Sturm Ruger Co Inc v. Chao, Elaine

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

       Argued April 15, 2002      Decided August 23, 2002 

                           No. 01-5111

                  Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., 
                            Appellant

                                v.

                          Elaine Chao, 
             Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor and 
        Charles N. Jeffress, Assistant Secretary of Labor 
               for Occupational Safety and Health, 
                            Appellees

          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                         (No. 00cv01026)

     Richard D. Wayne argued the cause and filed the briefs for 
appellant.

     Brian J. Sonfield, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 
cause for appellees.  With him on the brief were Roscoe C. 

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 
U.S. Attorney, Eugene Scalia, Solicitor, U.S. Department of 
Labor, Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor, and Bruce 
Justh and Ronald J. Gottlieb, Counsel.  Michael J. Ryan, 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

     Before:  Sentelle, Randolph, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

     Garland, Circuit Judge:  Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc. 
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia, challenging the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration's Data Collection Initiative as unlaw-
ful.  The court concluded that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the complaint, and that the company must pursue 
its claims through the review process prescribed by the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act.  We agree.

                                I

     We begin with a description of the statutory framework 
and of prior proceedings involving Sturm Ruger.

                                A

     The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSH Act) autho-
rizes the Secretary of Labor to promulgate workplace safety 
and health standards, 29 U.S.C. s 655(b), as well as regula-
tions "necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of [the 
Act] or for developing information regarding the causes and 
prevention of occupational accidents and illnesses," id. 
s 657(c)(1).  It further directs the Secretary to "prescribe 
regulations requiring employers to maintain accurate records 
of, and to make periodic reports on, work-related deaths, 
injuries and illnesses."  Id. s 657(c)(2).  And it gives the 
Secretary enforcement power, authorizing her to issue cita-
tions and to assess penalties for violations of the Act and of 
the standards and regulations promulgated thereunder.  Id. 
ss 658, 659.  The Secretary has delegated the bulk of these 
statutory responsibilities and authorities to the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).

     While the OSH Act charges the Secretary with rulemaking 
and enforcement, it gives the task of "carrying out adjudicato-
ry functions" to an independent entity, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC or the Com-
mission).  Id. s 651(b)(3);  see Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 
144, 147 (1991) (explaining that the OSH Act "assigns distinct 
regulatory tasks to two different administrative actors").  
Under the Act, employers may contest OSHA citations before 
OSHRC.  29 U.S.C. s 659(c).  Such contests are heard first 
by an ALJ, whose decision becomes the final order of the 
Commission unless the Commission decides to hear the case.  
Id. s 661(j).  Both employers and the Secretary may seek 
review of OSHRC orders in the courts of appeals.  Id. 
s 660(a), (b).1

     In 1996, OSHA launched an annual survey called the Data 
Collection Initiative (DCI).  See 62 Fed. Reg. 6434, 6434 
(Feb. 11, 1997).  Under the DCI, OSHA requires selected 
employers to report the number of workers they employed 
and the number of hours their employees worked during a 
specified period, as well as the number of work-related inju-
ries and illnesses their employees suffered during that period.  
See, e.g., OSHA Data Collection Form for Occupational Inju-
ries and Illnesses, 2000 (J.A. at 67).  From this information, 
OSHA calculates injury/illness incidence rates, which it uses 
to identify establishments to target for inspection.  See 62 
Fed. Reg. at 6435;  Secretary of Labor v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 
OSHRC Nos. 99-1873 & 99-1874 (ALJ Order Den. Mot. to 
Suppress, July 5, 2000) [hereinafter July 2000 ALJ Order] 
(noting that OSHA uses the DCI to target "sites in high-
hazard industries with average or above rates of injury and 
illness").2

__________
     1 A person adversely affected by a Commission order may obtain 
review in "any United States court of appeals for the circuit in 
which the violation is alleged to have occurred or where the 
employer has its principal office, or in the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit."  29 U.S.C. s 660(a).

