United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-1350
No. 00-1351
TILCON CAPALDI, INC., f/k/a TILCON GAMMINO, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
GERALD FELDMAN,
Defendant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
__________
OLD MASHPEE ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
NEWTON CENTRE RESTAURANT CORP., R&J, INCORPORATED,
LEONARD J. SAMIA and
NEW BOSTON FINANCIAL PARTNERSHIP,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Joseph J. Brodigan, P.C. with whom Langan, Dempsey &
Brodigan was on brief for plaintiff.
Peter B. McGlynn with whom Jason A. Manekas and Bernkopf,
Goodman & Baseman LLP were on brief for defendant Gerald
Feldman.
May 16, 2001
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. In 1986, Tilcon Capaldi, Inc.
("Tilcon"), a Rhode Island general contractor, sued to enforce
a mechanics' lien against Commercial Associates ("CA"), a
Massachusetts partnership for whom Tilcon had done site work
required for construction of a shopping center. After extended
and ramifying litigation in both state and federal court, Tilcon
obtained a judgment in 1992 in the federal district court in
Rhode Island for over $1 million in contract damages and ever
mounting interest.1 The judgment identified both CA and its
general partners as liable, without specifying whether the
parties were jointly or severally liable or whether they were
liable in their individual or partnership capacity.
Eventually, Tilcon registered the judgment with the
federal district court in Massachusetts. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994
& Supp. II 1996). In April 1997, that court issued a writ of
execution, mounting interest bringing the sum due to almost $1.8
million. Unlike the Rhode Island district court judgment, this
1
Reported decisions in this saga include Commercial
Associates v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 998 F.2d 1092 (1st Cir.
1993), Commercial Associates v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., 801 F.
Supp. 939 (D.R.I. 1992), and Tilcon Gammino, Inc. v. Commercial
Associates, 570 A.2d 1102 (R.I. 1990).
-2-
initial Massachusetts judgment specified that CA and the general
partners were jointly and severally liable for the judgment.
Once again, the judgment did not state the capacity in which the
partners were liable. Jerald Feldman was one of CA's general
partners named in the judgment.
In May 1997, Tilcon brought the present action in
federal district court in Massachusetts to reach and apply
assets of Jerald Feldman to satisfy the judgment. Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 214, § 3(6)-(7) (1998). Of importance for this appeal,
Tilcon sought to reach and apply--among other Feldman assets--
Feldman's interests in three nominee trusts apparently created
by Feldman and co-beneficiaries: his 16.88% beneficial interest
in Kelstock Realty Trust ("Kelstock"), his 18.75% beneficial
interest in Marlborough Realty Trust ("Marlborough"), and his
25% interest in Commercial Properties Trust ("Comprops").
A bench trial was held in this reach and apply action.
Feldman did not dispute that he held interests in the three
trusts, but he claimed that his interests could not be reached
because joint venture agreements, entered into after the trusts
were formed, made the interests unassignable.2 In addition,
2Initially a joint venture, Comprops was restructured during
this case as a limited partnership on the understanding that the
restructuring would not prejudice Tilcon's right of recovery.
Thus, for present purposes, it is convenient to treat it as if
the joint venture were still in force.
-3-
Feldman argued that under principles of partnership law, he was
not liable for the judgment or, in the alternative, that he was
only liable for his aliquot share of the judgment.
In a decision rendered on January 5, 2000, the district
judge agreed with Feldman that his interests could not be
reached by Tilcon because the joint venture agreements made
Feldman's interests unassignable. The court also found that
because Tilcon's judgment against Feldman rested on a contract
claim, he was only jointly liable and was therefore liable only
for his aliquot share. Finally, the court concluded that
Tilcon's earlier settlements with two of CA's other general
partners had not released Feldman from any liability, and that
Tilcon could recover from Feldman's assets (apart from the trust
interests) despite Feldman's claim that Tilcon had not exhausted
all efforts to satisfy the judgment from CA's partnership
assets.
Both parties now appeal from the district court's
judgment. Tilcon seeks to reach Feldman's trust interests and
to hold him liable for the full judgment; Feldman disclaims any
liability because of Tilcon's releases to other partners and
alleged failure to exhaust partnership assets. We address these
contentions in turn, applying de novo review to rulings of law.
