delivered the opinion of the Court.
On December 11, 1945 the plaintiff filed a taxpayer’s suit against the members of the Executive Council and the Board of Directors of the Puerto Pico Agricultural Company, alleging that the Company was created by Act No. 31, Laws of Puerto Rico, 1945, (p. 74); that § 27 of Act No. 31 appro
On January 17, 1946, after a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction the district court entered a restraining order prohibiting expenditure by the defendants of the funds in question. On January 28 the plaintiff moved for the appointment of a receiver. On February 1 the court, reciting (a) that the parties were in agreement that a receiver should be appointed without prejudice to the right of the defendants to raise any question as to the legality of these proceedings and (b) that the parties had submitted among others the name of Thomas A. Fennell, the General Manager of the Company, appointed Fennell as receiver to serve while the restraining order was in effect.
On February 18 the court granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, and named Federico López del Valle as receiver to serve until the case was finally decided. The new receiver never took office because he never posted a bond as required by the order of the court. On the same day the defendants moved for a trial on the merits. On February 19 the district court set the ease for trial on February 26, at 9 a.m.
On February 25 the district court, without notifying or hearing the parties, entered a judgment setting aside the preliminary injunction and the appointment of López del Valle as receiver and dismissing the case on the ground that the Legislature had on February 25 approved Acts Nos. 1 and 2,
Act No. 2 specifically provides in § 2 that ‘‘The action known in equity as taxpayer’s suit is hereby prohibited.” And § 3 extends this prohibition to pending actions. But the plaintiff contends that Act No. 2 is invalid and in any event could not be applied to the instant case which was pending when it was enacted.
In Buscaglia, Treas. v. District Court, 64 P.R.R. 11, this Court held, the writer dissenting, that a taxpayer may sue to restrain public officials from illegally expending public funds. If that question had been Federal or constitutional, this Court would have been compelled to follow Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, which holds that a Federal taxpayer has no standing to institute such a suit against Federal officials. But we held at p. 21 that the question was local and that we were free to lay down our own local rule contrary to that established in Massachusetts v. Mellon. In affirming our judgment, the Circuit Court said that “we have no doubt that it is within the competence of the territorial government, either by legislative act or judicial decision to authorize a taxpayer’s bill in equity . . Buscaglia v. District Court, 145 F.(2d) 274, 284 (CCA 1st, 1944), cert. denied, 65 S. Ct. 434. (Italics ours.°) And if the remedy of a taxpayer’s suit may be created by legislative act, by the same token it may be abolished by legislative act.
This is not a common law jurisdiction. For a remedy to exist in Puerto Eico it must be provided by statute. People v. Escambrón, 63 P.R.R. 731. The majority opinion in the Buscaglia case held in effect that a specific legislative provision authorizing a taxpayer’s suit was not necessary, and that in the absence of restrictive legislation against such a suit, our general statute establishing the remedy of in june
We are unable to follow the plaintiff in his argument that Act No. 2 is invalid. The cases are unanimous in holding that where, as in this jurisdiction, 48 USCA ^ 861, the Legislature has been vested with the power to determine the jurisdiction of the courts, it may legislate with reference to remedies by limiting or withdrawing the jurisdiction of the courts to issue injunctions in a particular type of controversy, such as labor disputes or as here taxpayers’ suits. And such restrictive legislation is valid even as applied to pending cases because injunction is a remedy in which there is no vested right. Smallwood v. Gallardo, 275 U.S. 56, 61-62; Gallardo v. Santini Co., 275 U.S. 62; Fajardo Sugar Co. of P. R. v. Domenech, Treas., 45 P.R.R. 539; Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R. Co., 321 U. S. 50, 63-64; Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182; Yakus v. U. S., 321 U. S. 414, 440-443, particularly footnote 8; Ponce v. Roman Catholic Church, 210 U. S. 296; People v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 50 P.R.R. 156, 172; Drivers’ Union v. Lake Valley, 311 U. S. 91, 101; New Negro Alliance v. Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F.(2d) 284, 287 (CCA 2nd, 1934); Cinderella Theatre Co. v. Sign Writers’ Local Union, 6 F. Supp. 164, 169 (Dist. Ct., Mich., 1934); Dehan v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 159 So. 637, 647 (La. 1935); Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506.1
The plaintiff also contends that the lower court erred in entering judgment without giving him an opportunity to be heard on the validity and applicability of Act No. 2. The district court, as we have seen, without notifying or hearing the parties, entered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction on February 25, a few hours after the approval of Act No. 2, despite the fact that the case was set for trial the next morning.