     2 When the DCI was first implemented in 1996, OSHA had in 
effect regulations requiring employers to maintain logs of work-

                                B

     In April 1997, OSHA sent Sturm Ruger a DCI survey, 
requiring it to provide information regarding its Pine Tree 
Castings Division, a New Hampshire facility that manufac-
tures steel investment castings.  Sturm Ruger complied and 
returned the completed survey to OSHA.  In June 1998, 
based on information in the survey, two OSHA compliance 
officers arrived at Pine Tree to inspect the facility.  See 29 
U.S.C. s 657(a) (providing that the Secretary may enter, 
inspect, and investigate workplaces as necessary to "carry out 
the purposes of [the Act]").  Sturm Ruger refused to consent 
to the inspection, prompting OSHA to obtain a search war-
rant from the United States District Court for the District of 
New Hampshire.  See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 
307, 311 (1978) (holding that OSHA must obtain a warrant to 
conduct nonconsensual inspections of business premises).  
When OSHA officers arrived to execute the warrant, Pine 
Tree employees prevented them from doing so.  On the same 
day, Sturm Ruger moved to quash the warrant, arguing that 
the data used to target Pine Tree for inspection was derived 
from a survey that was not authorized by regulation, and that 
the warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.

__________
related injuries and illnesses, 29 C.F.R. s 1904.2, and to provide 
these logs to OSHA upon its request, id. s 1904.7.  OSHA did not, 
however, have a regulation that required employers to respond to 
the DCI survey.  Several employers filed suit against the Secre-
tary, seeking an injunction against its implementation.  See Ameri-
can Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Reich, 955 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C. 1997).  
In January 1997, the district court granted summary judgment for 
the employers, holding that OSHA "must promulgate a regulation 
before purporting to command employers to file reports like the one 
at issue here."  Id. at 7.  The Secretary did not appeal that 
decision, and the next month, to "clarify OSHA's authority," OSHA 
adopted 29 C.F.R. s 1904.17, which we discuss below.  See 62 Fed. 
Reg. 6434, 6434 (Feb. 11, 1997).  Since the filing of Sturm Ruger's 
complaint, OSHA has revised 29 C.F.R. pt. 1904, and the regulation 
concerning the DCI now appears at 29 C.F.R. s 1904.41.  See 66 
Fed. Reg. 5916 (Jan. 19, 2001).

     On January 22, 1999, the district court denied the motion to 
quash and enforced the warrant.  Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. 
United States, No. Civ. 98-418-JD, 2000 WL 36931, at *11 
(D.N.H. Jan. 22, 1999).  Sturm Ruger appealed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and sought a 
stay of execution of the warrant pending appeal.  The First 
Circuit denied the stay, and OSHA executed the warrant.  
After inspecting the Pine Tree facility, OSHA announced that 
it was considering issuing citations for violations of safety and 
health standards discovered during the inspection.  Sturm, 
Ruger & Co. v. OSHA, 186 F.3d 63, 63 (1st Cir. 1999).

     In August 1999, the First Circuit dismissed Sturm Ruger's 
appeal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  Noting 
that the OSHA inspection had already occurred and that 
citations could soon issue, the court of appeals held that 
Sturm Ruger had to pursue its challenge by contesting the 
citations through the review process established by the OSH 
Act.  The court noted that this process "would involve initial 
review by an administrative law judge, discretionary review 
by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 
and eventual review by this court."  Id. at 63 (citing 29 U.S.C. 
ss 659-61).

     The First Circuit reached its conclusion notwithstanding 
Sturm Ruger's insistence that its claim "involve[d] a 'purely 
legal' issue consisting of a 'facial' challenge" to the DCI.  Id. 
at 64.  The court found that Sturm Ruger had "not suggested 
that its claims cannot be adequately adjudicated in the ... 
anticipated enforcement proceeding," id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted), and that in fact "a successful appeal following 
exhaustion of administrative remedies" would vindicate its 
rights, id. at 65.  Moreover, the court held that, while the 
company had "not shown that requiring exhaustion would 
subject it to irreparable harm," permitting the district court 
to hear the claim would interfere with "agency autonomy."  
Id. at 64-65.

