State v. Weinberger

No. 82-180 ( A )

I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F

1983

STATE O I4OTJTAIJA1
F

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

-vs-

ARROW WEINBERGER,

Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f R o o s e v e l t ,
The H o n o r a b l e P'I. James S o r t e , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

C o u n s e l o f Record:

For Appellant:

Skedd, A s h l e y , McCabe, W e i n g a r t r i e r & N c C a r t e r ;
J . C. W e i n g a r t n e r a r g u e d , H e l e n a , &Tontana

F o r Respondent:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Eel-ena, Montana
C h r i s Tweeten a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
James McCann, County A t t o r n e y , Wolf P o i n t , blontana

Submitted: J a n u a r y 1 0 , 1983

Decided r June 6 , 1983

Filed: 6 1983

Clerk
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I. H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.
D e f e n d a n t Arrow W e i n b e r g e r was c o n v i c t e d of d e l i b e r a t e
h o m i c i d e by a R o o s e v e l t County j u r y for the shooting death
o f F l o y d " S c o t t y " A z u r e a t a C u l b e r t s o n s e r v i c e s t a t i o n on

December 5, 1982. Defendant's twenty-year-old son, Adam,

was c o n v i c t e d o f f e l o n y m u r d e r f o r h i s p a r t i n t h e i n c i d e n t .

Arrow was s e n t e n c e d t o s e r v e s e v e n t y y e a r s i n t h e Montana
State Prison and was ordered to pay certain expenses
incurred in the presentation of the c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him.
H i s motion f o r a judgment n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v e r d i c t o r f o r

a new t r i a l was d e n i e d . H e appeals. We affirm.

The circumstances leading up to the shooting at a

Culbertson service station began sometime earlier. Adam
Weinberger, a resident of Fort Smith, Arkansas, had been

l i v i n g i n n o r t h e a s t e r n Montana. Beginning i n June 1981, h e
a t t e m p t e d t o e s t a b l i s h a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Luanne A z u r e , t h e

seventeen-year-old daughter of Scotty and Gloreen Azure.
A z u r e s were o p p o s e d to an involvement between Luanne and

Adam b e c a u s e h e was o l d e r t h a n Luanne and b e c a u s e o f Adam's
f a i l u r e t o " a c t l i k e a gentleman." D e s p i t e Azures' opposi-

t i o n , Adam and Luanne c o n t i n u e d t o s e e e a c h o t h e r .
On November 1 0 , 1 9 8 1 , Luanne r a n away f r o m home w i t h

three friends and w e n t t o Havre, Montana. Adam d i d not
accompany Luanne t o H a v r e , b u t s h e c a l l e d him f r o m t h e r e a n d

made a r r a n g e m e n t s t o meet him i n W i l l i s t o n , North Dakota.
A z u r e s s e a r c h e d t h e P o p l a r a r e a f o r Luanne w i t h o u t s u c c e s s .
On November 1 2 , t h e y t r a v e l e d t o W i l l i s t o n t o l o o k f o r h e r .
They f o u n d Adam W e i n b e r g e r , who f a l s e l y t o l d them t h a t h e
had not s e e n Luanne and t h o u g h t s h e was i n H a v r e . Later

t h a t d a y A z u r e s d i s c o v e r e d Luanne i n W i l l i s t o n and l e a r n e d
t h a t s h e had i n f a c t b e e n w i t h Adam.

A z u r e s began t o w a t c h Luanne c l o s e l y t o k e e p h e r away
f r o m Adam. They a l s o f i l e c i a complaint i n T r i b a l Court

a l l e g i n g t h a t Adam h a d c o n t r i b u t e d t o L u a n n e ' s d e l i n q u e n c y
by enticing her out of the family residence against her

p a r e n t s 1 w i s h e s and a f t e r c u r f e w . The c o m p l a i n t a s k e d t h a t
Adam be r e s t r a i n e d f r o m f u r t h e r c o n t r i b u t i n g t o h e r d e l i n -

q u e n c y and t h a t h e be k e p t away f r o m A z u r e s ' residence a t
a l l times. Sometime a f t e r t h e c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d , Arrow

Weinberger came to the Poplar area from Fort Smith,
Arkansas.

On December 1, Luanne again ran away from home.

A z u r e s were c o n v i n c e d t h a t Luanne was w i t h Adam b a s e d upon
the Williston incident. They i m m e d i a t e l y e n l i s t e d t h e h e l p
of l o c a l law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s and b e g a n t o s e a r c h f o r

Luanne and f o r W e i n b e r g e r s . A t t h e Azuresl request, police
stopped Arrow Weinbergerls Cadillac to look for Luanne.

B o t h Adam a n d Arrow l a t e r w e n t t o A z u r e s l home t o r e g i s t e r

their displeasure a t being stopped. Arrow was a n g r y a n d
t o l d A z u r e s t h a t h e d i d n o t l i k e t o g e t u p s e t " b e c a u s e when
I g e t upset, I stay upset . . ."
A z u r e s c o n t i n u e d t o s e a r c h t h e P o p l a r a r e a f o r Luanne.

On the evening of Friday, December 4, t h e y c o n t a c t e d Roy
Trottier, a federal Indian police o f f i c e r , and s o u g h t h i s

help. The n e x t m o r n i n g , A z u r e s d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Luanne had

been seen with Adam on the day she disappeared. They
immediately contacted T r o t t i e r and told him that if they
f o u n d Adam t h e y would r e p o r t h i s w h e r e a b o u t s t o t h e p o l i c e
and t h a t i f t h e y f o u n d Luanne t h e y would b r i n g h e r t o t h e
police. T r o t t i e r approved t h e plan. Luanne h a d , in fact,
b e e n i n c o n t a c t w i t h Adam W e i n b e r g e r and h e knew t h a t s h e

was i n t h e B i l l i n g s a r e a . She planned t o go t o F o r t Smith,
A r k a n s a s , w i t h him.

S c o t t y and G l o r e e n A z u r e t h e n b e g a n t o s e a r c h f o r Adam

Weinberger's car. They l a t e r e n l i s t e d t h e h e l p o f G l o r e e n ' s
s i s t e r , C a r o l Lee A z u r e , and C a r o l L e e ' s husband, Rodney.
Rodney was Scotty Azure's cousin. Carol Lee and Rodney
Azure found Adam's car in Brockton that afternoon and
notified the police. The p o l i c e d i s p a t c h e r s e n t a n o f f i c e r

t o B r o c k t o n , b u t h e a p p a r e n t l y was u n a b l e t o l o c a t e t h e c a r .

Carol Lee and Rodney then attempted to find Scotty and
Gloreen Azure. They e n c o u n t e r e d t h e A z u r e s f o l l o w i n g Adam

W e i n b e r g e r ' s c a r on t h e F o r t Kipp Road and t u r n e d a r o u n d t o
f o l l o w t h e c a r s toward C u l b e r t s o n . The t h r e e c a r s w e r e t h e n

p a s s e d by Arrow W e i n b e r g e r ' s white Cadillac. At a signal
f r o m Adam, Adam and Arrow p u l l e d t h e i r c a r s t o t h e s i d e o f
the road and stopped. The two A z u r e c a r s p r o c e e d e d i n t o

C u l b e r t s o n and s t o p p e d a t t h e S t a n d a r d g a s s t a t i o n . Scotty
parked a t t h e s i d e of the station. Rodney p a r k e d s e v e r a l
c a r l e n g t h s b e h i n d a r e d p i c k u p t h a t was a l s o p a r k e d a t t h e

s i d e of the station. The two A z u r e women w e n t into the

s t a t i o n t o ask t h e a t t e n d a n t t o c a l l t h e p o l i c e dispatcher.

S c o t t y and Rodney r e m a i n e d o u t s i d e .
At the time of the roadside stop, each Weinberger

v e h i c l e had two o c c u p a n t s . Arrow W e i n b e r g e r was a c c o m p a n i e d
by h i s b r o t h e r , F r a n k . Adam was a c c o m p a n i e d by a h i t c h h i k e r
named Thomas H a n z l i c k . When Adam r e t u r n e d t o his car a t
that stop after t a l k i n g w i t h Arrow, he t o l d Hanzlick t h a t
Arrow was g o i n g t o ''run down1' t h e A z u r e s and t a l k t o them.
The W e i n b e r g e r v e h i c l e s c o n t i n u e d i n t o C u l b e r t s o n and
a l s o stopped a t t h e Standard s t a t i o n . Arrow p a r k e d h i s c a r

almost d i r e c t l y behind S c o t t y Azure's w i t h about s i x f e e t of
s p a c e between the vehicles. Adam p a r k e d his car angling

into the passenger's s i d e of S c o t t y ' s c a r w i t h s e v e r a l f e e t
of c l e a r a n c e between t h e v e h i c l e s . The r e d p i c k u p t r u c k was
parked p a r a l l e l t o the driver's s i d e of S c o t t y ' s c a r a t a

d i s t a n c e of n i n e and o n e - h a l f f e e t away.

