[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
August 16, 2005
No. 04-14409
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-00338-CV-BH-M
STEPHANIE POIROUX SNOW, by and through her father
and best friend, Martin J. Snow, as administrator
of the estate of Stephanie Leigh Snow,
MARTIN J. SNOW, as administrator of the estate of
Stephanie Leigh Snow,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
CITY OF CITRONELLE, AL,
CLARENCE PARKER,
CONRAD REID,
CLINT JORDAN,
MARSHALL CHENNAULT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 16, 2005)
Before CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and FORRESTER *, District Judge.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
The issue presented in this appeal is whether city officials were deliberately
indifferent to a strong likelihood that Stephanie Poiroux Snow (Poiroux) would
commit suicide while in custody at the jail of the City of Citronelle, Alabama.
Martin Snow, as administrator of his daughter’s estate, filed this suit against the
City, its mayor, and several employees of the police department. Snow alleged
violations of his daughters’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and a claim for wrongful death under Alabama
law. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal
claims and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice. Because Snow
presented evidence that Officer Marshall Chennault told Snow and Snow’s wife,
Esther, that Poiroux was suicidal and that Officer Chennault had information that
Poiroux had recently attempted to slit her wrists, a genuine issue of material fact
exists regarding Officer Chennault’s knowledge that there was a strong likelihood
that Poiroux would commit suicide. We, therefore, reverse the summary judgment
entered against Snow’s claim as to Officer Chennault. We affirm the summary
judgment as to the federal claims against the remaining defendants, but we vacate
*
Honorable J. Owen Forrester, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
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the order of dismissal of the state-law claims. Although we reinstate Snow’s state-
law claims, we express no opinion on the merits of those claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Because summary judgment was entered against the plaintiff, we set forth
the facts, drawn from the evidence presented, in the light most favorable to Snow.
See, e.g., Swint v. City of Waddell, 51 F.3d 988, 992 (11th Cir. 1995).
On the evening of June 2, 2001, Poiroux was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs after she was involved in an automobile accident with
Clarence Parker, Chief of Police of the City of Citronelle. Officer Keith Miller,
who responded to the scene of the accident, observed that Poiroux was unsteady
and her speech was slurred. Poiroux denied drinking alcoholic beverages, but
failed the field sobriety tests. She was arrested and transported to the City of
Citronelle Police Station.
At the police station, Poiroux was placed in the female holding area, and
then placed into a cell after she let herself out of the holding area. Officer Jason
Blankinchip, who assisted Miller at the accident scene, had to force Poiroux, who
was approximately six feet tall and weighed 150 to 160 pounds, into the cell. After
a few minutes in the cell, Poiroux took off her shoe and began to beat it on the
walls and the door, and Poiroux stated that she wanted to get out of jail. Poiroux
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then climbed on the top bunk bed in the cell and began to hit the light fixture with
her shoe. She ignored requests to stop this behavior and was charged with
destruction of city property.
After ten to fifteen minutes, when Poiroux had become calm, Miller moved
her back into the holding area. In the holding area, Poiroux began crunching a
Pepsi can. Miller and Blankinchip then went into the room and removed the can
and all other materials. When asked why she had been crunching the can, Poiroux
responded that she was angry.
After Poiroux complained of seizures, the emergency medical unit was
called. Poiroux’s vital signs were normal, but Poiroux continued to complain of
seizures and stated that she wanted to go to the hospital. Officer Clint Jordan took
Poiroux to Springhill Memorial Hospital.
At Springhill Memorial, Poiroux was seen initially by a triage nurse. Jordan
overheard Poiroux tell the nurse that she had experienced a seizure early that night,
was taking prescription medications, and suffered from migraine headaches and
asthma. Jordan also overheard Poiroux tell the nurse that she had tried to overdose
on medicine in the past. Poiroux was next examined by a doctor, who found
nothing physically wrong with her, but stated that, in the light of Poiroux’s
comments about her overdose attempt, she might need to go to Mobile Infirmary.
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Poiroux was released from Springhill Memorial with no medications and no
instructions.
