No. 82-396
I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MOFJTANA
H F F
1983
S. DENNIS THOP4PKINS, d/b/a
PYRAMID BUILDERS I
P l a i n t i f f s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,
DAVID FULLER, COb!lMISSIONER O THE
F
DEPARTMENT O L B R AND II\lDUSTRY,
F A O
STATE O MONTANA,
F
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lake, The H o n o r a b l e
James B . W h e e l i s , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
P a u l J . Van T r i c h t a r g u e d , Dept. of L a b o r , Heilena
Montana
For Respondents:
Thomas Hoover a r g u e d , Big F o r k , Montana
F o r Amicus C u r i a e :
J o s e p h PJ. Duffy a r g u e d , Great F a l l s , Montana
(Montana S t a t e Bldg. T r a d e s C o u n c i l )
submitted: A p r i l 21, 1983
Decided: J u l y 21, 1983
Filed: Jut 2 11983
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
The D e p a r t m e n t of Labor and I n d u s t r y a p p e a l s a d e c i s i o n of
the District Court of the Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of
Lake. This dispute deals with the amount of wages p a i d by a
building contractor to his employees on a s t a t e - f inanced
construction project. Essentially, t h i s case involves interpre-
t a t i o n of M o n t a n a ' s L i t t l e "Davis-Bacon Act ,I1 s e c t i o n s 18-2-401,
et. seq., MCA ( 1 9 7 9 ) , which r e q u i r e s c o n t r a c t o r s on p u b l i c pro-
jects to pay their employees " t h e standard prevailing r a t e of
wages . . . a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e county o r l o c a l i t y i n which the
work is being performed." Section 18-2-403(1), MCA, (1979).
I n i t i a l l y , w e note t h a t t h e 1979 s t a t u t e s a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s
case. W a f f i r m t h e judgment w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e a t t o r n e y ' s
e
fees.
In 1980 the University of Montana let contracts for the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of a r e s e a r c h l a b o r a t o r y a t Y e l l o w Bay on F l a t h e a d
Lake. The r e s p o n d e n t was a c c e p t e d a s t h e m e c h a n i c a l c o n t r a c t o r .
P r i o r t o t h i s time, r e s p o n d e n t was p r i m a r i l y i n v o l v e d i n res i d e n -
t i a l construction. The l a b o r a t o r y was h i s f i r s t c o n t r a c t w i t h a
governmental e n t i t y . The r e s p o n d e n t was n o t a s i g n a t o r y t o any
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreement, and a l l of h i s e m p l o y e e s were
nonunion.
The c o n t r a c t r e q u i r e d t h e r e s p o n d e n t t o a b i d e by t h e l a b o r
laws of t h e S t a t e of Montana; specifically, he was r e q u i r e d to
p a y h i s e m p l o y e e s t h e " s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e " (SPR) a p p l i c a b l e
t o t h e c o u n t y o r l o c a l i t y i n which t h e work was b e i n g p e r f o r m e d .
The c o n t r a c t l a n g u a g e was t a k e n from v a r i o u s p a r t s of M o n t a n a ' s
L i t t l e Davis-Bacon A c t . C o n c e r n i n g h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , he con-
t a c t e d a K a l i s p e l l a t t o r n e y who r e v i e w e d t h e c o n t r a c t . Nothing
was discussed concerning the SPR p r o v i s i o n . Respondent also
t a l k e d t o t h e p r o j e c t a r c h i t e c t and a c o n t r a c t o r f r i e n d who had
b e e n c o a c h i n g him. T h r o u g h t h e s e d i s c u s s i o n s he b e l i e v e d h i m s e l f
t o be i n f u l l c o m p l i a n c e w i t h Montana law.
Construction began and thereafter the State received a
c o m p l a i n t t h a t r e s p o n d e n t was n o t p a y i n g h i s e m p l o y e e s t h e SPR.
The c o m p l a i n t was made by t h e b u s i n e s s representative for the
c a r p e n t e r s u n i o n of N o r t h w e s t Montana. The u n i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
t e s t i f i e d i n p a r t a s follows:
"Q. Did you have a conversation with
Thompkins on t h i s project? A. Yes, I
e n c o u r a g e d him t o j o i n t h e U n i o n .
"Q. Did you e n c o u r a g e him t o j o i n t h e U n i o n ?
A. I did.
"Q. What d i d you t e l l him when he w o u l d n ' t
j o i n t h e U n i o n ? A. I s a i d I ' d have t o do my
j o b and w h a t e v e r was a v a i l a b l e t o m e t o t r y
and g e t him t o j o i n .
"Q. And what d i d you d o ? A. I r e p o r t e d it
t o t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Labor t h a t I d i d n ' t t h i n k
h e was p a y i n g p r e v a i l i n g wage. "
The S t a t e i n v e s t i g a t e d and c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t was
legitimate. Below is a chart showing the wages that were
a c t u a l l y paid by t h e r e s p o n d e n t and t h e wages which t h e S t a t e
c l a i m s s h o u l d have been p a i d a s t h e SPR.
WAGES ACTUALLY "STANDARD PREVAILING RATE"
EMPLOYEE JOB PAID AS DETERMINED BY THE STATE
Mar t o n c a r p e n t e r $9.00/hour Carpenters :
Becker c a r p e n t e r $9.00/hour 12.05/hour--5/1/79-4/30/80
Ryland c a r p e n t e r $8.00/hour 13.02/hour--5/1/80-4/30/81
Thompkins c a r p e n t e r $ll.OO/hour
Hale laborer $6.00/hour Laborers :
Raudebaugh carpenter/ salaried l o . 55/hour--7/1/79-6/30/80
superintendent 11,45/hour--7/1/80-6/30/81
The S t a t e c l a i m s t h a t i t c o n s i d e r e d t h r e e s o u r c e s of infor-
m a t i o n t o d e t e r m i n e t h e SPR: (1) wage r a t e i n f o r m a t i o n c o m p i l e d
by the Employment Security ~ i v i s i o n ; ( 2 ) Davis-Bacon rates
p u b l i s h e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t of L a b o r ; and ( 3 ) l o c a l
c o l l e c t i v e bargaining agreements. However, t h e r a t e s e s t a b l i s h e d
b y t h e S t a t e were t a k e n v e r b a t i m from number three, collective
b a r g a i n i n g agreements. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e S t a t e , t h e r e was l i t t l e
variation between the three sources, and i n such c a s e s it h a s
b e e n t h e p o l i c y t o a d o p t r a t e s from t h e b a r g a i n i n g agreements.