S c o t t y A z u r e s t o o d b e t w e e n h i s c a r and t h e r e d p i c k u p
n e a r t h e o p e n d r i v e r ' s d o o r of h i s c a r a s W e i n b e r g e r s p u l l e d

into the station. Arrow g o t o u t o f h i s c a r and t o l d S c o t t y
t o l e a v e h i s son a l o n e . Adam c r o s s e d b e t w e e n S c o t t y ' s c a r

and A r r o w ' s C a d i l l a c t o t h e back of t h e r e d p i c k u p , s a y i n g ,
" g e t your b a t o u t , Azure." H e t h e n began t o d r a g a l o g g i n g

c h a i n o u t o f t h e p i c k u p w h i c h h e d o u b l e d o v e r and s t a r t e d t o
swing a t S c o t t y . Rodney A z u r e g r a b b e d t h e o t h e r e n d o f t h e

eighteen-£ oot-long chain as Adam threw the chain toward

Scotty. Scotty deflected t h e chain with a baseball b a t he
had r e t r i e v e d from h i s c a r . Arrow W e i n b e r g e r t h e n drew a
. 2 5 c a l i b e r p i s t o l and s h o t S c o t t y A z u r e o n c e i n t h e c h e s t ,

k i l l i n g him i n s t a n t l y . Arrow c l a i m e d t h a t h e a c t e d i n s e l f -
d e f e n s e a f t e r S c o t t y had h i t him w i t h t h e b a t o n c e and t r i e d

to hit him again. Other witnesses placed the two at a
d i s t a n c e of fifteen-to-twenty feet apart. The j u r y found

Arrow W e i n b e r g e r g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e .
Arrow W e i n b e r g e r p r e s e n t s t h i s C o u r t w i t h s i x i s s u e s
on a p p e a l :
1. Whether the i n s t r u c t i o n s t a k e n a s a whole c o r -
r e c t l y d e f i n e d t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide;
2. Whether c e r t a i n h e a r s a y t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d h a v e b e e n
submitted t o the jury;
 3. Whether "other c r i m e s " e v i d e n c e was erroneously

introduced against defendant;
4. Whether t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s t r i a l t a c t i c s deprived

d e f e n d a n t of a f a i r t r i a l ;
5. Whether section 46-18-232, MCA, which allows

imposition of t r i a l c o s t s a g a i n s t a convicted defendant, is
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; and

6. Whether d e f e n d a n t was p r o p e r l y s e n t e n c e d .
Defendant f i r s t a r g u e s t h a t a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n -

i n g d e l i b e r a t e homicide o m i t t e d an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e
crime. I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 p r o v i d e d :
1

"You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t t o s u s t a i n t h e
c h a r g e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide a g a i n s t
Arrow W e i n b e r g e r t h e S t a t e m u s t p r o v e
t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t Arrow W e i n b e r g e r pur-
p o s e l y o r knowingly performed t h e a c t o r
a c t s c a u s i n q t h e d e a t h o f Flovd Azure.
" I f you f i n d f r o m y o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
a l l the evidence t h a t t h i s proposition
h a s been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
d o u b t , t h e n you s h o u l d f i n d D e f e n d a n t
Arrow W e i n b e r g e r g u i l t y of D e l i b e r a t e
Homicide." (Emphasis added.)

D e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n a s i n c o m p l e t e on t h e
b a s i s t h a t i t a l l o w e d t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t him o f d e l i b e r a t e
homicide i f it found he i n t e n d e d t o p e r f o r m t h e a c t which

caused death r a t h e r than intending d e a t h a s t h e r e s u l t of
the act. W e disagree for several reasons.

First, this instruction, taken in context with the
other i n s t r u c t i o n s and p l a c e d w i t h i n t h e framework o f the
i s s u e s and a r g u m e n t s p r e s e n t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l , d i d n o t
a l l o w t h e j u r y t o c o n v i c t Arrow i f i t f o u n d t h a t h e h a d o n l y
intended t o p u l l t h e t r i g g e r . This Court has recognized t h a t
in the c a s e of deliberate homicide, the requisite mental
state attaches t o the result:
 " I n Montana, a p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e
of d e l i b e r a t e homicide i f h e p u r p o s e l y o r
k n o w i n g l y c a u s e s t h e d e a t h of a n o t h e r
human b e i n g ... The s t a t u t o r i l y d e f i n e d
e l e m e n t s o f t h e o f f e n s e , e a c h of which
t h e S t a t e m u s t p r o v e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e
d o u b t , a r e t h e r e f o r e c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h of
a n o t h e r human b e i n g w i t h t h e k n o w l e d g e
t h a t you a r e c a u s i n g o r w i t h t h e p u r p o s e
t o c a u s e t h e d e a t h o f t h a t human b e i n g . "
(Emphasis added.) S t a t e v . McKenzie
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 2 8 0 , 327-328, 5 8 1 P.2d
1 2 0 5 , 1 2 3 2 , v a c a t e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s , 443
U.S. 90$$ 99 S . C t . 3 0 9 4 , 6 1 L.Ed.2d 871.

Here, w e f i n d t h a t t h e j u r y was t h o r o u g h l y i n s t r u c t e d and

c o u l d n o t h a v e c o n v i c t e d Arrow u n l e s s i t f o u n d t h a t h e h a d

performed the a c t or a c t s causing Azure's death with the

knowledge that he was causing or the purpose to cause

Azure's death.

A t t h e o u t s e t of t r i a l , t h e j u r y was i n f o r m e d t h a t t h e

s p e c i f i c c h a r g e a g a i n s t Arrow was t h a t :

". . . Arrow W e i n b e r g e r p u r p o s e l y o r
knowingly caused t h e d e a t h of Floyd Azure
by s h o o t i n g him i n t h e h e a r t a r e a o f t h e
c h e s t w i t h a .25 c a l i b r e a u t o m a t i c p i s t o l
c a u s i n g Floyd Azure t o d i e a l m o s t i n -
s t a n t l y from a s e v e r e d pulmonary a o r t i c
artery . . ."
From t h a t p o i n t , t h e f o c u s of t h e t r i a l was on t h e e v e n t s

leading t o Azure's death and on w h e t h e r the s h o o t i n g was

deliberate, accidental or an act of self-defense. Arrow

presented extensive direct testimony that conflicted with

the State's evidence and he presented evidence through

cross-examination that supported the defense theories of

a c c i d e n t o r s e l f d e f e n s e . The j u r y was t h o r o u g h l y i n s t r u c t e d

on b o t h t h e o r i e s and b o t h were t h o r o u g h l y argued. In fact,

no f e w e r t h a n t w e l v e i n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e f i f t y - f i v e g i v e n t o

the jury defined self-defense, t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which it

may b e u s e d , and t h e p e r m i s s i b l e amount o f f o r c e w h i c h may

be u s e d . Where " a l l t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , r e v i e w e d as a w h o l e ,
f a i r l y a n d a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t t h e case t o t h e j u r y , " we w i l l

not overturn a conviction. State v. Riley (1982),

Mon t . , 649 P.2d 1273, 1281, 39 St.Rep. 1491, 1501;

S t a t e v. Johnson ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . , 646 P.2d 507, 512,

39 S t . R e p . 1014, 1020.

In addition to the self-defense instructions, the

j u r o r s were i n s t r u c t e d : t h a t t h e y must c o n s i d e r t h e i n s t r u c -

tions a s a whole (#I);t h a t each material allegation and

f a c t c h a r g e d u n d e r t h e s p e c i f i c c h a r g e a g a i n s t Arrow m u s t b e

p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t (#8); that the requisite

m e n t a l s t a t e was " p u r p o s e l y " o r "knowingly" w i t h r e g a r d t o

t h e r e s u l t of t h e c o n d u c t d e s c r i b e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g

an offense (#31, #32); the statutory definition of "pur-

p o s e l y " and " k n o w i n g l y " ( # 3 1 , # 3 2 ) ; t h e s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n

of d e l i b e r a t e homicide (#lo); t h a t b o t h a c t and m e n t a l s t a t e

m u s t b e p r o v e d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ( # 3 9 ) ; t h a t a p e r -

son must have the r e q u i s i t e mental s t a t e with respect to

each element of t h e o f f e n s e ( # 2 4 ) ; t h a t d e a t h o c c u r r i n g from

a c c i d e n t o r m i s f o r t u n e is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o c o n v i c t o f d e l i -

b e r a t e homicide ( # 1 5 ) ; t h a t t h e f a c t a d e a t h o c c u r r e d is n o t

s u f f i c i e n t p r o o f , s t a n d i n g a l o n e , t h a t a c r i m e was c o m m i t t e d

(#16).

We reject the tortured interpretation the dissenters

g i v e t o I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11. They a r g u e t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n No.

1 is i n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e o t h e r
1 instructions. Viewed in

c o n t e x t of t h e f a c t s of t h i s case, t h e arguments p r e s e n t e d

a t trial, and a l l o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s charged t o t h e jury,

we find t h e i r stance untenable. W e hold that the instruc-

t i o n s t a k e n a s a whole f a i r l y and a c c u r a t e l y p r e s e n t e d the

case t o t h e j u r y a n d w e r e s u f f i c i e n t .
 The s e c o n d b a s i s on which w e reject a challenge to
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 is t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t p r o p e r l y o b j e c t
1

t o it; nor d i d he t a k e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l t o

c u r e any d e f i c i e n c y i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . A s i n s t r u c t i o n s were
being settled, the State offered i t s proposed Instruction

No. 8, which was g i v e n a s t h e C o u r t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n No. 11.

The f o l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e t o o k p l a c e :

"MR. CHARLES MOSES [ D e f e n s e C o u n s e l ] : W e
would o b j e c t t o P l a i n t i f f ' s 8 upon t h e
f o l l o w i n g g r o u n d s , upon t h e f o l l o w i n g
grounds: t h a t t h i s i s a n e l e m e n t and
i s s u e s i n s t r u c t i o n and i t i s i n c o m p l e t e ;
t h e S t a t e i s r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e , number 1:
t h e S t a t e i s i m p l y i n g t h a t i t was d o n e
k n o w i n g l y o r p u r p o s e l y ; number 2 , t h a t i t
was done w i t h i n t e n t t o k i l l , which r e -
q u i r e s under d e l i b e r a t e homicide a s p e c i -
f i c p u r p o s e t o k i l l under t h e s t a t u t e ;
number 3 , t h a t i t h a s t o be c o m m i t t e d
w i t h i n t h e c o u n t y ; number 4 , t h e d e a t h
m u s t b e a r e s u l t of d e l i b e r a t i o n .
"THE COURT: Do you h a v e i n s t r u c t i o n l i k e
t h a t i n yours?
"MR. CHARLES MOSES: No I d o n ' t h a v e t h a t .