     On September 2, 1999, OSHA issued citations to Sturm 
Ruger based on its inspection of the Pine Tree facility.  In 
accordance with the OSH Act's review provisions, the compa-

ny contested those citations before an ALJ appointed by 
OSHRC.  See 29 U.S.C ss 659(c), 661(j).  At the outset of 
the proceeding, Sturm Ruger moved to suppress the evidence 
obtained during the Pine Tree inspection, arguing that no 
regulation authorized OSHA to collect the survey data that it 
used to target employers for inspection, and that the use of 
the data violated the Fourth Amendment.  The ALJ denied 
the motion on the ground that, by responding to the survey, 
Sturm Ruger had waived the right to challenge its legality.  
July 2000 ALJ Order at 4.

     After the ALJ issued a final decision on the merits, Sturm 
Ruger petitioned for, and the Commission granted, discre-
tionary review.  Sturm Ruger's petition argued that the 
citations should be vacated because they were discovered in 
an inspection based on data collected through an unlawful and 
unconstitutional survey.  Pet. for Discretionary Review p 15, 
reprinted in Secretary of Labor v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 
OSHRC Nos. 99-1873 & 99-1874, 2001 WL 95794 (ALJ Final 
Order, Jan. 23, 2001).  The DCI was unlawful under the OSH 
Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 
s 706, the company contended, because no regulation re-
quired employers to maintain the data sought by the survey.  
Id. pp 4, 7.  And it was unconstitutional because Sturm Ruger 
had "a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment 
in the information that the survey form compelled it to 
produce."  Id. p 23.  Sturm Ruger's case is currently pending 
before the Commission.

                                C

     On May 9, 2000, two months before the ALJ denied its 
motion to suppress, Sturm Ruger filed a complaint against 
the Secretary of Labor and the Assistant Secretary responsi-
ble for OSHA in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia. Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Herman, 131 
F. Supp. 2d 211 (D.D.C. 2001).  Like its filings before the 
Commission, the company's complaint alleged that the DCI 
was unlawful under the OSH Act, the APA, and the Fourth 
Amendment.  It sought both a declaratory judgment and an 

injunction barring OSHA from compelling compliance with 
the DCI survey, from conducting inspection programs that 
rely on survey data, and from "pursuing enforcement pro-
ceedings under the unlawful targeting inspection programs."  
Compl. at 13-14.

     In its complaint, Sturm Ruger made the same argument 
now pending before the Commission:  that the DCI was 
invalid because it required employers to report employment 
data (the number of employees and the hours they worked) 
despite the alleged absence of a regulation requiring employ-
ers to create and maintain such data.  The company rested 
its argument on a section of the OSH Act that states:

     On the basis of the records made and kept pursuant to 
     section 657(c) of this title, employers shall file such 
     reports with the Secretary as he shall prescribe by 
     regulation....
     
29 U.S.C. s 673(e).  Sturm Ruger did not dispute that OSHA 
had satisfied the requirement of the final clause of the section 
with 29 C.F.R. s 1904.17, a regulation that requires employ-
ers to file reports in response to annual DCI surveys.3  But it 
argued that the first clause of the section only permits the 
agency to compel employers to provide information that is 
contained in "records made and kept pursuant to section 
657(c)."  Section 657(c), in turn, provides:

     Each employer shall make, keep and preserve, and make 
     available to the Secretary ..., such records regarding 
     his activities relating to this chapter as the Secretary ... 
     may prescribe by regulation....
     
__________
3   Each employer shall, upon receipt of OSHA's Annual Survey 
     Form, report to OSHA ... the number of workers it employed 
     and the number of hours worked by its employees for periods 
     designated in the Survey Form and such information as OSHA 
     may request from records required to be created and main-
     tained pursuant to 29 C.F.R. Part 1904.

29 C.F.R. s 1904.17.

29 U.S.C. s 657(c)(1).  Sturm Ruger claimed that, although 
OSHA had a regulation requiring employers to create and 
maintain the injury and illness data sought by the DCI 
survey, 29 C.F.R. s 1904.2, no regulation required them to 
create and maintain the employment data also demanded by 
the survey.  Thus, the company argued, the DCI's require-
ment that employment data be reported was unlawful under 
the OSH Act, ss 657(c) & 673(e), and consequently under the 
APA because it was not "in accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. 
s 706(2).4  Finally, like its pleadings before the Commission, 
Sturm Ruger's complaint also contended that employers 
"have a privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment 
in the information that the survey form seeks to compel them 
to produce."  Compl. p 40.

