F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
OCT 2 2002
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM O. TIPPETTS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 01-4047
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 2:00-CV-570-J)
Submitted on the briefs:
David J. Holdsworth, Sandy, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Paul M. Warner, United States Attorney, Carlie Christensen, Assistant United
States Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before EBEL , KELLY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
EBEL , Circuit Judge.
William O. Tippetts appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims for
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from
his employment with the United States Postal Service. The district court granted
the government’s motion to dismiss based on the Federal Employees
Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8152, and the Civil Service Reform
Act (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 111 (codified as amended in various
sections of 5 U.S.C.). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
reverse and remand. 1
I. Background
Mr. Tippetts worked for the Postal Service for several years. In 1997, the
Postal Service investigated his medical records relative to his workers’
compensation claim. During that investigation, Postal Service personnel
erroneously reported Mr. Tippetts’ past military records as containing a diagnosis
of major depression with psychotic features, when, in fact, Mr. Tippetts’ medical
records clearly indicated a “[h]istory of major depression without psychotic
features, secondary to physical injuries.” Apparently the Postal Service, having
misread the records, viewed Mr. Tippetts’ employment application as fraudulent
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
because Mr. Tippetts had not revealed depression with psychotic features. On
July 2, 1997, Mr. Tippetts was placed on administrative leave, but he was not
informed of the reason and he was never told during his leave period why he had
been suspended. During the three and one-half months he was on administrative
leave, he was required to call in to work every day, but no work was ever
available for him. Also during the period he was on administrative leave,
Mr. Tippetts alleges that Postal Service management personnel stated to his
coworkers that he was psychotic. In October 1997, Mr. Tippetts’ employment
with the Postal Service was terminated. He appealed his termination to the Merit
Systems Protection Board, and in January 1998, a written settlement agreement
was entered whereby Mr. Tippetts’ employment was reinstated and he was
awarded some back pay. Mr. Tippetts returned to work in January, but the back
pay was not paid until July 1998.
Mr. Tippetts filed this lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, alleging that the actions by Postal Service
management personnel caused him emotional distress and financial losses. In
addition, he asserted that in investigating and revealing his private medical
records, his right to privacy was violated. The government moved to dismiss,
claiming the court was without jurisdiction by virtue of the CSRA and the FECA.
3
Following a hearing, the district court granted the motion to dismiss and entered
judgment against Mr. Tippetts.
On appeal, Mr. Tippetts pursues his claims for invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 2
We review de novo the dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Farley v.
United States, 162 F.3d 613, 615 (10th Cir. 1998). For the reasons discussed
below, we hold that Mr. Tippetts’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress presents a substantial question of coverage by the FECA and, therefore,
must be evaluated by the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) before it can be presented
to the court. We further hold that under the circumstances of this case,
Mr. Tippetts’ invasion-of-privacy claim should also be evaluated by the Secretary
for a determination of FECA coverage.
2
Mr. Tippetts also seeks a remedy for his financial losses resulting from
being placed on administrative leave and discharged. It appears from his
complaint that these losses are characterized as part of his damages for the
alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress. If he is attempting to appeal
or enforce the settlement agreement, he has not provided sufficient argument and
authority to demonstrate his entitlement to relief from this court. See Perry v.
Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1141 n.13 (10th Cir. 1999) (This court “will not craft
a party’s arguments for him.”).
4
II. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Federal Employees’ Compensation Act is a workers’ compensation
plan for federal government employees. 20 C.F.R. § 10.0. It provides that “[t]he
United States shall pay compensation . . . for the disability or death of an
employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of
his duty . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). If a claim is covered by the FECA, the court
is without jurisdiction to consider its merits. Swafford v. United States, 998 F.2d
837, 839 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Cobia v. United States, 384 F.2d 711, 712
(10th Cir. 1967)). The Secretary’s determination that the FECA applies
forecloses an FTCA claim, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c); see also Southwest Marine, Inc. v.
Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 90 (1991) (“[T]he courts have no jurisdiction over FTCA
claims where the Secretary of Labor determines that FECA applies.”); Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1983) (noting FECA’s
exclusive-liability provision guarantees employees “the right to receive
immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but
in return they lose the right to sue the Government.”). If the FECA applies, the
FTCA claim must be dismissed even if benefits are not actually awarded by the
Secretary. Farley, 162 F.3d at 616.
The Secretary must determine, as an initial matter, whether a claim falls
within the purview of the FECA. Id. When a claim is presented to the court
5
without having first been submitted to the Secretary for a ruling on FECA
coverage, the court must permit the Secretary to evaluate the claim if there is a
substantial question that FECA coverage exists. Farley, 162 F.3d at 616. “A
substantial question regarding [FECA] coverage exists unless it is certain the
Secretary would not find coverage.” Id. at 615-16.
Mr. Tippetts argues that emotional distress does not qualify as “personal
injury” covered by the FECA. See 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). There is some support for
this position. See Sheehan v. United States , 896 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.)
