find the following factors set forth in Logan exist in this case: Pore
held the victim at knife point and moved the victim from one room to another, to wit:
from the kitchen to the bedroom, from the bedroom to the front door to lock it and
impede anyone from leaving or entering, and then back to the bedroom. This evidence
sufficiently demonstrates substantial movement which has significance beyond the
underlying offense (to prevent escape and detection) and was independent from the
Stark County, Case No. 2011-CA-00190 18
rape. Moreover, the record also shows Pore, while in the bedroom initially, ordered the
victim to disrobe and then proceed to cut off her bra with the knife, therefore causing the
victim a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that involved in the
underlying rape.
{¶44} Thus, I would find under the circumstances of this case, there was
substantial evidence that Pore committed the offenses of rape and kidnapping with a
separate animus. Therefore, the crimes were not allied offenses and the trial court’s
finding should be affirmed.
{¶45} I would overrule the first assignment of error and address the remaining
assignments of error set forth by Pore.
______________________________
JUDGE PATRICIA A. DELANEY
[Cite as State v. Pore, 2012-Ohio-3660.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
CHARLES ROSS PORE :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 2011-CA-00190
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the judgment of
the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed in part; reversed in part; and the
case is remanded for further proceedings to resentence Pore in accordance with the law
and this Opinion. Costs divided equally between the parties.
_________________________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
_________________________________
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
_________________________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
State v. Pore
Combined Opinion