IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
STATE OF DELAWARE )
) I.D. Nos: 1212009736 A & B
v. )
)
WILLIAM T. WINDSOR )
Defendant. )
Submitted: June 29, 2022
Decided: September 28, 2022
ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING DEFENDANT’S
THIRD MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
AND NOW, upon careful consideration of Defendant’s Third Motion for
Postconviction Relief and the record in this case, Defendant’s Motion is summarily
dismissed as procedurally barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2) for the
following reasons:
1. In 2013, Defendant, Windsor T. Windsor (“Windsor”) pleaded guilty
to one count of rape in the second degree as to one minor victim and pleaded nolo
contendere to continuous sexual abuse of a child as to a second minor victim.1 The
Superior Court ordered a presentence investigation and deferred sentencing. At
Windsor’s sentencing hearing, Windsor told the Court for the first time that he
1
Windsor had been indicted on 160 criminal counts stemming from sex offenses committed
against the daughters of his girlfriend. Windsor v. State, 2014 WL 4264915 (Del. Aug. 28, 2014).
wished to withdraw his guilty plea.2 The Court denied the request. After hearing
statements from the young victims, the Court sentenced Windsor to a total of twenty-
two years of incarceration followed by decreasing levels of probation.
2. Windsor appealed. Among other things, Windsor appealed this Court’s
refusal to hear his pro se motion to withdraw the plea. The Supreme Court
considered this issue and determined that the motion to withdraw was a legal nullity.3
It affirmed Windsor’s convictions and sentence on August 28, 2014.4
3. Windsor then filed a timely motion for postconviction relief. Among
the issues Windsor raised in the first motion for postconviction relief was this
Court’s refusal to hear his motion to withdraw the guilty plea. This Court found this
claim to be procedurally barred as previously adjudicated and denied Windsor’s first
motion for postconviction relief.5 The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial
on September 25, 2015.6
4. Windsor filed a second, untimely motion for postconviction relief. In
addition to again challenging the Court’s refusal to withdraw his guilty plea,
Windsor claimed that he was innocent of the crimes.7 This Court considered the
2
Transcript of December 13, 2013 Sentencing, pp. 10-11.
3
Windsor, 2014 WL 4264915, at *3 (Del. Aug. 28, 2014).
4
Id.
5
State v. Windsor, 2015 WL 1455602 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2015).
6
Windsor v. State, 2015 WL 5679751 (Del. Sept. 25, 2015) (finding that Windsor’s claim that his
guilty plea was involuntary was inconsistent with his guilty plea colloquy).
7
State v. Windsor, 2018 WL 3492764 (Del. Super. Ct. July 19, 2018).
2
“new” evidence to which Windsor cited—affidavits from various individuals
regarding statements one of the victims made after Windsor’s conviction—and
found it to be unpersuasive.8 This Court denied Windsor’s second motion for
postconviction relief, and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the denial.9
5. In the present matter—his third, untimely motion for post-conviction
relief—Windsor raises the following grounds for relief: (1) “actual innocence,” (2)
“ineffective assistance of counsel regarding withdrawal of plea,” and (3) “ineffective
assistance of counsel (due process).”
6. Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(d)(2), second or
subsequent motions for postconviction relief shall be summarily dismissed.10
However, the Rule allows for two exceptions if the defendant was convicted after
trial: (1) if there is new evidence that creates a strong inference the defendant is
innocent, or (2) if there is a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively
applicable.11
7. Windsor does not explain how his current motion is not subject to
summary dismissal under Rule 61(d)(2). Because he pleaded guilty and did not go
8
Id. at *2.
9
Windsor v. State, 2019 WL 327964, at *2 n.6 (Del. Jan. 23, 2019) (recognizing that Windsor’s
motion was successive, the Supreme Court did not “address whether the ambiguous hearsay
affidavits that Windsor submitted create a strong inference of actual inference” while recognizing
the lower court specifically found that it did not).
10
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(2).
11
Id.
3
to trial, he cannot avail himself of the exceptions to Rule 61(d)(2) and therefore his
motion must be summarily dismissed. Moreover, to the extent Windsor attempts to
invoke the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision in Reed v. State,12 it is
inapplicable where, as here, the record reflects that Windsor did not advise trial
counsel that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea.13
8. Windsor’s Third Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY
DISMISSED. Windsor has also filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel and a
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Because his Motion for Postconviction Relief
is summarily dismissed, there is no reason to appoint counsel. Windsor’s Motion for
Appointment of Counsel is therefore DENIED. The Motion to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis is MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Robert H. Robinson, Jr.
Robert H. Robinson, Jr., Judge
pc: William Windsor
Prothonotary
12
258 A.3d 807 (Del. 2021).
13
Id. at 813 (“[W]e hold that a criminal defendant's control of the objectives of the representation
prior to sentencing requires that counsel either obey an instruction to file a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea, or seek leave to withdraw so that the defendant can file the motion with other counsel
or pro se.”). Following Windsor’s sentencing, Windsor’s counsel asked for a sidebar, where he
stated: “I would like to put on the record that the first I have heard of that [Rule] 32(d) request to
withdraw his plea was standing at the podium and that he and I did a video phone yesterday and
that was the first I have heard of that. I just wanted to have that on the record for [Rule] 61
purposes.” Transcript of December 13, 2013 Sentencing, p. 21.
4
State v. Windsor
Combined Opinion