Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-1460

INMATES OF THE SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

v.

ROBERT RUFO, SHERIFF OF SUFFOLK COUNTY, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, ET AL.,

Defendants, Appellants.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]

Before

Torruella, Circuit Judge,

Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,

and Boudin, Circuit Judge.

Douglas H. Wilkins, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Scott

Harshbarger, Attorney General, and Thomas O. Bean, Assistant Attorney

General, were on brief for appellants.
Max D. Stern with whom Lynn Weissberg and Stern, Shapiro,

Rosenfeld & Weissberg were on brief for appellees.

December 21, 1993

CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge. The Commissioner

of Corrections for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (the

"Commissioner"), defendant-appellant, brought a motion in the

United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts to vacate a consent decree of May 7, 1979 (as

modified by the orders of April 11, 1985, and April 22,

1985)1 entered into by the Sheriff of Suffolk County (the

"Sheriff"), the Commissioner, and others with the inmates of

the Suffolk County Jail (the "Inmates"),2 the plaintiff-

appellee class. The district court denied the Commissioner's

motion. Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 148

F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1993). The Commissioner appeals,

arguing, inter alia, that the district court mistakenly

treated his motion to vacate as if it were a motion to modify

the consent decree. We affirm.

I.

This appeal is part of an ongoing saga involving

the construction and the operation of the new Suffolk County

Jail on Nashua Street in Boston, Massachusetts (the "Nashua

Street Jail"), which replaced the old Suffolk County Jail on

Charles Street (the "Charles Street Jail"). The early

1. A copy of the original consent decree is included as an
appendix to this Opinion.

2. The Inmates are those individuals, male and female, in
the custody of the Sheriff of Suffolk County, who are
awaiting trial on criminal charges, and who have either been
denied bail or who are unable or unwilling to post bail.

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chapters of this drama, which began in 1971, need not be

repeated. They are fully set out in published opinions.

See, e.g., Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 928

F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1992); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail

v. Rufo, 148 F.R.D. 14 (D. Mass. 1993); Inmates of the

Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.),

aff'd mem., 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, Rufo v.

Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail, U.S. , 112 S. Ct.

748, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992); Inmates of the Suffolk County

Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd,

494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.

Ct. 239, 42 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1974). We pick up the story in

July 1989, approximately ten years after the consent decree

was entered.

"In July 1989, while the [Nashua Street Jail] was

still under construction, the [S]heriff moved to modify the

consent decree to allow the double bunking of male detainees

in 197 cells, thereby raising the capacity of the [Nashua

Street Jail] to 610 male detainees."3 Rufo v. Inmates of

3. The Sheriff's motion was brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(5) and (6), which state:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it
is no longer equitable that the judgment should

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the Suffolk County Jail, U.S. , , 112 S. Ct. 748,

756, 116 L. Ed. 2d 867 (1992). "The Sheriff argued that

changes in law and fact [constituted new and unforeseen

circumstances that] justified the modification." Rufo, 148

F.R.D. at 16. "The asserted change in law was [the Supreme

Court's] 1979 decision in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99

S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979), handed down [shortly]

after the consent decree was approved by the District

Court.4 The asserted change in fact was the increase in the

population of pretrial detainees." Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 756

(footnote not in original).

The district court denied the Sheriff's request to

modify the consent decree. Inmates of the Suffolk County

Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mass.), aff'd mem., 915

have prospective application; or (6) any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.

The district court found that the Sheriff relied initially on
the provision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) that authorizes the
modification of a judgment if "it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application." According
to the district court, "[t]his portion of the rule codifies
the standard set out in United States v. Swift & Co., 286

U.S. 106, 119, 52 S. Ct. 460, 464, 76 L. Ed. 999 (1932),
which dealt with a court's inherent power to modify."
Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 563. In Swift, the Supreme Court

held that "[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the
consent of all concerned." Swift, 286 U.S. at 119.

4. "In Bell, the [Supreme Court] held that double-bunking

was not in all circumstances unconstitutional." Rufo, 148

F.R.D. at 16.

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F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990). It held that the Sheriff had

failed to meet the standard for the modification of consent

decrees imposed by United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.