The r e s p o n d e n t commenced t h i s a c t i o n by s e e k i n g a d e c l a r a t o r y
judgment i n the D i s t r i c t Court. The S t a t e f i l e d an answer and
counterclaim praying for an order requiring Thompkins to pay
p a s t due wages and p e n a l t i e s and a t t o r n e y f e e s . Thompkins s o u g h t
summary judgment b u t h i s m o t i o n was d e n i e d . A n o n j u r y t r i a l was
h e l d a f t e r which t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e n t e r e d judgment i n f a v o r of
the p l a i n t i f f/contr actor. The Commissioner Labor and I n d u s t r y
then appealed.
The a p p e l l a n t h a s r a i s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s : (1) whether
the District Court erred by not adopting the commissioner's
d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the standard prevailing rate; ( 2 ) whether the
District Court erred in its interpretation of the statutory
phrase "work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r ; " ( 3 ) whether t h e admission
of h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e was r e v e r s i b l e error; and ( 4 ) whether the
award of attorney fees to respondent was proper. W address
e
these issues i n turn.
Appellant's first issue is raised in response to the
f o l l o w i n g comment by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t :
"Defendant [ a p p e l l a n t ] argues t h a t o n l y t h e
Commissioner of t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Labor and
Industry has the authority t o determine the
p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages i n a g i v e n a r e a .
D e f e n d a n t i g n o r e s t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e
statute: 'The Montana Commissioner may deter-
mine . . . ' M.C.A. 518-2-402(1979) . . .
B e c a u s e t h e power t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p r e v a i l i n g
r a t e of wages i s n o t e x c l u s i v e l y t h a t of t h e
C o m m i s s i o n e r , t h a t power, a t t h e time t h e p a r -
t i e s entered into the contract i n question,
rested a l s o with the p l a i n t i f f , subject to the
s t a n d a r d s s e t o u t i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w s . The
i s s u e , t h e n , on which p l a i n t i f f ' s r e q u e s t f o r
d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t u r n s , i s w h e t h e r p l a i n -
t i f f r a t h e r t h a n t h e d e f e n d a n t h a s made t h e
p r o p e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of what t h e i r c o n t r a c t
term ' s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages' a s
d e f i n e d i n M.C.A. S 18-2-401 ( a ) ( 1 9 7 9 ) means.
The i s s u e , c o n t r a r y t o d e f e n d a n t ' s p o s i t i o n ,
i s n o t w h e t h e r and under what s t a n d a r d s t h i s
C o u r t may r e v i e w a d e c i s i o n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n
o f an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c y .
"Plaintiff's request for a declaratory
judgment would be a r e q u e s t f o r a r e v i e w of a
d e c i s i o n o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
a g e n c y i f i n f a c t t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r of l a b o r
had d e t e r m i n e d t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of
wages f o r t h e j o b c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s i n q u e s t i o n .
B u t t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r d i d n o t make t h e d e t e r -
m i n a t i o n he was a u t h o r i z e d t o make u n d e r M.C.A.
5 18-2-402(1)(1979)."
The D i s t r i c t Court o b v i o u s l y viewed t h e problem a s o n e of
contract interpretation. Here, t h e c o n t r a c t required t h e respon-
dent t o pay his employees t h e SPR y e t t h e r e were no specific
hourly rates contained in the contract. The c o u r t f o c u s e d on
whether respondent, a s a contracting party, properly interpreted
t h e c o n t r a c t term " s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e ."
The a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t : ( 1 ) i t d i d make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n
of the SPR and its determination should have been granted
d e f e r e n c e by t h e c o u r t , and ( 2 ) t h e r e s p o n d e n t d i d n o t have t h e
s t a t u t o r y power to determine the r a t e . T h a t power r e s t s e x c l u -
s i v e l y with the appellant.
W agree with a p p e l l a n t ' s
e second p o i n t ; t h e r e s p o n d e n t was
n o t empowered by s e c t i o n 1 8 - 2 - 4 0 2 ( 1 ) , MCA, (1979), t o determine
t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages. The s t a t u t e i n q u e s t i o n
stated: " [ t ] h e Montana c o m m i s s i o n e r of l a b o r may d e t e r m i n e t h e
standard prevailing r a t e of wages i n the county o r l o c a l i t y in
which the contract i s t o be p e r f o r m e d . " Section 18-2-402(1),
MCA, (1979). The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n c o r r e c t l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t s i n c e
the power is permissive in that the "commissioner . . . may
determine the . . . rate," it must a l s o be n o n e x c l u s i v e .
A judge's task i n c o n s t r u i n g s t a t u t e s is "simply t o a s c e r t a i n
and d e c l a r e what i s i n t e r m s o r i n s u b s t a n c e c o n t a i n e d t h e r e i n ,
n o t t o i n s e r t what h a s been o m i t t e d . . ." S e c t i o n 1-2-101, MCA.
The court clearly violated this principle. The statute says
nothing about being nonexclusive. On t h e c o n t r a r y , the history
o f t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n would i n d i c a t e o t h e r w i s e .
The o r i g i n a l v e r s i o n of M o n t a n a ' s L i t t l e Davis-Bacon A c t was
e n a c t e d i n 1931. S i n c e t h e n i t h a s been amended s e v e r a l times.
M o n t a n a ' s A c t i s a n a l o g o u s t o t h e F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon A c t which
was a l s o e n a c t e d i n 1931. T h i s kind of l e g i s l a t i o n h a s a s o n e of
i t s p u r p o s e s t h e p r o t e c t i o n of l o c a l l a b o r m a r k e t s . The a c t p r e -
v e n t s c o n t r a c t o r s from i m p o r t i n g c h e a p l a b o r t o t h e d e t r i m e n t of
l o c a l workers. T h i s p u r p o s e i s a c h i e v e d by r e q u i r i n g c o n t r a c t o r s
t o p a y t h e r a t e of wages p r e v a i l i n g i n the locality. To a l l o w
potentially self-serving c o n t r a c t o r s t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r a t e would
defeat the legislative purpose. As t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme
Court noted i n a case construing the F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon Act:
" [ t ] h e l a n g u a g e of t h e A c t and i t s l e g i s l a t i v e
h i s t o r y p l a i n l y show t h a t it was n o t t o bene-
f i t contractors, but rather to protect t h e i r
e m p l o y e e s from s u b s t a n d a r d e a r n i n g s by f i x i n g
a f l o o r u n d e r wages on g o v e r n m e n t p r o j e c t s .
C o n g r e s s s o u g h t t o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s r e s u l t by
d i r e c t i n g t h e S e c r e t a r y of L a b o r t o d e t e r m i n e ,
o n t h e b a s i s of p r e v a i l i n g r a t e s i n t h e l o c a -
l i t y , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e minimum wages f o r e a c h
project." United States v. Binghamton
C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 5 4 ) , 347 U.S. 1 7 1 , 176-77.