"THE COURT: W e l l i f you w i l l p r e p a r e o n e
n s, we w i l l
c h a t h a s a l l o f t h o s e t h i -q ----------
t a k e a look a t it.
"MR. MOSES: Okay, Your Honor.

"THE COURT: Otherwise, I believe I w i l l
g i v e t h i s one.

"THE COURT: I w i l l g i v e it unless--I
d o n ' t t h i n k we h a v e t o a l l e g e t h a t i t was
i n R o o s e v e l t County, t h a t i s a l e g a l
question. C u l b e r t s o n is i n R o o s e v e l t
C o u n t y , Montana, and t h e a c t was commit-
ted i n R o o s e v e l t C o u n t y , Montana and i n
a d d i t i o n I would t a k e j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f
t h e f a c t t h a t C u l b e r t s o n is i n Roosevelt
C o u n t y , Montana. I don't think t h a t
t h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s have t o have a l l t h a t
s t u f f i n it. 8 w i l l be g i v e n . As I
--------------u ' r e s a y i n g a n d i t i s
u n d e r s t a n d i t y o-
your p o s i t i o n t h a t you h a v e t o p r o v e
.........................
- e ----------- i n - s t a t u t o r y l a n -
s e c i f i c i n t e n t- t h e
- under t h e
g u a g e , p u r p o s e l y , k n o w i n g l y ----------
 U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r u l i n u s ?
"MR. CHARLES MOSES: Right. " (Emphasis
added. )
While defendant objected on the ground that the

i n s t r u c t i o n was i n c o m p l e t e , i t i s a p p a r e n t f r o m t h e d i s c u s -
s i o n t h a t then followed t h a t t h e c r u x of t h e o b j e c t i o n was
that it d i d not require that the S t a t e prove a specific
i n t e n t t o k i l l b u t t h a t it allowed t h e S t a t e t o imply s u c h a

s p e c i f i c i n t e n t w i t h i n t h e s t a t u t o r y mental states of pur-
p o s e l y o r knowingly. Defense counsel argued f i r s t t h a t t h e

j u r y be i n s t r u c t e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t m u s t h a v e had a s p e c i f i c

p u r p o s e t o k i l l and t h a t t h e d e a t h m u s t h a v e b e e n a r e s u l t

of d e l i b e r a t i o n . H e a l s o argued t h a t t h e j u r y be i n s t r u c t e d

t h a t t h e crime had t o have been committed w i t h i n t h e c o u n t y .

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o o k j u d i c i a l n o t i c e o f v e n u e . The f i r s t
argument propounded by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l is n o t the law in

Montana.

The S t a t e n e e d not establish a s p e c i f i c purpose to
kill. Nor m u s t i t show t h a t d e a t h was t h e r e s u l t o f d e l i b e r -
a t i o n other than t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n i m p l i c i t within t h e s t a t u -
t o r y d e f i n i t i o n s of "purposely" and " k n o w i n g l y . " S t a t e v.
Sharbono ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 373, 392, 5 6 3 P.2d 61, 72-73.

S e e a l s o , C r i m i n a l Law Commission Comments t o s e c t i o n 45-5-
1 0 2 , MCA.
Where a person is aware t h a t it is h i g h l y probable

t h a t a c e r t a i n r e s u l t w i l l be c a u s e d by h i s c o n d u c t , h e a c t s
knowingly w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e r e s u l t of t h a t conduct. Sec-
t i o n 45-2-101(33), MCA. Where it is a p e r s o n ' s conscious
o b j e c t t o engage i n c e r t a i n conduct o r t o cause a p a r t i c u l a r

r e s u l t he acts purposely with r e s p e c t t o t h a t conduct o r its
result. S e c t i o n 45-2-101(58), MCA. The C o m p i l e r ' s Comments
to section 45-5-102, MCA, at 123, defining deliberate homi-
cide, note that:
"'Purposely' ... is the most culpable
mental state and implies an objective or
design to engage in certain conduct, al-
----g------Earticularly toward some
t h o u h n o t --__------_------------
result. 'Knowingly' . . . refers to a
state of mind in which a person acts,
while not toward a certain objective, at
least with full knowledge of relevant
-------------
facts and circumstances. Toqether these
terms replace the concepts of malice and
intent . . . premeditation is no longer
an element of homicide
added. )
. . ." (Emphasis

We agree. We have previously recognized the legislative
changes in the requirements of mens rea. State v. Sharbono,
supra, 175 Mont. at 392-394, 563 P.2d at 72-73; State v.
Coleman (1978), 177 Mont. 1, 30-31, 579 P.2d 732, 750, cert.
denied, 448 U.S. 914, 101 S.Ct. 34, 65 L.Ed.2d 1177. Here,
defendant's objection to Instruction No. 11 on the ground
that it was incomplete is founded upon mens rea requirements
that are no longer the law in Montana.
Defendant also failed to take the opportunity provided
by the District Court to draft an alternative instruction.
Instead, after instructions had been read to the jury and
the State had presented its initial final argument, defense
counsel resubmitted its proposed Instruction No. 35: "You
are instructed that with respect to the crime alleged of
deliberate homicide, a specific purpose to kill is an ele-
ment of such a charge and must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt." This proposed instruction was properly refused both
times. We conclude that defendant's contention that Instruc-
tion No. 11 was incomplete is without merit.
Defendant next challenges the introduction of certain
hearsay statements into evidence. He raises three separate
arguments i n a t t a c k i n g admission of t h e hearsay statements.

First, he c o n t e n d s t h a t two p r e s h o o t i n g s t a t e m e n t s were n o t
a d m i s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h e y were h e a r s a y o r d o u b l e h e a r s a y a n d
b e c a u s e t h e y were i r r e l e v a n t . Second, he contends t h a t t h e
S t a t e f a i l e d t o g i v e n o t i c e of two a d m i s s i o n s p u r s u a n t t o

s e c t i o n 46-15-303, MCA, and s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e n o t h a v e b e e n
allowed to introduce the statements. Third, he contends

that t h e admission of four i n c u l p a t o r y s t a t e m e n t s made b y
Adam, h i s n o n t e s t i f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t , were B r u t o n i n f r a c t i o n s

t h a t v i o l a t e d t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e of t h e S i x t h Amend-
ment t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . B r u t o n v. United

S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 3 9 1 U.S. 1 2 3 , 88 S . C t . 1 6 2 0 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476.
The p r e s h o o t i n g h e a r s a y s t a t e m e n t s t h a t were a d m i t t e d

and that defendant challenges were made by Gloreen and
Luanne A z u r e . G l o r e e n A z u r e was q u e s t i o n e d d u r i n g c r o s s -

examination on her basis for believing that Weinbergers
m i g h t know o f L u a n n e ' s w h e r e a b o u t s . The S t a t e was a l l o w e d

t o d e v e l o p t h o s e r e a s o n s on r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n and t e s t i -

mony o n Adam's i n v o l v e m e n t i n L u a n n e ' s t r i p t o W i l l i s t o n was
admitted. Gloreen was a l s o asked why she believed that
Arrow c o u l d be involved with Luanne's disappearance. She

answered :
" I was t o l d t h a t h e was on h i s way up
h e r e , and h e d i d n ' t c a r e how much money
i t c o s t him, and h e was b r i n g i n g a l a w y e r
and h e was g o i n g t o p r o v e t h a t h i s s o n
was a n a n g e l . . ."
Luanne was q u e s t i o n e d o n W e i n b e r g e r s ' knowledge o f h e r
w h e r e a b o u t s d u r i n g e a r l y December. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e
and Adam p l a n n e d t o go t o Arkansas; that she l e f t a note
t e l l i n g him s h e was g o i n g t o B i l l i n g s ; t h a t h e showed t h e
n o t e t o Arrow; and t h a t Arrow s a i d i t " s o u n d e d good" t o him.
B o t h s t a t e m e n t s were o b j e c t e d t o a s h e a r s a y , o r as d o u b l e

h e a r s a y , p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 8 0 5 , Mont.R.Evid.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y a l l o w e d t h e f i r s t s t a t e -

ment into evidence with an instruction that it was not
o f f e r e d t o prove t h e t r u t h of the matter asserted but was

o f f e r e d o n l y t o show why G l o r e e n a c t e d a n d b e l i e v e d a s s h e
did. The s t a t e m e n t was r e l e v a n t t o t h e i s s u e o f d e f e n d a n t ' s

s t a t e of mind a n d m o t i v e . I n a c a s e where s e l f - d e f e n s e is

r a i s e d , t h e s t a t e o f mind a n d i n t e n t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i s t h e
primary issue. The j u r y is e n t i t l e d t o know, so far as
e v i d e n c e is a v a i l a b l e , a l l t h e f a c t s a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s w h i c h
t e n d t o t h r o w l i g h t upon t h e p a r t i e s a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n s a n d
f e e l i n g s toward each o t h e r . S t a t e v. Hollowell ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79
Mont. 3 4 3 , 356-357, 256 P. 3 8 0 , 385. The j u r y was e n t i t l e d

t o view S c o t t y A z u r e ' s d e a t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of these prior
events. S t a t e v . R i l e y , s u p r a , 649 P.2d a t 1 2 8 0 , 39 S t . R e p .
a t 1499.