Because Springhill Memorial was unable to take blood and urine samples,
Jordan transported Poiroux to USA Medical Center emergency room for blood and
urine samples. After a nurse took the samples, Poiroux was seen by an emergency
room doctor. Jordan again overheard Poiroux tell the doctor that she had seizures,
migraines, and asthma, she was on a number of medications, and she had attempted
suicide by overdose in the past. Jordan did not hear when the overdose had taken
place.
At USA Medical Center, Dr. Wan ordered tests and contacted Mobile
Mental Health to have someone see Poiroux, but Mobile Mental Health would not
send someone to see Poiroux while she was under arrest. After he received the test
results, Dr. Wan prescribed some medications for Poiroux. Jordan was given
specific written information regarding how and when the medication should be
dispensed. Poiroux was released from USA Medical Center, and Jordan
transported her back to jail.
Poiroux’s outpatient records from USA Medical Center show that Poiroux
told a doctor or nurse that she had attempted suicide four times in the past and that
she had suicidal ideation. Dr. Wan, the emergency room doctor at USA Medical
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Center, testified at his deposition that ordinarily either he or the nurse would have
told the officer about the suicidal ideation of the patient, but Wan had no personal
recollection of Poiroux or of communicating that information to Jordan. Jordan
denies that any information concerning possible suicide was communicated to him
by the medical personnel at USA Medical Center, and he denies seeing any of
Poiroux’s outpatient records.
At the jail, Jordan turned Poiroux, who was crying and upset, over to
Dispatcher Yvonne Willman and Officer Chennault. Jordan told the dispatcher and
Chennault to watch Poiroux because she had been in an automobile accident and
had been given medication at the emergency room. Jordan also gave Chennault the
written prescriptions and instructions from the doctor. Jordan ended his shift and
went home. He had no further involvement with Poiroux.
Chennault then placed Poiroux in the female holding area. A few minutes
later, Chennault allowed Poiroux to make several telephone calls from the
dispatcher’s office. He then brought Poiroux back to the holding area where she
began to beat on the door. Because he thought that she was mentally unstable,
Chennault called Poiroux’s parents and asked them to take custody of her.
Chennault spoke first with Poiroux’s mother and then her father. The Snows
testified at their depositions that Chennault told them Poiroux was suicidal. The
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Snows did not agree to pick up Poiroux, but they agreed to bring her medications
to the jail.
After he ended the call with Poiroux’s parents, Chennault looked into the
holding area and saw Poiroux climbing on the sink in cell number two. Chennault
got Poiroux off the sink and locked the door to cell number two, at which point,
Poiroux became upset and charged at Chennault. After a struggle, Chennault
managed to close the door to the holding area. Poiroux then began beating on the
window with the telephone receiver. When Chennault entered the holding area to
get her to stop, Poiroux tried to hit him with the receiver. After another struggle,
Chennault sprayed Poiroux in the face with pepper spray to subdue her. Poiroux
immediately stopped struggling and was placed in the shower to be rinsed.
Chennault’s wife, who was present at the jail, helped Poiroux out of her dress and
into a blanket so that the dress could be dried.
Several hours later, Poiroux’s parents arrived with her medication and spoke
with Chennault. Chennault told the Snows he thought their daughter was mentally
unstable, he was having difficulties with her, and he had to use pepper spray to
subdue her. The Snows testified that Chennault also told them Poiroux was
suicidal. The Snows declined to take Poiroux home. At some point during his
shift, Chennault called the Washington County jail, and a jailor there told
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Chennault that, sometime within the last month, Poiroux had tried to cut her wrist
while at the Washington County jail and had been troublesome. Chennault went
off duty approximately one hour after meeting with the Snows and did not have
any further problems with Poiroux.
There is no evidence that Chennault told any official of the jail that he
thought Poiroux was suicidal, and it is undisputed that Chennault did not monitor
Poiroux as if she were suicidal. Had he believed that Poiroux was a suicide risk,
Chennault stated that he would have told the dispatcher to check on Poiroux every
fifteen minutes, removed items from the cell with which Poiroux could have
harmed herself, and perhaps would have placed Poiroux in the drunk tank.
Chennault also stated that, had he received information from USA Medical Center
that Poiroux had suicidal ideation, he would have instructed that she be returned to
the hospital for treatment and observation.