     The Secretary of Labor moved to dismiss Sturm Ruger's 
complaint on the ground that "the administrative review 
process established by the OSH Act is the exclusive means by 
which plaintiff may challenge the DCI's legality."  Sturm, 
Ruger & Co., 131 F. Supp. 2d at 215.  The district court 
agreed and granted the motion.  Applying the holding and 
reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision in Thunder Basin 
Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), the court concluded 
that the OSH Act established a comprehensive review proce-
dure that precluded district court jurisdiction.

                               III

     On appeal, we review de novo the dismissal of Sturm 
Ruger's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 
must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true.  

__________
     4 Sturm Ruger does not dispute that OSHA has mooted this 
argument for DCI surveys applicable to years beginning after 
January 1, 2002.  Appellant's Br. at 17 n.1, 29.  As the company 
points out, OSHA has promulgated regulations, effective as of that 
date, "which now require employers to create and maintain the DCI 
Survey data" regarding the number of employees and the hours 
they worked for each establishment.  Id. at 17 n.1 (citing 29 C.F.R 
s 1904.32 (2002);  66 Fed. Reg. 5916, 6042 (Jan. 19, 2001)).

See Sloan v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 
236 F.3d 756, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  We first consider whether 
the OSH Act has a statutory review structure like that of the 
statute at issue in Thunder Basin, the Federal Mine Safety 
and Health Amendments Act of 1977 (Mine Act), 30 U.S.C. 
s 801 et seq.  We then address whether Sturm Ruger's 
claims "are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed 
within this statutory structure."  Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 
212.

                                A

     In Thunder Basin, the Supreme Court considered a pre-
enforcement challenge filed by a mine operator against the 
Secretary of Labor.  The operator's employees had selected 
two employees of the United Mine Workers, who were not 
employees of the mine, to serve as their miners' representa-
tives under s 813(f) of the Mine Act.  Thereafter, the Mine 
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) of the Department 
of Labor instructed the operator to post the employees' 
designated representatives, as required by the statute and a 
MSHA regulation.  Instead, the operator filed suit in federal 
district court for an injunction against enforcement of the 
regulation, contending that designation of nonemployee union 
representatives violated its rights under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. s 141 et seq.  The operator 
also argued that requiring it to challenge MSHA's interpreta-
tion of the statute and regulation through the Mine Act's 
statutory review process would violate the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, because it would force the 
operator to choose between violating the Act and incurring 
penalties, or complying and thereby suffering irreparable 
harm. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 205.

     The Court held that the statutory review scheme of the 
Mine Act deprived the district court of subject matter juris-
diction over the operator's complaint.  It declared that "[i]n 
cases involving delayed judicial review"--that is, where ap-
peal can be taken to the court of appeals after completion of 
administrative proceedings--"we shall find that Congress has 

allocated initial review to an administrative body where such 
intent is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.' "  Id. at 
207 (quoting Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 
340, 351 (1984)).  The Court found that intent discernible in 
the following elements of the Mine Act's statutory review 
procedure.

     First, the Court noted that the "Act establishes a detailed 
structure for reviewing violations" of MSHA standards and 
regulations.  Id.  The Mine Act gives a mine operator thirty 
days to challenge before the Commission any citation issued 
by MSHA, after which time an uncontested order becomes 
" 'final' " and " 'not subject to review by any court or agen-
cy.' "  Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. s 815(a), (d)).  Challenges filed 
within the thirty-day period "are heard before an administra-
tive law judge (ALJ), with possible Commission review" to 
follow.  Id. at 207-08 (citation omitted).  "Only the Commis-
sion has authority actually to impose civil penalties proposed 
by the Secretary, and the Commission reviews all proposed 
civil penalties de novo."  Id. 208 (citations omitted).

