United States v. Alexander

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-60842
Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

MICHAEL ALEXANDER, also known as Sneaky, also known as,
Lowlow, also known as Anthony Johnson

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(3:97-CR-39-ALL-WN)
August 3, 1998

Before WISDOM, JONES, and E. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

A jury convicted Michael Alexander of armed carjacking, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119. He was 16 years old when he

committed the offense. The district court sentenced him to an 84-

month term of imprisonment. Alexander timely filed this appeal in

which he alleges three assignments of error: (1) the district court

*
Under 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
erred by certifying him as an adult for prosecution; (2) the

district court erred by admitting his confession into evidence

without first conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine its

voluntariness; and (3) his confession was not sufficiently

corroborated by other evidence. None of Alexander’s arguments is

persuasive. We affirm.

We review the district court’s decision to transfer Alexander

for adult prosecution for abuse of discretion, provided that the

court made specific findings with respect to certain criteria.2

Title 18 U.S.C. § 5032 requires the district court to consider the

following factors before transferring a juvenile for adult

prosecution: (1) the juvenile’s age and social background; (2) the

nature of the alleged offense; (3) the extent and nature of the

juvenile’s prior delinquency record; (4) the juvenile’s present

intellectual development and psychological maturity; (5) the nature

of past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such

efforts; and (6) the availability of programs designed to treat the

juvenile’s behavioral problems. In the case at bar, the district

court made specific findings with respect to all six factors.

Especially in light of the seriousness of the crime with which

Alexander was charged, we cannot say that the district court abused

its discretion in granting the government’s transfer motion.

Alexander did not challenge the voluntariness of his

2
United States v. Bilbo, 19 F.3d 912, 915 (5th Cir. 1994).

2
confession in the district court. Accordingly, we review his

argument that the district court erred by failing to sua sponte

conduct a hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of his

confession for plain error.3 The district court did not commit

error, plain or otherwise. It would have been required to conduct

a hearing sua sponte only if “the evidence raised a genuine issue

of voluntariness.”4 It clearly did not. When Alexander testified

at his transfer hearing, he plainly admitted during cross-

examination that he confessed by his own free will.

Finally, we will not disturb the jury’s verdict if a rational

trier of fact could have found Alexander guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt.5 At trial, the government adduced considerable evidence

that corroborated Alexander’s confession.6 The victim identified

Alexander as the man that stole his black Lexus automobile at

gunpoint, and Alexander’s cousin testified that he witnessed

Alexander driving a black Lexus on the same morning that the crime

took place. Alexander’s conviction is more than amply supported by

the evidence.

AFFIRMED.

3
See United States v. Iwegbu, 6 F.3d 272, 274 (5th Cir.
1993).
4
Id.
5
United States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 607 (5th Cir. 1998).
6
See United States v. Garth, 773 F.2d 1469, 1479 (5th Cir.
1985).

3