F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 6 2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-2049
RICARDO AGUIRRE-TELLO,
Defendant - Appellee.
ON REHEARING EN BANC
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. NO. CR-01-0284-MV)
Laura Fashing, Assistant United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico
(David C. Iglesias, United States Attorney, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and
Peter S. Levitt, Assistant United States Attorney, Las Cruces, New Mexico, on the
briefs), for Plaintiff - Appellant.
Felipe D.J. Millan, El Paso, Texas, for the Defendant - Appellee.
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, HOLLOWAY, SEYMOUR, ANDERSON,
EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE, LUCERO, MURPHY, HARTZ,
O’BRIEN, McCONNELL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
The United States appeals from an order of the district court dismissing the
indictment against defendant/appellee Ricardo Aguirre-Tello, charging him with
illegal re-entry into the United States after having been deported, in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). The district court dismissed the charge after concluding
that Aguirre-Tello’s underlying deportation proceeding had been fundamentally
unfair. A divided panel of this court affirmed.
We granted the government’s petition for rehearing en banc, with particular
attention to the following two questions: (1) whether Aguirre-Tello had a
constitutional right to be informed of discretionary relief in the form of a waiver
from deportation that might be available to him; and (2) whether he had
established that deficiencies in his deportation proceeding caused him prejudice,
defined by the panel majority as a reasonable probability that he would have
received a waiver from deportation had he applied for one. Answering both
questions in the negative, as well as addressing the remaining arguments made to
the original panel, we now reverse the judgment of the district court and remand
for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
Aguirre-Tello was born in Mexico in 1969. He testified before the district
court that he first came to the United States with his parents in 1973, and his
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attorney told the district court that he had been in this country ever since. He was
not in this country legally, however, until August 1987, when he was granted an
immigration visa.
In November 1989, Aguirre-Tello was convicted in California state court of
attempted murder, and was sentenced to a term of nine years, of which he served
just under five years. Upon his release from prison in 1994, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service commenced deportation proceedings against him. 1 A
deportation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on August 19,
1994, in El Centro, California. There were twenty potential deportees present at
the hearing, and Aguirre-Tello was one of three who indicated that they spoke
English and wanted their hearings conducted in English.
The IJ began by determining that all of the potential deportees understood
that the purpose of the hearing was to determine if the charges in their cases were
true and that each one would be asked to admit or deny the charges against him or
her. Thus, the IJ asked, “Even if the charges are proven [that] doesn’t mean you
must be deported; you might be eligible for some pardon or for asylum. If you
are eligible for a pardon, I will tell you. Do you understand the purpose for this
hearing?” The group of potential deportees, including Aguirre-Tello, responded,
1
On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent agency
within the Department of Justice and its functions were transferred to the newly
formed Department of Homeland Security.
-3-
“yes.” Appellant’s App. at 7. 2 The IJ then informed the potential deportees that
they had a right to be represented by counsel:
At this hearing, you can have an attorney, but the government won’t
pay for your attorney. You each have a list of free legal services. If
you haven’t had time to consult with an attorney, I’ll postpone your
case. But you don’t have to have an attorney; you have the right to
represent yourself. Do you understand your right to be represented?
Id. at 7-8. Aguirre-Tello and the others responded, “yes.” Id.
Later, the IJ further advised the potential deportees of their rights:
THE COURT: Do any of you want more time to get a lawyer? And
if you do, raise your hand. There are no hands. So we’ll continue
with each of you representing yourself. If you represent yourself,
you should know that you can listen to and ask questions of any
witness the government calls and look at anything the government
gives me to consider against you. You can object to the
government’s evidence by explaining to me why you disagree with it.
You can call witnesses to testify for you and show me anything you
believe is important to your case. You can testify and tell me your
story in your own words. Do you understand these rights?
DEFENDANTS: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, by all responses.
THE COURT: If you disagree with my decision, you can appeal.
Your right to appeal is explained on the same paper that lists the
legal services. By an appeal, you ask a higher court to review what
I’ve done and determine if I’ve made a mistake. Do you understand
your right to appeal?
DEFENDANTS: Yes.
THE INTERPRETER: By all respondents, yes.
2
The hearing was taped but the tape was not immediately transcribed. The
transcription that is a part of the record on appeal was done by a New Mexico
court reporting service from the tape of the hearing, presumably around the time
of the district court hearing, although the date of the transcription is not provided.
-4-
Id. at 13-14.
