The libellants place their right of action in this cause upon the grounds that the transaction between them and Gilbert L. Moore, in relation to the outfit and supply of materials for building and equipping the schooner Goerniue, was a maritime contract concerning a foreign vessel and her employment, in navigation and commerce, and that a debt was thereby created which became by implication of law a lien upon the vessel, accompanying her wherever she went; or that by the local law of North Carolina, under which she was built, registered and owned, and where the supplies were used, the schooner was made subject to a lien for that debt, which, by the principles of the general maritime law, is enforceable in this court The position on the part of the claimants is, that this court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, in any aspect of the case under which it is presented by the pleadings and proofs, and the cases of Pratt v. Reed, 19 How. [60 U. S.] 359, and People's Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers [20 How. (61 U. S.) 393],1 are relied upon as having settled, by the solemn adjudications of the supreme court, the law definitely to that effect. In view of the magnitude of interests depending upon the general question in this district, and its importance practically in the every-day business dealings within the port between mechanics and material men, and ship-owners and masters, it is deemed desirable that this specific point should be made the prominent subject of consideration and decision: especially if those judgments of the supremo court have worked any change in the rules heretofore applied to this class of casos, and have diminished the securities formerly enforced in this court in behalf of that order of creditors.
In the first place, it is important to consider what were the special features in the case of Pratt v. Reed [supra] adjudged upon by the supreme court, and what character was affixed by that decision to- the contract or credit in regard to necessaries supplied a foreign vessel on a voyage, in order to give them a privilege or lien against the vessel. The steamboat Sultana was employed on the western lakes in the transportation of passengers and freight. She was enrolled and owned at Buffalo, and a debt was contracted at Erie, Pennsylvania, by her owner and master, for supplies of coal to her during the performance of a succession of trips, for a period of about two years. It was assumed by the court to have been necessary for the navigation of the vessel, that she should be furnished with coal on those occasions, although the proof on that head was held to be loose and indefinite. The li-bellant furnished her coal in that manner when demanded, from June, 1852, to May, 1854, and rendered a bill therefor, containing a running account of debits and credits. The owner of the boat usually navigated her as master, and was present when the supplies were furnished. When he was not present they were furnished at the request of the person in command. The answer denied that the supplies were furnished on the credit of the boat, and averred that they were furnished on the credit of the master. The court laid out of view the inadequacy of proof that the supply of coal was an actual necessity to the navigation of the vessel, within the admiralty rule, at the time it was supplied her, because of the more serious difficulty in the case of the libellant, in the entire absence of any proof to show that there was also a necessity at the time, of procuring the supplies, for a credit upon the vessel, which was asserted by the court to be as essential as that of the necessity of the article itself. “It seems to be supposed,” the court remarks, “that circumstances of less pressing necessity for supplies or repairs, and an implied hypothecation of the vessel to procure them, will satisfy the rule, than in case of a necessity sufficient to justify a loan of money on bottomry for the like purpose. We think this is a misapprehension.” The court proceeds to fortify the position of law taken by them on those facts, by reasoning against the sufficiency of the facts to authorize an implication of a lien in the case, and by an intimation strongly disfavoring the increase of maritime liens of this class, upon the lakes and rivers, as tending to perplex and embarrass business, rather than furnish facilities for carrying forward, and declaring that such liens should be strictly limited to the necessities of commerce which created them. The jurisdiction of the court over the question is one and the same when it concerns the business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different states and territories upon the lakes and navigable waters connecting the lakes, as is possessed and exercised in case the vessels are employed in navigation and commerce upon the high seas or tide-waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. Act Cong. Feb. 26, 1845 (5 Stat. 7261.
