[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 27, 2005
No. 03-15902
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 96-07266-CV-DTKH
TERRY M. JAMERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 27, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, PRYOR and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
The sole issue in this appeal is whether Terry M. Jamerson is entitled to
federal habeas relief because a Florida trial court allegedly instructed the jury that
it could find Jamerson guilty as an accomplice to second-degree murder if the jury
found Jamerson guilty of any lesser-included offense. Because the jury
instructions, in the context of the entire charge, fairly and correctly stated the law
of Florida, we conclude, under the highly deferential standard of habeas review,
that Jamerson was not denied due process. We affirm the denial of habeas relief.
I. BACKGROUND
Jamerson’s conviction arises from the 1992 murder of Luyen Nguyen, a 19-
year-old student of Vietnamese descent, who was beaten to death by a group of
drunken young men. According to testimony at Jamerson’s trial, Nguyen and two
friends, Jeff Sintay and Ryan Guerra, attended a party in Coral Springs, Florida on
August 15, 1992. The three left the party after 45 minutes. Sintay testified that, as
they were leaving the apartment where the party was held, Sintay overheard
several derogatory remarks directed at Nguyen. Those remarks included the racial
slurs “chink” and “Vietcong.”
Sintay told Nguyen about the epithets. Nguyen said that he wanted to return
to the party to “talk” about the insults. Concerned about “the type of element” at
the party, Sintay convinced Nguyen not to return to the party.
On the sidewalk outside the apartment building, Sintay, Guerra, and Nguyen
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encountered Bradley Mills, who had also attended the party. Nguyen asked Mills
about the comments made at the party. Mills then called several partygoers
gathered on a balcony overlooking the sidewalk and said “this kid’s got a
problem.” Mills also called for “Chris” and “Jammer” to come down to the
sidewalk.
Sintay testified that several persons, including Jamerson, surrounded
Nguyen. An argument ensued, and Jamerson pushed Nguyen after another person
slapped Nguyen in the face. After Jamerson pushed Nguyen, members of the
group surrounding Nguyen struck him numerous times. Sintay testified that, after
the attack, Jamerson ran past Sintay and stated, “We got him good, but someone
got me good too.” Nguyen died from a blow to the head that broke his neck and
severed an artery.
Other witnesses corroborated Sintay’s testimony. David Michaelson
testified that he saw a group of persons “kicking and punching and jumping on”
Nguyen, and Jamerson was part of that group. John Russ testified that he heard a
“lot of yelling,” including the phrase “I hate Vietnamese.” Russ also testified that
he saw Jamerson and another person walking away from where Nguyen lay on the
ground after the beating. Mathew Metzger, who knew Jamerson and was a
resident of the apartment complex, testified that Jamerson came to his apartment
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that night, used Metzger’s telephone, and asked Metzger about the best way to
leave the apartment complex without being seen.
Jamerson and two others were charged with second-degree murder and tried
as principals in the first degree. At the close of evidence, the state trial court
instructed the jury on the elements of second-degree murder, along with the lesser-
included offenses of manslaughter, aggravated battery, and battery. The trial court
also instructed the jury regarding the Florida law of principals, which holds
accountable, as a principal in the first degree, any person who aids in the
commission of any criminal offense, regardless of whether that person was present
at the commission of the offense. Fla. Stat. § 777.011.
The trial court gave the Florida Standard Jury Instruction then in effect
regarding principal liability:
If two or more persons help each other commit a crime and the
Defendant is one of them, the Defendant is a principal and must be
treated as if he had done all of the things the other person or persons did
if the Defendant:
Number one, knew what was going to happen.
And, number two, intended to participate actively or by sharing
in an expected benefit.
And, number three, actually did something by which he intended
to help commit the crime.
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Help means to aid, plan or assist.
To be a principal, the Defendant does not have to be present when
the crime is committed.
During deliberations, the jury asked the trial court the following question:
“Regarding the principals clause in number one, ‘knew what was going to
happen,’ do we interpret this to mean death/serious bodily injury or fight?” After
extensive argument, and over the objections of defense co-counsel, the trial court
answered that the liability of a principal applied to each criminal charge:
Members of the jury, the law of principals applies to the main
accusation, second degree murder. It also applies to the lesser included
offenses of manslaughter, aggravated battery and battery.