Later in the hearing, the IJ addressed Aguirre-Tello individually. After
determining that Aguirre-Tello did not have an attorney, the IJ asked if he wanted
more time to get an attorney. Aguirre-Tello said no. Aguirre-Tello affirmed that
he understood his rights and that he understood the charges. He also admitted that
he was a citizen of Mexico, that he had entered the United States as an immigrant
in August 1987, and that in November 1989 he had been convicted of attempted
murder in Los Angeles County, California. Aguirre-Tello also stated that he had
been sentenced to nine years in prison and had served 63 months. 3
As the colloquy between the IJ and Aguirre-Tello continued, Aguirre-Tello
testified that he was born in Mexico, that neither of his parents was an American
citizen at the time, that he had received a “green card” but had never applied for
citizenship, and that he had lived in the United States for the last seven years. At
that point, the IJ evidently realized that it had been seven years less one day since
3
If Aguirre-Tello had actually served more than five years in prison, he
would not have been eligible for the waiver of deportation discussed at length in
this opinion. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(c) (INA), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(c) (1994) (repealed effective Sept. 30, 1996). It appears that Aguirre-
Tello spent some period of time in pretrial detention, although it is unclear how
much time he spent in such detention and whether that time was included in the
63 months he spent in prison. In any event, although the government belatedly
argues this point on rehearing en banc, it did not pursue this issue in the district
court or on appeal to the panel. Because the government raises this issue too late,
and the district court made no factual findings regarding it, we have no
determination by the district court to review, and we do not address the matter.
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Aguirre-Tello had been permitted to enter the United States legally, which meant
that, under the law then in effect, he would be eligible the next day to apply for a
discretionary “waiver” from deportation. Accordingly, the following exchange
occurred between the IJ and Aguirre-Tello:
THE COURT: Okay. You are not today eligible for a pardon, but
you would be tomorrow. Do you want your case postponed to see if
you might be granted a pardon and allowed to remain in this country?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: No.
THE COURT: All right. If I order you deported then, to what
country do you want to go?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: Mexico.
THE COURT: Do you know, sir, that if you’re deported, that you’ll
lose your status in this country and you could not return except with
a visa and proper permission from the Attorney General?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: I do.
....
THE COURT: And do you know that your crime would make you
ineligible for a visa to come back to the US?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: I do.
THE COURT: So that if you want to stay in the US, this is the time
to, shall we say, fight it out and try to remain; do you understand
that?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: I understand.
THE COURT: Now that you know all that, do you want to apply for
a pardon?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: No.
THE COURT: Why not?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: I want to voluntarily return to my
country.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, there’s no voluntary return available in a
case like this, but are you saying you just want to go back?
DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: That’s it.
THE COURT: All right. Based on your statements to me, I find that
you’ve knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived your
opportunity for relief. And I order you deported to Mexico. You can
appeal. Do you want to appeal?
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DEFENDANT AGUIRRE: No.
THE COURT: Then my decision’s final. Good luck, sir.
Id. at 24-26. Aguirre-Tello was accordingly deported to Mexico.
As alleged in the indictment in this case, Aguirre-Tello was found in Dona
Ana County, New Mexico, on or about February 10, 2001. He had not received
permission from the United States Attorney General to apply for admission into
this country following his 1994 deportation. Aguirre-Tello moved to dismiss the
indictment, alleging that the 1994 deportation proceeding was fundamentally
unfair and invalid under due process grounds.
At the time of Aguirre-Tello’s deportation hearing, in 1994, an alien who
was otherwise subject to deportation who had been lawfully in this country for
seven consecutive years could apply for a discretionary waiver from deportation.
INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed effective Sept. 30, 1996)
(“Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded
abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to
a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in
the discretion of the Attorney General. . . .”). Although the statute referred to
persons who temporarily leave the United States, it has been held that the
§ 212(c) waiver is equally applicable to permanent residents who have never left.
See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001).
-7-
The district court concluded that Aguirre-Tello’s due process rights were
violated in the 1994 deportation proceeding because the IJ used the term “pardon”
instead of “waiver” and thereby failed to convey adequately to Aguirre-Tello the
nature of the discretionary relief for which he could apply the next day. The
district court also found that Aguirre-Tello had not been given a list of free legal
services prior to the 1994 deportation hearing, nor had he been advised then that
his bond had already been set at $20,000 and that these errors “further
exacerbate[d] the constitutional deficiencies of the deportation proceeding.”
Mem. Op. and Order at 8, Appellant’s App. at 181. The district court further
noted that Tenth Circuit precedent requires that a defendant in these
circumstances show not only that the underlying deportation proceedings had been
fundamentally unfair, but also that the deficiencies in the proceedings caused him
prejudice. After noting that there were slight differences between the Ninth and
Tenth Circuit standards for prejudice, 4 the district court concluded that Aguirre-
Tello had shown prejudice under any standard.
The court also concluded that Aguirre-Tello was not precluded from
attacking the deportation order by his failure to take a direct appeal. Citing
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 840 (1987), it found that a waiver
4
The deportation proceeding took place in California, which is within the
Ninth Circuit.
-8-
of appeal rights that is not “considered or intelligent” improperly deprives the
person of judicial review of the deportation order. The court found that Aguirre-
Tello’s waiver had not been considered and intelligent because the most likely
avenue of relief, for which he was to be eligible one day later, had not been
explained to him.
DISCUSSION
When a previous deportation proceeding is attacked on constitutional
grounds, we are presented with a mixed question of law and fact, which we
review de novo. United States v. Rangel de Aguilar, 308 F.3d 1134, 1137 (10th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d 992, 997 (10th Cir. 1994).