The plaintiff was entitled to the opportunity, both in the district court and in this Court, to assail the validity and applicability to this casé of Act No. 2. Indeed, if a substantial
Moreover, in addition to attacking the validity and applicability of Act No. 2, the defendant might have wished to raise some questions concerning the bonds posted herein or the receivership. Or he might have evinced a desire to change his prayer for relief and ask for a declaratory judgment instead of an injunction. See § 4, Act No. 2; Núñez v. Benitez, Chancellor, 65 P.R.R. 812; Cook v. Fortson, 329 U. S. 677, 91 L.ed. 65, 66, footnote 6, separate opinion of Mr. Justice Rutledge. But cf. College of Pharmacists v. Board of Pharmacy, 60 P.R.R. 789; Government of the Capital v. Executive Council, 63 P.R.R. 417. It happens that the plaintiff has made no concrete claims with reference to such matters before us and has confined himself to attacking the validity and applicability of Act No. 2. We therefore find no reason to remand the case for the lower court to pass on them. But even if the plaintiff had wished to press these or other questions in the lower court, the latter deprived him of his opportunity to do so by dismissing the case without a hearing.
In seeking to justify this action of the district court, the defendants cite Casanovas & Cía, Sucrs., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 61 P.R.R. 52, and Santana v. Salinas, 54 P.R.R. 109. But in those cases no one was deprived of an opportunity to be heard. The parties argued their cases and submitted them to this Court. Thereafter, we concluded that we had no jurisdiction. Consequently, it was our duty to dismiss-the cases. But they are scarcely authority for the proposition that a court, without waiting to hear the parties who may desire to amend their pleadings or raise points which have
This case was one of wide public interest. Judges do not live in a vacuum. We know what the rest of the community knows. And we are aware that the immediate purpose of Act No. 2 was to cut oft' the right of the plaintiff to pursue his remedy in this case. Under those circumstances it was highly important that the courts, an independent branch of government, should give the plaintiff every opportunity to demonstrate if he could that Act No. 2 was invalid or did not apply to this case or to make any other contentions. The case was set for hearing on the morning after Act No. 2 was approved. The defendants at the opening of the case would have undoubtedly moved to dismiss in view of the passage of Act No. 2 and the court could have then heard the plaintiff and decided the matter promptly.
We are now satisfied, after hearing the parties and examining the record, the statute and the cases, that the lower court correctly ruled, in view of the contentions made by the plaintiff in this Court, that the suit should be dismissed. But the district court should have waited until the next morning and heard the parties as to the validity and applicability of Act No. 2. We recently emphasized the importance of permitting the parties to argue their causes. We held that it was reversible error in a criminal case tried without a jury for a district court to refuse to permit counsel for the defendant to argue his case after all the testimony had been submitted. People v. Díaz, ante, p. 74. No one has suggested that this Court was entitled to decide the important questions presented by this case without hearing the parties.
We gave the plaintiff such a hearing; we fail to see why the lower court could not have done the same. To wait until the next morning could not have possibly prejudiced the defendants : the properties of the Company never left the possession of Fennell, its General Manager, as the new receiver appointed to replace him never took office. On the other hand,
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
1.
The plaintiff complains that Act No. 2 leaves the community without a remedy in the courts to protect the expenditure of public funds. But “it must he remembered that legislatures are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and
2.
In. view of tlie absolute prohibition contained in § 2 of Act No. 2 against taxpayers' suits, we find no occasion to examine here the validity of Act No. 1. Likewise, this case does not involve a situation where private rights of an individual are directly affected by the operations of the Agricultural Company.