Most of Luanne's s t a t e m e n t was n o n o b j e c t i o n a b l e and

was p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d . O n l y t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e s t a t e m e n t
(Arrow's knowledge and approval of Luanne's trip to
Billings) should not have been admitted into evidence.

Defendant c o n t e n d s t h a t viewed i n t h e c o n t e x t o f G l o r e e n ' s
s t a t e m e n t and the r e f e r e n c e made to the tribal complaint
f i l e d a g a i n s t Adam, t h e comment was p r e j u d i c i a l . We w i l l

a d d r e s s t h i s c o n t e n t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of d e f e n d a n t ' s
argument on " o t h e r c r i m e s " e v i d e n c e .
Defendant argues t h a t Luanne's statement constitutes
e v i d e n c e o f o t h e r c r i m e s and t h a t i t d o e s n o t meet t h e f o u r -
prong test of a d m i s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s Court s e t f o r t h in
S t a t e v. Just (1979), Mont. , 6 0 2 P.2d 9 5 7 , 36
St.Rep. 1649. We agree that it does not meet the Just test.
It need not. We reject defendant's contention that it
constitutes evidence of other crimes. Defendant failed to
object to admission of the statement at trial on these
grounds and may not do so now. State v. Campbell (1981),
Mont . , 622 P.2d 200, 202, 38 St.Rep. 19, 22. Nor
has Arrow convinced us that the jury would recognize as
"another crime" the tenuous connection he attempts to draw
between: (1) a complaint filed against Adam in Tribal Court;
(2) Adam's plan to take Luanne to Arkansas; (3) Arrow's
knowledge that Luanne left a note saying she went to
Billings; and, (4) Arrow's statement that "it sound[ed] good
to [him] " . The connection appears to be too flimsy to merit
serious consideration. In a criminal case where prejudice
is alleged, it must be established from the record that a
substantial right was denied. State v. Dupre (1982),
Mon t . , 650 P.2d 1381, 1386, 39 St.Rep. 1660, 1666;
section 46-20-701, MCA. Defendant has failed to demonstrate
such prejudice.
Defendant next challenges the introduction of several
statements which were not included within the "Notice of
Confessions and/or Admissions" filed by the State in
response to defendant's motion requesting production of such
statements. Defendant contends that the District Court erred
in ruling that the motion was moot as a result of the notice
filed. We agree. Section 46-15-303, MCA, provides:
"Motion to produce confession or admis-
sion. (1) On motion of a defendant in any
criminal case made prior to trial, the
court shall order the state to furnish
the defendant with a copy of any written
confession or admission and a list of the
witnesses to its making. If the defendant
has made an oral confession or admission,
 a l i s t of t h e w i t n e s s e s to i t s making
s h a l l be f u r n i s h e d .
" ( 2 ) The l i s t o f w i t n e s s e s may, upon
n o t i c e and m o t i o n , b e amended by t h e
state prior to trial.
"(3) No s u c h c o n f e s s i o n o r a d m i s s i o n
s h a l l be r e c e i v e d i n e v i d e n c e which h a s
------------n i s h e d i n c o m p l i a n c e w i t h
not been fur
s u b s e c t i o n (1) u n l e s s t h e c o u r t i s s a t i s -
f i e d t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r was unaware o f
t h e existence o f s u c h c o n f e s s i o n o r ad-
m i s s i o n ~ r i o rt o t r i a l and t h a t h e c o u l d
n o t h a v e become a w a r e o f s u c h i n t h e
e x e r c i s e of d u e d i l i g e n c e . " (Emphasis
added. )
The r e c o r d d o e s n o t s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g by t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t o r was unaware o f the existence of
the statements. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e r e f o r e had no d i s c r e -

t i o n t o allow t h e statements i n t o evidence.
The f i r s t s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam i n t h e s e r v i c e

s t a t i o n a f t e r the shooting. He said, "What d o you e x p e c t ,
t h e y were t a i l g a t i n g u s . " The p r o s e c u t o r f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e
t h i s s t a t e m e n t t o d e f e n d a n t s i n c e h e f i r s t became a w a r e o f

it a f t e r t h e "Notice of C o n f e s s i o n s and/or A d m i s s i o n s " was

filed. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y p r o v i d e d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l
the opportunity t o interview a l l possible witnesses t o t h e
making o f t h e s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e i t was a l l o w e d i n t o e v i d e n c e .
The s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t was made by Adam to the hitchhiker,

Hanzlick. A s Adam s t o p p e d a t t h e s e r v i c e s t a t i o n , h e a s k e d :

"Are you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " Defense c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h e

State's attempt t o introduce t h i s statement i n its cross-
examination of Hanzlick. After discussion outside the

p r e s e n c e of the jury, t h e District Court struck t h e s t a t e -
m e n t and u s e d a n a d m o n i s h m e n t f r a m e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o
i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y t o d i s r e g a r d it. No m o t i o n f o r m i s t r i a l
was made. The e x i s t e n c e o f a s i m i l a r s t a t e m e n t ("we m i g h t
see a f i g h t " ) had b e e n p r o v i d e d i n a n a f f i d a v i t s u p p o r t i n g
the amended complaint and its admission had been argued
earlier in the t r i a l .

Defendant h a s f a i l e d t o demonstrate p r e j u d i c e a r i s i n g

from t h e f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e n o t i c e of these statements a s
distinguished from the introduction of the statements

themselves. The p u r p o s e o f t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g p r o d u c t i o n
of c o n f e s s i o n s and a d m i s s i o n s i s t o a l l o w t h e d e f e n d a n t t o

prepare a defense t o the statements. Here, d e f e n d a n t was
g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o i n t e r v i e w any p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o

t h e making of t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t b e f o r e i t was i n t r o d u c e d .

The second s t a t e m e n t was not admitted, and the jury was
a d m o n i s h e d w i t h a n i n s t r u c t i o n p r e p a r e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l .
While t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e s t a t e m e n t s may h a v e b e e n d e t r i -

mental to defendant, he has not demonstrated prejudice
stemming f r o m t h e S t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o p r o d u c e t h e s t a t e m e n t s

prior to trial.

Defendant f i n a l l y argues t h a t f o u r s t a t e m e n t s a t t r i -
buted to his nontestifying codefendant were admitted in
v i o l a t i o n of t h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n c l a u s e of t h e United S t a t e s
Constitution. The f o u r o u t - o f - c o u r t s t a t e m e n t s were i n t r o -
duced through f o u r w i t n e s s e s .
G l o r e e n Azure t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e s h o o t i n g Adam

said t o her, " I h o p e you a r e s a t i s f i e d , you c a u s e d a l l o f
t h i s trouble." Rodney A z u r e t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r t h e s h o o t -

i n g Adam s a i d t o him, "What d i d you e x p e c t , t h e y w e r e t a i l -
g a t i n g us." The t h i r d s t a t e m e n t was i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e
t e s t i m o n y of A r t h u r Sarnow, who t r a n s p o r t e d t h e W e i n b e r g e r s
a n d Tom H a n z l i c k f r o m t h e s c e n e o f t h e s h o o t i n g . H e testi-

f i e d t h a t Adam t u r n e d t o w a r d Arrow W e i n b e r g e r , F r a n k Wein-
b e r g e r , and H a n z l i c k and s a i d , " T h a t ' s one and f o u r t o go."

The l a s t o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s was H a n z l i c k l s s t r i c k e n s t a t e -
ment. Adam a s k e d , " [ a ] r e you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " as t h e y

drove i n t o the s e r v i c e s t a t i o n . Arrow c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e s e
s t a t e m e n t s v i o l a t e t h e r u l e announced i n Bruton.

I n Bruton t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h e l d that
"where t h e p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g e x t r a j u d i c i a l s t a t e m e n t s

of a c o d e f e n d a n t who s t a n d s a c c u s e d s i d e - b y - s i d e with the
defendant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a

joint t r i a l , " limiting instructions t o the jury t o disregard
the statements inculpating the defendant are inadequate.

Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. a t 135-136, 88 S.Ct. a t 1628, 20
L.Ed.2d a t 485. The f a c t s i n B r u t o n a r e c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h -
a b l e from t h e c a s e b e f o r e us.
I n Bruton t h e n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefendant, Evans, con-

f e s s e d o r a l l y t h a t h e and B r u t o n committed a r o b b e r y . The
c o n f e s s i o n was a d m i t t e d , a n d t h e j u r y w a s i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t

was c o m p e t e n t o n l y a g a i n s t E v a n s . The C o u r t r e v e r s e d b a s e d
upon, f i r s t , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t s were " p o w e r f u l l y

i n c r i m i n a t i n g " and " d e v a s t a t i n g " t o B r u t o n a n d , s e c o n d , upon
t h e r e c o g n i z e d m o t i v a t i o n t o s h i f t blame o n t o o t h e r s . It

concluded t h a t :
"The u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f s u c h e v i d e n c e is
i n t o l e r a b l y compounded when t h e a l l e g e d
accomplice, a s h e r e , d o e s n o t t e s t i f y and
c a n n o t be t e s t e d by c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n .
I t was a g a i n s t s u c h t h r e a t s t o a f a i r
t r i a l t h a t t h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e was
directed." B r u t o n , s u p r a , 3 9 1 U.S. a t
1 3 6 , 8 8 S . C t . a t 1 6 2 8 , 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485.
Extrajudicial statements of a n o n t e s t i f y i n g codefen-
d a n t do n o t always r e q u i r e r e v e r s a l . S t a t e v. Powers ( 1 9 8 2 ) ,
Mon t . , 6 4 5 P.2d 1 3 5 7 , 1 3 6 3 , 39 S t . R e p . 989, 996;

Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct.
1 7 2 6 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284; Schneble v. Florida ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 4 0 5 U.S.