In answer to your specific question, quote, knew what was going
to happen, unquote, that pertains to a criminal act. Knew what was
going to happen pertains to a criminal act.
The jury returned to its deliberations, but later asked a second question
about principal liability, which was accompanied by a diagram:
[I]f we have established that a specific crime was committed
between C and D, and there is a chart here for [the court], under the law
of principals, could anyone who committed a lesser related crime
between A and C be charged as a principal with the crime committed
between C and D?
Over the objections of defense co-counsel, the trial court told the jury to read the
earlier instructions again:
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With respect to this question, I would ask all of you to deliberate
further. Reread my instructions on the law. And since you have already
focused in on the law of principals, I would ask you to reread the law of
principals.
Hopefully, whatever facts you have established will be able to
answer this question under the law as I have already given it to you . .
..
You are free to revisit this specific question or a related question.
If you can answer this question from what I have just said, and if it
triggers some other type of related question, in short, take another hard
look at the instructions on the law.
If your question is a factual one, I can’t answer that. I have no
right to. If you feel that your question is purely a legal question in
which you are asking me to expand or amplify on either the law of
principals or some other legal concept, ask the question again.
The jury asked no additional questions and, after further deliberations,
found Jamerson guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court sentenced
Jamerson to 22 years in prison. Jamerson appealed.
On direct appeal, Jamerson argued that the trial court misstated the law in its
answers to the jury’s questions regarding the phrase “knew what was going to
happen.” Jamerson contended that the trial court instructed the jury that so long as
the jury found Jamerson guilty of any crime, it could convict him of second-degree
murder under the law of principals. The appellate court rejected this argument,
with one judge dissenting, and affirmed Jamerson’s conviction without a written
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opinion. Jamerson v. State, 677 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per
curiam). The dissenting judge contended that the answers given by the trial judge
“beg[ged] the question asked by the jury” and “could have potentially misled the
jury to believe that if a defendant knew any criminal act was going to happen, then
that defendant could be convicted of second-degree murder.” Id. at 1300
(Pariente, J., dissenting).
In October 1996, Jamerson filed in the Southern District of Florida a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under 28 U.S.C. section 2254. A magistrate
judge issued a report and recommendation that the petition be denied, and the
district court adopted that recommendation in December 1998. Jamerson appealed
to this Court, where we concluded that the district court did not apply the correct
standard to determine whether the alleged error deprived Jamerson of due process.
Jamerson v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., No. 00-15605, slip op. at 3 (11th Cir.
June 26, 2001) (per curiam). We stated that the proper standard was whether the
error had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s
verdict.” Id. at 2 (quoting California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5, 117 S. Ct. 337, 338
(1996)). We remanded the case for review under the correct standard and possible
review for harmless error:
[T]he district court is free to determine in the first instance
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whether the jury instruction and supplemental explanation in question
constituted federal constitutional error under the proper standard and, if
the court decides it did, then decide whether the error was harmless
under the proper standard. Or the court may initially determine if the
alleged error was harmless.
Id. at 4 (footnote omitted).
The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the petition
be denied. The magistrate judge stated that the jury instructions and later answers
to the jury’s questions, viewed as a whole, fairly and accurately stated the law.
The magistrate judge further recommended that, even if the instructions were
erroneous, the error was harmless. The magistrate judge noted that “the mere
possibility of jury confusion does not establish the substantial and injurious effect
on the jury’s verdict” that is required for habeas relief, and “consideration of the
jury instructions as a whole and the trial record” showed that the jury determined
Jamerson intended to participate in second-degree murder.