74 S . C t . 4 3 8 , 98 L.Ed. 594.
W h o l d t h a t t h e a u t h o r i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e SPR r e s t s e x c l u -
e
s i v e l y w i t h t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r of l a b o r u n d e r t h e s t a t u t e . We also
c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was i n c o r r e c t i n allowing the
c o n t r a c t o r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e SPR i n t h e a b s e n c e of s u c h a d e t e r -
mination by the commissioner. While we agree with the
commissioner's contention t h a t the respondent d i d not have t h e
s t a t u t o r y power to determine the SPR, this conclusion by the
c o u r t is n o t r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e d r e a s o n s .
A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i t d i d make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e SPR
and t h a t i t s f i g u r e s s h o u l d have b e e n a c c e p t e d u n l e s s t h e y w e r e
shown t o be a r b i t r a r y o r c a p r i c i o u s .
Here, t h e c o u r t f o c u s e d on c o n t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s ; framing t h e
i s s u e a s w h e t h e r t h e r e s p o n d e n t made t h e p r o p e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e c o n t r a c t term " s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e . " I n o t h e r words,
t h e c o u r t reasoned t h a t the respondent, a s a contracting party
had the power to pay his employees at those rates which he
believed would meet the contract requirements. However, this
power i s n o t t h e same a s t h a t g r a n t e d t o t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r u n d e r
statute. The c o m m i s s i o n e r d e r i v e s h i s power from s t a t u t e , w h e r e a s
t h e r e s p o n d e n t d e r i v e s h i s power from t h e c o n t r a c t . The D i s t r i c t
Court confused t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n . T h i s is p r o b a b l y t h e r e a s o n t h e
court interpreted t h e s t a t u t e a s it d i d . Notwithstanding this
con£u s i o n , the District Court reached the conclusion.
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e e r r o r was h a r m l e s s .
Next, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t i t d i d make a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
t h e SPR and that its figures should have been a c c e p t e d unless
t h e y were shown t o be a r b i t r a r y o r c a p r i c i o u s . The f o c u s of t h i s
argument concerns the appropriate standard of review. The
District C o u r t would have b e e n o b l i g a t e d to affirm the agency
d e t e r m i n a t i o n even i f it found i t t o be an a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i -
cious standard of judicial review. State ex. rel. Montana
Wilderness Association v. Board of Natural Resources and
Conservation (1982), Mont. , 648 P.2d 7 3 4 , 39 S t . R e p .
1238. T h i s s t a n d a r d r e c o g n i z e s a g e n c y e x p e r t i s e and p r o h i b i t s a
c o u r t from s u b s t i t u t i n g i t s judgment f o r t h a t of a n a g e n c y . It
h a s been a r g u e d t h a t wage f i g u r e s of t h e Commissioner d i d n o t
exist at the time of contracting. Therefore, on this basis,
t h e r e was not an agency d e c i s i o n . W do n o t e n t i r e l y a g r e e .
e
The e v i d e n c e shows t h a t rates a r e not set for i n d i v i d u a l pro-
jects. The appellant determines prevailing rates each year
d u r i n g May o r J u n e . A c c o r d i n g t o a p p e l l a n t , when a c o n t r a c t i s
entered into, these r a t e s become a p p l i c a b l e and t h e c o n t r a c t o r
then has a duty t o c o n t a c t t h e department to f i n d o u t what he
s h o u l d pay h i s employees. A p p e l l a n t r e l i e s on t h i s p r a c t i c e t o
show an a g e n c y d e c i s i o n d e s e r v i n g of d e f e r e n c e . W cannot accept
e
this argument. W hold
e that even though the state's figures
e x i s t e d a t t h e time o f c o n t r a c t i n g , t h e i r mere e x i s t e n c e c a n n o t
b e h e l d t o c o n s t i t u t e an a g e n c y d e c i s i o n .
Under t h e b a s i c c o n t r a c t p r i n c i p l e s a p a r t y c a n n o t be bound
t o terms he is n o t a w a r e o f . T h e r e must be m e e t i n g of t h e minds
or mutual assent on all of the essential terms. Chadwick v.
Giberson (1980), Mont. , 618 P.2d 1 2 1 3 , 37 S t . R e p . 1723.
Here the contract stated: " [ t l h e standard prevailing r a t e of
wage, t h a t p a i d by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s i n t h e a r e a , m u s t be p a i d
for work performed. " The respondent, unexperienced i n public
works p r o j e c t s , read t h i s l a n g u a g e and c o n c l u d e d t h a t h i s wage
rates were within the range of rates prevailing in the area.
R e s p o n d e n t c a n n o t be h e l d t o payment of s p e c i f i c r a t e s t h a t d i d
n o t a p p e a r i n t h e c o n t r a c t of which he had no knowledge, b u t o n l y
existed somewhere w i t h i n the bureaucracy. W note
e that this
problem has been c o r r e c t e d by the l e g i s l a t u r e . The c u r r e n t law
r e q u i r e s a l l bid s p e c i f i c a t i o n s and c o n t r a c t s t o c o n t a i n the spe-
cific rates payable by contractors. Section 18-2-422, MCA,
(1981). W hold the D i s t r i c t Court did not e r r o r i n i t s r e f u s a l
e
t o adopt the commissioner ' s r a t e s .
The next i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t i s whether the D i s t r i c t
Court e r r e d i n i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the s t a t u t o r y p h r a s e , "work
of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r . "
The statute which contains the disputed phrase states:
" ' S t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n q -t e-of wages
ra . . .
a p p l i c a b l e t o the county or l o c a l i t y i n which
t h e work i s being performed,' means t h o s e
waqes which a r e paid i n the county or l o c a l i t y
- y o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s f o r work of 2 s i m i l a r
b
c h a r a c t e r performed i n t h a t county or l o c a l i t y
by each c r a f t , c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , or type of
worker . . ." ( emphasis added )
1 8 - 2 - 4 0 1 ( 5 ) ( a ) , MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) .
Section
A p p e l l a n t ' s argument i s somewhat confusing. A t one p l a c e i n
the b r i e f , a p p e l l a n t argues t h a t "work of a similar character"
r e f e r s t o s i m i l a r p u b l i c works p r o j e c t s . Furthermore, a t t r i a l ,
v a r i o u s w i t n e s s e s f o r the s t a t e t e s t i f i e d t h a t the phrase means
s i m i l a r p u b l i c works. Our problem is t h i s ; i n these i n s t a n c e s i t
appears that appellant is construing the statutory phrase to
i n c l u d e only p u b l i c works. However, i n another p o r t i o n of its
brief, appellant lists several public works and commercial
c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t s t h a t i t claims were of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r
t o the Yellow Bay P r o j e c t . For a n a l y s i s of t h i s i s s u e , w w i l l
e
assume that a p p e l l a n t does not d i s t i n g u i s h between public and
private projects. The statute makes no distinction in this
regard, nor should we. Therefore, a p p e l l a n t ' s argument can be
stated as follows: the s t a t u t o r y phrase "work of a similar
c h a r a c t e r " r e f e r s t o p r o j e c t s as a whole, e i t h e r p u b l i c or p r i -
vate, and not as the c o u r t found, t o the v a r i o u s components or
i n d i v i d u a l labor of p r o j e c t s .