The defendant has the burden of showing that the underlying deportation hearing
was fundamentally unfair, and to do so he must show that he was prejudiced. Id.
at 998. As part of this showing, he must establish that the unfairness of the
deportation proceeding deprived him of his right of direct appeal. Id. We must
afford the deportation proceeding a “presumption of regularity.” United States v.
Arevalo-Tavares, 210 F.3d 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000). 5
5
The government argued to the previous panel in this case that judicial
review of Aguirre-Tello’s 1994 deportation proceeding is barred by Aguirre-
Tello’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies which were available to him
then, a requirement Congress imposed in 1996 and which is codified at 8 U.S.C.
(continued...)
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I. Right to be informed of § 212(c) relief
A.
We consider first the initial question upon which the petition for rehearing
en banc was granted, whether Aguirre-Tello had a constitutional right to be
informed of discretionary relief that might be available to him. We hold he did
not.
We begin with the undisputed proposition that a potential deportee is
entitled in his deportation proceeding to procedural due process under the Fifth
Amendment, designed to ensure that the proceeding is fundamentally fair.
Deportation proceedings are, of course, civil proceedings, not criminal ones, “and
various constitutional protections associated with criminal proceedings therefore
are not required.” Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984)). The Supreme Court has
not further defined what fundamental fairness requires in a civil deportation
proceeding context, but it has suggested that it prohibits “procedural errors . . . so
5
(...continued)
§ 1326(d). The district court held that § 1326(d) did not bar Aguirre-Tello’s
collateral challenge to his deportation proceeding because, inter alia, the
government had not raised the issue and the due process violations the court
found in Aguirre-Tello’s deportation proceeding effectively prevented Aguirre-
Tello from exhausting his administrative remedies. Our disposition of this case
renders it unnecessary for us to address the exhaustion argument.
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fundamental that they may functionally deprive the alien of judicial review.”
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839 n.17 (1987).
We have stated that “[w]hen facing deportation . . . aliens are entitled to
procedural due process, which provides an opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d
1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). Aguirre-Tello
received that, and he was entitled to nothing more. We agree with the majority of
other circuits which have addressed the issue and concluded that there is no
constitutional right to be informed of the existence of discretionary relief for
which a potential deportee might be eligible. See United States v. Lopez-Ortiz,
313 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1135 (2003)
(“[E]ligibility for § 212(c) relief is not a liberty or property interest warranting
due process protection, [and therefore] the Immigration Judge’s error in failing to
explain [the deportee’s] eligibility does not rise to the level of fundamental
unfairness.”); see also Smith v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir. 2002)
(holding that “the discretionary right to suspension of deportation does not give
rise to a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause”);
Oguejiofor v. Attorney General, 277 F.3d 1305, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Under
our precedent, an alien has no constitutionally-protected right to discretionary
relief or to be eligible for discretionary relief.”); Escudero-Corona v. INS, 244
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F.3d 608, 615 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Eligibility for suspension is not a right protected
by the Constitution. Suspension of deportation is rather an act of grace that rests
in the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General.”); Ashki v. INS, 233 F.3d
913, 921 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Eligibility for suspension is not a right protected by the
Constitution. Suspension of deportation is rather an ‘act of grace’ that rests in the
‘unfettered discretion’ of the Attorney General. Because suspension of
deportation is discretionary, it does not create a protectible liberty or property
interest.”) (quoting Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 709 (4th Cir. 2000). But see
United States v. Muro-Inclan, 249 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen the
record before the [IJ] raises a reasonable possibility of relief from deportation
under this provision, it is a denial of due process to fail to inform an alien of that
possibility at the deportation hearing.” (quotation omitted) (citing United States v.
Aerate, 224 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000))); cf. United States v. Roque-
Espinoza, 338 F.3d 724, 730 (7th Cir. 2003) (considering without deciding
whether there is a distinction “between an alien’s claim that she has a right to
seek discretionary relief, and the very different claim that she has a right to have
that discretion exercised in a particular way”); United States v. Perez, 330 F.3d
97, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding deportation proceeding fundamentally unfair when
ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in an alien who was “eligible for
§ 212(c) relief and could have made a strong showing in support of such relief”
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failing to apply for waiver). Accordingly, the IJ’s failure to specifically advise
Aguirre-Tello that he could be eligible for § 212(c) relief the following day was
not a constitutional violation.
B.
Even assuming, arguendo, that there was some obligation to inform
Aguirre-Tello of his right to a § 212(c) waiver, we hold that the IJ fulfilled it.
We begin by noting that there is no dispute that Aguirre-Tello understood
English, having lived in the United States since the age of four. Indeed, he was
one of three potential deportees who specifically asked to have the hearing
conducted in English. The IJ directly and individually told Aguirre-Tello, “You
are not today eligible for a pardon, but you would be tomorrow. Do you want
your case postponed to see if you might be granted a pardon and allowed to
remain in this country?” Appellant’s App. at 24 (emphasis added). Aguirre-Tello
responded “[n]o” when asked if he wanted his case postponed so he could be
“allowed to remain in this country.” Id.
After explaining to him the consequences of being deported, which
Aguirre-Tello stated three times he understood, the IJ then told him, “So that if
you want to stay in the US, this is the time to, shall we say, fight it out and try to
remain; do you understand that?” Id. at 25 (emphasis added). Aguirre-Tello
responded, “I understand.” Id. The IJ then said, “Now that you know all that, do
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you want to apply for a pardon?” to which Aguirre-Tello replied, “[n]o.” Id. The
IJ then specifically asked him why not, to which Aguirre-Tello said, “I want to
voluntarily return to my country.” Id. The IJ inquired one more time: “[A]re you
saying you just want to go back?” to which Aguirre-Tello replied, “[t]hat’s it.”
Id. at 26.
While the IJ twice referred to seeking a “pardon,” the IJ made it abundantly
clear that the possibility under consideration was that Aguirre-Tello would be
allowed to remain in the United States and avoid deportation. That is precisely
the result Aguirre-Tello would have obtained if he successfully sought a waiver of
his deportation. Aguirre-Tello was adamant, however, that he wished to return to
Mexico. From that colloquy and the surrounding circumstances, we hold that
Aguirre-Tello was adequately informed that he would be eligible the next day to
seek avoidance of deportation and that he knowingly and willingly declined to
pursue that opportunity.
The district court found that, notwithstanding Aguirre-Tello’s stated desire
to return to Mexico, that obvious intention should be disregarded because
Aguirre-Tello was misled and confused by the IJ’s use of the word “pardon”
instead of the correct term, “waiver.” We disagree. The district court
characterized a “pardon” as “commonly understood to be a rare act of forgiveness
by an executive authority.” Mem. Op. and Order at 7, id. at 170. In fact, both a
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pardon and a § 212(c) waiver are acts of grace, left to the complete and unfettered
discretion of the one from whom they are sought. “Suspension of deportation is .
. . an act of grace that rests in the unfettered discretion of the Attorney General.”
Escudero-Corona, 244 F.3d at 615 (quotation omitted); Ashki, 233 F.3d at 921.
We therefore disagree with the district court’s conclusion that there was
any meaningful difference between the availability of a “pardon” and the
availability of a § 212(c) waiver. Moreover, we hold that Aguirre-Tello’s
understanding that it was a discretionary waiver he could have sought, as opposed
to a pardon, would not have made one iota of difference to him. Aguirre-Tello
understood that he could seek to avoid deportation, but he knowingly and clearly
chose not to. Thus, to the extent the IJ had any obligation to inform Aguirre-
Tello of the existence of the § 212(c) waiver for which Aguirre-Tello could
presumably have applied the following day, the IJ adequately discharged that
obligation.
II. List of legal services and existence of bond
A.
In addition to holding that the IJ violated Aguirre-Tello’s due process
rights by failing to inform him of the possibility of the § 212(c) waiver, the
district court also found two other deficiencies in the deportation proceeding,
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each of which the court held was an additional due process violation rendering the
proceeding fundamentally unfair. One of the purported deficiencies—that
Aguirre-Tello was not given a list of free legal services prior to his deportation
hearing—is unsupported by the record. 6
6
We conclude that the district court’s finding that Aguirre-Tello was not
given a list of free legal services is clearly erroneous. The IJ specifically stated
to Aguirre-Tello and the other potential deportees, “You each have a list of free
legal services.” Appellant’s App. at 7-8. There is no indication that anyone
present denied having that list. The IJ referred to the list again, stating, “Your
right to appeal is explained on the same paper that lists the legal services.” Id. at
13-14. When asked following that statement if they understood their right to
appeal, all the potential deportees responded, “Yes.” Id. Unless we are to
disregard the presumption of regularity which we must accord to the deportation
hearing, or disregard the IJ’s explicit representation, we must assume that the IJ
accurately represented the situation. Aguirre-Tello’s denial, some seven years
later, that he was given a list is unpersuasive.
We note that a finding of fact is clearly erroneous “if it is without factual
support in the record, or, where ‘there is evidence to support it, [if] the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.’” Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir.
1996) (quoting Hildebrand v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 28 F.3d 1024, 1026
(10th Cir. 1994) (further quotation and citation omitted). After reviewing the
entire record, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
committed when the district court found that Aguirre-Tello was not given a list of
free legal services.
Moreover, were we to affirm the district court’s finding that Aguirre-Tello
did not receive a list of free legal services, we would conclude that no unfairness
ensued. Significantly, Aguirre-Tello does not contest the fact that the IJ made the
announcement that all the potential deportees had received a list of free legal
services. In the absence of any dispute that the IJ made that announcement and,
furthermore, absent any affirmative showing that Aguirre-Tello did not hear or
understand that announcement, Aguirre-Tello has failed to make a showing of
unfairness, either on this issue alone or in combination with the other issues
discussed herein.
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B.