     The Court further noted that under the Act, "[m]ine oper-
ators may challenge adverse Commission decisions in the 
appropriate court of appeals, whose jurisdiction 'shall be 
exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final' except 
for possible Supreme Court review."  Id. (quoting 30 U.S.C. 
s 816(a)(1)).  Courts of appeals must "uphold findings of the 
Commission that are substantially supported by the record."  
Id. (citation omitted).  In addition, "the statute establishes 
that the Commission and the courts of appeals have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over challenges to agency enforcement pro-
ceedings," and its "comprehensive review process does not 
distinguish between pre-enforcement and post-enforcement 
challenges, but applies to all violations of the Act and its 
regulations."  Id. at 208-09 (citation omitted).  Finally, the 
"Act expressly authorizes district court jurisdiction in only 
two provisions ..., which respectively empower the Secre-
tary to enjoin habitual violations of health and safety stan-
dards and to coerce payment of civil penalties."  Id. at 209 
(citations omitted).  "Mine operators," by contrast, "enjoy no 

corresponding right but are to complain to the Commission 
and then to the court of appeals."  Id.

     In the instant case, the district court concluded, and we 
agree, that "[t]he administrative and judicial review proce-
dures in the OSH Act are 'nearly identical' to those in the 
Mine Act."  131 F. Supp. 2d at 216 (quoting In re Establish-
ment Inspection of Manganas Painting Co., 104 F.3d 801, 
802 (6th Cir. 1997)).  This is hardly surprising since, as we 
have previously noted, the Mine Act's review process was 
written to conform to the review process of the OSH Act.  
See Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 268 F.3d 
1123, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 2001);  see also 123 Cong. Rec. 4387-88 
(1977) (statement of Sen. Williams, the Act's sponsor, upon 
introduction of the Act).  Like the Mine Act, the OSH Act 
gives employers a limited period to contest a citation issued 
by OSHA, and provides that if no contest is brought within 
that period, the citation is "deemed a final order ... not 
subject to review by any court or agency."  29 U.S.C. 
s 659(a).  Contests to OSHA citations are brought before an 
independent adjudicatory commission (OSHRC), where they 
are heard first by an ALJ and then reviewed by the Commis-
sion, at its discretion.  Id. ss 659(c), 661(j).  Only the Com-
mission has authority to impose civil penalties proposed by 
the Secretary, which the Commission reviews de novo.  Id. 
s 666(j).

     As under the Mine Act, employers may appeal adverse 
Commission decisions to the appropriate court of appeals, 
whose jurisdiction "shall be exclusive and its judgment and 
decree shall be final," but which must uphold the Commis-
sion's findings of fact if "supported by substantial evidence."  
Id. s 660(a); see supra note 1.  And like the Mine Act, the 
OSH Act does not distinguish between pre- and post-
enforcement challenges.  Finally, also like the Mine Act, the 
OSH Act expressly grants district courts jurisdiction over 
specified actions, see 29 U.S.C. ss 657(b), 660(c)(2), 662(a) & 
(d), 666(l), but those do not include actions brought by 
employers.

     In short, in every relevant respect the statutory review 
provisions of the OSH Act parallel those of the Mine Act, and 
we therefore join the First and Sixth circuits in concluding 
that Thunder Basin's analysis of review under the Mine Act 
is fully applicable to the OSH Act.  See Manganas Painting 
Co., 104 F.3d at 803;  Northeast Erectors Ass'n of the BTEA 
v. Secretary of Labor, 62 F.3d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1995).5

                                B

     Our conclusion that the OSH Act creates a comprehensive 
review process comparable to that of the Mine Act's does not 
end the inquiry.  We must also consider whether Sturm 
Ruger's claims "are of the type Congress intended to be 