427, 92 S . C t . 1 0 5 6 , 3 1 L.,Ed.2d 340. A c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t is

entitled to a fair t r i a l . b u t n o t a p e r f e c t one. S t a t e v.

Powers, s u p r a ; Bruton v. United S t a t e s , supra. In accord,
.i.~r,z.~)<
-I&hmirv. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 5 3 ) , 3 4 4 U.S. 6 0 4 , 73 S.Ct. 481,

97 L.Ed. 593; Brown v . U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 4 1 1 U.S. 223,

93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208; Michigan v. Tucker (1974),

417 U.S. 4 3 3 , 94 S . C t . 2 3 5 7 , 4 1 L.Ed.2d 182.

Where a s t a t e m e n t h a s b e e n e d i t e d t o remove s p e c i f i c

references to codefendants, it is a d m i s s i b l e in a joint

trial. United S t a t e s v. Stewart (5th Cir. 1 9 7 8 ) , 579 F.2d

356, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 99 S . C t . 332, 58 L.Ed.2d

332; United States v. Holleman (7th C i r . 1978), 575 F.2d

139; United S t a t e s v. Dady (6th Cir. 1976), 536 F.2d 675

( p e r c u r i a m ) ; United S t a t e s v. Wingate (2nd C i r . 1 9 7 5 ) , 520

F.2d 309, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 858, 47

L.Ed.2d 84; United S t a t e s v. Alvarez (3rd Cir. 1 9 7 5 ) , 519

F.2d 1052, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914, 96 S.Ct. 221, 46

L.Ed.2d 143;. United S t a t e s v. Panepinto (3rd C i r . 1970),

430 F.2d 613, c e r t . d e n i e d , 400 U.S. 949, 9 1 S.Ct. 258, 27

L.Ed.2d 256; U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Lipowitz (3rd C i r . 1 9 6 9 ) , 407

F.2d 597, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 946, 89 S.Ct. 2026, 23

Similarly, where a statement is not powerfully

i n c r i m i n a t i n g b u t i m p l i c a t e s t h e complaining defendant "only

to the extent that the jury may make inferences based on

other c l e a r l y admissible evidence," it does n o t v i o l a t e t h e

Bruton r u l e . U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Belle (3rd Cir. 1979), 593

F.2d 487, 495 (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 911, 99
277
S.Ct. 2825, 61 L.Ed.2d 4343; c f . , U n i t e d S t a t e s v. Winograd
(7th Cir. 1 9 8 1 ) , 656 F.2d 279, 283, cert. denied, 455 U.S.

989; United S t a t e s v. DiGregorio (1st C i r . 1 9 7 9 ) , 605 F.2d
1184, 1190, c e r t . denied, 444 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 287, 62
L.Ed.2d 197; E n g l i s h v. United S t a t e s ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) , 620
F.2d 1 5 0 , 1 5 3 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 449 U.S. 859, 1 0 1 S.Ct. 1 6 0 , 66
L.Ed. 2d 75. W i n o g r a d , D i G r e g o r i o and E n g l i s h e a c h a n a l y z e d
whether t h e s t a t e m e n t was v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o t h e g o v e r n -

m e n t ' s case o r w h e t h e r i t was s i m p l y l i n k a g e t e s t i m o n y t h a t
was i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h o t h e r f a c t s . See

a l s o , S t i n s o n v. S t a t e ( A 1 a . C r i m . A ~ ~ .1 9 8 1 ) , 4 0 1 So.2d 257,
261; Commonwealth v . Rawls ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 276 P a . S u p e r . 89, 419
A.2d 1 0 9 , 111-112.

Here, we m u s t e x a m i n e t h e f o u r c h a l l e n g e d s t a t e m e n t s

i n t h e c o n t e x t of the entire trial. Defendant a r g u e s t h a t
h e was d e n i e d h i s r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t h i s a c c u s o r s a s g u a r a n -

t e e u by t h e S i x t h Amendment o f t h e United S t a t e s Constitu-
tion. We disagree.

The f o u r s t a t e m e n t s were introduced through four of
twenty-three witnesses presented by the State. Defendant

presented seven witnesses, including his own testimony.

Defense counsel was af forded full opportunity to cross-

examine a l l of the S t a t e ' s witnesses. The s t a t e m e n t s w e r e
n o t c r i t i c a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s case a g a i n s t Arrow i n l i g h t o f
eyewitness testimony describing the f i n a l confrontation

b e t w e e n Arrow and the victim. Nor were t h e y " p o w e r f u l l y
incriminating" t o Arrow. None of the statements directly
i m p l i c a t e d Arrow by name. None d i r e c t l y c o n n e c t e d him w i t h
A z u r e ' s murder. None o f t h e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s was c h a l l e n g e d
on t h e b a s i s o f a d e n i a l o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n . W e w i l l examine

e a c h s t a t e m e n t and i t s a d m i s s i o n i n t o e v i d e n c e i n t u r n .
 The first s t a t e m e n t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was intro-

duced t h r o u g h G l o r e e n A z u r e on r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n . The
p r o s e c u t o r asked Gloreen:

"Q. Do you r e c a l l t a l k i n g t o Adam Wein-
berger, the defendant, a t t h a t time,
s t a t i n g t o him t h a t ' y o u h a d k i l l e d h i m ' ?
A. H e s a i d I h o p e you a r e s a t i s f i e d , you
caused a l l of t h i s trouble."

No o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d a t t r i a l t o t h e a d m i s s i o n o f
t h i s statement. On a p p e a l , d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o d e m o n s t r a t e
t h a t its admission c o n s t i t u t e s p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r . A t most,

t h i s s t a t e m e n t c a n b e v i e w e d a s l i n k a g e t e s t i m o n y t h a t is

incriminating only i n conjunction with other facts. It does

not demonstrate a codefendant's "recognized motivation to

s h i f t blame o n t o o t h e r s . " B r u t o n v . U n i t e d S t a t e s , 3 9 1 U.S.

a t 136, 88 S.Ct. a t 1 6 2 8 , 20 L.Ed.2d a t 485. I f anything,
t h e s t a t e m e n t s e r v e s as a n admission a g a i n s t i n t e r e s t t h a t
tends to incriminate Adam himself. Rule 801(d)(2)(A),
Mont.R.Evid. T h i s s t a t e m e n t was n o t v i t a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s
case a g a i n s t Arrow. W f i n d no p r e j u d i c e .
e
Nor d o w e f i n d t h a t a d m i s s i o n o f t h e s e c o n d s t a t e m e n t

was prejudicial. It was introduced through the direct

e x a m i n a t i o n o f Rodney A z u r e . Defense c o u n s e l f i r s t o b j e c t e d
t o i t s i n t r o d u c t i o n on t h e b a s i s t h a t no n o t i c e was p r o v i d e d

to the defendants of the statement. The D i s t r i c t Court
remedied that omission by allowing defense counsel to

s u b p o e n a and i n t e r v i e w a n y p o s s i b l e w i t n e s s e s t o t h e m a k i n g
of the statement. Counsel next o b j e c t e d on t h e b a s i s o f
l a c k of foundation. The w i t n e s s t h e n p r o v i d e d t e s t i m o n y o n
the time, p l a c e and p e o p l e p r e s e n t . Finally, the witness,
Rodney A z u r e , t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s :
"Q. And d i d you h e a r him make a n y s t a t e -
m e n t s a t t h a t t i m e , Adam W e i n b e r g e r ? A.
 I heard it yes.

"Q. You d i d h e a r him make a s t a t e m e n t ?
A. Yes.

"Q. And t o whom w e r e t h e y d i r e c t e d ? A.
I d o n ' t know who t h e y w e r e d i r e c t e d to,
i t seems l i k e h e was j u s t g l a r i n g .

"Q. And what d i d h e s a y ? A. He said
'What do you e x p e c t , t h e y were t a i l g a t i n g
us'."
No f u r t h e r o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . Nor has prejudice
been demonstrated. T h i s s t a t e m e n t a g a i n can s e r v e a t most
a s l i n k a g e testimony. Without t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of other
facts, Adam's comment is not powerfully incriminating to
Arrow. Nor, in light of the other evidence produced at
trial, i s i t v i t a l t o t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e a g a i n s t Arrow. It

d o e s n o t s h i f t blame f r o m Adam t o Arrow. W f i n d no B r u t o n
e
violation.
The third statement, the most incriminating of the

four, is s t i l l i n c r i m i n a t i n g o n l y i n l i g h t of o t h e r c l e a r l y
a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l and i s t h e r e f o r e mere
linkage testimony. I t was i n t r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e t e s t i m o n y

o f A r t h u r Sarnow, a G.V.W. o f f i c e r f o r t h e Montana Highway
D e p a r t m e n t . Sarnow was a s k e d by a s h e r i f f ' s d e p u t y t o a s s i s t
i n moving t h e t h r e e W e i n b e r g e r s and Tom H a n z l i c k f r o m t h e

s c e n e of t h e s h o o t i n g . The o n l y o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d by d e f e n -
d a n t a s t o S a r n o w ' s t e s t i m o n y was t h e f o l l o w i n g o b j e c t i o n o n

t h e b a s i s of f o u n d a t i o n :

"Q. Okay, a n d w h i l e you w e r e i n t h e
p a t r o l c a r , d i d you h e a r o n e o f t h e s e two
d e f e n d a n t s s a y anything t o t h e o t h e r one?
A. Y e s s i r I did.