The second purported deficiency—that the IJ failed to inform Aguirre-Tello
that his bond had been set at $20,000—while supported by the record, does not
render the entire proceeding fundamentally unfair in violation of Aguirre-Tello’s
due process rights. Only a few courts have explicitly addressed this issue. See,
e.g., United States v. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d 89, 92 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding
no fundamental unfairness where deportees were not “expressly told of the
possibility of being free on bond pending appeal.”); United States v. Zaleta-Sosa,
854 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting Palacios-Martinez). We agree that such a
failure standing alone does not render the deportation proceeding fundamentally
unfair in violation of due process. Moreover, as we discuss, infra, we conclude
that, on the particular facts of this case, Aguirre-Tello suffered no prejudice from
the failure to tell him about the bond, because the evidence is overwhelming that
the availability of the bond would not have affected his strongly held desire to
forego any opportunities to seek relief from deportation and return to Mexico.
III. Prejudice
Furthermore, to enable us to reach the ultimate conclusion that the
deportation proceeding was fundamentally unfair, Aguirre-Tello would still have
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to demonstrate that any errors that occurred prejudiced him. We hold he has
failed to demonstrate prejudice.
A.
While we have noted the requirement to establish prejudice, this circuit has
not yet established a standard for it. In one case, we stated that the defendant had
failed to show that, if he had been informed of his right to appeal, “the outcome
of his case would have been different.” Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d at 998. To the
extent Meraz-Valeta in fact adopted that high standard, 7 we now overrule it.
We note that the majority of other circuits addressing this issue have not
required an alien to show that the outcome of the proceeding “would” have been
different in order to demonstrate prejudice. Rather, these circuits have adopted a
lower standard, requiring only that the alien demonstrate a “reasonable likelihood
that, but for the errors complained of, he would not have been deported.” United
States v. Calderon-Pena, 339 F.3d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States
7
Meraz-Valeta cited United States v. Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th
Cir. 1989) for its “would have been different” language. While Holland does use
that language at one point, it also refers to the “possibility of prejudice” and
considers whether the alleged deficiency in the proceeding “could have made a
difference.” Id. Moreover, in its specific discussion of the showing required to
establish prejudice, the court stated, “[t]he prejudice need not rise to the level of
showing that the defendant would not have been deported, but rather that the
errors might have affected the outcome of the hearing.” Id. at 1536. Thus, it is
not at all clear that Meraz-Valeta intended to establish a prejudice standard
requiring a showing that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different
but for the alleged error.
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v. Wilson, 316 F.3d 506, 511 (4th Cir.) (“In order to demonstrate prejudice, a
defendant must show ‘a reasonable likelihood that but for the errors complained
of, the defendant would not have been deported.’” (quoting United States v.
Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 1992))), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1959 (2003); United States v. Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 487 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[F]or
a collateral attack on a now-final deportation order, the defendant must show
prejudice in the sense of a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
different if the error in the deportation proceeding had not occurred.” (emphasis
omitted)); United States v. Perez-Ponce, 62 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]
showing of prejudice means ‘there was a reasonable likelihood that but for the
errors complained of the defendant would not have been deported.’” (quoting
Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d at 407)); United States v. Fellows, 50 Fed. Appx.
82, 2002 WL 31419235, at *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 29, 2002) (same).
The Second Circuit has stated that the prejudice requirement was satisfied
in a case where the alien showed “he was eligible for § 212(c) relief and could
have made a strong showing in support of such relief,” Perez, 330 F.3d at 104, but
it has “‘decline[d] to state the quantum of proof necessary for an alien to succeed
in his demonstration of prejudice’” and has “suggested that a showing that there
was a reasonable likelihood that an alien would not have been deported or a
plausible showing of such might be sufficient.” Id. at 104 n.6 (quoting United
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States v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2002)). The Seventh
Circuit has stated that an alien can show prejudice from the failure to inform him
of certain rights “because an informed exercise of those rights would have yielded
him relief from deportation.” United States v. Espinoza-Farlo, 34 F.3d 469, 461
(7th Cir. 1994). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a less strict standard, stating that
to demonstrate prejudice, an alien “must demonstrate plausible grounds for relief
from deportation.” United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 228 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir.
2000); see also Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1007 (9th Cir. 2003) (“To
demonstrate prejudice, an alien need demonstrate only that the IJ’s conduct
‘potentially . . . affect[ed] the outcome of the proceedings.’” (quoting Campos-
Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999))).
We agree with those circuits which have adopted a “reasonable likelihood”
standard. To require an alien to show something more—i.e., that he “would” have
obtained relief or the outcome of the proceeding “would” have been
different—sets the bar too high in a case such as this, in which the alien seeks
discretionary relief. On the other hand, to require that the alien show only
“plausible grounds for relief” sets the bar too low and permits the alien to
establish prejudice where there is only a slight possibility that the error had any
effect on the deportation proceeding. In sum, the standard to apply in a case like
Aguirre-Tello’s is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that Aguirre-Tello
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would have obtained relief from deportation had the IJ advised him more
specifically about the availability of a § 212(c) waiver from deportation, and
informed him of his bond status.
B.