-4-
United States v. Howard (In re Howard), 996 F.2d 1320, 1327
(1st Cir. 1993).
1. The most difficult issue is whether Feldman's
interests in the trusts, now themselves embedded in joint
ventures, can be reached and applied to satisfy the judgment
against him. The basic tenets of Massachusetts law are clear.3
A creditor may "reach and apply" a debtor's interest in
intangible property that cannot otherwise be executed against in
an action at law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, § 3(6), including a
debtor's beneficial interest in trusts, New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Hoss, 249 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Mass. 1969).
However, self-settled trusts aside, a creditor may not reach and
apply a debtor's interest if the trust includes a spendthrift
clause by which the creator of the trust (the settlor) forbids
creditor attachments. Hale v. Bowler, 102 N.E. 415, 416 (Mass.
1913).
However, special rules apply when a settlor creates a
trust for his own benefit and also attempts to immunize the
3
Also not in dispute is that Massachusetts law applies to
this aspect of the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a) ("The procedure
on execution . . . shall be in accordance with the practice and
procedure of the state in which the district court is held . .
. ."); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Markarian, 114 F.3d
346, 349-50 (1st Cir. 1997).
-5-
trust from creditor claims. In such cases, Massachusetts has
adopted the Restatement rule:
Where a person creates for his own benefit a
trust for support or a discretionary trust, his .
. . creditors can reach the maximum amount which
the trustee under the terms of the trust could
pay to him or apply for his benefit.
Ware v. Gulda, 117 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1954) (internal
quotation marks omitted); accord Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 156(2) (1959) [hereinafter Restatement]. Thus, even if the
trustee chooses not to make any payments to the beneficiary, a
creditor may still reach the maximum amount the trustee could
pay. 2A Scott & Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 156.2, at 178
(1987) (summarizing the holding in Ware).
This rule keeps a debtor from protecting his "property
in such a way that he can still enjoy it but can prevent his
creditors from reaching it." 2A Scott & Fratcher, supra, § 156,
at 167. It is not necessary to the rule adopted by Ware that
the transferor intend to defraud his creditors. Restatement §
156(2) cmt. a. The Ware rule also applies even if the trust
includes an explicit spendthrift provision. State St. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Reiser, 389 N.E.2d 768, 770 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979)
(citing cases); accord Restatement § 156(1). It has special
force in the case of nominee trusts, where the beneficiary can
control the trustee's actions, cf. Sylvia v. Johnson, 691 N.E.2d
-6-
608, 610 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998), but it applies even where the
trustee has sole discretion, Ware, 117 N.E.2d at 138.
If we were only looking at Feldman's interests in the
three trusts before they became subject to the joint venture
agreements, Tilcon would have a straightforward claim to reach
and apply Feldman's interest in the self-settled trusts. In
each case, Feldman had a beneficial interest and, as Ware
teaches, a spendthrift limitation would not be effective to
block Tilcon's claim. However, the Comprops beneficiaries
entered into a joint venture agreement in January 1989, and the
Kelstock and Marlborough trust beneficiaries did so in August
1994. Hence, by the time Tilcon attempted to reach and apply
Feldman's interests in the trusts in 1997, they were subject to
a new set of restrictions on transfers.
The Kelstock, Marlborough, and relevant Comprops joint
venture agreements provide that the joint venturers "may not
sell, transfer, convey, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose
of all or any part of . . . their Interest or rights in the
Venture," except by transfer to other original venturers or
their family members, and except in response to a bona fide
written offer to which the other venturers agree after
exercising rights of first refusal. In addition, each agreement
contains a spendthrift provision which purports to protect all
-7-
the income and corpus of the venture from attachment by
creditors. Both sides have assumed that Feldman's joint venture
interest subsumes his trust interest.