(“FECA compensates government employees only for physical harm.”), modified
on other grounds , 917 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. DeFord v. Sec’y of Labor ,
700 F.2d 281, 290 (6th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that FECA does not cover mental
distress for intentional discrimination). Circuit precedent, however, directs a
finding that Mr. Tippetts’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
presents a substantial question of FECA coverage. Farley , 162 F.3d at 615-16
(claiming emotional distress resulting from sexual discrimination); Swafford , 998
F.2d at 838 (claiming emotional distress from sexual harassment by another
employee); accord Bennett v. Barnett , 210 F.3d 272, 274, 278 (5th Cir. 2000)
(claiming emotional distress from on-the-job harassment); McDaniel v. United
States , 970 F.2d 194, 195-97 (6th Cir. 1992) (Secretary determined that
claimant’s emotional injuries caused by supervisor’s harassment were covered by
6
FECA); see generally Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, Federal Compensation
Acts, In Nature of Workers’ Compensation Acts, As Affecting Recovery Against
United States Under Federal Tort Claims Act , 135 A.L.R. Fed. 403 (1996).
Mr. Tippetts also argues that the FECA does not apply to him because he
was not performing any work duties during the time his emotional-distress claim
accrued by virtue of the fact that he was on administrative leave. It is for the
Secretary to determine whether an injury occurred during the employee’s
performance of his duty. Tarver v. United States, 25 F.3d 900, 903 (10th Cir.
1994). To the extent Mr. Tippetts claims his suffering and financial hardship
after his employment was terminated are outside FECA coverage, we look to
whether the claim arose from the employment context. Id. ; cf. Lombardi v. Small
Bus. Admin. , 889 F.2d 959, 961 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding CSRA controlled
plaintiff’s claims which arose as result of employment relationship).
Mr. Tippetts further maintains that because his claim is for intentional,
rather than negligent, acts, the FECA does not apply. But the FECA’s
“applicability turns on whether the injury was suffered in the performance of the
employee’s duty. Except for those exclusions noted in the statute, [which do not
apply here,] it does not matter whether the injury was caused by an intentional or
negligent act.” Farley , 162 F.3d at 616 n.3. Moreover, the fact that Mr. Tippetts’
emotional distress was not accompanied by physical manifestations or emotional
7
illness does not remove the question from the Secretary’s purview. See, e.g. , id.
at 614-15 (claiming emotional injury; no claim of illness or physical injury).
Accordingly, because we have determined that there is a substantial
question that Mr. Tippetts’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
is covered by the FECA, we must remand to the district court with instructions to
reinstate the claim and to abate the proceedings pending a determination by the
Secretary whether it is covered by the FECA. Farley , 162 F.3d at 616; Hudiburgh
v. United States , 626 F.2d 813, 814 (10th Cir. 1980).
We are aware that the statute of limitations may have run on this claim.
5 U.S.C. § 8122(a) (requiring claims to be filed within three years after injury).
The Secretary has the discretion, however, to waive the limitations period. Id.
§ 8122(d)(3). We decline to predict whether the Secretary would exercise that
discretion, but even if she rules that the claim is filed too late, she must determine
whether the claim falls within FECA coverage. See Concordia v. United States
Postal Serv. , 585 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cir. 1978). This determination is for the
Secretary and must be made in order to permit the court to know whether to
entertain Mr. Tippetts’ emotional-distress claim under the FTCA. If the FECA
does not cover this claim, the district court may find that it is preempted by the
CSRA, but it is premature to evaluate the claim before the Secretary has ruled.
See Farley , 162 F.3d at 616.
8
III. Invasion of Privacy
Mr. Tippetts alleges that his right to privacy was violated by Postal Service
supervisory personnel when they investigated his medical file, conveyed false
information to other Postal Service supervisors, placed him on administrative
leave, and required him to call in every day even though there was no work for
him. 3 He also alleges that supervisors told his coworkers he was “psychotic,”
which we characterize as a claim of defamation.
We are aware of no cases holding that a claim of invasion of privacy or
defamation is covered by the FECA. Similarly, we know of no cases clearly
holding that these claims are not covered. The parties have not provided
arguments and authorities on this point. Therefore, we decline to say whether
Mr. Tippetts’ invasion-of-privacy and defamation claims present a substantial
question of FECA coverage. But because these claims are closely related to his
emotional-distress claim and they arise from the same facts, we determine that it
is prudent to transfer these claims to the Secretary for an initial determination of
whether they are covered by the FECA. If she determines they are not covered,
then the claims will again be before the district court. As with the
3
We assume, without deciding, that Mr. Tippetts could make a prima facie
case of one or more of the four types of invasion of privacy recognized under
Utah law. See Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374, 377-80
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (discussing four privacy torts).
9
emotional-distress claim, we do not yet assess whether the CSRA would preempt
the claims of invasion of privacy and defamation. Accordingly, we remand
Mr. Tippetts’ invasion-of-privacy and defamation claims to the district court with
instructions to reinstate them and to abate the proceedings pending a
determination by the Secretary whether they are covered by the FECA. Even if
the Secretary determines that the limitations period has expired, she must
determine whether the claims fall within FECA coverage.
IV. Conclusion
Mr. Tippetts’ claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress presents a
substantial question of FECA coverage and, therefore, must be submitted to the
Secretary for a determination of coverage. Although the issue of FECA coverage
is uncertain for his claims of invasion of privacy and defamation, under the
circumstances of this case, we determine that it is most efficient to obtain a
coverage ruling from the Secretary in conjunction with her ruling on the
emotional-distress claim. Even if the Secretary determines that the statute of
limitations has run on the claims, she must announce whether she would have
taken jurisdiction if the statute if the limitations period had not expired. The
district court’s order dismissing Mr. Tippetts’ case is REVERSED and
REMANDED with instructions to reinstate it, but hold it in abeyance, pending
a determination by the Secretary.
10
Tippetts v. United States
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2002-10-02
Citations: 308 F.3d 1091
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