Chennault was replaced on duty by Miller. When Miller started his shift,
Poiroux was asleep in the holding area. A little while later, the dispatcher notified
Miller that Poiroux had taken down the shower rod in the bathroom and was using
it to reach into cell number two, which was locked, and beating on the walls with
it. Miller took the rod and replaced it in the shower. About ten minutes later,
Poiroux again took the shower rod down. Miller returned to the holding area, took
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the shower rod, and talked to Poiroux. After speaking with Miller, Poiroux took a
shower and had a meal at approximately six o’clock.
At six o’clock, Willman’s shift ended, and Eva Henderson came on duty as
dispatcher. A couple of hours after the duty switch, Poiroux began repeatedly
knocking on the window between the holding room and the dispatcher’s office in
an attempt to talk to Henderson. Henderson called Miller, who told Poiroux to
stop knocking on the window or she would be locked in a cell. Miller then went
into the docket room to do paperwork. Henderson remained in the dispatcher’s
office watching the cells through the monitors. One monitor was directed
constantly on the holding area. Henderson observed Poiroux in the holding area at
least every thirty minutes and sometimes more frequently. At some point,
Henderson saw Poiroux sitting on the bunk in cell number one tearing strips of
what appeared to be toilet paper.
At a few minutes before nine o’clock, Poiroux requested medication from
Henderson and stated that she wanted to get out of jail. Henderson told Poiroux to
lie down and that she would inquire about the medication. A few minutes after
nine o’clock, Miller returned to the dispatcher’s office and looked through the
window to check on Poiroux. When he did not see her through the window, Miller
went to look through the door of the holding area.
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Miller found Poiroux hanging from the air conditioning vent above the sink.
There is also testimony that Henderson discovered Poiroux hanging when she
looked through the cell window. Poiroux hung herself with strips from a blanket
and was in full view of the monitor. On the monitor, it appeared to Henderson that
Poiroux was leaning over the sink to wash her face. Attempts to revive Poiroux
were unsuccessful.
Snow, as administrator of Poiroux’s estate brought this action against the
City of Citronelle, the Mayor of the City of Citronelle, and several members of the
City of Citronelle police department. Snow alleged violations of Poiroux’s rights
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for the officers’ deliberate
indifference to a substantial likelihood that Poiroux would commit suicide while at
the City of Citronelle jail. The district court granted summary judgment to all
defendants in their individual capacities on the grounds of qualified immunity.
The district court found that the defendants did not violate Poiroux’s constitutional
rights, and, in the alternative, if her rights were violated, the law was not clearly
established. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the City
of Citronelle and the defendants in their official capacities because it found that
Poiroux’s rights were not violated. The district court declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims and dismissed them
10
without prejudice. Snow appeals.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment by the district court de
novo and applies the same legal standards as the district court. Crosby v. Monroe
County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1331-32 (11th Cir. 2004). “Summary judgment is proper
only when the evidence before the court establishes ‘that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.’” Id. at 1332 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “All evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Although Snow brought claims under both the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, “the Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment do not apply to pretrial detainees,” like Poiroux. Belcher v. City of
Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Tittle v. Jefferson County
Comm’n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 n. 3 (11th Cir.1994)). The key issue in this appeal,
therefore, is whether Snow alleged facts sufficient to withstand summary judgment
on his claim that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood
that Poiroux would commit suicide while at the City of Citronelle jail in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Snow faces a difficult burden.
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“[I]n a prisoner suicide case, to prevail under section 1983 for violation of
substantive rights, under . . . the . . . [F]ourteenth [A]mendment, the plaintiff must
show that the jail official displayed ‘deliberate indifference’ to the prisoner’s
taking of his own life.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe
County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). “To establish a defendant’s deliberate indifference, the plaintiff
has to show that the defendant had (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious
harm; [and] (2) disregard[ed] . . . that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]n a prison
suicide case, deliberate indifference requires that the defendant deliberately
disregard ‘a strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the self-infliction
of harm will occur.’ ‘[T]he mere opportunity for suicide, without more, is clearly
insufficient to impose liability on those charged with the care of prisoners.’” Id.
(citations omitted). An officer “cannot be liable under [section] 1983 for the
suicide of a prisoner who never had threatened or attempted suicide and who had
never been considered a suicide risk.” Id. at 1116 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
To resolve this appeal, we must address four matters. We first address why
the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of five of the
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defendants in their individual capacities. Second, we address why the district court
erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Officer Chennault. Third, we
explain why the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the
City and its employees in their official capacities. Finally, we explain why we
must reinstate Snow’s claims under state law without deciding any issue about the
merits of those claims.
A. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment for
Jordan, Henderson, Parker, Reid, and Miller.
Snow sued Mayor Presnell and six members of the City of Citronelle police
department in their individual capacities: Jordan, Chennault, Henderson, Parker,
Reid, and Miller. Snow does not appeal the summary judgment as to Presnell. Of
the remaining defendants, Snow’s claims against Jordan, Henderson, Parker, Reid,
and Miller fail because Snow has not presented any evidence that these five
defendants had subjective knowledge of a strong likelihood that Poiroux would
attempt to commit suicide. Although Poiroux’s emergency room records show a
strong likelihood that she would attempt to commit suicide because Poiroux told
the emergency room staff she had attempted suicide four times in the past and the
doctor’s notes show that she had suicidal ideation, there is no evidence that these
defendants knew about that information. There is no evidence that any of these
five defendants suspected that Poiroux was suicidal.
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The closest issue as to these five defendants involves Jordan, but there is
insufficient evidence that Jordan was aware of a strong likelihood that Poiroux
would commit suicide or that he acted with deliberate indifference to this
likelihood. Jordan, who was the only officer to speak with medical personnel,
stated that he was not informed of Poiroux’s suicidal ideation. Jordan overheard
Poiroux tell the medical personnel that she had attempted suicide in the past, but
Jordan did not know when the attempt had taken place. The testimony of Dr. Wan,
that he or the nurse ordinarily would have told an officer about a detainee’s
suicidal ideation, does not establish that Jordan had that knowledge, because Dr.
Wan did not have any present recollection of Poiroux. Wan’s testimony was
nothing more than speculation. In addition, it is undisputed that Jordan did not see
Poiroux’s outpatient records. Viewed in the light most favorable to Snow, the only
evidence presented to establish the first element regarding Jordan was his
knowledge of Poiroux’s previous suicide attempt, but this knowledge, without
more, is not sufficient to put Jordan on notice of “a strong likelihood rather than a
mere possibility that the self-infliction of harm will occur.” Cook, 402 F.3d at
1115.
No other defendant had contact with the medical personnel and could have
learned of Snow’s suicidal ideation from the doctors and nurses who treated Snow,
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and Snow did not present other evidence that Henderson, Miller, Parker, or Reid
had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm. The district court, therefore,
correctly entered judgment against Snow on his claims against Jordan, Henderson,
Miller, Parker, and Reid in their individual capacities.
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment for Chennault.
Whether Snow presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact with
regard to Officer Chennault is another matter. Taken in the light most favorable to
Snow, a jury could find that Chennault had subjective knowledge that there was a
strong risk that Poiroux would attempt suicide and deliberately did not take any
action to prevent that suicide. First, Chennault testified in deposition that he
telephoned the Washington County jail, and a jailor told him that, sometime in the
last month, Poiroux had tried to cut her wrist while in custody there and had given
them a lot of trouble. Second, the Snows testified that Chennault told them
Poiroux was suicidal. Third, it is undisputed that Chennault did not communicate
any information regarding his belief that Poiroux was a strong suicide risk to
anyone else at the jail. Finally, Chennault stated that he did not take the actions he
would have taken had he regarded Poiroux as a suicide risk.
Chennault did not inform Henderson to check on Poiroux every fifteen
minutes. Chennault did not remove items from the cells with which Poiroux could
15
have harmed herself. Chennault did not place Poiroux in the drunk tank, and
Chennault did not return Poiroux to USA Medical Center for treatment and
observation. In short, Chennault did nothing.
That evidence of Chennault’s complete failure to take any action after
Poiroux was returned to the jail from USA Medical Center creates a substantial
issue about whether the suicide of Poiroux was avoidable. Although Henderson
testified that she monitored Poiroux fewer than fifteen minutes before Poiroux’s
suicide, the jury could infer that Henderson and other employees would have been
more vigilant had they been informed that Poiroux was suicidal. In addition, a jury
could find that, if either Poiroux had been placed in the drunk tank and items she
could have used to harm herself removed from her reach or Poiroux had been
returned to USA Medical Center, then Poiroux would not have committed suicide.