In the decision now before us, the district judge
relied on the anti-assignment clauses in the joint venture
agreements to debar Tilcon from reaching Feldman's trust
interests. Of course, Feldman was not seeking to assign either
his trust or joint venture interests. But based on his reading
of Massachusetts case law, the district judge held--as a general
rule--that the reach and apply statute in Massachusetts applies
only to interests that are capable of being assigned. The
district court ruled that the anti-assignment clauses took away
this capability and therefore blocked Tilcon.4
We disagree. The reach and apply statute in
Massachusetts is very broadly written and contains no express
reservation for cases in which an anti-assignment clause exists.
Indeed, the statute extends explicitly to a defendant's interest
in partnership property where one would expect that there would
commonly be contractual limits on assignment. Mass. Gen. Laws
4
Strictly speaking, the joint venture agreements purported
to prevent Feldman from assigning his interest in the joint
venture--not his trust interest. However, the district judge
and the parties have not distinguished the two but have instead
treated the anti-assignment clause as if it applied to the trust
interest as well as the joint venture interest.
-8-
ch. 214, § 3(6). It is hard to see why the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, which decided Ware, would not read the
statute to override self-imposed anti-assignment clauses as
readily as self-imposed clauses barring creditor attachment.
Indeed, Ware itself involved a trust in which both clauses were
present. 117 N.E.2d at 138.
The district court's contrary view rests primarily on
one Massachusetts decision stating that certain personal tort
causes of action were unassignable and could not be reached
under the reach and apply statute. Bethlehem Fabricators, Inc.
v. H.D. Watts Co., 190 N.E. 828, 833 (Mass. 1934). But such
claims are unassignable for policy reasons that do not apply
here. See id. at 568. We do not read Bethlehem, or another
case where state law barred a transfer of an interest without
legislative consent, Hurley v. Boston R.R. Holding Co., 54
N.E.2d 183, 198-99 (Mass. 1944), as making a self-imposed anti-
assignment clause a bar to the reach and apply statute. To us,
Ware is presumptively the proper analogy unless the joint
venture situation can be meaningfully distinguished from Ware's
treatment of trusts.
The best argument for a distinction is that the
spendthrift clause in a self-settled trust is often just a self-
indulgence at the expense of creditors. By contrast, in a joint
-9-
business, it is solvent partners (not just the scapegrace
debtor) who will be affected if a new and unwelcome "partner"
supplants the debtor. It would be possible for this reason to
treat Ware as limited to trusts and to treat anti-assignment
clauses in joint ventures as blocking the reach and apply
statute--albeit not because of any general rule in Bethlehem.
However, the reach and apply statute itself provides
that a partner's interest in partnership property may be reached
and applied to satisfy a business debt, and the reach and apply
statute is subject to equitable limitations.5 Perhaps on
specific facts allowing a joint venture interest to be seized
outright by the creditor would seriously disrupt the business;
if so, conceivably limitations might be imposed on the remedy
(e.g., by providing that the creditor could receive profits but
not participate in management). But the mere potential for such
problems in some cases, for which tailored solutions are usually
possible, is no reason to bar the reach and apply statute from
the start.
5The statute explicitly provides limitations to avoid
disrupting partnership business, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 214, §
3(6), and a court's broader equitable powers apply, allowing
additional limitations on applications of the statute, see
Bressler v. Averbuck, 76 N.E.2d 146, 148 (Mass. 1947); Shapiro,
Perlin & Connors, Massachusetts Collection Law § 11:23 (2d ed.
1992).
-10-
In the present case, Feldman has apparently made no
effort to show any specific disruption from the seizure of his
interests nor, perhaps more pertinently, have his co-venturers
sought to do so. We think that this failure even to allege such
facts forfeits any such argument; but we leave it open to the
district judge on remand (if he wishes) to consider limitations,
assuming that he is persuaded that serious problems are
presented for the other joint venturers. Otherwise, the reach
and apply statute applies with full force to Feldman's trust and
joint venture interests.
2. Tilcon's second claim on appeal is that the
district court erred in determining that Feldman was only
"jointly" liable for the judgment and not "jointly and
severally" liable. The district judge's determination, says
Tilcon, improperly makes Feldman only responsible for his
"aliquot share of the judgment" instead of the entire amount.