If we were to accept appellant's definition, the statute
could be paraphrased as follows; " ' s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of
wages . . . means t h o s e wages . . . which a r e p a i d . . . b y o t h e r
c o n t r a c t o r s . . . [on s i m i l a r p r o j e c t s ] i n t h a t county o r loca-
l i t y . . ." A c c o r d i n g t o a p p e l l a n t , t h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l p u b l i c
and c o m m e r c i a l p r o j e c t s which were s i m i l a r . T h e s e i n c l u d e work
d o n e on t h e Ronan S c h o o l , t h e S a i n t I g n a t i u s Water Improvement
Project, a Polson industrial building, the Lake County
Courthouse, t h e B and B S t o r e i n P o l s o n , and Ready Mix C o n c r e t e
i n Polson. On t h e o t h e r hand, if the respondent's definition
were a c c e p t e d , the s t a t u t e would read: " 'standard prevailing
r a t e of wages . . . means t h o s e wages . . . which a r e paid ...
by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s . . . [ f o r s i m i l a r t y p e s of labor] i n that
c o u n t y o r l o c a l i t y . . ."
W agree with a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
e "Work of a s i m i l a r
c h a r a c t e r " r e f e r s t o p r o j e c t s a s a whole. Clearly, the federal
l a w and accompanying r e g u l a t i o n s h a v e f o c u s e d on t h e t y p e of pro-
j e c t r a t h e r t h a n t h e t y p e of i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r . However, w e n o t e
t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e F e d e r a l A c t is d i f f e r e n t . The a n a l o g o u s
federal provision states: "specifications for every contract
... s h a l l c o n t a i n a p r o v i s i o n s t a t i n g t h e minimum wages t o be
paid . . . b a s e d upon wages . . . p r e v a i l i n g . . . on projects
o f -a c h a r a c t e r s i m i l a r
- .. .I1 40 U.S.C. section 276(a), (1964).
The u s e of t h e word " p r o j e c t s " would c e r t a i n l y d i c t a t e t h e f o c u s
of the Federal A c t .
M o n t a n a ' s A c t u s e s t h e word "work" r a t h e r t h a n " p r o j e c t s . " A
reading of the A c t l e a d s us to the conclusion t h a t "work" is
synonomous w i t h " p r o j e c t s .I1 For example, s e c t i o n 18-2-403 ( l ) ,
MCA, ( 1 9 7 9 ) r e a d s :
" I n a n y c o n t r a c t l e t f o r s t a t e , c o u n t y , muni-
c i p a l , s c h o o l , o r h e a v y highway c o n s t r u c t i o n ,
s e r v i c e s , r e p a i r , o r m a i n t e n a n c e work . . .
t h e r e s h a l l be i n s e r t e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t a p r o -
vision requiring the contractor . . .
t o pay
t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages ...in
e f f e c t and a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e c o u n t y o r l o c a -
l i t y i n which t h e work i s b e i n g p e r f o r m e d . "
(emphasis added)
The word "work" r e f e r s t o " s t a t e , c o u n t y , m u n i c i p a l , school,
o r h e a v y highway c o n s t r u c t i o n , services, r e p a i r , o r maintenance
work." W f i n d t h e word "work" r e f e r s t o t h e e n t i r e p r o j e c t f o r
e
w h i c h t h e c o n t r a c t is l e t .
Another example is section 18-2-401 ( 5 ) ( b ) , MCA, (1981).
"When work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r i s n o t b e i n g p e r f o r m e d i n t h e
county or l o c a l i t y , t h e s t a n d a r d p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages ...
shall be those rates established by collective bargaining
agreements i n e f f e c t i n t h e county o r locality . . ." If the
foregoing section is to have any meaning, "work" must mean
"projects." If "work" r e f e r r e d t o i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r i t would be
d i f f i c u l t t o i m a g i n e any p u r p o s e f o r t h e r u l e . Where c o u l d o n e
f i n d a c o u n t y o r l o c a l i t y where a b s o l u t e l y no i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r is
being performed by c a r p e n t e r s , laborers, plumbers, o r whatever
the applicable trade, i n order f o r t h e r u l e t o apply. However,
c o u n t i e s o r l o c a l i t i e s c o u l d e a s i l y f a i l t o h a v e s i m i l a r on-going
p r o j e c t s s u c h a s highway c o n s t r u c t i o n .
W could
e imagine a s i t u a t i o n where l a b o r e r s a r e p e r f o r m i n g
t h e same k i n d s of t a s k s on d i f f e r e n t p r o j e c t s . For example, a
l a b o r e r w o r k i n g f o r a r e s i d e n t i a l c o n t r a c t o r c o u l d spend h i s t i m e
hauling bricks, as could a laborer working on a state office
building. The o n l y d i f f e r e n c e c o u l d be the r a t e of pay. The
former c o u l d be e a r n i n g $ 6 p e r hour w h i l e t h e l a t t e r c o u l d be
e a r n i n g $10 p e r h o u r ; t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n u n i o n and n o n u n i o n
wages. T h e n , i f t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r were r e q u i r e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e
p r e v a i l i n g r a t e f o r l a b o r e r s working on a s t a t e f i n a n c e d l a b o r a -
t o r y , b a s e d on r a t e s p a i d by c o n t r a c t o r s f o r i n d i v i d u a l l a b o r of
a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r , which r a t e would be a p p r o p r i a t e ? Should the
c o m m i s s i o n e r be o b l i g a t e d t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e l a b o r e r s
w o r k i n g on t h e l a b o r a t o r y w i l l be h a u l i n g b r i c k s ? W e think not.