Applying that standard to the facts of this case, we hold that Aguirre-Tello
has failed to demonstrate prejudice. First, the record makes it abundantly clear
that, had Aguirre-Tello been more precisely informed that he would be eligible to
seek a waiver from deportation the day following the deportation proceeding, and
that his bond had been set at $20,000, he would not have chosen to postpone the
proceeding and apply for the waiver. He repeatedly informed the IJ, in response
to direct questioning, that he wanted to return to Mexico and that he did not wish
to attempt to avoid deportation. There is no reasonable likelihood that Aguirre-
Tello would have sought a waiver, had the IJ explained its availability to him
differently and informed him of his bond.
Assuming Aguirre-Tello did apply for a waiver, there is no reasonable
likelihood that he would have received one. Aguirre-Tello would have had
modest favorable circumstances surrounding his application (that his parents were
legal permanent residents, that he had lived in the United States since he was four
although he had legally lived in this country only since age seventeen or eighteen,
and that he had no other criminal record). But the Attorney General would have
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weighed against those circumstances the fact that Aguirre-Tello had been
convicted of a serious violent crime (attempted murder). There is no reasonable
likelihood that, in deciding who is deserving of discretionary relief from
deportation from among the many aliens eligible for such relief, the Attorney
General would grant that relief to one so recently convicted of such a serious
violent crime. 8
In support of its conclusion that Aguirre-Tello established prejudice, the
district court relied upon a chart published by the Executive Office of
The Eleventh Circuit has described the inherent difficulty in demonstrating
8
prejudice from the denial of eligibility for discretionary relief:
An alien’s actual chances of receiving such discretionary relief
[suspension of deportation] are too speculative, and too far beyond
the capability of judicial review, to conclude that the alien has
actually suffered prejudice from being ineligible for suspension of
deportation. . . . Just as a court cannot review the inherently
“subjective” judgments made by the executive in deciding whether to
commute a life sentence, this Court cannot predict the subjective and
fact-intensive judgments that the Attorney General would make in
deciding whether to grant extraordinary relief, such as the suspension
of deportation. . . . The alien cannot demonstrate prejudice, much
less substantial prejudice, arising from the ineligibility for such an
“act of grace” because no standards exist for a court to determine
whether the executive would have granted the extraordinary relief
anyway.
Mejia Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1148 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted); see also Wilson, 316 F.3d at 511 (upholding district court’s finding that
“a fifty-fifty chance [of obtaining discretionary § 1182(c) relief] was not
sufficient to establish prejudice”).
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Immigration Review which showed that, between 1989 and 1995, some 51.5% of
all applications for a § 212(c) waiver were granted. What the chart does not
show, however, is what proportion of those successful waiver applicants were
convicted of serious violent felonies comparable to Aguirre-Tello’s conviction for
attempted murder. Without any indication that any of those successful applicants
were similarly situated to Aguirre-Tello, the conclusion that he had at least a 50%
chance of receiving a discretionary waiver is pure speculation, if not actually
misleading. Additionally, the argument improperly presumes a legal obligation on
the part of the IJ to have advised Aguirre-Tello not only of the differences
between a pardon and a waiver, but of a hypothetical difference in the chances of
success for each one.
C.
In sum, assuming all three alleged deficiencies in the deportation hearing
are established, whether they are viewed as constitutional or non-constitutional
violations, and whether they are viewed individually or cumulatively, we hold that
they did not render Aguirre-Tello’s deportation proceeding fundamentally unfair. 9
9
The prior discussion subsumes within it and essentially resolves Aguirre-
Tello’s obligation to demonstrate that any fundamental unfairness in his
deportation proceeding deprived him of his right to judicial review. See Meraz-
Valeta, 26 F.3d at 998 (stating that the defendant must show “that the deportation
hearing was fundamentally unfair and deprived the alien of the right to judicial
review”); see also Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 839. We have determined that
(continued...)
-23-
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the panel opinion in this case is VACATED, and
the district court order dismissing the indictment against Aguirre-Tello is
REVERSED. We REMAND this matter to the district court for further
proceedings consistent herewith.
9
(...continued)
Aguirre-Tello’s deportation proceeding was not fundamentally unfair. It did not
deprive him of his right to judicial review. The record shows that Aguirre-Tello
was informed of his right to appeal, and he knowingly and voluntarily waived that
right.
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No. 02-2049, United States v. Aguirre-Tello
LUCERO, Circuit Judge, with whom HENRY, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring:
I join Part III and concur in the result of the majority opinion. Because
Aguirre-Tello had been convicted of the crime of attempted murder, there is less
than a minuscule likelihood that he would have been granted a § 212(c)
discretionary waiver. Thus, he ultimately fails to establish the necessary prong of
prejudice. Absent prejudice, there can be no relief, and therefore the result
reached by the majority opinion reversing the district court is correct. I consider
it unnecessary to reach the remaining issues.
02-2049, United States v. Aguirre-Tello
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the majority opinion except Part 1(A) of the Discussion and the first
two paragraphs of footnote 6.
No. 02-2049, United States v. Aguirre-Tello
HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge, with whom SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, joins,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would not reverse either of the two major holdings
of the panel opinion, as the en banc majority does in this opinion.