■The similitude, aud indeed identity, of the present case with that of Pratt v. Beed, in their leading features, appear thus to be nearly exact. In both instances the supplies and necessaries were obtained in ports of states foreign to those to which the vessels respectively belonged, and wore procured through the direct contract and orders of the owner, who also, in each ease, was master of the vessel at the time. In neither case was there any stipulation for direct payment of the purchase prices at the time of purchase, nor any terms of credit agreed upon between the parties. The decision in Pratt v. Reed. therefore, in no way rested upon a question of implied authority in a
People’s Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers was a case decided by the supreme court in December term, 1857 [20 How. (61 U. S.) 393.] 1 A vessel, owned in New Jersey, was built and supplied with materials in that state by the libellants, residents in New York, on credit, and without any express pledge of the vessel for the debt The propositions of law determined by the court, and the facts to which they are applied, are specifically stated by the judge who delivered the opinion of the court. “The only matter in controversy is (say the court) whether the district courts of the United States have jurisdiction to proceed in admiralty to enforce liens for labor and materials furnished in constructing vessels to be employed in the navigation of waters to which the admiralty jurisdiction extends.” “We have the simple case,” continues the judge, “whether these ship carpenters had a lien for work and materials that can be enforced in rem in admiralty.” “The question presented involves a contest between the state and federal government. The latter has no power or jurisdiction beyond what the constitution confers. The contest here is not so much between rival tribunals, as between distinct sovereignties claiming to exercise power over contracts, property, and personal franchises.” “What were meant in 1789 by ‘cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ must be meant now. What was reserved to the states to be regulated by their own institutions, cannot be rightfully infringed by the general government, either through its legislation or judiciary department.” “The contract (in the case) is simply for building the hull of a ship, and delivering it on the water. ‘She was constructed and delivered according t<5 the contract.’ ‘The admiralty jurisdiction is limited to contracts, claims, and services purely maritime, and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation.’ Judge Hopkinson, in 1781, declared, as respects ship-builders, that the practice of former times doth not justify the admiralty’s taking cognizance of their suits. ‘We feel warranted in saying that at no time since this has been an independent nation has such a practice been allowed.’ ” The judge adds: “It is proper, however, to notice the fact, that district courts have recognized the existence of admiralty jurisdiction in rem against a vessel to enforce a carpenter’s bill for work and materials in constructing it, in cases where a lien had been created by the local law of the state where the vessel was built. Thus far, however, in our judicial history, no case of the kind has been sanctioned by this court.” This ad
The latest decision of the supreme court upon a legal question within its jurisdiction settles for the government • of all inferior judicatories the practical meaning and force of the proposition so determined; and it is no part of the function of subordinate courts to adjudge, or even inquire whether such determination comports with, or subverts, antecedent judgments, of the same forum, upon similar questions. The last decision is, practically, the final one. Neither of the two cases last passed upon by the supreme court, in relation to implied liens in favor of material men and laborers; against American vessels in American ports, demanded the direct and broad answer to the inquiry whether those liens exist or can be enforced in the federal courts in any form, by virtue of the general maritime law; but the principles announced by the court, in those cases, render it quite palpable that scarcely another advance remains to be made in order to abrogate that remedy absolutely, and reinstate and restrict the admiralty powers of the judiciary in respect to those credits, in subordination to the rule of the common law as that was administered under the English jurisprudence, at the time of the adoption of the United States constitution. It is my province to accept and pursue the law as declared by the supreme court; and, in my opinion, the rule established by that tribunal, in those cases, determines that the claim put forth in this action, either for building or constructing, or outfitting or providing materials, supplies, labor, rigging, or ship-stores necessary to render this vessel sea-worthy, and fit for navigation at sea, is not within the jurisdiction of the court, and accordingly the libel must be dismissed with costs.
The amount in demand being sufficient to authorize an appeal of the case to the court of last-resort, I put the decision specifically upon the question of jurisdiction, that being directly involved, and being a point of high practical moment to the mercantile, manufacturing and shipping interests of the country, and shall forbear discussing those other features in the case bearing strongly against the adequacy of the pleadings and proofs to sustain the action in this form, if the cases of Pratt v. Reed [supra] and People’s Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers [supra] had interposed no legal impediment to the suit. Decree accordingly.
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[From 7 Am. Law Beg. 5.]
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[From 7 Am. Law Reg. 5.]