__________
     5 Sturm Ruger suggests that this conclusion is "implicitly" incon-
sistent with our decision in Workplace Health & Safety Council v. 
Reich, 56 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  See Appellant's Br. at 41.  In 
that case, the petitioner sought pre-enforcement review of an OSHA 
rule in this court, and we therefore had to decide whether the rule 
was a "standard," the only kind of OSHA action that the OSH Act 
expressly authorizes courts of appeals to review directly.  See 29 
U.S.C. s 655(f).  We held that the rule was a "regulation" rather 
than a "standard," and that we therefore did not have jurisdiction.  
Workplace Health, 56 F.3d at 1467-68.  At the same time, we 
stated our belief that pre-enforcement review of regulations was 
appropriate in the district court.  Id. at 1469.  And in a subsequent 
case, in the course of deciding that we had original jurisdiction over 
an OSHA standard, we cited Workplace Health for the proposition 
that regulations are subject to review in the district court.  Cham-
ber of Commerce v. Dep't of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 209 (D.C. Cir. 
1999).  Neither Workplace Health nor Chamber of Commerce, 
however, mentioned Thunder Basin or considered its impact on 
district court jurisdiction.  And as the Supreme Court has "re-
peatedly held," "the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects" 
gives a ruling "no precedential effect" on the unaddressed question.  
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996);  see Steel Co. v. 
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1997);  Hagans v. 
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534-35 n.5 (1974).

reviewed within this statutory structure."  Thunder Basin, 
510 U.S. at 212.  In Thunder Basin, the Court indicated that 
district courts could still assert jurisdiction over "claims 
considered wholly collateral to a statute's review provisions 
and outside the agency's expertise."  Id. at 212 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  That is "particularly" so, the 
Court said, "where a finding of preclusion could foreclose all 
meaningful judicial review."  Id. at 212-13.  Sturm Ruger's 
claims, however, do not fit within those categories.

     Like the statutory claims at issue in Thunder Basin, Sturm 
Ruger's claim that the DCI violates the OSH Act because it is 
not authorized by regulation is not "wholly collateral" to the 
OSH Act's review provisions.  Id. at 214.  Rather, it "re-
quire[s] interpretation of the parties' rights and duties" under 
the Act and its regulations, and therefore "fall[s] squarely 
within the Commission's expertise."  Id. at 214;  see Martin, 
499 U.S. at 154-55.  As for the company's claim that the DCI 
violates the Fourth Amendment, we note that the same 
factors that persuaded the Thunder Basin Court that the 
constitutional challenge at issue there should be raised within 
the statutory review structure are present here:  (1) "the 
reviewing body is not the agency itself but an independent 
Commission";  (2) the Commission has addressed constitution-
al claims in previous enforcement proceedings, see, e.g., 
McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(reviewing an OSHRC decision that an OSHA regulation 
authorizing a warrantless and nonconsensual search of busi-
ness records violated the Fourth Amendment);  and (3) the 
employer's claims can still "be meaningfully addressed in the 
Court of Appeals" after the Commission has rendered a 
decision.  Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 215.

     In light of these considerations, we find Sturm Ruger's 
invocation of the Supreme Court's opinion in Leedom v. Kyne, 
358 U.S. 184 (1958), inapposite.  Leedom involved a union's 
challenge to a determination by the National Labor Relations 
Board that a bargaining unit including both professional and 
nonprofessional employees was appropriate--despite a direct-
ly contrary provision of the NLRA.  Id. at 185-86;  see 29 

U.S.C. s 159(b)(1).  Although the Court had previously held 
that a Board order in a certification proceeding was not "a 
final order" and therefore "not subject to judicial review 
except as it may be drawn in question by a petition for ... 
review of an order ... restraining an unfair labor practice," it 
nonetheless held that the district court had jurisdiction over 
the union's challenge.  Leedom, 358 U.S. at 187, 191.  "Cen-
tral" to the decision in Leedom, the Court has since explained, 
was the understanding that barring district court review 
would have "wholly deprive[d] the union of a meaningful and 
adequate means of vindicating its statutory rights," because 
the union's members had " 'no other means, within their 
control' " of obtaining judicial review.  Board of Governors v. 
MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (quoting Leedom, 358 
U.S. at 190);  see Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 213 (citing 
Leedom as an example of a case in which the plaintiff had no 
other means to protect its rights).

