Plaintiff in error moves to reinstate this case, which was dismissed as brought into Court too late. The affidavits show that the bill of exceptions, which was signed under a mandamus from this Court, was delayed, in its final settlement, at the request of the counsel for defendant in error. There was no laches in plaintiff in error, or his counsel, up to the time of signing the bill of exceptions. The Avrit was issued and served Avithin a year from that time, but more than two years after judgment.
We think there can be no doubt that the statute bar commences running from the rendition of judgment: — Fleet v. Youngs, 11 Wend. 522; Lee v. Tillotson, 4 Hill, 27; Manhattan Co. v. Osgood, 1 Cow. 65. The exceptions do not operate upon the judgment in any way, until steps are taken to remove the cause for review. And we do not well see how any saving clause can be introduced into the statute, which is not within the fair meaning of its language.
The question then arises, whether a party is bound to wait for the sealing of a bill of exceptions before he issues his writ of error. It is said by Mr. Tidd (2 Tidd's Pr. 863) that by bringing a writ of error before the bill is signed, it is waived. For this he cites Ditton v. Parker, 1 Bing. 17; S. C. 11 Price, 100. The report in Bingham sustains this view,' but the report in Price is more full, and it there appears that while Wood L. took this view, Parke and Burrough, JJ. placed their decision upon a different ground. The case was an application to the Court of Exchequer Chamber to compel the defendant in error to settle a bill of exceptions, .so that the Judge who tried the cause might seal it, and also for an order directing the transcript to be amended by annexing the bill of exceptions when it should be completed. The majority put their decision upon the ground
In Willans v. Taylor, the counsel for the plaintiff in error, in order to show that the Court in Dillon v. Parker could not have held a writ of error to be a waiver of exceptions, referred to the almost uniform practice that has always prevailed, of issuing writs of error before judgment is entered (and therefore before exceptions are ever in fact settled), in order to prevent execution. Mr. Tidd recognizes this as the usual practice: — 2 Tidd’s Pr. 1141; see also Arnold v. Sandford, 14 Johns. 417; Richardson v. Backus, 1 Johns. 493.
It is a very common practice to allow parties in error to supply deficiencies in the record, and to apply to the Court below to have the record corrected. In the case of
Our statute also plainly contemplates that the proper steps may be had to compel the signing of a bill of exceptions by the Judge who tried the cause, without reference to the issuing of a writ of error:— Comp. L. § 4406. But we conceive the rule very clearly settled by the authorities referred to. _ The Supreme j Court will
The question involved in this motion came up in Brown v. Bissell, 1 Doug. Mich. 273, where it was held by this Court, under our former statutes, that a bill of exceptions signed after error brought was at most merely irregular; and the English cases in 6 Bingham, and 2 Barn. & Ad. were cited as showing that such a bill was good. We have [thought it our duty to examine into the matter somewhat at length, as the counsel for plaintiff in error has been misled by the doctrine laid down by Mr. Tidd, into a mistake which, as the facts appear to us, we regret exceedingly that we are not able to rectify. As the statutory bar is complete, we are compelled to decline to reinstate tbe case. The equities being very plainly with the plaintiff in error, we deny his motion without costs.