Although Chennault denies telling the Snows or anyone else that he thought
Poiroux was a suicide risk, the conflicting testimony creates an issue of fact for a
jury to decide about Chennault’s knowledge. Viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Snow, a jury could find that Chennault subjectively believed that there
was a strong risk that Poiroux would attempt suicide and deliberately did not take
any action to prevent her suicide. Those facts, if found by a jury, would establish a
constitutional violation. Because, at the time of Poiroux’s death, it was clearly
16
established that an officer’s deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm to a
detainee is a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court erroneously
granted summary judgment on Snow’s claim against Chennault. McElligott v.
Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
C. The District Court Correctly Entered Summary Judgment
in Favor of the City and its Officials.
In addition, Snow sued the City of Citronelle and Parker, Reid, and Presnell
in their official capacities. The district court properly granted summary judgment
on these claims. “Because suits against a municipal officer sued in his official
capacity and direct suits against municipalities are functionally equivalent,” we
address Snow’s argument in relation to the City of Citronelle. Busby v. City of
Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991).
A municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 on a theory of
respondeat superior. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197,
1203 (1989). “‘It is only when the “execution of the government’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury” that the municipality may be held liable under
[section] 1983.’” Id. (quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267, 107 S. Ct.
1114, 1119 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2037-38 (1978))). To hold the
municipality liable, there must be “a direct causal link between a municipal policy
17
or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 385.
Snow erroneously argues that the City of Citronelle should be liable because
the failure of the city to have a suicide policy constituted deliberate indifference to
a known, substantial risk of suicide. Although the jail did not have a written
suicide policy, all of the officers stated that an unwritten policy existed regarding
suicidal detainees. Even assuming the absence of any suicide policy, however, the
evidence does not establish a causal link between Poiroux’s suicide and the alleged
lack of a suicide policy at the City of Citronelle jail. The evidence is undisputed
that Chennault, the only officer who may have had knowledge that Poiroux
presented a strong likelihood of suicide, did not communicate that information to
his colleagues. The officers on duty, therefore, would not have known to put
Poiroux on a suicide watch even if there was a policy. Furthermore, Chennault
stated that, had he suspected Poiroux was suicidal, he would have taken the actions
a suicide policy would require: he would have told the dispatcher to check on
Poiroux every fifteen minutes, removed items from the cell with which Poiroux
could have harmed herself, and placed Poiroux in the drunk tank. Because the
record shows that Chennault believed he should have taken these actions if a
detainee was suicidal and Snow does not argue that the Constitution required
Chennault to do more, his failure to do so cannot be attributed to the alleged lack
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of a suicide policy.
Neither can the municipality be held liable for failure to train, failure to
supervise, or inadequate staffing. Snow has not presented any evidence that
Poiroux’s suicide is attributable to any of these alleged failures. The municipality,
therefore, cannot be held liable, and the district court correctly entered summary
judgment.
D. The State-Law Claims Must Be Reinstated.
After the district court granted summary judgment on the federal claims, the
court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Snow’s state-law claims
and dismissed them without prejudice. Because we reinstate Snow’s federal
claims, we must vacate the discretionary dismissal of the state-law claims, but we
express no opinion on the merits of those claims. See Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d
1323, 1334 (11th Cir. 2003). Because Snow concedes that his state-law claims
against the City of Citronelle and Mayor Presnell should be dismissed, the state-
law claims are reinstated as to all other defendants.
IV. CONCLUSION
We reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of Chennault because
there is an issue of fact regarding Chennault’s subjective knowledge of a
substantial likelihood that Poiroux would commit suicide. We affirm the summary
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judgment as to all remaining defendants, because Snow did not present any
evidence that the remaining defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial
likelihood of a suicide attempt, and Poiroux’s suicide cannot be attributed to a
failure of the City of Citronelle to have a suicide policy. Finally, we vacate the
dismissal of Snow’s state law claims as to all defendants, except the City of
Citronelle and Mayor Presnell, but express no opinion on the resolution of those
claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED.
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Stephanie Poiroux Snow v. City of Citronelle, AL
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date filed: 2005-08-16
Citations: 420 F.3d 1262
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion