Trans Union LLC v. Federal Trade Commission

                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

          Argued May 3, 2002      Decided July 16, 2002 

                           No. 01-5202

                        Trans Union LLC, 
                            Appellant

                                v.

                Federal Trade Commission, et al., 
                            Appellees

          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  for the District of Columbia 
                         (No. 00cv02087)

     Ernest Gellhorn argued the cause for the appellant.  Roger 
L. Longtin and Stephen L. Agin were on brief.  Mary E. 
Gately entered an appearance.

     John F. Daly, Counsel, Federal Trade Commission, argued 
the cause for the appellees.  Lawrence DeMille-Wagman and 
Michael D. Bergman, Attorneys, Federal Trade Commission;  
Jeanette Roach, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-

ration;  Alisa B. Klein and Mark B. Stern, Attorneys, United 
States Department of Justice;  Rosa M. Koppel, Attorney, 
United States Department of Treasury;  Thomas J. Segal, 
Deputy Chief Counsel, and Elizabeth R. Moore, Counsel, 
Office of Thrift Supervision;  and Katherine H. Wheatley, 
Assistant General Counsel, Board of Governors of Federal 
Reserve System, were on brief.  Richard M. Ashton, Associ-
ate General Counsel, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve 
System;  Gregory F. Taylor, Counsel, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation;  and Larry J. Stein, Attorney, United 
States Department of Treasury, entered appearances.

     Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, State of California, and 
Susan E. Henrichsen, Deputy Attorney General, State of 
California, were on brief for the amici curiae in support of 
the appellees.

     Before:  Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit 
Judges.

     Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

     Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge:  Trans Union, 
LLC, a "credit reporting agency" (CRA) under the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. ss 1681 et seq.,1 
challenges regulations promulgated by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and other federal agencies2 to implement 
__________
     1 The FCRA defines a CRA as

     any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative 
     nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the 
     practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit informa-
     tion or other information on consumers for the purpose of 
     furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses 
     any means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of 
     preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
     
15 U.S.C. s 1681a(f).  The parties agree that Trans Union comes 
within this definition.  See Appellant's Br. at 3;  Appellees' Br. at 
12.

     2 The other federal agencies sued in this action are the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal 

the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. ss 6801 et seq.).  Trans Union contends the 
regulations unlawfully restrict a CRA's ability to disclose and 
reuse certain consumer information because (1) a CRA is not 
a "financial institution" subject to the FTC's rulemaking 
authority under the GLBA;  (2) the regulations' definition of 
the statutory term "personally identifiable financial informa-
tion" (PIFI) is overbroad;  (3) the regulations' restrictions on 
reuse of information are inconsistent with the GLBA;  and (4) 
the challenged regulations infringe Trans Union's right of 
free speech under the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The district court rejected these challenges 
and upheld the regulations.  For the reasons set out below, 
we affirm the district court's decision.

                                I.

     The Congress enacted the GLBA in order "[t]o enhance 
competition in the financial services industry," Pub. L. No. 
106-102, 113 Stat. at 1338, by "eliminat[ing] many Federal 
and State law barriers to affiliations among banks and securi-
ties firms, insurance companies, and other financial service 
providers," H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-434 at 1 (1999).  Title V 
of the GLBA contains a number of provisions designed to 
protect the privacy of "nonpublic personal information" (NPI) 
that consumers provide to financial institutions, see 15 U.S.C. 
ss 6801-6809, reflecting "the policy of the Congress that each 
financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obli-
gation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect 
the security and confidentiality of those customers' nonpublic 
personal information," 15 U.S.C. s 6801(a).  The GLBA re-
stricts the ability of a "financial institution" to disclose NPI to 
a nonaffiliated third party by requiring (subject to certain 
exceptions not pertinent here) that the financial institution 
provide the consumer with notice of the institution's disclo-

__________
Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National Credit Union 
Administration.  This opinion will refer to the appellee agencies, 
collectively, as the FTC.

sure policies and the opportunity for the consumer to "opt 
out" of disclosure.  Id.  s 6802(a)-(b), (e).  The GLBA fur-
ther mandates that an unaffiliated third party recipient of 
NPI "shall not, directly or through an affiliate of such receiv-
ing third party, disclose such information to any other person 
that is a nonaffiliated third party of both the financial institu-
tion and such receiving third party, unless such disclosure 
would be lawful if made directly to such other person by the 
financial institution."  Id.  s 6802(c).

     To implement its disclosure restrictions, the GLBA gives 
the FTC and other agencies broad rulemaking authority:

     (a) Regulatory authority
     
          (1) Rulemaking
          
          The Federal banking agencies, the National Credit 
          Union Administration, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
          the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the 
          Federal Trade Commission shall each prescribe, after 
          consultation as appropriate with representatives of 
          State insurance authorities designated by the National 
          Association of Insurance Commissioners, such regula-
          tions as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of 
          this subchapter with respect to the financial institu-
          tions subject to their jurisdiction under section 6805 of 
          this title.
          
15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1).  Section 6805(a) further provides for 
enforcement of both the GLBA and the regulations promul-
gated pursuant thereto "by the Federal functional regulators, 
the State insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Com-
mission with respect to financial institutions and other per-
sons subject to their jurisdiction under applicable law," as 
described in section 6805(a).  Id. s 6805(a).  The first six 
paragraphs of section 6805(a) specify under what authority 
and by which agencies the GLBA and the regulations are to 
be enforced against banks, savings associations, commercial 
lending companies, credit unions, securities brokers and deal-
ers, investment companies, investment advisers and insurance 
providers.  See id. U.S.C. s 6805(a)(1)-(6).  The final, catchall 
paragraph of section 6805(a) mandates enforcement "[u]nder 

the Federal Trade Commission Act by the Federal Trade 
Commission for any other financial institution or other person 
that is not subject to the jurisdiction of any agency or 
authority under paragraphs (1) through (6)."  Id. 
s 6805(a)(7).  CRAs are not among the entities identified in 
the first six paragraphs.

     On May 24, 2000 the FTC published its Final Rule on 
"Privacy of Consumer Financial Information," 65 Fed. Reg. 
33,646, setting forth regulations comparable to and consistent 
with those promulgated by other federal agencies.  See 65 
Fed. Reg. at 33,646 n.3.3  On August 30, 2000 Trans Union 
filed an action in the district court challenging the FTC's 
regulations on the grounds, inter alia, that (1) a CRA is not a 
"financial institution" subject to the FTC's rulemaking au-
thority under 15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1);  (2) the FTC overbroad-
ly defined PIFI;  (3) the regulations' restrictions on reuse of 
consumer information are inconsistent with the GLBA;  and 
(4) the regulations violate Trans Union's First Amendment 
free speech right.  In a memorandum opinion and order filed 
April 30, 2001, the district court rejected all of Trans Union's 
objections and granted summary judgment in the agencies' 
favor.  See Individual References Serv. Group, Inc. v. FTC, 
145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001).  Trans Union filed a notice 
of appeal on June 20, 2001 challenging the regulations on the 
four grounds enumerated above.

                               II.

     The court reviews the district court's summary judgment 
decision de novo and "we may affirm only if 'there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact [and] the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' "  Gilvin v. Fire, 
259 F.3d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. 

__________
     3 We hereafter expressly address only the regulations adopted by 
the FTC because it is the agency with jurisdiction over CRAs and 
thus with authority to enforce the GLBA and regulations promul-
gated thereunder against appellant Trans Union under 15 U.S.C. 
s 6805(a)(6).

Civ. P. 56(c))).  We conclude the FTC is entitled to summary 
judgment under this standard and therefore affirm the dis-
trict court.  We address each of Trans Union's arguments 
seriatim.

                  A. Authority to Regulate CRAs

     First, Trans Union asserts the FTC lacks authority to 
promulgate regulations governing CRAs because a CRA is 
not a "financial institution" subject to the FTC's regulatory 
authority under 15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1).  In reviewing the 
FTC's interpretation of the GLBA, we use the familiar Chev-
ron analysis:

     If ... " 'Congress has directly spoken to the precise 
     question at issue,' " we "must give effect to Congress's 
     'unambiguously expressed intent.' " Secretary of Labor v. 
     [Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n], 111 F.3d 
     913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Chevron USA, Inc. v. 
     Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
     842, 104 S.C. 2778, 81 LED.2d 694 (1984)).  "If 'the 
     statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
     issue,' we ask whether the agency's position rests on a 
     'permissible construction of the statute.' "  Id. (quoting 
     Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.C. 2778).
     