"Q. And who d i d you h e a r s a y s o m e t h i n g ?
A. The young boy i n t h e p i n k t h e r e .
"Q. And who d i d h e s a y i t t o ? A. To t h e
back s e a t where the o t h e r t h r e e peo-
p l e were s i t t i n g .
 "Q. And t h a t i s where t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t
was s e a t e d ? A. Y e s , i n t h e m i d d l e i n t h e
back, yes.
"Q. And d o you r e c a l l w h a t h e s a i d ?

"MR. S. MOSES: Your Honor, I am g o i n g t o
a s k f o r a f u r t h e r f o u n d a t i o n a s t o who
was s i t t i n g i n t h e c a r .
"MR. RACICOT: W e have a l r e a d y d i d t h a t ,
Your Honor.
"MR. S. MOSES: You o n l y t a l k e d a b o u t t h e
d e f e n d a n t s though.
"THE COURT: Okay, who was t h e d r i v e r and
SO on.
"A. Duane Rasmussen, R o o s e v e l t County
d e p u t y s h e r i f f was d r i v i n g .
"Q. And you w e r e s i t t i n g w h e r e ? A. On
t h e p a s s e n g e r s i d e , a g a i n s t t h e window.
"Q. And where was t h e d e f e n d a n t Adam
W e i n b e r g e r , t h e young s o n s i t t i n g ? A.
The young o n e was b e t w e e n Duane a n d I i n
the front seat.
"Q. And w h a t d i d h e s a y when h e t u r n e d
a r o u n d t o t h e back s e a t ? A. H e turned
t o w a r d s m e t o t h e back s e a t a n d h e s a i d
' T h a t ' s o n e and f o u r t o g o ' . "

Again, t h i s testimony i n c r i m i n a t e s Arrow o n l y when linked
with other f a c t s introduced a t t r i a l . I t does n o t attempt

to s h i f t blame f r o m Adam to Arrow. It rather tends to

i n c r i m i n a t e Adam h i m s e l f . No B r u t o n o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d .

W e f i n d no v i o l a t i o n .

The l a s t s t a t e m e n t d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was i n t r o d u c e d

t h r o u g h t h e f o l l o w i n g r e c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e h i t c h h i k e r ,
Tom H a n z l i c k :
"Q. Do you r e c a l l when you p u l l e d up
w i t h Adam W e i n b e r g e r i n t h e c a r a n d
t e l l i n g m e t h a t Adam W e i n b e r g e r s a i d ,
when you p u l l e d up i n t h e c a r a n d p a r k e d
a t t h e C u l b e r t s o n s t a t i o n ? A. Y e s , do I
r e c a l l it, yes s i r .
"Q. What d i d h e s a y t o y o u ?
 "MR. S. MOSES: Your Honor, was i t w h a t
Adam s a i d ?
"MR. RACICOT: R i g h t , w h a t Adam W e i n b e r g e r
said.
"THE COURT: It doesn't r e f e r t o someone
else?
"MR. RACICOT: I t d o e s n ' t r e f e r t o a n y b o d y
e l s e , i t i s w h a t Adam W e i n b e r g e r s a i d t o
you. H e a s k e d you ' A r e you r e a d y t o
f i g h t ? ' d i d n ' t h e ? A. Y e s s i r , he did."

Defense counsel clarified that the s t a t e m e n t was made by

Adam, p o t e n t i a l l y a nontestifying codefendant, and a l l o w e d

the question to be asked and answered w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n .
Then o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d . I t was d i r e c t e d o n l y t o l a c k o f

n o t i c e , however.
After lengthy discussion and consultation of legal

t e x t b o o k s i n chambers, t h e D i s t r i c t Court gave t h e f o l l o w i n g
i n s t r u c t i o n , which was f o r m u l a t e d by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l :

"THE COURT: A l l r i g h t , I am g o i n g t o
instruct the Jury that the l a t e s t state-
ment t h a t was t e s t i f i e d t o c o n c e r n i n g - -
made by Adam W e i n b e r g e r t o t h i s w i t n e s s
s h o u l d b e d i s r e g a r d e d by t h e J u r y . You
may p r o c e e d . "
T h i s f o u r t h s t a t e m e n t ("Are you r e a d y t o f i g h t ? " ) d o e s

no more t h a n s e r v e t o l i n k Arrow w i t h t h e o t h e r e v i d e n c e , i f
that. I t c e r t a i n l y d o e s n o t s h i f t blame f r o m Adam t o Arrow.

Nor i s i t p o w e r f u l l y i n c r i m i n a t i n g . I t i s damaging p r i m a r i l y

t o Adam h i m s e l f . W e h o l d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a s f a i l e d t o demon-

s t r a t e p r e j u d i c e i n t h e admission of t h e s e f o u r s t a t e m e n t s .
I n D u t t o n v. Evans ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210,
27 L.Ed.2d 213, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t a d d r e s s e d a t
l e n g t h t h e c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e r i g h t o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n and
evidence admitted under a h e a r s a y e x c e p t i o n . The s a f e g u a r d s
t h e Court recognized a s present i n t h e statement admitted i n

E v a n s a r e s i m i l a r t o t h o s e w e see h e r e .
 The d e f e n d a n t i n D u t t o n v . Evans, s u p r a , was c h a r g e d

w i t h two o t h e r men, Wade T r u e t t a n d Venson W i l l i a m s , f o r t h e
execution-style murder o f t h r e e p o l i c e o f f i c e r s . E v a n s was
tried separately. Truett testified at Evans' trial.
W i l l i a m s d i d not. One o f t h e twenty p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s e s

was an inmate from a federal penitentiary in Atlanta,
Georgia. The i n m a t e t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e a n d W i l l i a m s h a d b e e n
f e l l o w p r i s o n e r s a t t h e p e n i t e n t i a r y when W i l l i a m s was t a k e n

t o Gwinnett County f o r a r r a i g n m e n t i n t h e murder charges.
Upon W i l l i a m s 1 r e t u r n , t h e inmate asked: "How d i d you make
out i n court?" W i l l i a m s responded, "If it h a d n ' t been f o r
t h a t d i r t y son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, w e w o u l d n ' t be i n t h i s
now." 400 U.S. a t 77, 9 1 S.Ct. a t 2 1 4 , 27 L.Ed.2d a t 220.
Defense c o u n s e l o b j e c t e d t o t h i s s t a t e m e n t on t h e b a s i s t h a t

i t was h e a r s a y a n d t h u s v i o l a t e d E v a n s ' r i g h t of confronta-

tion.
The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t u p h e l d the introduc-
t i o n of the s t a t e m e n t on a number o f grounds. The C o u r t
f i r s t distinguished a l i n e of c a s e s i n which state court

c o n v i c t i o n s were r e v e r s e d b e c a u s e of a d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t
of confrontation. The Court then particularly examined

Bruton and enunciated the differences between it and the

E v a n s case. I n Bruton an e n t i r e c o n f e s s i o n of t h e n o n t e s t i -

f y i n g c o d e f e n d a n t was a d m i t t e d w i t h o u t o p p o r t u n i t y t o e f f e c -
t i v e l y cross-examine f o r the t r u t h of the matters contained
within the confession. The C o u r t i n E v a n s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t
there was no "recognized exception to the hearsay rule"
b e f o r e it i n B r u t o n . 400 U.S. a t 86, 9 1 S.Ct. a t 2 1 8 , 27
L.Ed.2d a t 225, and t h e n r e f u s e d t o e q u a t e t h e S i x t h Arnend-

ment C o n f r o n t a t i o n C l a u s e a n d t h e e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r s a y r u l e ,
a l t h o u g h i t acknowledged t h a t b o t h s t e m from t h e same r o o t s .

In distinguishing Evans from o t h e r confrontation
clause cases, t h e Court noted t h a t t h e inmate's testimony

was n o t ' ' c r u c i a l " or "devastating1'; it d i d not involve t h e
u s e o r m i s u s e o f a c o n f e s s i o n made i n t h e c o e r c i v e atmos-

p h e r e of o f f i c i a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n ; i t d i d n o t i n v o l v e a sug-

g e s t i o n of p r o s e c u t o r i a l misconduct or negligence; it did

n o t i n v o l v e a d m i s s i o n of a p a p e r t r a n s c r i p t of p r o c e e d i n g s
i n which cross-examination was n o n e x i s t e n t or inadequate;
and, finally, it d i d n o t i n v o l v e w h o l e s a l e d e n i a l of c r o s s -

examination. Evans, 4 0 0 U.S. a t 87, 91 S.Ct. a t 219, 27

Evans also did not involve a joint trial, as had

Bruton. However, t h e n a t u r e of t h e s t a t e m e n t and t h e s a f e -
guards recognized a s present i n Evans a p p l y t o Adam Wein-
berger's statements. The C o u r t n o t e d t h a t :
"Evans was n o t d e p r i v e d of any r i g h t of
c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of whether
W i l l i a m s a c t u a l l y made t h e s t a t e m e n t
r e l a t e d by Shaw. N e i t h e r a h e a r s a y n o r a
c o n f r o n t a t i o n q u e s t i o n would a r i s e had
Shawls t e s t i m o n y been used t o p r o v e mere-
l y t h a t t h e s t a t e m e n t had b e e n made. T h e
hearsay r u l e does n o t prevent a witness
from t e s t i f y i n g a s t o what h e h a s h e a r d ;
i t i s r a t h e r a r e s t r i c t i o n on t h e p r o o f
of f a c t through e x t r a j u d i c i a l statements.
From t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e C o n f r o n t a t i o n
C l a u s e , a w i t n e s s , under o a t h , s u b j e c t t o
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , and whose demeanor c a n
be o b s e r v e d by t h e t r i e r o f f a c t , i s a
r e l i a b l e i n f o r m a n t n o t o n l y a s t o what h e
...................................l s o a s t o w h a t h e h a s
has seen but a
heard." (Emphasis a d d e d . ) Evans, 4 0 0
U.S. a t 88, 91 S.Ct. a t 219, 27 L.Ed.2d
a t 226.
S i m i l a r l y , Arrow Weinberger was n o t d e n i e d any r i g h t
of c o n f r o n t a t i o n on t h e i s s u e of whether o r n o t t h e s t a t e -
ments were made by Adam and o v e r h e a r d by e a c h of the four
witnesses. While none of t h e s t a t e m e n t s were c h a l l e n g e d on
t h e b a s i s of Bruton o r a s h e a r s a y , t h e "state-of-mind" ex-

ception t o the h e a r s a y r u l e o r Montana's transaction rule
would h a v e p r o v i d e d t h e " r e c o g n i z e d e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y

r u l e " t h a t was n o t p r e s e n t i n B r u t o n . B r u t o n , n. 3 , 3 9 1 U.S.
a t 128, 88 S.Ct. a t 1623-1624; R u l e 8 0 3 ( 3 ) , M0nt.R.Evid.i

