This is a suit for damages for breach of contract and to foreclose a lien on land given to secure the performance of said contract. The contract sued on and the lien sought to be foreclosed are evidenced by the following instruments:
“This agreement made and entered into this 25th day of March, A. D. 1895, by and between S. K. McIlhenny, party of the first part, and Charles Tinsley, party of the second part. Be it known, the party of the first part hereby agrees to sell, and does sell, to party of second part, twenty thousand ($20,000) dollars, par value of Reeves and Martin County, Texas, 6 per cent bonds, being fourteen thousand ($14,000) dollars of Reeves County, Texas, compromise court house and jail bonds; two thousand ($2000) dollars of Martin County, Texas, compromise courthouse and jail bonds, and four thousand ($4000) dollars of Martin County, Texas, road and bridge compromise bonds, for the sum of fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars. Said bonds are now being held by the Planters and Mechanics National Bank of Houston, as collateral, to secure the payment of a note for fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars made and signed by James R. Masterson and party of the first part, said note being represented to party of second part by S. K. McIlhenny as being of the usual form of notes used by banks. Said party of second part, wishing to avail himself of the time said note has to run, viz., until May 6, 1895, hereby agrees and binds himself to pay,
(Signed) "Chaeles Tinsley.
"S. K. McIlhenny.
“I hereby guarantee the fulfillment of this contract by Charles Tinsley. (Signed) “Thomas Tinsley.”
“The State of Texas, County of Harris. Know all men by these presents, that Charles Tinsley and Thomas Tinsley, being justly indebted to James R. Masterson and S. K. McIlhenny in the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, for twenty thousand dollars of Reeves County and Martin County, Texas, bonds, the payment of which they desire to assure and secure to the said James R. Masterson and S. K. McIlhenny, in consideration thereof, and for the purpose set forth, and in consideration of ten dollars to me in hand paid, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, I, Thomas Tinsley, have granted, bargained and sold, and by these presents do grant, bargain, sell and convey unto James R. Masterson and S. K. McIlhenny, of the county of Harris, in the State of Texas, the following described property: An undivided interest of fifteen hundred acres in 2020 acres of the Mary Bigger survey, situate about 20 miles N. W. of Austin, in Travis County, Texas, at present owned by Thomas Tinsley free and clear of all incumbrances, except taxes, and of which a more complete description is to be found in Travis County deed records. Together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances to the same belonging. And Thomas Tinsley do bind himself, my heirs, executors and administrators to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said property unto the said James R. Masterson and S. K. McIlhenny, their heirs and assigns, against the claim or claims of any or all persons lawfully claiming the same, or any part thereof.
“This conveyance is intended as a mortgage upon the following terms, to wit: In the event the said Charles Tinsley and Thomas Tinsley shall pay to the said Masterson and McIlhenny the sum of fifteen thousand dollars for said Reeves and Martin County bonds, then all herein contained to be null and void and of no effect. The words, ‘I, Thomas Tinsley were inserted before signing; also the words ‘Thomas Tinsley’ on the second line from the bottom on the first page were inserted before signing.
“In testimony whereof, I sign my name this seventh day of May, A. D. 1895.
(Signed) “Thomas Tinsley.
“Acknowledged before Alfred Wisby on the 7th day of May, 1895.”