After the magistrate judge issued the report and recommendation, but before
the district court issued its ruling, Jamerson was released unconditionally from
custody. The district court ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of
mootness. After hearing from the parties, the district court concluded that, under
Minor v. Dugger, 864 F.2d 124, 127 (11th Cir. 1989), Jamerson’s petition was not
moot, because of the “possibility of collateral legal consequences” from
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Jamerson’s conviction. The district court then adopted the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied Jamerson’s petition. This
appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 701 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 934,
120 S. Ct. 336 (1999). Because Jamerson filed his petition after April 24, 1996,
this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA), which establishes a “highly deferential standard for reviewing state
court judgments,” Parker v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., 331 F.3d 764, 768 (11th
Cir. 2003), and “prevent[s] federal habeas ‘retrials’ . . . to ensure that state-court
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535
U.S. 685, 693, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2002). A federal court can grant habeas
relief from a state conviction in two circumstances: (1) where the state court
proceeding “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States”; or (2) where the state court proceeding
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
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2254(d); see also Diaz v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corrs., 402 F.3d 1136, 1141 (11th
Cir. 2005).
Federal habeas proceedings “are not forums in which to relitigate state
trials.” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S. Ct. 3383, 3392 (1983). The
writ of habeas corpus protects persons against “extreme malfunctions in the state
criminal justice systems,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n.5, 99 S. Ct.
2781, 2796 n.5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment), and habeas relief
has historically been limited “to those whom society has grievously wronged.”
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Because “[d]irect review is the principal avenue for
challenging a conviction,” and habeas proceedings are “secondary and limited,”
id. at 633, 113 S. Ct. at 1719, “an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal
will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment.” Id. at 634,
113 S. Ct. at 1720 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Federal habeas relief is unavailable “for errors of state law.” Estelle v.
McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers,
497 U.S. 764, 780, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990)). A jury instruction that “was
allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief,” id. at 71-72,
112 S. Ct. at 482, because federal habeas review “is limited to deciding whether a
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conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Id. at
68, 112 S. Ct. at 480. Unlike state appellate courts, federal courts on habeas
review are constrained to determine only whether the challenged instruction,
viewed in the context of both the entire charge and the trial record, “‘so infected
the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due process.’” Id. at 72, 112
S. Ct. at 482 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S. Ct. 396, 400-01
(1973)).
III. DISCUSSION
To resolve this appeal, we must review two issues. We first address our
jurisdiction and consider whether the unconditional discharge of Jamerson’s
sentence renders this appeal moot. We then consider whether the jury instructions
given by the trial court violated the federal guarantee of due process.
A. Jamerson’s Appeal is Not Moot.
Although Florida does not contend that Jamerson’s petition is moot based
on the unconditional discharge of his sentence, we must ensure that we have
jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Cuban Am. Bar Ass’n, Inc. v. Christopher, 43
F.3d 1412, 1422-23 (11th Cir. 1995). Section 2254, by its literal terms, applies to
persons “in custody,” but the Supreme Court has held that section 2254(a) is
satisfied so long as the petitioner is in custody when the petition is filed. Maleng
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v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 1925 (1989) (per curiam).
Completion of a criminal sentence does not render a petition for habeas relief
moot, because the ongoing collateral consequences of a wrongful conviction, such
as the possible enhancement of a later criminal sentence on the basis of the earlier
wrongful conviction, satisfy the case-or-controversy jurisdictional requirement of
Article III of the Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8, 118 S. Ct. 978,
983 (1998). The unconditional discharge of Jamerson’s sentence, therefore, does
not moot this appeal.
B. The Jury Instructions Did Not Violate Due Process.
Jamerson contends that the answers of the trial court to the jury’s questions
erroneously permitted the jury, in violation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.
Ct. 1068 (1970), to convict Jamerson of second-degree murder without a finding
of the required state of mind. Jamerson contends that the instructions incorrectly
stated that, if the jury found Jamerson guilty of any crime, the jury could find
Jamerson guilty of second-degree murder. We disagree. The instructions of the
trial court correctly stated the law and, therefore, did not deprive Jamerson of due
process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482.
Jamerson was prosecuted as a principal in the first degree. See Fla. Stat. §
777.011. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that to be guilty as a principal for
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a crime committed by another, the defendant “must intend that the crime be
committed and do some act to assist the other person in actually committing the
crime.” Staten v. State, 519 So. 2d 622, 624 (Fla. 1988). In other words, to be
liable as a principal for a criminal act, Jamerson must have intended that the crime
charged be committed.
We must consider together the instructions on each criminal charge and
principal liability in reviewing whether the later answers of the trial court to the
jury’s questions violated due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S.
Ct. at 482. It is undisputed that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the
elements of second-degree murder, including the required mental state, and the
trial court correctly instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses of
manslaughter, aggravated battery, and battery. It is also undisputed that the trial
court gave the standard jury instruction then in effect on the law of principals.
With those indisputably correct instructions in mind, we next consider the
questions of the jury and the answers provided by the trial court. Regarding the
phrase “knew what was going to happen” in the instruction about principal
liability, the jury asked “do we interpret this to mean death/serious bodily injury or
fight?” The trial court answered that “the law of principals applies to the main
accusation, second degree murder. It also applies to the lesser included offenses
13
of manslaughter, aggravated battery and battery. In answer to your specific
question, quote, knew what was going to happen, unquote, that pertains to a
criminal act.”
This answer to the jury’s question correctly stated the relevant law. The
trial court explained that the law of principals applied to all offenses the jury was
considering—second-degree murder, manslaughter, aggravated battery, and
battery—and correctly stated that “knew what was going to happen” pertained to
each of those criminal acts. By instructing the jury that “knew what was going to
happen” pertained to a criminal act, the trial court correctly answered the jury’s
question. This appeal is not even as close as Estelle v. McGuire, where the
Supreme Court held, on habeas review, that a deviation by a trial court from a
standard California jury instruction regarding evidence of a characteristic plan or
scheme did not violate due process. Id. at 71, 75, 112 S. Ct. at 481, 484. The
Court held that there was not a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury misused the
nonstandard instruction, because the instruction had to be read in the context of
the entire charge and the trial court gave a limiting instruction. Id. at 74-75, 112
S. Ct. 483-84.
Even if the answer of the trial court to the jury’s first question could have
been clearer, we may not judge it “in artificial isolation,” but must consider the
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jury instructions as a whole. Id. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482 (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S.
at 147, 94 S. Ct. at 400-01). Viewed in that context, the answer of the trial court
did not “so infect[] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due
process.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial court correctly
instructed the jury about the elements of each charge and stated that the jury had to
find Jamerson possessed a depraved mind to convict him of second-degree
murder: “Before you can find any Defendant guilty of second degree murder, the
State must prove . . . [that] there was an unlawful killing of Luyen Nguyen by an
act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of
human life.” In the standard jury instruction on principals, the jury was also
required to determine whether Jamerson “actually did something by which he
intended to help commit the crime.” That instruction did not say “help commit
any crime,” and the trial court did not say, in its answer to the jury’s first question,
that “knew what was going to happen” pertained to any crime.
In response to a follow-up question, the trial court instructed the jury to
review and consider all of the earlier instructions. The jury asked whether
“anyone who committed a lesser related crime between A and C [could] be
charged as a principal with the crime committed between C and D,” and the trial
court instructed the jury to “[r]eread my instructions on the law.” Because we
15
presume that juries follow instructions, Stevens v. Zant, 968 F.2d 1076, 1086
(11th Cir. 1992), we presume that the jury in Jamerson’s trial followed the
instructions on second-degree murder, lesser-included offenses, and the law of
principals, which, taken as a whole, correctly stated the law. The admonition of
the trial court to read again all of the earlier instructions reinforces our conclusion
that Jamerson was not denied due process.
We recognize that the trial court could have answered the jury’s questions in
greater detail, but the Constitution “entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not
a perfect one.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431,
1436 (1986). Our inquiry also is not whether the challenged instructions were
“undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned;” our inquiry is whether
the instructions “so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates
due process.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 72, 112 S. Ct. at 482 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Because the instructions fairly and correctly stated the
law, United States v. Russell, 717 F.2d 518, 521 (11th Cir. 1983), they did not
violate due process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because the trial court correctly stated the law in its answers to the
questions from the jury, Jamerson’s conviction did not violate due process. The
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ruling of the district court, therefore, is
AFFIRMED.
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