S t a t e v. Clark (1936), 1 0 2 Mont. 432, 58 P.2d 276; In Re
P e t i t i o n o f P e t e r s o n ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 2 3 9 , 467 P.2d 281.

I n Evans, t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d t h a t
t h e confrontation i s s u e a r o s e "because t h e jury was b e i n g
invited to infer that Williams had implicitly identified

E v a n s a s t h e p e r p e t r a t o r o f t h e m u r d e r when h e blamed E v a n s
f o r h i s predicament." Evans, 400 U.S. a t 88, 9 1 S.Ct. at

219, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 227. I n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e r e was no

d e n i a l of t h e r i g h t of c o n f r o n t a t i o n , t h e Court considered
several factors. It noted that the statement did not
c o n t a i n an e x p r e s s a s s e r t i o n a b o u t p a s t f a c t ; t h a t W i l l i a m s '

p e r s o n a l knowledge o f t h e i d e n t i t i e s a n d r o l e s o f t h e o t h e r

m u r d e r p a r t i c i p a n t s had b e e n a b u n d a n t l y e s t a b l i s h e d b y o t h e r
e v i d e n c e ; a n d , t h a t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y Williams' s t a t e m e n t was

f o u n d e d on f a u l t y r e c o l l e c t i o n was r e m o t e i n t h e e x t r e m e .
Finally, the circumstances provided widely recognized in-

d i c i a o f r e l i a b i l i t y w h e r e , as h e r e , t h e s t a t e m e n t was s p o n -
t a n e o u s and where it w a s a g a i n s t W i l l i a m s ' p e n a l i n t e r e s t t o

make i t .
T h o s e same f a c t o r s a p p l y h e r e . None o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s

contained an express assertion about past fact. Adam's
k n o w l e d g e o f A r r o w ' s r o l e i n t h e s h o o t i n g was s o l i d l y e s t a b -
l i s h e d t h r o u g h o t h e r e v i d e n c e . The c h a n c e t h a t Adam's s t a t e -
m e n t s were f o u n d e d upon f a u l t y r e c o l l e c t i o n i s r e m o t e i n t h e
extreme. The statements were spontaneous and were made
a g a i n s t Adam's p e n a l i n t e r e s t .

The C o u r t e n d e d by s t a t i n g :
"The d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s C o u r t m a k e i t
c l e a r t h a t t h e mission of t h e Confronta-
t i o n Clause is t o advance a p r a c t i c a l
concern f o r t h e accuracy of t h e t r u t h -
d e t e r m i n i n g p r o c e s s i n c r i m i n a l t r i a l s by
assuring t h a t ' t h e t r i e r of f a c t [has] a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the
t r u t h of t h e p r i o r s t a t e m e n t . ' C a l i f o r n i a
v . G r e e n , 399 U.S. a t 1 6 1 ...
" A l m o s t 40 y e a r s a g o , i n S n y d e r v . Massa-
chusetts, 2 9 1 U.S. 9 7 , Mr. Justice
Cardozo w r o t e an o p i n i o n f o r t h i s C o u r t
refusing t o set aside a state criminal
c o n v i c t i o n b e c a u s e of t h e c l a i m e d d e n i a l
of t h e r i g h t of confrontation. The c l o s -
i n g w o r d s of t h a t o p i n i o n a r e w o r t h re-
peating here:

"'There is danger t h a t t h e c r i m i n a l law
w i l l be b r o u g h t i n t o c o n t e m p t - - t h a t d i s -
c r e d i t w i l l e v e n t o u c h t h e g r e a t immuni-
t i e s a s s u r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment
--if gossamer p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p r e j u d i c e
t o a defendant a r e t o n u l l i f y a sentence
p r o n o u n c e d by a c o u r t o f c o m p e t e n t j u r i s -
d i c t i o n i n o b e d i e n c e t o l o c a l law, and
set t h e g u i l t y free.' [ C i t a t i o n omit-
t e d . ] " 400 U.S. a t 89-90, 9 1 S.Ct. a t
220, 27 L.Ed.2d a t 227.

W e agree. Arrow W e i n b e r g e r h a s f a i l e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e j u -
d i c e i n t h e admission of these statements. We hold t h a t h i s

r i g h t t o c o n f r o n t a t i o n was n o t v i o l a t e d .
Defendant a l s o argues t h a t t h i s Court should recognize

as plain error any alleged Bruton violation and should
t h e r e f o r e c o n s i d e r t h e s e a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s even where n o t

p r e s e r v e d by c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s o b j e c t i o n . W e d e c l i n e t o d o s o .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t was n e v e r g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o
r u l e on a d m i s s i o n of t h e s t a t e m e n t s o r t o c o r r e c t i t s e l f if
admission w a s not proper. We w i l l not put the t r i a l court
i n e r r o r w h e r e it h a s n o t b e e n g i v e n s u c h a c h a n c e . State
v . W a l k e r ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 8 Mont. 216, 2 2 3 , 419 P.2d 3 0 0 , 304.

Here, defense counsel was familiar with t h e Bruton
o b j e c t i o n and u s e d i t s u c c e s s f u l l y t o p r e v e n t a d m i s s i o n o f

another statement. No s u c h o b j e c t i o n was r a i s e d t o these
four statements. Defendant's contention to the contrary

notwithstanding, w e a l s o n o t e t h a t both d e f e n s e counsel were
present at trial when three of the four s t a t e m e n t s were
admitted. W e r e j e c t h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h a t less experienced
trial counsel f a i l e d t o make o b j e c t i o n s w h i c h would have

b e e n made had b o t h c o u n s e l b e e n p r e s e n t . W also refuse t o
e

a d o p t a p l a i n e r r o r r u l e t h a t would a l l o w d e f e n d a n t s t o l a y

in the grass and create Bruton violations by failing to
o b j e c t and t h e n w i t h h o l d i n g o n e c o d e f e n d a n t f r o m t h e w i t n e s s
stand.
D e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r t h a r g u m e n t is t h a t t h e p r o s e c u t i o n ' s

t r i a l t a c t i c s d e p r i v e d him o f a f a i r t r i a l . He a r g u e s t h a t
the State should not have introduced evidence of the

v i c t i m ' s good c h a r a c t e r i n i t s c a s e - i n - c h i e f ; t h a t evidence
of defendants' character and t h e i r p l a n t o t a k e Luanne t o

Arkansas should n o t have been a d m i t t e d ; t h a t evidence of t h e
reasonableness of the victim's and his family's actions
should not have been admitted; that the State "carefully
tailored" its case to avoid calling witnesses who would

t e s t i f y t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r ; and t h a t
t h e S t a t e i m p r o p e r l y e l i c i t e d t e s t i m o n y d u r i n g i t s c a s e on

the condition of a defense witness at the time of the
s h o o t i n g and improperly sympathized o r agreed with state-

m e n t s made by w i t n e s s e s . W r e j e c t t h e s e arguments o u t of
e
hand. No o b j e c t i o n s w e r e raised at trial on a n y o f the
points defendant now c h a l l e n g e s . Nor, taken in toto, do
these i n c i d e n t s evidence misconduct t h a t p r e j u d i c e d defen-
d a n t . Most of t h e e v i d e n c e d e f e n d a n t c h a l l e n g e s was p r o p e r l y
a d m i t t e d t o p r o v i d e t h e j u r y w i t h a l l of t h e f a c t s and c i r -

c u m s t a n c e s n e c e s s a r y t o s h e d l i g h t upon t h i s c a s e .

C h a r a c t e r e v i d e n c e o f a v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e may

be a d m i t t e d by t h e p r o s e c u t i o n t o rebut evidence t h a t t h e
v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r . R u l e 4 0 4 ( a ) ( 2 ) , Mont.R.Evid.
Here, the prosecution introduced t h e evidence through t h e
f i r s t witness i n its case-in-chief b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t had

i n t r o d u c e d e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e v i c t i m was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r .
Where t h e d e f e n s e r a i s e s t h e i s s u e o f s e l f - d e f e n s e through

cross-examination t h a t tends t o demonstrate t h a t the victim
was t h e f i r s t a g g r e s s o r , nothing precludes t h e S t a t e from

rebutting t h a t argument i n its case-in-chief with evidence
of t h e v i c t i m ' s p e a c e f u l n a t u r e . However, t h e S t a t e s h o u l d

not i n t r o d u c e evidence of the victim's peaceful nature i n
a n t i c i p a t i o n of such a n argument. Here, no o b j e c t i o n was

raised at trial and the defendant's c l a i m of self-defense
was c l e a r l y a t i s s u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l . Defendant h a s
again f a i l e d t o demonstrate prejudice.

