The defendant was indicted for the murder of William Crouch; he was found guilty of the offense of voluntary manslaughter; he moved for a new trial on the grounds stated in the record; the motion was overruled by the presiding judge, the defendant excepted, and the refusal to grant the new trial on all of the grounds in said motion is the error assigned.
1. The first ground is that the verdict was contrary to the evidence and the principles of justice, and without evidence to
In the light of these facts, we think that this defendant has done remarkably well to escape the gallows. If he had been found guilty of murder, and we had been called upon to review that verdict, we should have been constrained to say that there was evidence enough to support it. Punishment, five years in the penitentiary, when the judge might have sentenced him for twenty years, is very light for such a crime, and shows that the presiding judge tempered justice with much mercy. The verdict is in accordance with the principles of justice — ■ at least the defendant is the last man who ought to complain of it.
2. The second ground is that the court erred in admitting the testimony of Laura Sykes. She swore that four or five nights before, defendant came to her house and said he had traveled all through Texas, was afraid of no man, and that he intended to kill deceased, repeating the threat twice, and cursing and abusing the deceased. We are utterly at a loss to see any legal reason why this testimony should have been excluded. The threats were evidence of malice, and proper to be considered by the jury.
3. The third ground is that the court erred in admitting the testimony as to what occurred at Montezuma. The defendant cannot object to it, for he introduced the witness who testified about it, and for the purpose, doubtless, of showing that deceased had followed defendant to Oglethorpe after some trouble at Montezuma.
5, 6. It was objected that the court said to the jury, aftei giving in chargea request of defendant very favorable to him, on the subject of circumstantial evidence, and the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis before there could be a conviction of murder, “if the state has satisfied you that Stiles killed Crouch, then the law presumed malice, and it is incumbent on Stiles to show his innocence.” Even if this were not law, which is not conceded, it did not hurt the defendant, as he was not convicted of murder.
It is also objected that the court, after charging, at the request of defendant, that if the jury believed that deceased was advancing upon defendant to commit a serious personal injury upon him, and he shot to save his own life, the jury ought to find him not guilty, added these words: “And the danger was so urgent and pressing that he shot to save his own life,” etc., etc. This seems to be the plain language of the Code as laid down in section 4333. So, also, it was objected that to the charge, if defendant was acting under the fears of a reasonable man when he shot, the court also added: “ If you believe that his life or person was in pressing and urgent-peril.” So, also, it was objected that the- court, in charging one of defendant’s requests, left out the words, “if these things be so.” We think those words were mere surplusage, repetition, and that the plain sense'of the request was fully given. So, again, it was objected that the court, in charging reasonable doubts, told the jury they should, if they could, reconcile all the evidence, and if they could not, then that they should believe those most entitled to credit. It seems to us that this was right. The main ground of defendant’s counsel, if we understand it, seems to be that section 4331 of the Code, in l’espect to the circumstances of the killing being sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man, was construed in connection with section 4333, which enacts that “ if a person kill another in his defense, it must appear that the danger was so urgent and pressing at the time of the killing, that in order to
Judgment affirmed.