National Multi Housing Council v. EPA, 292 F.3d 232, ___ 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Cyprus Emerald Resources Corp. v. 
Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 195 F.3d 42, 45 
(D.C. Cir. 1999)).  To the extent that the statutory term 
"financial institution" may be ambiguous, we believe the FTC 
reasonably construed the term to apply to a CRA.

     Section 6809 of title 15 defines "financial institution" as 
"any institution the business of which is engaging in financial 
activities as described in section 1843(k) of Title 12."  Section 
1843(k)(4) of title 12 in turn defines "activities that are 
financial in nature" to include "[e]ngaging in any activity that 
the [Federal Reserve] Board has determined, by order or 
regulation that is in effect on November 12, 1999, to be so 
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks 
as to be a proper incident thereto (subject to the same terms 

and conditions contained in such order or regulation, unless 
modified by the Board)."  On February 28, 1997, the Federal 
Reserve Board promulgated a regulation, still "in effect on 
November 12, 1999," which expressly identifies as among 
"activities ... so closely related to banking or managing or 
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto" those 
activities that "are usual in connection with making, acquir-
ing, brokering or servicing loans or other extensions of cred-
it," including:

     Credit bureau services. Maintaining information related 
     to the credit history of consumers and providing the 
     information to a credit grantor who is considering a 
     borrower's application for credit or who has extended 
     credit to the borrower.
     
Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Reg-
ulation Y), 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9329 (1997) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. s 225.28(b)(2)(v)).  Because the Federal Reserve 
Board's regulation characterizes credit bureau services as "so 
closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks 
as to be a proper incident thereto," we conclude the FTC 
permissibly determined that Trans Union, which provides 
such services, see Appellant's Brief at 3, comes within the 
GLBA's definition of a "financial institution"4 and is therefore 

__________
     4 Trans Union also contends the FTC is precluded from regulat-
ing a CRA's disclosure of consumer report information by virtue of 
the GLBA's "savings" clause:

     [N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to modify, limit, or 
     supersede the operation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and 
     no inference shall be drawn on the basis of the provisions of 
     this chapter regarding whether information is transaction or 
     experience information under section 1681a of this title.
     
15 U.S.C. s 6806.  Trans Union reasons that because the FCRA 
authorizes a CRA to furnish consumer reports, the FTC may not 
place restrictions on a CRA's disclosure of credit report informa-
tion.  The FCRA, however, expressly limits a CRA's authority to 
furnish reports to specific, enumerated types of information, see 15 
U.S.C.  s 1681a(d), and to specific, enumerated "circumstances and 
no other," 15 U.S.C. s 1681b(a).  Thus, the savings clause does not 

subject to its rulemaking authority under 15 U.S.C. 
s 6804(a)(1).

            B. Definition of "Personally Identifiable 
                         Financial Information"

     Next, Trans Union challenges the FTC's definition of PIFI.  
Both the GLBA and the regulations define NPI5 in terms of 
PIFI.  The GLBA does not define PIFI but the FTC regula-
tions define the term to mean

     any information:
     
           (i) A consumer provides to you [the financial institu-
          tion] to obtain a financial product or service from you;
          
           (ii) About a consumer resulting from any transaction 
          involving a financial product or service between you 
          and a consumer;  or
          
           (iii) You otherwise obtain about a consumer in con-
          nection with providing a financial product or service to 
          that consumer.
_________
prevent the FTC from restricting a CRA's disclosure either of 
unenumerated types of information or under unenumerated circum-
stances.
     5 The GLBA defines NPI as
     personally identifiable financial information--
           (i) provided by a consumer to a financial institution;
           
          (ii) resulting from any transaction with the consumer or any 
          service performed for the consumer;  or
          
          (iii) otherwise obtained by the financial institution.
          
 15 U.S.C. s 6809(4)(A).  The FTC regulations define NPI as

     (i) Personally identifiable financial information;  and
     
     (ii) Any list, description, or other grouping of consumers (and 
     publicly available information pertaining to them) that is de-
     rived using any personally identifiable financial information 
     that is not publicly available.
16 C.F.R. s 313.3(n)(1).