The district judge did indeed say that Feldman was only liable
for his "aliquot share." Apparently the parties and the
district judge use the term "aliquot," often used to denote a
fractional interest, to indicate that Feldman is currently held
responsible only for a share of the judgment proportional to his
share in the CA partnership.
-11-
In attacking the district judge's ruling, Tilcon argues
that the Rhode Island federal court judgment, before being
registered in Massachusetts, did not say that Feldman or any
other defendant was liable for less than the full amount (some
courts presume that an unadorned judgment is joint and several,
Angona v. County of Nassau, 129 A.D.2d 543, 543-44 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987)); that the district judge should not have looked
beyond the bare language of the original judgment; that, in any
case, Feldman failed to offer evidence that the underlying
liability was only for a breach of contract (which is ordinarily
joint only); and that it was up to Feldman to get the judgment
clarified in Rhode Island but he failed to do so.
Probably Feldman's liability under the Rhode Island
federal judgment is only joint, 6 but Tilcon is mistaken in
thinking that this makes Feldman responsible only for a portion
of the judgment, aliquot or otherwise. This is so even if we
agree, as we would be likely to do if it mattered, that the
6What matters is the Rhode Island federal judgment. The
clerk in the Massachusetts district court added, at Tilcon's
behest, the words "jointly and severally" when the judgment was
registered, but the district judge in this case deemed this
irrelevant and Tilcon properly does not dispute in principle the
"reformation" of the initial Massachusetts judgment. The
pertinent language from the Rhode Island federal judgment, that
judgment as registered by Tilcon in the Massachusetts district
court, and the final Massachusetts federal judgment are included
as an appendix to this opinion.
-12-
judgment should be read or reformed to make it explicit that
liability of the CA partners is joint only. But why this is so
takes a bit of explaining, the point being rarely discussed in
any detail in either recent case law or modern treatise.
At common law, the phrase "joint and several" refers
to the liability of multiple wrongdoers (typically, for torts).
It means that damages are a single sum specified in the
judgment, that each wrongdoer is liable for the full amount, but
the wronged party cannot collect under the judgment more than
the single sum. Restatement (Third) of Torts § 20 & cmt. b
(Proposed Final Draft (Revised) 1999). Joint liability
(typically, for breach of contract) does not differ in these
respects, contrary to Tilcon's assumption; each party jointly
liable for a judgment for breach of contract is liable for the
full amount. 2 Bromberg & Ribstein, Bromberg & Ribstein on
Partnership § 5.10(b), at 5:91-92 (2000); 12 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 36:1, at 610 (4th ed. 1999)
[hereinafter Williston].
The difference in the two types of liability is in
certain other details, largely vestiges of common law procedure,
which still bite where they have not been abolished.
Importantly, the common law rule was that all those jointly
liable had to be sued together or the suit would be dismissed,
-13-
and that a settlement with one of those liable discharged all of
the others. 2 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra, §§ 5.08(b), 5.10(b)-
(c). Further, in the case of partners jointly (but not
severally) liable for a wrong done by the partnership, there is
a requirement that partnership assets be sought first. Id. §
5.08(d).7
Finally, there is sometimes an interplay between these
two categories of liability and issues of contribution,
Restatement (Third) of Torts § 23 reporters' note, cmt. a.
However, the relationship is complicated, the cases are not
uniform, and contribution rules have increasingly been affected
by statute, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231B, § 1 (1998). In any
case, issues of contribution are distinct from questions of what
a plaintiff may collect from any individual defendant.
In short, even if the judgment is joint only, Tilcon
can --subject to defenses yet to be discussed--collect the full
amount of the judgment from Feldman (to the extent it has not
already been paid by others). So far as the district court's
7
Just to round out the trilogy of types of liability,
liability is termed "several" when different individuals are
separately liable for what may be different amounts ( e.g., where
a tortfeasor is liable for the amount of damages in direct
proportion to his percentage of fault, Restatement (Third) of
Torts § 21, or where parties to a contract are each "bound
separately for the performance which he or she promises,"
Williston, supra, § 36:1, at 611).