It o n l y makes sense that "work of a similar character" cannot
refer t o individual labor. If the t o t a l project i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
i s u s e d i n t h e a b o v e e x a m p l e , t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r need o n l y d e t e r -
mine w h e t h e r t h e l a b o r a t o r y is more s i m i l a r t o an o f f i c e b u i l d i n g
o r a residence. W h i l e t h i s example is s i m p l i f i e d , i t i l l u s t r a t e s
t h e n e c e s s i t y of d e f i n i n g work of a similar character t o mean
similar projects. Appellant points out, and we agree, that
" [ t l h e Montana ' L i t t l e Davis-Bacon' A c t was d e s i g n e d to preserve
t h e e x i s t i n g wage p a t t e r n s i n t h e a r e a , t h e e x i s t i n g wage d i f -
f e r e n t i a l between commercial and r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n .'I
A l t h o u g h w e a g r e e w i t h a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "work of
a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " we do n o t f i n d e r r o r . W do r e c o g n i z e why
e
appellant raised the issue. A p p e l l a n t was prompted by a c u r i o u s
s t a t e m e n t made by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The c o u r t s t a t e d :
" t h i s c o u r t c a n o n l y c o n c l u d e t h a t work of
c a r p e n t e r s , l a b o r e r s and s u p e r i n t e n d e n t s i n
r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n i s of a s i m i l a r
c h a r a c t e r t o t h a t which p l a i n t i f f ' s employees
p e r f o r m e d on t h e Y e l l o w Bay P r o j e c t . T h a t i s ,
t h e s i m i l a r i t y is between t h e t y p e of l a b o r
i n v o l v e d and n o t t h e t y p e ( i . e . , g o v e r n m e n t o r
p r i v a t e ) of p r o j e c t i n v o l v e d . "
T h i s comment by t h e c o u r t i s an i n c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of
t h e phrase "work of a similar character ." We cannot understand
why t h e c o u r t made t h e s t a t e m e n t . The c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s of the
i s s u e and its previous statements are c l e a r l y contrary. This
s t a t e m e n t is n o t h i n g more t h a n v e r b i a g e , and c e r t a i n l y n o t of t h e
n a t u r e on which t o p r e d i c a t e e r r o r . What t h e t r i a l c o u r t s a i d ,
and what the court did, are two d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . From our
following discussion, i t is e v i d e n t t h a t what t h e c o u r t d i d was
proper.
Here, t h i s D i s t r i c t Court a s f a c t f i n d e r attached signifi-
c a n c e t o two k i n d s of e v i d e n c e . F i r s t was t h e t e s t i m o n y of James
Thompson, t h e p r o j e c t a r c h i t e c t . Thompson t e s t i f i e d a s f o l l o w s :
"Q. Would you e x p l a i n t h e n a t u r e of t h e
b u i l d i n g t h a t was b u i l t , J i m ? Whether it was
f r a m e , l o g , what kind of a b u i l d i n g was i t
t h a t we're t a l k i n g about here? A. I t was
basically a relatively simple structure,
c o n c r e t e b l o c k , e x t e r i o r w a l l s , open westbound
s t y l e j o i s t s w i t h a c o n c r e t e f l o o r poured o v e r
them f o r t h e f l o o r o v e r a c r a w l s p a c e . The
r o o f s t r u c t u r e was wood w i t h a m e t a l c o v e r i n g ,
t h e metal roof covering, t h e e x t e r i o r f i n i s h
o f t h e b u i l d i n g was a foam w i t h a t y p e of
s t u c c o f i n i s h over it.
"Q. Would you c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e j o b a s a t e c h -
n i c a l one o r a s i m p l e o n e ? A. I would s a y
t h e job was r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e and c o u l d be
b r o k e n down i n t o a s e r i e s of s u b c o n t r a c t s .
T h a t i t was a s e r i e s of s u b c o n t r a c t s t h a t made
it simple.
"Q. A l l r i g h t , would a c o n t r a c t o r w i t h s u f -
f i c i e n t experience t o build a residence or
a p a r t m e n t h o u s e h a v e t h e w o r k i n g knowledge t o
c o m p l e t e t h i s p r o j e c t . A. Most c e r t a i n l y .
"Q. V e r y w e l l , p u t t i n g up t h e b l o c k and
p u t t i n g up t h e s h e e t r o c k i n t h i s b u i l d i n g , i s
t h a t a n y d i f f e r e n t t h a n p u t t i n g up b l o c k o r
s h e e t r o c k i n a home o r i n a c o m m e r c i a l
b u i l d i n g ? A. No.
"Q. I t ' s o n e in the same. A. One in the
same. "
In view of the above-quoted evidence the court, in its
c o n c l u s i o n s of law, s t a t e d : " [ t l h e 'work of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r '
to be performed, . . . was residential type construction."
(emphasis added) In explaining t h i s conclusion, the court said:
" [ t l h e r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t t h e e m p l o y e e s whose wages a r e a t i s s u e
. . . were c a p a b l e of b u i l d i n g a r e s i d e n c e . J a m e s Thompson, the
p r o j e c t a r c h i t e c t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t g c o n t r a c t o r c a p a b l e of workinq
-
one r e s i d e n t i a l buildig - -
was a l s o qualified - perform
to t
&
contract . . ." (emphasis added)
S i n c e t h e Y e l l o w Bay p r o j e c t was much l i k e b u i l d i n g a resi-
dence, the court found important t h e evidence concerning rates
paid by residential contractors in Lake County. The Court
discussed the evidence a s follows:
"The o n l y e v i d e n c e on t h e r e c o r d r e g a r d i n g
w h e t h e r p l a i n t i f f [ p a i d p r e v a i l i n g wages] i s
t h a t i n t r o d u c e d by p l a i n t i f f . The f o l l o w i n g
i s p l a i n t i f f ' s summary of t h a t e v i d e n c e .
" ' T o make a n e f f o r t t o d e t e r m i n e what t h e p r e -
v a i l i n g wage i s i n Lake County t h e p l a i n t i f f
c a l l e d Mr. Doug S t a m , l o c a l manager of t h e
s t a t e job s e r v i c e o f f i c e . Introduced into
e v i d e n c e was a l i s t p r e p a r e d by Mr. Stam which
c o n t a i n e d names of 5 0 c o n t r a c t o r s and h e
opined t h a t approximately 1 5 of these contrac-
t o r s were c a p a b l e of c o m p l e t i n g t h e Y e l l o w Bay
job. Mr. Stam a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t he knew of
h i s p e r s o n a l knowledge t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g
c o n t r a c t o r s i n Lake County w e r e p a y i n g t h e i r
e m p l o y e e s t h e f o l l o w i n g wages :'
"'CONTRACTOR CARPENTERS LABORERS
Mr. Durand $10.00 $7.00
Mr. O l s o n 9.00 7.00
Mr. F e e b e r 8.00 6.00
Mr. McCrum 8.00 5.00
Mr. G a l y 8.00 - 1 0 . 0 0 4.00 - 5.00
Mr. Baker 8.00 - 11.00 4.50 - 6 . 0 0 '
" ' P l a i n t i f f called to the stand the following
c o n t r a c t o r s and t h e y t e s t i f i e d t h e y p a i d t h e i r
e m p l o y e e s t h e f o l l o w i n g wages :'
"'CONTRACTOR CARPENTERS LABORERS
Wallace Olsen $ 8.00 - 10.00 $4.00 - 6.00
Allen Smith 11.00 + f r i n g e s 8.00
Dennis Paulson 7.00 ----
Daniel J u r y 6.00 - 8.00 5.00
Don W h i t i n g 7.00 - 8.00 5.00 - 6.00
Dan Baker 7.00 - 8.00 ----I
" ' A l l of t h e c o n t r a c t o r s l i s t e d a b o v e a r e resi-
d e n t s of Lake C o u n t y , Montana; a l l t e s t i f i e d
t h a t t h e y d i d r e s i d e n t i a l b u i l d i n g (James
Thompson t e s t i f i e d t h a t a n y c o n t r a c t o r t h a t
c o u l d b u i l d a r e s i d e n c e could have handled
t h i s p u b l i c p r o j e c t ) and t h e wages l i s t e d a r e
t h o s e p a i d by t h e c o n t r a c t o r s d u r i n g t h e y e a r
1980. Each c o n t r a c t o r employed from 1 - 8
e m p l o y e e s d u r i n g t h e y e a r 1 9 8 0 . The d e f e n d a n t
has taken the p o s i t i o n t h a t the prevailing
r a t e of wages i n t h e a r e a i s $ 1 1 . 1 3 p l u s
f r i n g e b e n e f i t s (union s c a l e ) . Only one
c o n t r a c t o r t e s t i f i e d from Lake County ( A 1
S m i t h ) who p a y s h i s e m p l o y e e s u n i o n s c a l e and
t h o s e e m p l o y e e s work o n l y on a p a r t time
basis. V i r t u a l l y a l l o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s were
non-union and a l l w i t n e s s e s who t e s t i f i e d
i n c l u d i n g A 1 Smith, t h e s o l e union c o n t r a c t o r ,
were unaware of a n y o t h e r u n i o n c o n t r a c t o r i n
Lake County.'
