The Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the separate motions of BWC and Tempositions which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against each of them. “[A] teacher owes it to his [or her] charges to exercise such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence would observe in comparable circumstances” (Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d 44, 49 [1994] [internal quotation marks omitted]). “Schools are not insurers of safety, however, for they cannot reasonably be expected to continuously supervise and control all movements and activities of students; therefore schools are not to be held liable for every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may injure another” (id. at 49 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “[T]o impose liability . . . based on inadequate supervision, the injuries to the plaintiff must have been foreseeable and proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision” (Nash v Port Wash. Union Free School Dist., 83 AD3d 136, 149 [2011] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, BWC and Tempositions each made a prima facie showing of their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, establishing, prima facie, that the substitute teacher provided adequate supervision, and that any alleged inadequacy in the level of supervision was not a proximate cause of the accident (see Mirand v City of New York, 84 NY2d at 50-51; Schleef
In light of our determination, we need not reach BWC’s remaining contentions. Angiolillo, J.E, Lott, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur. [Prior Case History: 27 Misc 3d 1205(A), 2010 NY Slip Op 5055KU).]