106, 119, 52 S. Ct. 460, 464, 76 L. Ed. 999 (1932).5 The

district court also "stated that, even under the flexible

modification standard adopted by other Courts of Appeals, the

[S]heriff would not be entitled to relief because `[a]

separate cell for each detainee has always been an important

element of the relief sought in this litigation perhaps even

the most important element.'" Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 756-57

(quoting Kearney, 734 F. Supp. at 565) (footnote omitted).

As a final matter, the district court "rejected the argument

that the decree should be modified because the proposal

complied with constitutional standards, reasoning that such a

rule `would undermine and discourage settlement efforts in

institutional cases.'" Id. at 757 (quoting Kearney, 734 F.

Supp. at 565).

This court affirmed the district court's decision.

Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557

(1st Cir. 1990). Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted

certiorari, 498 U.S. 1081, 111 S. Ct. 950, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1039

(1991), and, after hearing, vacated the decision below and

remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.

Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 765. The Supreme Court ruled that the

5. For a description of this standard, see supra note 3.

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district court had erred in applying the rigid "grievous

wrong" standard of United States v. Swift to the Sheriff's

motion to modify the consent decree. Id. at 757-58 (holding

that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) does not intend that

"modifications of consent decrees in all cases [are] to be

governed by the standard actually applied in Swift . . . [but

rather] permits a less stringent, more flexible standard").

The Court observed that "[t]he experience of the district and

circuit courts in implementing and modifying such decrees has

demonstrated that a flexible approach is often essential to

achieving the goals of [institutional] reform litigation."

Id. at 758. Against this backdrop, the Court held that "a

party seeking modification of a consent decree bears the

[initial] burden of establishing that a significant change in

circumstances warrants revision of the decree." Id. at 760.

To meet this initial burden, a party seeking modification of

an institutional reform consent decree may show "either a

significant change in factual conditions or in law." Id.

Once the party seeking modification meets this standard, "the

court should consider whether the proposed modification is

suitably tailored to the changed circumstance."6 Id.

6. The standard announced by the Rufo Court applies only to

motions to modify institutional reform consent decrees. The

Court did not have before it the "question [of] whether [in
whole or in part] the . . . decree should be vacated." Rufo,

112 S. Ct. at 763 n.12 (emphasis added).

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On remand, the district court reconsidered the

Sheriff's motion to modify the consent decree to permit the

double-bunking of inmates in 197 of the 322 regular male

housing cells at the Nashua Street Jail. The court also

considered two other motions filed after the case was

remanded, one of which was the Commissioner's present motion

to vacate the consent decree altogether.7 See Rufo, 148

F.R.D. at 15. The district court denied all three motions.

The district court explained its denial of the

Sheriff's motion for modification to allow double-bunking of

pretrial detainees at the Nashua Street Jail in a

comprehensive opinion, concluding that "the Sheriff's

proposed modification [was] not suitably tailored to changed

circumstances shown by the record." Id. at 24. According to

the district court, the Sheriff had not "made [a] showing of

reasoned exploration of other feasible alternatives that

would maintain rather than impair the integrity of the

consent decree." Id. Nevertheless, the district court ruled

that, "[t]hough [it] ha[d] rejected the Sheriff's request to

double-bunk, . . . it does not follow that no acceptable

alternative could be fashioned for a modified use of the

Nashua Street facility in a way that would meet the

7. The third motion was a "motion of the Sheriff to modify
the consent decree to hold up to forty Suffolk County female
pretrial detainees at the Suffolk County House of Correction
at South Bay, Boston, Massachusetts." Rufo, 148 F.R.D. at

15.

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objectives of the consent decree, including protection

against abuse and undue risk of contagion." Id. Therefore,

the district court did "not foreclose consideration of

another proposal submitted promptly, with evidentiary support

that justifies a finding that it is suitably tailored to

changes in circumstances, beyond the control of the

defendants after due effort, from the circumstances existing

when the decree was entered (or from circumstances existing

when it was modified)." Id. The Sheriff appealed from the

district court's denial of his two motions, but agreed to

stay his appeal pending further proceedings on a new motion

to modify filed in the district court. We were told at

argument that proceedings regarding this motion are in

progress in the district court.

In explaining its denial of the Commissioner's

separate motion to vacate the consent decree, the district

court began by stating that the Commissioner did not support

the Sheriff's proposal for modification because the

Commissioner felt that "the plan would require unnecessary

judicial involvement in the day-to-day administration of the

jail." Id. at 23. The district court noted that the

Commissioner objected to being forced by orders in this case

to accept from the Sheriff the overflow from the Nashua

Street Jail. The district court went on to say:

Rather than submitting his own plan
for modification, . . . the Commissioner

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challenges the consent decree and this
court's jurisdiction over the case,
arguing that it is no longer equitable
for the consent decree to have
prospective effect. . . .

* * *

The Commissioner's proposed way of
avoiding undue involvement of the court
in day-to-day implementation of the
consent decree is an unacceptable
extreme simply let the Sheriff have
unfettered discretion to order double-
bunking without any constraints or
limitations as to criteria regarding
associated conditions of confinement.
The Commissioner contends not only that
the court should not require that single-
bunking be maintained but also that the
court should not require that any other
safeguards be instituted in lieu of
single-bunking to carry out the
objectives of the decree as fashioned by
consent. This hard-line approach is
plainly incompatible with this court's
obligation, under the order of remand, to
consider whether any proposed
modification of the consent decree is
suitably tailored to changed
circumstances. The Commissioner of
Corrections' position must be rejected.
His motion, accordingly, is denied.

Id.

II.

On appeal, the Commissioner argues that the

district court applied the wrong legal standard when ruling

on his motion to vacate the consent decree. The Commissioner

asserts that the district court mistakenly applied the

Supreme Court's Rufo standard, which he says relates only to

motions to modify, not to vacate, institutional reform

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consent decrees. According to the Commissioner, a district

court that rules upon a motion to vacate an institutional

reform consent decree must consider only whether the

defendants are in present compliance with constitutional

requirements and whether the effects of the original

violation have abated. Maintaining that these conditions

have been met, the Commissioner contends that the district

court erred in refusing to vacate the decree, and he seeks a

remand so that the court can reconsider the issue.

Although we agree with the Commissioner that

motions to vacate consent decrees and motions to modify them

involve somewhat different analytical frameworks, we find the

Commissioner's proposed standard inadequate. We also think

that, whatever the weaknesses of its stated rationale, the

lower court properly declined to vacate the consent decree

under the present circumstances and at the present time.

III.

As an initial matter, "[w]e note that [describing]

the appropriate legal standard [to be applied by district

courts to motions to vacate institutional reform consent

decrees] presents a pure question of law, subject to de novo

review." Societe des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa

Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 642 n.9 (1st Cir. 1992); see,

e.g., Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir.

1992). Moreover, even should we find that the district court

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applied an incorrect legal standard to the Commissioner's

motion to vacate the consent decree, we may, in appropriate

circumstances, affirm the district court's denial of the

Commissioner's motion if we are satisfied that the district

court's decision was correct. See, e.g., Knight v. Mills,

836 F.2d 659, 661 n.3 (1st Cir. 1987) ("It is proper for an

appellate court to affirm a correct decision of a lower court

even when that decision is based on an inappropriate ground."

(emphasis in original)). In determining the propriety of the

district court's decision, we may affirm on any independently

sufficient ground supported by the record, see Willhauck v.

Halpin, 953 F.2d 689, 704 (1st Cir. 1991), and we review the

district court's resolution of mixed questions of law and

fact under a clearly erroneous standard, United States v.

Rule Indus., 878 F.2d 535, 542 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989).

IV.

In Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 111

S. Ct. 630, 112 L. Ed. 2d 715 (1991), and more recently in

Freeman v. Pitts, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 1430, 118 L. Ed.

2d 108 (1992), the United States Supreme Court described the

standard for district courts to apply when deciding whether

to dissolve injunctive orders previously entered in school

desegregation cases. While the desegregation cases have a

special history and context all their own, many of the same

considerations would appear to be relevant to other types of

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institutional reform litigation. This circuit has cited to

Dowell's principles in cases involving consent decrees

pertaining to conditions at correctional facilities and to

the treatment of mentally ill or retarded persons. See,

e.g., In re Pearson, 990 F.2d 653 (1st Cir. 1993) (petitioner

sought writ of mandamus to halt the district court's efforts

to evaluate, by the appointment of a special master, the

continuing need for, or the possible modification of, consent

decrees affecting the operation of a state institution, the

Massachusetts Treatment Center for Sexually Dangerous

Persons); Consumer Advisory Bd. v. Glover, 989 F.2d 65 (1st

Cir. 1993) (Consumer Advisory Board and a group of residents

and outpatients of Pineland Center, a state institution for

the mentally retarded, brought action on behalf of Center

residents and outpatients against the Commissioner of Mental

Health and other state officials, seeking enforcement of

rights created under a 1978 consent decree).

In Dowell, the Supreme Court stated that

desegregation decrees should not exist forever. See Dowell,

498 U.S. at 248 ("[I]njunctions entered in school

desegregation cases . . . are not intended to operate in

perpetuity."). This circuit has invoked this principle in

other kinds of institutional reform cases. See Pearson, 990

F.2d at 658 ("In institutional reform litigation, injunctions

should not operate inviolate in perpetuity."); Glover, 989

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F.2d at 68 ("[I]nstitutional reform decrees need not endure

forever."). In all types of institutional reform litigation,

federalism concerns dictate that any "intrusion by a federal

court into the affairs of local government should be kept to

a bare minimum and not be allowed to continue after the

violation has abated and its pernicious effects have been

cured." Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d 1273, 1276 (1st

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1043, 122 L. Ed. 2d 352

(1993).

In Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247, 249-50, as supplemented

by Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446, the Supreme Court indicated

that there are two conditions that must be met before a

district court is essentially obliged to terminate a

litigated decree and return the institution or programs under

court supervision to the governance of state or local

authorities.

First, the district court must determine that the underlying

constitutional wrong has been remedied, either fully or to

the full extent now deemed practicable. See Dowell, 498 U.S.

at 247, 249-50; Glover, 989 F.2d at 69. Second, there must

be a determination that the authorities have complied with

the decree in good faith for a reasonable period of time

since it was entered. See Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446;

Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50.

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Implicit in these requirements is the need for the

district court, before terminating the decree entirely, to be

satisfied that there is relatively little or no likelihood

that the original constitutional violation will promptly be

repeated when the decree is lifted. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at

247 ("[A] finding . . . that the Oklahoma City School

District was being operated in compliance with the commands

of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

and that it was unlikely that the Board would return to its

former ways, would be a finding that the purposes of the

desegregation litigation had been fully achieved." (emphasis

added)). Whether authorities are likely to return to former

ways once the decree is dissolved may be assessed by

considering "[t]he defendants' past record of compliance and

their present attitudes toward the reforms mandated by the

decree." Lloyd C. Anderson, Release and Resumption of

Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees in Structural Reform

Litigation, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 401, 411 (1987) (citing

Morgan v. McDonough, 689 F.2d 265, 280 (1st Cir. 1982)). Of

possible further relevance is the way that demographic,

economic, and political forces may be expected to influence

local authorities and the institution once the shelter of the

decree has been lost.

Obviously, there can be no perfect certainty that

the original constitutional violation will not be repeated.

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No one can demand such an assurance too far into the future.

But it would be a travesty of the two requirements just

stated that the violation be eliminated and that the

officials have shown their commitment to obey the law if a

decree could be terminated in the face of substantial

evidence that the same underlying violation would then be

resumed.

These general statements leave many questions

unanswered. One, as already mentioned, is the extent to

which they can be extended from the school desegregation

cases, in which the statements were made, to all other

institutional reform decrees including those involving

prisons. Our tentative view, as said, is that they probably

can be so extended, although the point need not be decided

definitively. Another question, perhaps more perplexing, is

whether there ought to be any difference in treatment between

a litigated decree and a consent decree when it comes to

standards for termination; arguments can be made on both

sides and, again, we need not definitely resolve the

question. Finally, there is the question of whether and to

what extent the "extra" remedial protections of the decree,

at least if embodied in a bargained-for consent decree, ought

to remain relevant when the underlying federal violations

have entirely ceased and are not likely to recur. As with

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the others, there are plausible arguments on both sides of