" T h i s summary a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t s t h e e v i d e n c e
i n t r o d u c e d r e g a r d i n g wages. I t shows t h a t a
m a j o r i t y of t h e c a r p e n t e r s i n Lake County
represented in t h i s s u r v e y who work on
r e s i d e n t i a l - t y p e c o n s t r u c t i o n a r e p a i d $7.00 -
$9.00 an h o u r and t h a t l a b o r e r s a r e p a i d $4.00
- $6.00 a n h o u r . P r e s u m a b l y , t h e d i f f e r e n c e s
represent differences in individual training
and e x p e r i e n c e .
"From t h e s e a v e r a g e s i t i s a p p a r e n t t h a t
p l a i n t i f f p a i d t h e p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages i n
Lake County f o r r e s i d e n t i a l - t y p e c o n s t r u c t i o n
f o r c a r p e n t e r s and a l a b o r e r . "
I n v i e w of t h e two t y p e s of e v i d e n c e , t h e c o u r t r e a s o n e d a s
follows: The t e s t i m o n y of the a r c h i t e c t established t h a t the
Y e l l o w Bay p r o j e c t was much l i k e b u i l d i n g a r e s i d e n c e , t h e r e f o r e ,
t h e Y e l l o w Bay p r o j e c t i s of a s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r t o r e s i d e n t i a l
construction. Consequently, the standard prevailing rate of
wages m u s t be t h o s e wages which a r e p a i d i n t h e c o u n t y o r l o c a -
l i t y by o t h e r c o n t r a c t o r s involved i n r e s i d e n t i a l construction.
This reasoning is exactly what is called for in section
18-2-401(5)(a), MCA, (1981). The court's analysis clearly
recognizes that "work of a similar c h a r a c t e r " means the total
project, n o t t h e v a r i o u s k i n d s of l a b o r i n v o l v e d . W agree with
e
that statutory interpretation. W do
e not understand why the
c o u r t made t h e s t a t e m e n t t h a t " t h e s i m i l a r i t y is b e t w e e n t h e t y p e
of labor i n v o l v e d and n o t t h e t y p e . . . of p r o j e c t involved."
In its conclusion of law number six the court unequivocally
stated: "[tlhe 'work of a similar character' t o be p e r f o r m e d
under M.C.A. 518-2-401(3)(a) (1979) was residential type
construction." These statements are conflicting. In such a
s i t u a t i o n w e m u s t g i v e e f f e c t t o t h e s t a t e m e n t which makes v a l i d
the court's analysis.
Appellant's argument is really a manifestation of its
disagreement with the court's conclusion that the "work of a
s i m i l a r c h a r a c t e r " t o be p e r f o r m e d was r e s i d e n t i a l t y p e c o n s t r u c -
tion. W n o t e t h a t t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c -
e
t i o n is o n e of s e v e r a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s used by t h e S e c r e t a r y of
L a b o r u n d e r t h e F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon A c t . Appellant goes t o g r e a t
l e n g t h s t o i n s t r u c t t h i s C o u r t on t h e h i s t o r y and d e v e l o p m e n t of
t h e Davis-Bacon Act. According t o a p p e l l a n t , t h i s Court should
support "uniformity between s t a t e and federal regulations and
procedures." Presumably, part of that uniformity would be
recognition of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D e p a r t m e n t of L a b o r ' s various
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of construction. The c o m p l i a n c e o f f i c e r of the
L a b o r S t a n d a r d s D i v i s i o n of t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Labor and I n d u s t r y
t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e F e d e r a l Davis-Bacon r a t e s a r e determined f o r
t h r e e d i f f e r e n t t y p e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n ; r e s i d e n t i a l , b u i l d i n g , and
h e a v y and highway. Y e t when a s k e d a b o u t r e s i d e n t i a l c o n s t r u c t i o n
classification i n Montana, the witness replied: "Okay, well,
f i r s t o f a l l , we d o n ' t u s e r e s i d e n t i a l . W h a v e n ' t had a n e e d .
e
Okay, building construction would be any type of building."
We do n o t attempt to define "residential construction" for
t h e commissioner, nor do w e h o l d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h i s
k i n d of c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . W only hold t h a t the evidence supported
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t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e Yellow
Bay laboratory was "of a similar character" to residential
construction. W f u r t h e r hold
e t h a t t h e evidence supported the
court's conclusion that the respondent had paid the "standard
p r e v a i l i n g r a t e of wages."
Next, appellant challenges the admission of what has been
labeled the "Stam s u r v e y . " A t trial, Mr. Stam, t h e manager of
t h e l o c a l job service office, t e s t i f i e d concerning t h e r a t e of
wages paid by contractors to carpenters and laborers i n Lake
County. The b a s i s of h i s t e s t i m o n y came from a t e l e p h o n e s u r v e y
c o n d u c t e d by h i m s e l f t h e d a y b e f o r e . He contacted several local
contractors and asked them what their wage rates were. He
t e s t i f i e d a t length concerning t h e i r responses. The e v i d e n c e was
c l e a r l y h e a r s a y b u t was a d m i t t e d o v e r o b j e c t i o n p u r s u a n t t o R u l e
8 0 3 ( 2 4 ) , Mont.R.Evid., which a l l o w s a s e x c e p t i o n s t o t h e h e a r s a y
rule "statement[s] not specifically covered by any of the
f o r e g o i n g e x c e p t i o n s b u t having comparable c i r c u m s t a n t i a l guaran-
t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s . "
W e h o l d t h a t i t was e r r o r t o a d m i t t h e t e s t i m o n y b e c a u s e t h e
e v i d e n c e d i d n o t h a v e c o m p a r a b l e g u a r a n t e e s of trustworthiness.