     As we have just discussed, however, barring district court 
review in this case will not deprive employers of the opportu-
nity to obtain judicial review.  An employer can, for example, 
refuse to answer the survey, draw a citation from OSHA, and 
then contest the citation through the statutory review proce-
dure that ultimately ends in a court of appeals.  See Thunder 
Basin, 510 U.S. at 216.  Sturm Ruger contends that this 
review option is not meaningful because, faced with the threat 
of OSHA sanctions, employers will not risk ignoring the 
survey.6  But the Court rejected a similar argument in Thun-
der Basin, noting that "[a]lthough the Act's civil penalties 
unquestionably may become onerous if petitioner chooses not 
to comply, the Secretary's penalty assessments become final 
and payable only after full review by both the Commission 
and the appropriate court of appeals."  Id. at 218 (citing 30 
U.S.C. ss 820(i) & 816);  see OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. ss 666(j) & 
660.  Moreover, in this case Sturm Ruger has already trig-

__________
     6 Sturm Ruger also appears to make the opposite argument, 
contending that OSHA is attempting to shield the DCI from review 
by choosing not to cite employers who fail to respond.  But if that 
were the case, a point OSHA disputes, employers that fail to answer 
the survey would suffer no injury.

gered the review process that ultimately will bring it to a 
court of appeals, by contesting the citations its Pine Tree 
facility received as the allegedly tainted product of a search 
based on information obtained through the DCI.7

     Finally, we consider our recent decision in National Min-
ing Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 856-57 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002), in which this court held that, notwithstanding the 
rule of Thunder Basin, a district court had jurisdiction to 
hear a "generic" challenge to regulations issued by the Secre-
tary of Labor under the Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA), 30 
U.S.C. s 901 et seq.  That decision is inapplicable to Sturm 
Ruger's challenge for three reasons.

     First, National Mining Association emphasized that the 
challenge at issue there was a direct attack on the validity of 
"a formal regulation," issued pursuant to "notice-and-
comment" rulemaking.  National Mining Ass'n, 292 F.3d at 
858.  In so holding, we distinguished Compensation Depart-
ment v. Marshall, in which the Third Circuit held that a 
district court lacked jurisdiction to review a claim that the 
Secretary's policy of independently examining x-rays submit-
ted by those seeking black lung benefits was unlawful under 
the BLBA.  667 F.2d 336, 340-44 (3d. Cir. 1981).  That case, 
we explained, involved an attack on an enforcement policy 
rather than a regulation, and "there was no reason why the 
[plaintiff] could not challenge [the] policy in an individual 
adjudication before the Benefits Review Board and, if neces-

__________
     7 In a footnote, Sturm Ruger suggests that it cannot receive 
meaningful review through the statutory process because the ALJ 
held that, by voluntarily responding to the survey, the company had 
waived its right to challenge it.  See Appellant's Br. at 39 n.11.  But 
the ALJ's decision does not preclude the Commission, or the court 
of appeals upon subsequent review, from rejecting the ALJ's deci-
sion and accepting Sturm Ruger's contention that the "waiver" was 
involuntary because its response to the survey was coerced.  On the 
other hand, if both the Commission and court conclude that the 
company did voluntarily answer the survey, then its injury will have 
been due to its own voluntary action, and it will lack standing to 
complain.  See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997).

sary, in the Court of Appeals."  National Mining Ass'n, 292 
F.3d at 858.

     The same is true here.  As we described in Part I.C, Sturm 
Ruger does not challenge the validity of an OSHA regulation.  
To the contrary, it insists that there is no regulation that 
authorizes the collection of the employment information de-
manded by the DCI, and that the survey is therefore ultra 
vires.  See Appellant's Br. at 16, 18, 34.8  Moreover, as in 
Compensation Department, the gravamen of Sturm Ruger's 
complaint is that OSHA is employing an unlawful enforce-
ment strategy, in which it "use[s] the information gained 
through the survey form to target its enforcement activities 
on employer establishments."  Compl. p 10;  see id. at pp 1, 
32.9  As we said in National Mining Association regarding 
Compensation Department, there is no reason why Sturm 
Ruger cannot challenge the Secretary's enforcement strategy 
in an individual adjudication before the Commission.  See 
National Mining Ass'n, 292 F.3d at 858.