The defendant Charles Tinsley answered admitting the execution of the contract for the purchase of said bonds, but averred that he entered into said contract believing that the plaintiff McIlhenny was the owner of 6 per cent bonds of Reeves and Martin counties, Texas, of the “par value of $20,000,” and that the plaintiffs did not in fact own bonds of said counties of the “par value of $20,000,” nor were bonds for that amount then held by the Planters and Mechanics National Bank of Houston as collateral to secure the payment of said notes, and that plaintiffs have never at any time tendered or offered to deliver to these defendants bonds of said counties of the par value of $20,000 in accordance with the terms of said contract. He further averred that plaintiffs only owned and had in said bank at the date of said contract bonds of the face value of $19,360, and were wholly unable to carry out their said contract, to defendants’ damage in the sum of $5000; that about the date of said-contract the plaintiff McIlhenny detached from said bonds, which he had contracted to sell to defendants, coupons representing unmatured interest and 2 per cent of the principal of said bonds of the aggregate face value of $1374.40, and sold and delivered same to this defendant for a tract of land in Gray County, Texas, of the value of $1520; that this defendant did not then know that plaintiffs were unable to deliver the bonds contracted for, nor that the detaching of said coupons from said bonds would reduce them to less than $20,000 par value, and that this transaction was wholly unknown to his guarantor, Thomas Tinsley; that plaintiffs failed and refused to make up the deficiency in the face value of said bonds caused by detaching said coupons, and tried to force the defendants to take said bonds and pay the full amount of $15,000 agreed to be paid for bonds of the face value of $20,000. That on or about the date of the contract the defendant, Charles Tinsley, paid to McIlhenny $500 in cash on said contract. That on May 1, 1895, he paid $300. That on May 20, 1895, defendant sold, by and with the consent of plaintiffs and the bank, four of Reeves County bonds of the denomination of $500, less 4 per cent of the principal, retired in payment of two coupons, for the sum of $1728, which was paid to the Planters and Mechanics National Bank. That on February 27, 1896, the defendant, by and with the consent of the plaintiffs and said bank, sold twenty-four Reeves County bonds of the denomination of $500 each, less 4 per cent of the principal, which had been retired by the payment of two, coupons, for the sum of $10,075, which said amount was paid to the plaintiffs’ agent, or parties designated by the plaintiffs and the Planters and Mechanics National Bank to receive the same. That on October 4, 1897, the defendants
The defendant Thomas Tinsley adopted the answer of his codefendant, and further pleaded that in June or July, 1895, he notified the plaintiff S. K. McIlhenny that he would no longer be bound by said contract, because he had learned that there was not $20,000 worth of bonds, and never had been, attached to said note, and that by reason thereof the plaintiffs were put upon notice that they should sue at once the principal obligor in said contract, the sole party liable, if any were in fact liable to them. That subsequent to said notice the plaintiffs entered into another contract with Charles Tinsley with reference to the subject matter sued on, which said contract was in lieu and a substitution of the original contract, and that by the making of said contract 'said defendant was released from all obligation under his contract of guaranty. He further alleged that the consideration for said guaranty had failed, and said guaranty was not binding upon him for the reason that at the time of said contract and of making said guaranty, the plaintiffs did not have attached to said note $20,000 of bonds, nor in the possession of plaintiff or of said bank, and the said defendants have never tendered the bonds for said $15,000, and the guarantor had received no consideration for said promise and undertakings, as set forth in plaintiffs’ petition, and there had been a total failure of consideration for the promise and undertakings.
The cause was tried by a jury, and under instruction from the court a verdict was returned for plaintiffs for the balance due upon said $15,000 note, after crediting same with such payments as the jury found from the evidence had been made thereon by the defendants and the proceeds of the sales of said bonds. From a judgment rendered in accordance with this verdict, arid foreclosing the lien on the land described in the mortgage, the defendants below prosecute this writ of error.
