Case: 20-60750 Document: 00516033500 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/28/2021
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 28, 2021
No. 20-60750 Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Yanira Del Carmen Torres-De Cabrera; Anderson
Cabrera-Torres; Kevin Cabrera-Torres,
Petitioners,
versus
Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A209 228 524
BIA No. A209 228 523
BIA No. A209 228 704
Before Wiener, Dennis, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 20-60750
Yanira Del Carmen Torres-De Cabrera and her minor children are
natives and citizens of El Salvador. They petition for review of the denial of
their application for asylum and withholding of removal.
This court reviews the final decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) and will only consider the decision of the immigration judge
where it influenced the decision of the BIA. See Zhu v. Gonzales, 493 F.3d
588, 593 (5th Cir. 2007). Questions of law are reviewed de novo and factual
findings for substantial evidence. See id. at 594; Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d
531, 536 (5th Cir. 2009). Under the substantial evidence standard, this court
may not reverse an immigration court’s factual findings unless “the evidence
was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it.”
Wang, 569 F.3d at 537. Whether an applicant is eligible for asylum or
withholding of removal is a factual finding. See Chen v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d
1131, 1134 (5th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted).
To be eligible for asylum, the petitioners must show they are unable
or unwilling to return to El Salvador “because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of,” as relevant here, “membership
in a particular social group [(PSG)].” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A); see also 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). Petitioners assert there is substantial evidence that, if
removed, they would suffer persecution on account of Torres-De Cabrera’s
membership in a PSG of “Salvadoran women who fear violence and
delinquency in their home country.” This court has declined to recognize as
cognizable PSGs that are “exceedingly broad and encompass[] a diverse
cross section of society.” Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th
Cir. 2012). Petitioners fail to show their proposed PSG is more than a “catch
all” of persons fearing persecution. See id. at 518-19. 1
1
We lack jurisdiction over Torres-De Cabrera’s briefing regarding narrowing her
PSG due to her failure to raise it below. See Omari v. Holder, 562 F.3d 314, 319 (5th Cir.
2009) (holding that the 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional). To
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No. 20-60750
This court has also consistently held that “[b]ecause the level of proof
required to establish eligibility for withholding of removal is higher than that
required for asylum, failure to establish eligibility for asylum is dispositive of
claims for withholding of removal.” Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 595 (5th
Cir. 2006); see Munoz-Granados v. Barr, 958 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 2020).
Because petitioners fail to demonstrate their membership in a cognizable
PSG as required for asylum, they necessarily fail to satisfy the more stringent
standard for withholding of removal. See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 906
(5th Cir. 2002).
DENIED.
the extent Torres-De Cabrera contends that the IJ was required to ensure that her PSG was
consistent with her testimony and failed to do so, we have explained that an IJ “does not
have a duty to act as an advocate for the alien” particularly where, as here, the applicant is
represented by counsel. Arteaga-Ramirez v. Barr, 954 F.3d 812, 813 (5th Cir. 2020).
3