16 C.F.R. s 313.3(o)(1)(i)-(iii).6  This broad definition of PIFI 
"treat[s] any personally identifiable information as financial if 
it was obtained by a financial institution in connection with 
providing a financial product or service to a consumer."  65 
Fed. Reg. at 33,658.  Trans Union challenges the definition 
on two grounds, both of which we reject.

     First, Trans Union asserts the FTC's definition of PIFI is 
ultra vires because the GLBA does not expressly confer 
authority to define PIFI as it does the term "publicly avail-
able information."  See 15 U.S.C. s 6809(4)(B) (term "non-
public personal information" "does not include publicly avail-
able information, as such term is defined by the regulations 
__________
     6 The regulation provides the following examples of PIFI:
          (A) Information a consumer provides to you on an applica-
     tion to obtain a loan, credit card, or other financial product or 
     service;
          (B) Account balance information, payment history, overdraft 
     history, and credit or debit card purchase information;
          (C) The fact that an individual is or has been one of your 
     customers or has obtained a financial product or service from 
     you;
         (D) Any information about your consumer if it is disclosed in 
     a manner that indicates that the individual is or has been your 
     consumer;
     
          (E) Any information that a consumer provides to you or that 
     you or your agent otherwise obtain in connection with collect-
     ing on, or servicing, a credit account;
     
          (F) Any information you collect through an Internet "cookie" 
     (an information collecting device from a web server);  and
     
          (G) Information from a consumer report. 
 116 C.F.R. 313.3(o)(2)(i).  The regulation expressly excludes the 
following from the definition of PIFI:

          (A) A list of names and addresses of customers of an entity 
     that is not a financial institution;  and
          (B) Information that does not identify a consumer, such as 
     aggregate information or blind data that does not contain 
     personal identifiers such as account numbers, names, or ad-
     dresses.
116 C.F.R. 313.3(o)(2)(ii).

prescribed under section 6804 of this title").  We disagree.  
"Where ... Congress enacts an ambiguous provision within a 
statute entrusted to the agency's expertise, it has 'implicitly 
delegated to the agency the power to fill those gaps.' "  
County of Los Angeles v. Shalala, 192 F.3d 1005, 1016 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (quoting National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. 
FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1569 (D.C. Cir. 1987);  citing Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 843-44);  see also Women Involved in Farm 
Economics v. USDA, 876 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(noting "the presumptive delegation to agencies of authority 
to define ambiguous or imprecise terms we apply under the 
Chevron doctrine"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990).  Thus,

     administrative implementation of a particular statutory 
     provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears 
     that Congress delegated authority to the agency general-
     ly to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
     agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgat-
     ed in the exercise of that authority.  Delegation of such 
     authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an 
     agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-
     comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a 
     comparable congressional intent.
     
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).  
The GLBA is silent on the meaning of PIFI and, as is 
apparent from the parties' differing positions and from our 
discussion of the term's meaning infra, the term itself is not 
without ambiguity.  Accordingly, we conclude that the FTC is 
authorized to define PIFI and that its definition is entitled to 
Chevron deference, given the broad rulemaking authority the 
GLBA confers on the FTC (and the other agencies) to 
"prescribe ... such regulations as may be necessary to carry 
out the purposes of [the act] with respect to the financial 
institutions subject to their jurisdiction under section 6805 of 
this title."  15 U.S.C. s 6804(a)(1).

     Trans Union next challenges the FTC's definition of PIFI 
insofar as it encompasses information appearing in consumer 
credit report headers, such as name, address, telephone num-
ber and social security number, which, Trans Union contends, 
is not "financial" information and therefore does not come 

within the GLBA's definition of NPI as "personally identifi-
able financial information."  15 U.S.C. s 6809(4)(A) (empha-
sis added).  Because, as noted above, the GLBA is silent on 
the meaning of PIFI, we review the FTC's interpretation of 
the term under Chevron only to determine if it is a permissi-
ble one.  We conclude that it is.