I
The en banc majority has redefined the issue
The en banc majority opinion unnecessarily decides an important issue of
constitutional law. The en banc majority opinion, as I read it, does not dispute
(although it also does not acknowledge) the legal fact that under administrative
regulations and our precedents, the Immigration Judge (IJ) presiding over the
deportation proceedings had a duty to inform Mr. Aguirre-Tello of the
discretionary relief from deportation available to him. 1 The en banc majority,
however, holds that the failure to perform this duty is not so grave a defect as to
render the proceedings “fundamentally unfair” and a violation of the
constitutional guarantee of due process.
1
See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1483, 1485 (10th Cir. 1993),
impliedly overruled on other grounds by United States v. Fagan, 162 F.3d 1280
(10th Cir. 1998); see also Moran-Enriquez v. INS, 884 F.2d 420, 422 (9th Cir.
1989); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1994) (“The immigration judge shall inform the
respondent of his or her apparent eligibility to apply for any of the benefits
enumerated in this paragraph and shall afford the respondent an opportunity to
make application therefor during the hearing.”) (emphasis added).
For at least three reasons, I believe that the en banc majority errs in its
definition of the issue. First, the issue as framed by the en banc majority was not
timely raised in this appeal, as noted in the panel opinion, 324 F.3d 1181, 1190
n.8. Second, the issue that the en banc majority chooses to address is not the
basis of the district court’s order under review, nor is it the issue decided by the
panel opinion. Third, decision of this issue is not necessary even under the en
banc majority’s analysis, because the en banc majority also decides that the IJ
adequately advised Mr. Aguirre Tello of the relief available to him. Although I
completely disagree with the latter proposition, as I discuss below, the en banc
majority’s adoption of this view makes its analysis of the constitutional issue
obiter dictum.
The second reason cited above requires some explanation. The district
court found that the advice given by the IJ was misleading, 2 not merely
insufficiently detailed. The panel majority agreed with that determination.
Moreover, both the district judge and the panel majority found that the underlying
deportation proceedings were fundamentally unfair, based on the misleading
nature of the IJ’s comments combined with two other defects in the deportation
2
The trial judge’s Memorandum Opinion and Order found that the words
chosen by the Immigration Judge to explain the discretionary relief which
Aguirre-Tello might be given were misleading. “[I]t is particularly troubling
when the chosen words are even more misleading and confusing than the
technical terms themselves.” 181 F. Supp.2d 1298, 1303 (2002).
-2-
proceeding– the failure to advise Mr. Aguirre-Tello that bond had been set in his
case (he was not even told, as the individuals, whose colloquies with the IJ he had
just observed, had been told, that bond was available in deportation cases), and
the failure to provide him with a list of free legal services that were available to
him. I will discuss these two aspects of the case more below, but just now the
point is that the panel majority held this: “We conclude that the combination of
these deficiencies did result in fundamental unfairness.” 324 F.3d 1181, 1192
(emphasis added).
II
The correct question is whether the combination of deficiencies
resulted in fundamental unfairness.
The panel majority held that the underlying deportation proceedings were
fundamentally unfair, and so a denial of due process, because of the combination
of three factors: the misleading advice from the IJ regarding the type of relief that
was available (discretionary relief from deportation instead of the rare grant of a
pardon), the failure to advise that bond had been set, and the failure to provide
information regarding the free legal services that were available. I must
respectfully disagree with the en banc majority’s analysis of each of these factors.
-3-
A
The IJ’s misleading advice
The relief for which defendant was eligible in 1994 was a waiver of
deportation by the Attorney General under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Naturalization Act of 1952 as amended in 1990, which has since been repealed
but was then codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1326(c). A full explanation of the source of
this potential relief was given in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 2275-78
(2001), and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to note that it was well
established in 1994, and it is not contested here, that the Attorney General was
authorized to waive deportation of a permanent resident alien who had lawfully
resided in this country for seven years and had not served more than five years of
imprisonment on a conviction for an aggravated felony. See id.
The primary problem in the underlying deportation proceeding, the panel
majority concluded, was that the IJ affirmatively misled Aguirre-Tello by saying
that in one more day he would be eligible for “a pardon.” As the district judge
observed, the common meaning of pardon is a rare act of executive clemency. By
contrast, during the relevant years including 1994, the year of defendant’s
deportation proceeding, the section 212(c) waivers were granted to a substantial
percentage, just over one-half, of those who applied for them. St. Cyr, 121 S.Ct.
at 2277 & n.5. Thus, rather than merely hope for a “rare” act of forgiveness from
-4-
the President, Mr. Aguirre-Tello had an opportunity to avoid deportation through
a mechanism that was frequently employed for that purpose. His chances for
obtaining a waiver were far greater than the likelihood that he could obtain a
pardon. The finding that the advice given was confusing is unassailable.
Ignoring the fact that the district court and the panel majority both had held
that the primary defect in the deportation proceeding was the misleading nature of
the statements of the IJ, the en banc majority today adopts the government’s
untimely raised argument that the issue is whether there is a constitutional right to
be advised that discretionary relief may be available. In contrast, I continue to
believe that affirmatively misleading statements regarding the relief available
resulted in fundamental unfairness.