The material facts disclosed by the record are as follows: The note for $15,000 due the bank was not paid at maturity, and was renewed by plaintiffs from time to time by the execution of new notes for the balance due on the original debt, after crediting same with the proceeds of the several sales of bonds. The first sale of bonds was made by Charles Tinsley in February, 1896. This was a sale of twenty-eight of the Reeves County bonds,, of face value of $14,000, the amount realized therefor being $9486.50. The next sale was of interest coupons and realized $205. This sale was in October, 1897, and was also made by Charles Tinsley. After these sales were made and the proceeds thereof paid upon the note the bank sued MeIlhenny and Master=son for the balance due upon the note. Pending this suit, Masterson, with the consent of the bank, sold eight of the bonds of the face value of $4000 for $2500, which amount was also credited upon the note. The suit then proceeded to judgment, and the bank recovered against MeIlhenny and Masterson for the balance due upon the note. Upon this judgment an execution was issued under which the remaining four bonds were sold by the sheriff and the proceeds of the sale credited upon the judgment. The balance due upon the judgment was paid or secured to be paid by Masterson. The bank did not recognize the Tinsleys as having any interest in the bonds, or as being responsible to it for the payment of the note, and its dealings in the matter were entirely with MeIlhenny and Masterson. It was agreed between the latter and Charles Tinsley that he, being a broker, should haye the sale of the bonds, and the contract before set out expressly gives him that right. Prior to the execution of the mortgage by Thomas Tinsley he and Charles Tinsley agreed, as a consideration for its execution, that he should have an interest in the profits that might be made out of the purchase and sale of the bonds. The twenty-eight Reeves County bonds sold by Charles Tinsley were sold in Austin. He notified Masterson that he had effected a sale of these bonds, and at the latter’s request the bonds were forwarded to' Austin by the bank and the money
“Having conveyed to said bank as collateral security for the payment of this note $2000 in Martin County bonds, $4000 Martin County bridge bonds, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10, for $500 each; $14,000 Reeves County bonds, Nos. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 14 to 34, inclusive, twenty-eight bonds, $500 each.”
It was admitted on the trial that Charles Tinsley was present when the instrument of date May 7, 1895, was executed by Thomas Tinsley, and knew the contents of said instrument. The execution of the original contract was also admitted by both defendants, and both defendants, by their attorney, declared that this stood upon the two instru
Upon these facts the trial court instructed the jury, in substance, that the legal effect of the written instruments introduced in evidence and of the other undisputed evidence in the case was to render the defendants liable to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $15,000 for the purchase of the bonds before described, with 6 per cent interest per annum on said $15,000 from May 6, 1895, until same was paid, with a right in the bank and plaintiffs to resell said bonds and apply the proceeds of such sale to the payment of said $15,000 obligation, and that the jury should find for plaintiffs the balance due upon said obligation, less the credits which they might find same entitled to under additional instructions given therein.
This charge is assailed by the first assignment of error on the ground that it is upon the weight of evidence, and because it instructs the jury to allow plaintiffs interest on the $15,000 note from May 7, 1895, when the contract only bound defendants to pay said note at its maturity, and further because it fixes an erroneous measure of damage, the true measure of damage being the difference between the market value of the bonds at the date of the maturity of the note and the price agreed to be paid for them by the defendants.
We do not think any of these objections to the charge are valid. It was proper for the court to construe the legal effect of the written instrument introduced in evidence, and the exercise of this prerogative does not make the charge obnoxious to the rule which forbids the court to charge upon the weight of the evidence. Dorr v. Stewart, 3 Texas, 481; San Antonio v. Lewis, 9 Texas, 71; Collins v. Ball, 82 Texas, 269.
We think the instructions that plaintiffs would be entitled to recover interest at 6 per cent from May 7, 1895, was not error of which the defendants can be heard to complain. Under a proper construction of the contract defendants might, we think, be held liable to pay the interest called for in the note from the date of the execution of the contract, and it is clear that plaintiffs were, entitled to recover interest at 6 per cent from May 7, 1895, the date on which both defendants acknowledged that they were indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of $15,000.
. As we construe. the contract plaintiffs’ cause of action is for debt rather than for damages for breach of contract for the sale of property, and it follows that .the true measure of damages is the amount due upon the note, less the credits to which the evidence shows the same to be entitled. The contract of sale of the bonds was completed and the title to the bonds vested in Charles Tinsley on the date of the execution of the contract, subject to the lien of the bank to secure the payment of the note. The original guarantor, Thomas Tinsley, by subsequent agreement with Charles Tinsley became a partner in the transaction and primarily liable for the payment of the purchase money, which liability he duly acknowledged in writing on the 7th day of May, 1895.
We are of opinion that the record shows no error that requires a reversal, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.
Affirmed.