     Trans Union contends the term "financial" in PIFI must be 
given its "plain meaning" and therefore must be applied only 
to information that "describes [an individual's] financial condi-
tion."  Appellant's Br. at 21.  We disagree.  The dictionary 
defines "financial" expansively to mean "relating to finance 
and financiers."  Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 851 
(1993);  see also V Oxford English Dictionary 921 (2d ed.1989) 
(defining "financial" as "[o]f, pertaining, or relating to finance 
or money matters").  Given the breadth of the definition, we 
cannot conclude the Congress unambiguously intended the 
restrictive "plain meaning" Trans Union espouses.  Similarly, 
we cannot rule out the FTC's broad interpretation of "finan-
cial" to encompass any information that "is requested by a 
financial institution for the purpose of providing a financial 
product or service," 65 Fed. Reg. at 33,658, inasmuch as all 
such information can be fairly characterized as "relating to 
finance and financiers."  The FTC explained that its "ap-
proach is consistent with the broad definition of 'financial 
institution' used in the statute, which encompasses not only 
traditional financial activities (such as banks, mortgage lend-
ers, finance companies), but also a large number of entities 
that engage in activities not traditionally considered financial 
(such as financial career counselors, insurance companies, and 
data processors)."  65 Fed. Reg. at 33,658.  While the FTC 
could have defined "financial" more narrowly, the meaning it 
chose is nevertheless a permissible one.  Accordingly, under 
Chevron, we defer to the FTC's interpretation.

                      C. "Reuse" Regulation

     Next, Trans Union raises two objections to the "reuse" 
restrictions set out in 16 C.F.R. s 313.11 which limit the 
manner in which a third party, such as a CRA, may "use" 
information it receives from a financial institution, as, for 

example, in a credit report request.  We reject each chal-
lenge.

     First, Trans Union contends the regulation exceeds the 
FTC's authority under the GLBA because it prohibits a CRA 
from using "aggregated information" about consumers, which 
contains no "personally identifiable" information, while 15 
U.S.C. s 6802(c) prohibits a third party from reusing only 
"nonpublic personal information."  We reject this challenge 
as not yet ripe.

     "To determine whether a controversy is ripe for judicial 
review the court must evaluate 'the fitness of the issues for 
judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withhold-
ing court consideration.' "  General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 
F.3d 377, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).  Whether the FTC may 
lawfully prevent disclosure of aggregated data by CRAs is 
plainly not yet fit for judicial decision.  The FTC (as well as 
the other agencies) has not determined whether or to what 
extent aggregation should be considered "use" within the 
meaning of 16 C.F.R. s 313.11.  See Appellees' Br. at 44 n.26 
("None of the agencies has taken any enforcement action or 
issued any formal guidance on such issues.");  5/3/2002 Oral 
Arg. Tr. at 42 ("[I]t's an open issue at the agencies.  I think if 
you look at the rule-making record, the statement of basis 
and purpose, it's quite clear that when the agencies were 
promulgating the use restriction, aggregation was not even 
discussed.").  Unless and until the FTC determines that use 
includes aggregation, and at what level, the issue is not fit for 
the court to consider and Trans Union suffers no hardship 
from the court's withholding consideration of the issue.

     Second, Trans Union contends the reuse regulation improp-
erly prohibits CRAs from reusing account numbers for mar-
keting purposes in violation of section 6802(d) which, Trans 
Union contends, expressly exempts CRAs from all restric-
tions on marketing account numbers.  We conclude the FTC 
reasonably construed section 6802(d) otherwise.  Section 
6802(d) establishes a flat prohibition on disclosure by a finan-
cial institution of consumer account numbers with no provi-

sion for waiver by the consumer pursuant to the opt-out 
provisions in section 6802(b):  "A financial institution shall not 
disclose, other than to a consumer reporting agency, an 
account number or similar form of access number or access 
code for a credit card account, deposit account, or transaction 
account of a consumer to any nonaffiliated third party for use 
in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or other marketing 
through electronic mail to the consumer."  15 U.S.C. 
s 6802(d).  The FTC has interpreted the language "other 
than to a consumer reporting agency" to create a narrow 
exception that permits a financial institution to disclose an 
account number to a CRA only for the specific marketing 
purposes expressly authorized in section 605(c)(1)(B) of the 
FCRA, namely "in connection with [a] credit or insurance 
transaction that is not initiated by the consumer" if "the 
transaction consists of a firm offer of credit or insurance," 15 
U.S.C. s 1681b(c)(1)(B).  In other words, the FTC maintains, 
the Congress inserted the exception into section 6802(d) 
solely to prevent a conflict between this section and FCRA 
s 605(c)(1)(B) which authorizes such marketing disclosure.  
We find the FTC's interpretation is both plausible and consis-
tent with the plain intent of section 6802(d) to more tightly 
restrict disclosure of account numbers than of other NPI.  If 
the exception were read as broadly as Trans Union advo-
cates--to permit unfettered marketing use of an account 
number by a CRA--the account number would enjoy less, not 
more, protection than other NPI because it could be disclosed 
without any opportunity for the consumer to opt out.