this question.8

We see no need, however, to resolve these issues at

this time. For purposes of the present appeal, it is enough

to assume arguendo that the proper standard for decree

termination is the one most favorable to the Commissioner

that we can imagine being adopted by the Supreme Court. On

this view of the law, the Commissioner would arguably be

entitled to termination of the decree if the Commissioner

could show: that the federal violations of the type that

provoked the original action have been entirely remedied or

remedied to the full extent feasible;9 that a reasonable

8. The plaintiffs, for instance, argue that the purposes and
requirements of the consent decree continue to deserve weight

even if it is assumed that a defendant has come into
compliance with the bedrock obligations imposed by the
Constitution. Thus, the plaintiffs would argue that the
Commissioner's and the Sheriff's announced intention to
abandon single-celling a requirement of the consent decree
but not necessarily of the Constitution is enough to
demonstrate that the time is not yet ripe to vacate the
decree. The Supreme Court's decision in Rufo itself lends

some support to the plaintiffs' position in this regard,
where the issue before the court was the proposed
modification of a consent decree, a proposal that may well be

made even when the ongoing constitutional violations have not
been entirely extirpated. See Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 762-64.

9. The Commissioner asserts, and there appears to be no
dispute, that the Nashua Street Jail, constructed in
accordance with the decree, presently meets constitutional
standards and has done so since it opened in May of 1990.
The district court found that "[t]he Nashua Street [J]ail is
a modern, seven-story structure of steel, concrete, and brick
construction. It provides conditions of confinement far
superior to those at the former Charles Street Jail, which
had been determined to be below constitutionally mandated

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period of time has passed during which such compliance has

been achieved;10 and that it is unlikely that the original

violations will soon be resumed if the decree were

discontinued. Under this standard (a view we neither adopt

nor reject), the Commissioner on this record has not made a

showing adequate to oblige the district court to terminate

the decree.

Unlike the standard just described, the

Commissioner's proposed formula for vacating the consent

decree which we find too restrictive by any measure

assumes that the district court is obliged to terminate

whenever the existing constitutional violation has ceased.

This approach gives insufficient weight to the problem of

recurrence. To the extent that recurrence is taken into

account, the Commissioner brushes the issue aside by

proclaiming that the Supreme Court has made clear that

double-celling is not a constitutional violation even for

pretrial detainees. There are a number of flaws in his

analysis.

We accept entirely the proposition, established by

the Supreme Court, that double-celling is not automatically

standards." Rufo, 148 F.R.D. at 17.

10. The consent decree was entered in 1979, and was modified
in 1985. The Commissioner's motion to vacate was filed in
April of 1992, nearly two years after the Nashua Street Jail
was opened to receive prisoners.

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unconstitutional for pretrial detainees. See Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337 (1981) (similarly as to convicted prisoners). But

this is a far cry from the implicit position of the

Commissioner that whatever double-celling may be contemplated

by the Sheriff in the foreseeable future at the Nashua Street

Jail is therefore clearly constitutional. We may assume that

the housing of two detainees in a cell providing a large

amount of space, with appropriate security measures to

protect against inmate assaults, would be constitutional; but

we think it obviously apparent that double-celling in very

small quarters, with lack of security against assaults, and

possibly other threats (e.g., disease) could violate due

process. And it is far from clear on the record before us

that the immediate plans proposed by the Sheriff are

constitutional, let alone any prospective next steps that

might follow from the complete vacation of the consent

decree.

Looking only to the immediate future, we have here

a prison facility that was expressly constructed under the

consent decree on the assumption that it would house only one

detainee per room unit. The size and security arrangements

were specifically designed with that in mind, and certain of

the "amenities," such as the use of a solid door with the

small peep hold instead of bars, may increase the risk that

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assaults on inmates would go undetected (double-celling

resumed). Moreover, the rooms just meet the minima for

single occupancy that are recommended by standard setting

agencies.11 The district court also made findings that the

risk of tuberculosis spreading in these close quarters, if

double-celling were permitted, is a factor of importance.