     Second, we noted in National Mining Association that the 
regulations there at issue were "challenged primarily on the 

__________
     8 See, e.g., Appellant's Br. at 25 ("Because no OSHA regulation 
requires maintenance of such data, there can be no requirement to 
report said information [and] [t]herefore, the Annual DCI Surveys 
are an unlawful exercise of authority by OSHA....");  id. at 34 
("[A]t all times relevant to the Complaint, there has been no 
regulation ... requiring employers to create and maintain the data 
which OSHA requires employers to report on the DCI concerning 
number of employees and number of hours worked by employees in 
establishments.").  In particular, Sturm Ruger does not contend 
that 29 C.F.R. s 1904.17 unlawfully requires employers to report 
employment information that OSHA has not separately required 
the employers to create and maintain.  Rather, it contends that 
s 1904.17 "merely authorizes OSHA to collect such data which 
OSHA requires employers to maintain by regulation and no such 
regulation requires this data to be maintained."  Compl. p 36.

     9 See also Compl. at 13-14 (seeking a declaratory judgment that 
OSHA's "site specific targeting plans utilizing [DCI] data [are] ultra 
vires," and an injunction "enjoin[ing] Defendants from conducting 
inspection programs which... rely upon" DCI data).

ground that they are impermissibly retroactive," that to 
determine whether that was true would require analysis of 
"all of the regulations together as well as the entire rulemak-
ing process," and that such an analysis "would not be feasible 
in individual adjudications dealing with particular regulatory 
provisions."  Id. at 858-59.  By contrast, as we have dis-
cussed above, there is no reason why Sturm Ruger cannot 
obtain meaningful review of its challenge through the statuto-
ry review process.

     Third, and most important, National Mining Association 
was not a case in which the "plaintiff sought to short-circuit 
the administrative process" through the vehicle of a district 
court complaint.  Id. at 858.  Sturm Ruger's complaint, 
however, fits that description well.  As the district court 
noted, the company "raised the identical claims in its chal-
lenge to the citations that is currently pending before the 
OSHRC."  131 F. Supp. 2d at 217 n.1;  see Pet. for Discre-
tionary Review pp 4, 7, 15, 23;  supra Part I.B.  Moreover, it 
raised similar claims before the First Circuit, and was di-
rected by that court to exhaust its remedies before the 
Commission.  Sturm, Ruger & Co., 186 F.3d at 63.  Rather 
than allowing the statutory review process to run its 
course--a course that will eventually lead back to a court of 
appeals--Sturm Ruger sought to make an end run around 
that process by going directly to district court.  Indeed, the 
company is attempting to end the process altogether:  its 
complaint seeks an injunction permanently barring the Sec-
retary from "pursuing enforcement proceedings under the 
unlawful targeting inspection programs," Compl. at 14, an 
injunction that would terminate the proceeding currently 
pending before the Commission.  Our obligation to respect 
the review process established by Congress bars us from 
permitting Sturm Ruger to make this end run, and requires 
dismissal of its district court complaint.10

__________
     10 See Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. at 216 (holding that Congress did 
not intend "to allow mine operators to evade the statutory review 
process");  Northeast Erectors Ass'n of the BTEA, 62 F.3d at 40 
(dismissing a pre-enforcement challenge that would "subvert Con-

                                IV

     For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court, dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, is

                                                                           Affirmed.

__________
gress's intent to have such claims reviewed through the OSH Act's 
detailed administrative procedure");  cf. Great Plains Coop v. 
CFTC, 205 F.3d 353, 354-55 (8th Cir. 2000) (applying Thunder 
Basin to the Commodity Exchange Act, and holding that the 
plaintiff could not "make an 'end run' around the statutory [review] 
scheme" by filing a district court complaint aimed at "halting the 
CFTC's administrative proceedings against" the plaintiff);  Block-
som & Co. v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding 
that an employer may not "bypass the review procedures Congress" 
established under the OSH Act by filing, at the same time that it 
was contesting a safety citation before OSHRC, a district court 
complaint "assert[ing] its defenses to the Secretary's citations").