I n determining whether or not t h e e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d ,
t h e Commission on R u l e s of E v i d e n c e n o t e d t h a t " [ t l h e g u a r a n t e e
o f t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s s e t o u t i n t h e Commission Comments t o e a c h of
t h e o t h e r e x c e p t i o n s [ o f R u l e 8031 i s t h e c r i t e r i a t o be used i n
d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r t o a p p l y t h i s open-ended e x c e p t i o n and f i n d a
'comparable c i r c u m s t a n t i a l g u a r a n t e e of trustworthiness. ' I' We
h a v e r e v i e w e d t h e o t h e r e x c e p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n R u l e 8 0 3 and f i n d
t h a t t h e S t a m t e s t i m o n y s h o u l d have b e e n e x c l u d e d . For example,
o n e of t h e e x c e p t i o n s d e a l s w i t h v a r i o u s k i n d s of p u b l i c r e c o r d s
and reports. R u l e 8 0 3 ( 8 ) Mont.R.Evid. Under t h i s exception,
d a t e c o m p i l a t i o n s of an a g e n c y a r e a d m i s s i b l e i f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n
i s t h e r e s u l t of a r e g u l a r l y - c o n d u c t e d a c t i v i t y o r a d u t y imposed
by law. The Commission Comments to exception (8) refer to
g u a r a n t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s u n d e r e x c e p t i o n ( 6 ) ;
"The g u a r a n t e e of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s is p r o v i d e d
b y t h e n a t u r e of t h e r e c o r d and t h e c i r -
cumstances of preparation, enhanced by
s y s t e m a t i c c h e c k i n g , by r e g u l a r i t y and con-
t i n u i t y which p r o d u c e h a b i t s of p r e c i s i o n , b y
a c t u a l e x p e r i e n c e of b u s i n e s s i n r e l y i n g upon
them, o r by a d u t y t o make a n a c c u r a t e r e c o r d
a s p a r t of a c o n t i n u i n g j o b o r o c c u p a t i o n . ' "
A n n o t a t i o n s t o Mont .R.Evid. Commission Comments t o R u l e 8 0 3 ( 6 ) ,
p. 285. E x c e p t i o n number ( 8 ) i s p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p r o p r i a t e t o o u r
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e S t a m t e s t i m o n y s i n c e t h e e v i d e n c e c o n s i s t e d
o f d a t a c o m p i l e d by a s t a t e e m p l o y e e . T h e r e is no d o u b t t h a t t h e
e v i d e n c e d i d n o t m e e t t h e g u a r a n t e e s of t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s .
Even though the evidence was inadmissible, the error was
harmless. Under R u l e 6 1 , M.R.Civ.P., "[nlo error i n either the
admission or e x c l u s i o n of evidence . . . is g r o u n d f o r . ..
disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial
justice. The c o u r t a t e v e r y s t a g e of t h e p r o c e e d i n g m u s t d i s r e -
g a r d a n y e r r o r o r d e f e c t i n t h e p r o c e e d i n g which d o e s n o t a f f e c t
t h e s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s . "
T h i s r u l e was i n t e n d e d t o p r e v e n t r e v e r s a l s b a s e d on i n c o n -
sequential errors. Where s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e h a s b e e n d o n e , t h e
l i t i g a t i o n s h o u l d be e n d e d . Copenhaver e t a l . v . Northern Pac.
Ry. Co. ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 42 Mont. 4 5 3 , 1 1 3 P. 467. The a d m i s s i o n of t h e
c o n t e s t e d h e a r s a y e v i d e n c e d i d n o t a f f e c t s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s of
t h e a p p e l l a n t b e c a u s e t h e e v i d e n c e was c u m u l a t i v e . The r e s p o n -
dent called six local contractors to testify concerning their
wage r a t e s f o r c a r p e n t e r s and l a b o r e r s . A l l of the contractors
were Lake County residents and testified that they performed
residential construction. F i v e of t h e s i x c o n t r a c t o r s p a i d t h e i r
e m p l o y e e s a t r a t e s s i m i l a r t o t h e r a t e s p a i d by r e s p o n d e n t . From
t h i s evidence, the c o u r t could l o g i c a l l y conclude t h a t respondent
had paid the standard prevailing rate of wages. The "Stam
s u r v e y " was n o t n e e d e d .
Finally, w c o n s i d e r whether t h e c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n
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in awarding a t t o r n e y fees to the respondent? In the court's
memorandum it is s t a t e d :
"Plaintiff [respondent] has requested t h i s
C o u r t t o award him a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s ...
he is
n o t e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s on s t a t u t o r y
grounds . . . However, a s an equitable
m e a s u r e , t h e C o u r t may p r e v e n t a p a r t y from
b e a r i n g t h e u n c o n s c i o n a b l e b u r d e n of f u n d i n g a
l a w s u i t , e v e n one a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e , which is
t h e r e s u l t of u n j u s t p o l i c y . "
I t h a s long been t h e r u l e i n Montana t h a t i n t h e a b s e n c e of
a g r e e m e n t between t h e p a r t i e s o r s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n , a suc-
cessful party is n o t entitled to a n award of attorney's fees.
Nikles v. Barnes (1969), 1 5 3 Mont. 113, 454 P.2d 608. This
general rule is applicable to this case. The trial court
attempted to r e l y on i t s e q u i t a b l e power i n making t h e a w a r d .
T h i s was error. We r e c o g n i z e a very narrow e x c e p t i o n to the
above r u l e . A D i s t r i c t C o u r t d o e s h a v e e q u i t a b l e power t o award
attorney's f e e s where t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y h a s been f o r c e d i n t o
a n a c t i o n t h a t is f r i v o l o u s and u t t e r l y w i t h o u t m e r i t . W i l s o n v.
Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (1982 ) ,
Mont . , 648 P.2d 7 6 6 , 39 S t . R e p . 1294. Clearly, t h e excep-
t i o n is n o t a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s c a s e .
The award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s i s v a c a t e d and t h e r e m a i n d e r of
t h e judgment i s a f f i r m e d f o r t h e r e a s o n s s t a t e d h e r e i n .
We concur:
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I concur (1) the Commissioner has exclusive power to determine the standard
prevailing rates of wages under the S t a t e ' s s t a t u t e s ; ( 2 ) that "work of a similar
character" refers to projects and not to types of labor; ( 3 ) that the Stam "Survey"
was inadmissible; and ( 4 ) that no attorney's fees should be awarded. Otherwise,
I p u t as much distance as possible between m and everything e l s e that i s said
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in the majority opinion.