                          D. Free Speech

     Finally, Trans Union contends the regulations' restrictions 
on disclosure and reuse violate its First Amendment right of 
free speech because they prevent Trans Union from dissemi-
nating truthful nonpersonal information.  To the extent the 
challenge goes to the reuse of aggregated information, we 
conclude it is not ripe for the reasons set out supra, p. 12.  
With regard to the other challenged restrictions, we conclude 
Trans Union's First Amendment arguments are foreclosed by 
our opinion in Trans Union Corp. v. FTC (Trans Union I), 

245 F.3d 809, reh'g denied, 267 F.3d 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2386 (June 10, 2002).

     First, Trans Union asserts the regulations do not survive 
strict scrutiny review.  In Trans Union I, however, the court 
expressly held that "information about individual consumers 
and their credit performance" in Trans Union's marketing 
lists is not subject to strict scrutiny because it "is solely of 
interest to the company and its business customers and 
relates to no matter of public concern."  245 F.3d at 818.  
The information Trans Union wishes to disclose here likewise 
implicates no public concern and therefore, as in Trans 
Union I, "warrant[s] 'reduced constitutional protection.' "  Id. 
(quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 
472 U.S. 749, 762 n.8 (1985)).

     Trans Union next argues that even if its contemplated 
marketing qualifies only as commercial speech, the regula-
tions do not pass constitutional muster for several reasons.  
Trans Union first contends the regulations do not advance a 
substantial state interest.  See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) ("In 
commercial speech cases, ... we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.").  This argument as 
well is precluded by Trans Union I which expressly recog-
nized that the governmental interest in "protecting the priva-
cy of consumer credit information" "is substantial."  245 F.3d 
at 819.  Trans Union also contends the FTC did not satisfy 
its burden of identifying a harm that the regulation alleviates 
to a material degree.  See Greater New Orleans Broadcast-
ing Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999) 
(under Central Hudson test, "governmental body seeking to 
sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate 
that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will 
in fact alleviate them to a material degree") (quoting Eden-
field v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993)).  On rehearing in 
Trans Union I, however, the court concluded that "the 
government cannot promote its interest (protection of person-
al financial data) except by regulating speech because the 
speech itself (dissemination of financial data) causes the very 

harm the government seeks to prevent."  Trans Union v. 
FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The same is true 
here.  Finally, Trans Union asserts the regulations are over-
broad.  See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 ("laws restricting 
commercial speech" must "be tailored in a reasonable manner 
to serve a substantial state interest in order to survive First 
Amendment scrutiny") (citing Board of Trustees of State 
University of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989);  Central 
Hudson, 447 U.S., at 564).  As we noted on rehearing in 
Trans Union I, regulations such as these, which "[a]im[ ] 
directly at [their] intended target," "ha[ve] neither indirect 
nor unintended effects on speech" and "therefore sweep[ ] 
only as broadly as necessary to accomplish [their] goal:  
protecting the privacy of personal financial information."  267 
F.3d at 1142-43.  Trans Union has not proposed any specific 
means by which "the Government could achieve its interests 
in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts 
less speech."  Thompson v. Western States Med. Ctr., 122 
S. Ct. 1497, 1506 (2002).  The only alternative Trans Union 
suggests--allowing CRAs to use a notice and opt-out mecha-
nism as other financial institutions do--is not significantly 
narrower than the regulations' present restrictions under 
which a consumer is already provided notice and opportunity 
to opt out by the financial institution with which he conducts 
the transaction in the first instance.  There is no reason to 
believe a consumer would be more eager to relinquish his 
privacy right to a CRA that subsequently obtains his NPI 
than he was to the financial institution with which he initially 
dealt.

     For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court 
is

                                                                 Affirmed.