This is not to say that the Sheriff's double-celling plans

for the Nashua Street Jail, or others that are proposed, may

not yet be found constitutional. We say merely that whether

they will be constitutional remains currently undecided

and the answer is pivotal to whether vacating the decree will

result in a recurrence of unconstitutional conditions, given

that both the Commissioner and Sheriff are committed to

double-celling unless otherwise ordered.

Other longer term prospects of vacating the decree

also give us pause. Even if the district court were to find

that modification of the decree to accept the Sheriff's

11. The court below found that:

The present cells in the Nashua Street Jail
were explicitly designed for single-bunking. They
are slightly smaller in area than the cells in the
old Charles Street facility. The contemporaneous
views of expert consultants who participated in
recommendations for design of the Nashua Street
facility were that cells of this size were
acceptable only because they were meant for single
occupancy.

Rufo, 148 R.F.D. at 21; see also Rufo, 112 S. Ct. at 755 n.3

(listing state and national design standards).

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proposed double-celling arrangements in certain cells

satisfies constitutional minimums, it is by no means clear

that the district court would also find that there is no

likelihood that unconstitutional crowding would occur if the

decree were entirely terminated. As we have said, even on

the reading of the law that we think most favorable to the

Commissioner, the district court would hardly be obliged to

terminate the decree if it had substantial reason to fear

that the constitutional conditions would be recreated soon

after judicial oversight had been eliminated.

It is a notorious fact that prisons are now

desperately crowded and that the willingness of legislatures

to fund new prison construction is limited by competing

social needs and public resistance to increased taxes.

Without knowing far more than this record reveals about the

likelihood that the Sheriff would be in a position to resist

such unconstitutional overcrowding, it is hardly possible to

make a clear determination that the Dowell standard could be

satisfied in this case.

One further consideration bears on our sense that

the district court was entitled, at this stage, not to order

termination of the decree. The district court did not wholly

foreclose the possibility of double-celling; to the contrary,

it invited the Sheriff, who is not a party to this appeal, to

make a further showing with respect to his own double-celling

-20-

plans and alternatives to them. The Sheriff has made clear

that he intends to do so.12 It appears certain that in

such a proceeding further light would be cast on the impact

of the Sheriff's proposal on the lives and conditions of the

detainees.

It seems to us that, where the constitutional

status of the proposal is uncertain, the district court could

reasonably consider first the lesser remedy of decree

modification before definitively deciding whether the decree

should be irreversibly terminated. A decision by the

district court to allow some double-celling might satisfy the

Commissioner despite his doctrinal objections to continued

court supervision; but far more important, the district court

could conclude on a more careful look at the Sheriff's

embellished proposal that it would produce

unconstitutional conditions, a conclusion that would provide

an a fortiori basis for refusing to terminate the decree.

After all, if the Sheriff by his own admission is planning to

introduce changes that the district court finds recreate the

unconstitutional crowding violation, then one can hardly say

that future violations are unlikely.

12. The Commissioner is involved in this litigation not
because he manages the Nashua Street Jail (that is the
Sheriff's responsibility), but because he must assist the
Sheriff in lodging surplus pretrial detainees who cannot be
accommodated at the Nashua Street Jail. See Inmates of the

Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.

1974).

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We recognize that the district court's reasons for

refusing to terminate may be based on a reading of a

governing law that is quite different from the arguendo

position we have described as the most favorable that the

Commissioner could achieve. It could have been the district

court's view that the termination was improper merely because

it would frustrate an important object of the original decree

single-celling or because the kind of considerations

pertinent to decree modification (e.g., exploration of other

alternatives, financial stringency) have not been shown to

favor the Commissioner. Still, we see no reason to grapple

either with these matters or with related unsettled questions

of governing law where, as here, the immediate outcome in the

ongoing case appears to us correct and the issues that we

leave to another day are difficult ones not clearly settled

by Supreme Court precedent.

Accordingly, whatever the district court may have

intended, our affirmance of the court's refusal to terminate

rests upon and is limited to the grounds we have just

discussed: first, the absence of an adequate record to

justify a complete decree termination at this time; and,

second, the prospect of further proceedings in which

additional light may be shed, not only on the basis for

decree modification but also on issues that would clearly

bear upon the decree's termination. On this basis, and with

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these clarifications, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

So ordered.

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