I t i s easy to expose the sophistry of the majority. One need only ask,
" I f Yellow Bay Laboratory were a federal project, would Thompkins have had to
pay Davis-Bacon wage-rates?" The answer i s a resounding "yes". A t the same
time as the Yellow Bay project, contractors on the federally-funded Lake County
Courthouse and Ronan School project paid Davis-Bacon wages based on the federal
determinations. Here the State Commissioner had promulgated standard prevai 1ing
wage-rates applicable to Yellow Bay Laboratory. Thompkins did not pay the wage-
rates. H clearly violated State law and the terms of his contract with the
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State. Almost universally i t i s recognized right, suitable, and expedient that
s t a t e L i t t l e Davis-Bacon acts and the federal Davis-Bacon Act be construed in
harmony. See Associated General Contractors v. State of Nw Hampshire, 306 A2d
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204 ( N H 1973). The purpose of the s t a t e act i s to safeguard existing minimum
wage standards and prevent unfair competition. Sec. 39-1-401 MCA.
I t i s incredible that a court of t h i s level would s t a t e that here the
Commissioner had indeed determined standard prevailing wage-rates which existed
a t the time the Yellow Bay Laboratory contract was entered into, and then to
s t a t e that the S t a t e ' s wage figures are not a part of that contract. "There
must," says the majority, "be a meeting of the minds or mutual assent on a l l of
the essential terms." To assume t h a t this contractor, counseled by an attorney,
was so naive as not to know what "standard prevailing wage-rates" meant i s
i t s e l f naivete of the farthest reach.
The issue should not be so simply dismissed on the mere grounds there was
no mutual consent t o the standard prevailing wage-rates. The provisions of
subsisting statutes in force and applicable to contract are incorporated in
the contract much as those specifically set forth therein. Valier Company v .
State, 123 Mont. 329, 215 P2d 966 (1950). Therefore, Thompkins contracted
if he p a i d l e s s than t h e standard p r e v a i l i n g wayes "as e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e
pub1 i c works c o n t r a c t " , he f o r f e i t e d Twenty-five (25) Do1 l a r s p e r day f o r each
underpaid worker. Section 18-2-407, MCA. He c o n t r a c t e d t h a t t h e Commissioner
of Labor may s e t t h e standard p r e v a i l i n g wage-rates. S e c t i o n 18-2-402, MCA.
Since Thompkins was n o t a s i g n a t o r t o any c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g agreement, he
c o n t r a c t e d t o pay " n e g o t i a t e d f r i n g e b e n e f i t s " t o h i s employees as wages by
u n d e r t a k i n g a s t a t e public-works c o n t r a c t . S e c t i o n 18-2-405, MCA. These
s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s were p a r t and p a r c e l of t h i s c o n t r a c t w i t h t h e S t a t e
whether s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e d i n h i s c o n t r a c t o r n o t . I t i s n o t an excuse t h a t
t h e standard p r e v a i 1 i n g wage-rate " e x i s t e d i n t h e bureaucracy" as t h e ma,jori t y
states. I t was Thompkins' s t a t u t o r y and c o n t r a c t u a l d u t y t o comply w i t h t h e
f i n d i n g s o f t h e l a w f u l l y e s t a b l i s h e d bureaucracy a c t i n g under s t a t u t o r y
directives.
The i n c o n v e n i e n t e x i s t e n c e o f these s t a t u t e s and d e c i s i o n a l c o n t r a c t law
proved no d e t e r r e n t t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , and i s now no b a r t o t h e m a j o r i t y .
One o f t h e prime o b j e c t s o f t h e S t a t e ' s L i t t l e Davis-Bacon Act i s t o p r e v e n t
c o n t r a c t o r s from t a k i n g advantage o f t h e excess l a b o r pool i n a depressed
locality. P i t t i n g worker a g a i n s t worker i n c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e few j o b s
a v a i l a b l e by f o r c i n g them t o b a r g a i n i n d i v i d u a l l y f o r t h e wages on p u b l i c
c o n t r a c t s i s n o t good business o r good p o l i c y f o r t h e S t a t e o r any o f i t s
subdivisions. P r e v e n t i o n of c u t t h r o a t worker c o m p e t i t i o n i n t h e s t r u g g l e t o
s u r v i v e i s something t h e c o u r t s ought t o p r o t e c t i n t h e n o b l e s t ~ e r f o r m a n c eo f
t h e i r duty. The m a j o r i t y f a i l s i t s d u t y here. I dissociate myself from t h i s
result entirely. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge, by assessing a t t o r n e y ' s fees a g a i n s t
t h e Commissioner where no s t a t u t o r y o r e q u i t a b l e b a s i s e x i s t e d f o r a t t o r n e y ' s
fees, seemed determined t o punish t h e S t a t e . T h i s c o u r t , by s i d e - s t e p p i n g
c o n t r a c t law, punishes t h e workers and awards t h e c o n t r a c t o r a f a t t e r p r o f i t
from t h e i r r i g h t f u l due.
F i n a l l y , t h i s c o u r t e r r s , as d i d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge, when i t h o l d s
t h a t b u i l d i n g t h e Yellow Bay L a b o r a t o r y was t h e same as b u i l d i n g a house. Rare
indeed i s t h e house ( i t would be a c a s t l e ) where t h e mechanical s u b - c o n t r a c t ,
t h a t p o r t i o n o f t h e p r o j e c t b i d and won by Thompkins, amounts t o Two Hundred
T h i r t y - f i v e Thousand (235,000) Do1 l a r s o u t o f a Hal f - M i l l i o n Do1 1 a r p r o j e c t .
(The plumbing c o n t r a c t was One Hundred Twenty Thousand (120,000) Do1 1a r s ; t h e
e l e c t r i c a l about E i g h t y Thousand (80,000) Do1 l a r s . ) Edgar Guest said, " I t takes
a heap o ' l i v i n ' t o make a house a home." I t takes more than l i v i n ' , i t takes
a heap o ' plumbin' and a heap o ' h e a t i n ' and c o o l i n ' t o make a house a l a b .
(See Odgen Nash: "Come Clean, Mr. Guest".) B u t i t does n o t t a k e a Class A
C o n t r a c t o r ' s License t o b u i l d a house, and t h a t i s what S t a t e law r e q u i r e d f o r
a p r o j e c t t h e s i z e o f Yellow Bay Laboratory, S e c t i o n 15-50-204, MCA. This
c o u r t and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t should have c o n f i n e d t h e search f o r p r e v a i l i n g
wage-rates t o t h e wages p a i d i n t h e l o c a l i t y by t h e c l a s s o f c o n t r a c t o r s
e l i g i b l e t o b u i l d t h e p r o j e c t , t h a t i s , Class A C o n t r a c t o r s .
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