-14-
reference to aliquot liability in this case indicates otherwise,
the district court judgment must be modified. On the issue of
full versus partial liability, the question whether the judgment
is joint only turns out to be irrelevant. As will shortly be
apparent, it also turns out to be irrelevant to two defenses
offered by Feldman (discharge by settlement with another partner
and failure to exhaust partnership assets) even though
ordinarily at common law jointness is important in passing upon
such defenses.
Because the outcome of this case is unaffected by
whether liability is joint or joint and several, we need not
pursue the multi-faceted problems--including interesting choice
of law issues not addressed by the parties--involved in deciding
whether the underlying Rhode Island federal judgment was for
joint liability only. However, it is worth noting that the
original Rhode Island federal judgment grounds liability
specifically on breach of contract; both in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island, the derivative liability of partners for breach of
contract by the partnership is joint only. See Mass. Gen. Laws
ch. 108A, § 15(1) (1998); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-12-26(a) (1999);
see also 2 Bromberg & Ribstein, supra, § 5.08(b).
3. By cross appeal, Feldman urges two defenses to
preclude all personal liability, at least at this time. He says
-15-
that when Tilcon signed settlement agreements with two other CA
partners, this discharged his liability entirely. Separately,
he claims that if he is liable at all, Tilcon is not entitled to
collect against him until it shows that it has exhausted the
partnership assets. Both arguments assume that Feldman's
liability is joint only--otherwise the objections would not
apply--and we will assume jointness arguendo.
Starting with the discharge defense, Tilcon admits that
it made partial settlements with two other CA partners, but
points out that each settlement agreement purported to reserve
its rights against other partners like Feldman. At common law,
the discharge of one person jointly liable, by settlement or
otherwise, discharged the others. 12 Williston, supra, § 36:18,
at 684-85. As to partnership obligations, Rhode Island has
rejected this so- called "unity of discharge" rule by statute.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-12-9. Nevertheless, the district court
thought that Massachusetts law governed--CA is a Massachusetts
partnership--and Tilcon makes no effort to show that this choice
of law decision was mistaken.
Feldman says that Massachusetts has never explicitly
abrogated the unity of discharge rule for partnerships.
However, as the district court noted, Massachusetts has
abrogated the rule for joint tortfeasors, Mass. Gen. Laws ch.
-16-
231B, § 4(a) (1998); Selby v. Kuhns, 188 N.E.2d 861, 865-66
(Mass. 1963), and also for co-obligors when, as here, there is
an express reservation of rights or other sufficient evidence of
intent not to release co-obligors, Hale v. Spaulding, 14 N.E.
534, 534-35 (Mass. 1888). The district judge held that
Massachusetts courts would take the same view as to
partnerships.
Although the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
been silent on this issue, indications are that it would treat
partnerships like other co-obligors in this respect. Cf. Selby,
188 N.E.2d at 865-66 (unity of discharge doctrine generally
discredited). At least one Massachusetts appellate court has
specifically suggested as much. E. Elec. Co. v. Taylor Woodrow
Blitman Constr. Corp., 414 N.E.2d 1023, 1028-30 (Mass. App.
Ct.), rev. denied, 441 N.E.2d 1042 (Mass. 1981). Moreover, a
First Circuit panel has previously concluded that Massachusetts'
rejection of the unity of discharge rule is not narrowly
confined. Hermes Automation Tech., Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs.
Indus. Co., 915 F.2d 739, 745-46 (1st Cir. 1990). Against all
this authority, Feldman's vague argument that partners should be
treated differently (and that Massachusetts would diverge from
the modern trend) is insufficient to carry the day.
-17-
Feldman's exhaustion defense is also unpersuasive.
Here, choice of law does not appear to matter. Rhode Island
follows the general rule that where a partner's liability is
joint only and also derivative (i.e., imposed only because the
defendant is a partner), the partnership assets must be sought
and exhausted, or shown to be unavailable, before the private
assets of an innocent partner can be seized. See Nat'l Exch.
Bank v. Galvin, 37 A. 811, 811 (R.I. 1897). Massachusetts does
not appear to have a case in point but we are told that
exhaustion in such a case is the "virtually unanimous rule," 2
Bromberg & Ribstein, supra, § 5.08(e), at 5:68, and Tilcon cites
no authority to show an exception applies.