The en banc majority rejects the district judge’s finding that Mr. Aguirre-
Tello was confused by the IJ’s advice. Maj. op. at 14. This is a remarkable
holding for at least two reasons. First, the en banc majority offers no reason for
its rejection of the district court’s view of the evidence that Aguirre-Tello was
confused. Second, as noted in the panel opinion, the record shows clearly that
both the district judge and the prosecutor were confused by the IJ’s advice after
listening to the audio tape of the deportation proceeding. Aplt. App. at 150. Mr.
Aguirre-Tello, however, is perceived by the en banc majority to have greater
-5-
knowledge and understanding of the byzantine regulatory framework than those
two professionals for reasons which are unexplained.
B
The other defects in the deportation hearing
Mr. Aguirre-Tello may have been led to believe that bond was not available
for him because bond was not mentioned in his colloquy with the IJ, in contrast to
the specific advice that had been given by the IJ just moments before to another
individual. 181 F.Supp. 2d at 1304. In any event, it is undisputed that he was not
told of the availability of bond in general, much less of the fact that bond had
already been set in his case at $20,000.
The most egregious error in the en banc majority opinion, however, is its
treatment of the district judge’s finding that Mr. Aguirre-Tello was not provided a
list of free legal services that were available to him. The en banc majority’s
rejection of this finding as clearly erroneous is untenable and clearly prohibited
under the emphatic opinion of Justice White in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
470 U.S. 564 (1985). He there stated:
If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of
the record viewed in its entirety, the Court of Appeals may not
reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as a trier of
fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently. Where there
are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.
-6-
Id. at 573-74, (emphasis added). See also United States v. De La Cruz-Tapia, 162
F.3d 1275, 1277 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Toro-Palaez, 107 F.3d 819,
824-25 (10th Cir. 1997). Here the defendant took the stand and testified that the
list of available free legal services had not been provided to him, and the trial
judge, who was presiding over that proceeding believed him. That finding simply
cannot be clearly erroneous. The en banc majority’s feeble characterization of the
defendant’s testimony as “unpersuasive” is itself the epitome of a proposition that
is unpersuasive, and this is because appellate judges have no business deciding
whether testimony is persuasive or not. That task is assigned to the trier of fact.
III
Fundamental unfairness and prejudice
I adhere to the conclusion of the panel majority that the effect of the
combined defects in the deportation hearing constituted a denial of due process.
My reasoning is set out in the panel opinion and I see no need to elaborate further
on the conclusion, which I believe is strongly supported by the factors I have set
out here. Similarly, little would be gained by reiterating the panel majority’s
analysis of the prejudice issue. I do feel compelled to comment further on the
prejudice analysis of the en banc majority, however.
First, I note that the en banc majority today completely ignores the
authoritative guidance of the agency in charge, the Board of Immigration Appeals,
-7-
which was set out in the panel majority’s opinion, 324 F.3d at 1194 (quoting In re
Edwards, 20 I. & N. Dec. 191, 195-96, 1990 WL 385757 (1990)). Second, I must
strongly disagree with the en banc majority’s reliance on an extremely unrealistic,
and I think unfair, view that Mr. Aguirre-Tello’s expressed desire to return to
Mexico can be regarded as an absolute, unaffected by his perception of the bleak
prospects for deliverance from his situation.
Mr. Aguirre-Tello, as seen by the en banc majority, is a most remarkable
individual. Most of us are affected by circumstances in making our major
decisions. Whether we are willing to invest our time and energies in a particular
endeavor is usually influenced by our reckoning of the likelihood that we might
succeed. Not so Mr. Aguirre-Tello says the en banc majority. In spite of the fact
that he had not been in Mexico since he was four years old, in spite of the fact
that our nation acts as a magnet drawing immigrants, legal and illegal, from that
nation in astounding numbers, Mr. Aguirre-Tello was “adamant” about his desire
to be expelled to Mexico. His adamant, unbending desire to be deported to a land
he had not seen since early childhood was, to the en banc majority, apparently
uninfluenced by his external realties. Thus, the en banc majority disregards the
district court’s implicit finding that Mr. Aguirre-Tello would have chosen to
apply for an administrative waiver, had he realized that his chances for success on
a waiver application were far greater than his chances for a presidential pardon.
-8-
None of this is convincing. Mr. Aguirre-Tello was misled by the IJ’s
repeated reference to his eligibility for a “pardon.” He was also unfairly
disadvantaged by the other procedural defects. The cumulative effect of this
combination of defects was a denial of his due process rights. The trial judge’s
holding here obviously rested on an implicit finding that Mr. Aguirre-Tello would
have sought the administrative waiver, had he understood his prospects. That
implicit finding is clearly supported here.
Finally, since the en banc majority concludes here, wrongly in my opinion,
that Mr. Aguirre-Tello failed to show that he had been prejudiced by the
cumulative effect of the errors, the expansive additional views are mere dicta.
Accordingly I must respectfully dissent.
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