In his l a s t two a r g u m e n t s , defendant challenges im-
p o s i t i o n o f t r i a l c o s t s and e x p e n s e s a s p a r t of h i s s e n t e n c e
a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and r e q u e s t s t h a t h i s s e n t e n c e b e v a c a t -

ed s i n c e i t was b a s e d upon e r r o n e o u s i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g
p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s . H e a r g u e s , f i r s t , t h a t s e c t i o n 46-18-232,

MCA, is p a t e n t l y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s i n c e i t e n h a n c e s p u n i s h -

ment i n r e t r i b u t i o n f o r a d e f e n d a n t ' s e x e r c i s e o f a f u n d a -
mental c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t . We r e j e c t t h i s contention.

S e c t i o n 46-18-232, MCA, prohibits recoupment a g a i n s t
a n i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t and a l l o w s a d e f e n d a n t t o b e r e l i e v e d
f r o m payment o f s u c h c o s t s upon p e t i t i o n t o t h e s e n t e n c i n g
c o u r t " [ i l f it a p p e a r s t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t
payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on
the defendant or his immediate family . . ." Statutes that
allow such a discretionary imposition of costs have been
upheld against the due process argument marshalled by defen-
dant. Fuller v. Oregon (1974), 417 U.S. 40, 51-54, 94 S.Ct.
2116, 2123-2125, 40 L.Ed.2d 647, 653-655; United States v.
Glover (2nd Cir. 1978), 588 F.2d 876, 878-879; People v.
Estate of Scott (1977), 66 111.2d 522, 363 N.E.2d 823, 825;
cf., Olson v. James (10th Cir. 1979), 603 F.2d 150 (invali-
dating a Kansas statute imposing obligation to repay costs
of appointed counsel regardless of defendant's ability to
pay). Montana's statute does no more than deprive "a finan-
cially able defendant of available funds which, in fairness,
should be remitted to the public coffers." Glover, 588 F.2d
at 879, quoting United States v. Bracewell (2nd Cir. 1978),
569 F.2d 1194, 1197.
Nor do we accept defendant's argument that his
sentence should be vacated based upon inaccurate information
in his sentencing report. A defendant's right to be
sentenced on the basis of accurate information is protected
where he is represented by counsel at sentencing and is
given the opportunity to rebut any inaccuracies. State v.
Trangsrud (1982), Mont. , 651 P.2d 37, 40, 39
St.Rep. 1765, 1768. He then has an affirmative duty to
present evidence to show such inaccuracies. State v. Radi

(19791, Mont . , 604 P.2d 318, 320, 36 St.Rep. 2345,
2347. Here, defendant was represented by counsel and was
presented with an opportunity to rebut the report. He did
not do so. Rather, defense counsel reviewed the report and
deemed it "appropriate." Defendant should address any chal-
l e n g e t o t h e e q u i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review

Division. This Court w i l l consider only l e g a l i s s u e s raised
by t h e s e n t e n c e .

I n conclusion we a l s o address t h e d i s s e n t e r s ' concern
with a potential conflict of i n t e r e s t stemming from b o t h
defendants being represented by o n e l a w f i r m . We reject

t h e i r argument. W e note, f i r s t , t h a t both defendants agreed

to joint representation and, in fact, hired the same l a w

firm a s p r i v a t e counsel. Both d e f e n d a n t s waived a s e p a r a t e
trial. Both d e f e n d a n t s r e c o n s i d e r e d their d e c i s i o n t o be
j o i n t l y r e p r e s e n t e d d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t h e t r i a l and r e a f -
firmed t h a t decision.
N e i t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t nor t h e d i s s e n t e r s demonstrate
an a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t . A defendant h a s t h e burden

of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t such r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n f a c t c r e a t e d a n

a c t u a l c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t t h a t prejudiced the defendant.
The law d o e s n o t r e q u i r e a n a f f i r m a t i v e i n q u i r y i n t o w h e t h e r
codefendants agree t o j o i n t representation. S t a t e v. Henry
( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 4 2 6 , 4 3 1 , 582 P.2d 3 2 1 , 323-324. A defen-

d a n t may w a i v e t h e r i g h t t o demand r e t r i a l o n t h e i s s u e o f
c o n f l i c t of i n t e r e s t of counsel. S t a t e v. G a l l a g h e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,

1 6 2 Mont. 1 5 5 , 1 6 1 , 509 P.2d 8 5 2 , 855. Where, a s h e r e , t h e
d e f e n s e s p u t f o r t h by t h e two d e f e n d a n t s a r e n o t i n con-
flict, a d e f e n d a n t is n o t d e p r i v e d o f e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e
o f c o u n s e l by j o i n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . S t a t e v. Henry, s u p r a ,
1 7 7 Mont. a t 4 3 1 , 582 P.2d a t 324. W e r e j e c t t h e d i s s e n t e r s '
o b j e c t i o n s a s mere s p e c u l a t i o n .
Affirmed.

Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur:

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:

My dissent is a long one, and I do not apologize for

the delay. It will be filed when it is ready.
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring with the dissent of
Justice Daniel J. Shea, and stating further in dissent:

I would reverse the conviction of Arrow Weinberger. The
instructions in relation to him were in hopeless conflict.
Under section 45-5-101, MCA, a person commits the
offense of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, or
negligently "causes the death of another human being." A

person commits deliberate homicide under section 45-5-102,
MCA, if the criminal homicide is committed "purposely" or
"knowingly".
The District Court, in instructing the jury with respect
to deliberate homicide, followed the statutes when it
instructed the jury in instruction no. 10:
"A person commits the offense of deliberate
homicide if:
"(1) He purposely or knowingly causes the death of
another human being . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
Under the statutory definition, and the portion of
instruction no. 10 which we have quoted, the inquiry for the
jury was, who caused the death of Azure? Obviously if Azure
caused his own death, as in the case of Arrow Weinberger
acting in self defense, then the crime has not been
committed. It is the statutory scheme that the jury search
for the cause of the death in homicide cases.
In this case the District Court elaborated on the
statutory definition. In instruction no. 11, it instructed
the jury:
"You are instructed that to sustain the charge of
deliberate homicide against Arrow Weinberger, the
State must prove that the defendant Arrow
Weinberger purposely or knowingly performed the -
act
or acts causing the death of Floyd Azure . . ."
(Emphasis added.)
Thus the District Court, by giving instruction no. 11 changed
the nature of the inquiry for the jury. Instead of searching
for the cause of Azure's dea-th, the jury was instructed to
find who performed the acts causing the death of Azure.
Instruction no. 11 created a crime not defined in the
Montana statutes, and for Arrow Weinberger, wiped out any
self defense. Under instruction no. 11, since Arrow
Weinherger performed the acts (even though he may have been
acting in self defense) which caused Azure's death, he was
guilty of homicide.
Under instruction no. 11, the mere performance of the
acts causing Azure's death constitutes a forcible felony.
Instruction no. 47 then wiped away completely any self
defense available to Arrow Weinberger:
"You are instructed that the defense of self
defense or justifiable use of force is not
available to a person who is attempting to commit
or committing a forcible felony. A forcible felony
is any felony which involves the use or threat of
physical force or violence against any individual."
The State admits in its brief that court's instruction
no. 11 "failed to define completely the crime charged," but
the State contends that the failure of definition of court's
instruction no. 10 was cured by other instructions given in
the case.
Our annals are full of cases in which we have said that
if an instruction is "not as full as it might have been," but
the instructions taken as a whole fairly present the case to
a jury, we will not reverse the conviction because of an
incomplete instruction. However, this rule applies only to
incomplete instructions, not to erroneous instructions or
those which are at cross purposes with each other. The cases
relied upon by the State and by the majority in this case do
not meet the situation here where the court erroneously
defined the elements of the crime in instruction no. 11. If
there is any single item of instruction that needs to be
straight-forwardedly presented in the criminal case, it must
be the elements of the crime. We said in State v. Lundblade
(19811, Mont . , 625 P.2d 545, 548,38 St.Rep. 441:
"At a minimum, the District Court must explain or
define the crime - - jury,
for the (Citing a case.)
In determining whether the instructions did this,
we are guided by certain settled principles.
First, we must view the instructions as a whole
(citing a case) and we will find no error if the
instructions as a whole fully and fairly instruct
on the law applicable to the case (citing cases) " .
Here there is a hopeless conflict in the instructions
concerning deliberate homicide in Arrow Weinberger's case.
The instructions as a whole do not fully and fairly instruct
on the applicable law but confuse the elements of deliberate
homicide and strip any meaning from the self defense
instructions.
I could cite other instructional conflict, but it would
serve no purpose here and would only take up space. It is
enough to say that court's instructions no. 24, 31, and 32 do
not cure the instructional failure, as the majority contends
or the State argues, because in each of those instructions,
there is a phrase used "described by a statute defining an
offense" to inform the jury how to apply purposely or
knowingly as a requisite for mental state. Nowhere in the
instructions in this case did the court specifically tell the
jury a particular statute that defined the offense. In other
words, under instructions 24, 31 and 32, the jury was told to
look to a statute for the elements, but the statute was not
given to them.
 F o r t h e s e and t h o s e r e a s o n s s e t f o r t h by J u s t i c e S h e a , I

dissent.

Q .&
Justice

I concur i n t h e foregoing d i s s e n t of M r . J u s t i c e Sheehy.