Instead, Tilcon mainly argues that it has an
"individual judgment" against Feldman and there is nothing in
the judgment to show that Feldman's liability is derivative.
Although the district court relied tersely on this argument, we
would be surprised if the opaque language of the judgment were
conclusive, cf. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Cullen, 791
F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (Breyer, J.) (looking beyond a state
court judgment to the underlying complaint). And Tilcon offers
no serious argument that Feldman was held liable except
derivatively or that he waived the exhaustion defense (as
partners sometimes do in loan documents).
-18-
On the other hand, we agree with the district court
that Feldman is playing games with this issue. The district
court pointed out that there is no "hint anywhere in the record
that [CA] is a viable entity" and that the witness who Tilcon
has said could have nailed down CA's insolvency "was excused at
[Feldman's] request." We are thus faced with a situation in
which Tilcon has long held an unsatisfied judgment against CA
and Tilcon has not only alleged but also said how it could prove
CA's insolvency.
In response, even on this appeal, Feldman has merely
said that Tilcon failed to prove lack of partnership assets;
there is no representation that such assets exist. In this
situation, in which insolvency is suggested by circumstance and
apparently uncontested, Feldman's objection based on failure to
exhaust is not well taken. Cf. Eversley v. MBank Dallas, 843
F.2d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1988) (district court entitled to rely
on the undisputed factual allegations of a party moving for
summary judgment).
To conclude, we hold that Feldman is liable for the
entire amount of the judgment as executed by the district court
of Massachusetts and that his interests in the Kelstock Realty
Trust, Marlborough Realty Trust, and Commercial Properties Trust
are able to be reached and applied, subject to such equitable
-19-
limitations as the district court may think necessary. To this
extent, the district court's judgment is vacated and remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion; in all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Costs on both appeals
are awarded to Tilcon.
It is so ordered.
-20-
Appendix
Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, Oct. 7, 1992 (excerpt)
3) Judgment for Tilcon Gammino on Count I of its
counterclaim against Commercial Associates,
Anthony J. DelVicario, Stephen J. Watchmaker,
Neil Zais, Gerald Feldman and Thomas Prendergast
for breach of contract in the amount of
$268,903.23 plus interest from October 31, 1985,
plus additional interest on the $1,200,000.00
recovered in the mechanics' lien proceeding from
October 31, 1985 to January 24, 1991, plus costs.
Execution of Judgment in the U.S. District Court of the District
of Massachusetts, Apr. 4, 1997 (excerpt)
Plaintiff Tilcon Gammino, Inc. has
recovered judgment, jointly and severally,
against defendants' Commercial Associates,
Anthony J. DelVicario, Stephen J. Watchmaker,
Neil Zais, Gerald Feldman and Thomas Prendergast
in the United States District Court for
Massachusetts in the following amounts:
1. $268,903.23, together with pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest of $366,725.25 as of
March 14, 1997, for a total of $635,628.48.
2. $756,000, together with pre-judgment and
post-judgment interest of $401,943.60 as of March
14, 1997, for a total of $1,157,943.60.
Total combined judgment with interest as of
March 14, 1997, $1,793,572.
Final Judgment of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, Jan. 28, 2000 (excerpt)
1. The execution issued by this Court on
April 4, 1997, in the case entitled Commercial
Associates, et al. v. Tilcon Gammino, Inc., Civil
Action No. 96-10864 MBD, shall be reformed by
striking the words "and severally" as they appear
after the word "jointly" in the third paragraph
of page one;
2. Jerald R. Feldman is jointly (but not
severally) liable for the judgment issued in the
-21-
United States District Court for the District of
Rhode Island in favor of Tilcon Gammino, Inc. on
or about October 7, 1992, in the case entitled
Commercial Associates, et al. v. Tilcon Gammino,
Inc., Civil Action No. 86-748T . . . .
-22-
Tilcon Capaldi, Inc. v. Feldman
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2001-05-16
Citations: 249 F.3d 54
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion