F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PU BL ISH
May 31, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-6111
LER OY ER IC ALLEN ,
Defendant-Appellant.
A PPE AL FR OM T HE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FO R TH E W ESTERN DISTRICT O F O K LAH O M A
(D.C. NO . CR-05-158-T)
Paul Antonio Lacy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for the Defendant-Appellant.
John C. Richter, United States Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for the
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before O’BRIEN, HOL LOW A Y, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judge.
Leroy Eric Allen pleaded guilty to a single count of possession of
methamphetamine w ith intent to distribute. That crime carries a statutory
minimum punishment of ten years imprisonment and a maximum of life. The
district court sentenced M r. Allen to 360 months imprisonment, which is more
than two-and-a-half times the top end of the Sentencing Guidelines’
recommended range. The district court based its sentencing decision on certain
extreme facts that came to light during the investigation of M r. Allen— namely,
his professed desire to rape and murder young girls and the possible steps he took
toward achieving those ends. Indeed, the district court gave M r. Allen the
sentence he would have received had he been convicted by a jury of solicitation
of murder or attempted sexual abuse and abduction of a child. W e hold that,
although the sentencing court may consider M r. Allen’s unrelated, non-charged
conduct in fashioning a sentence, the magnitude of the variance in this case and
the way it was calculated were unreasonable. W e therefore vacate the sentence
and remand for resentencing.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Investigation
This highly disturbing case began on M ay 27, 2005, when Leroy Eric Allen
visited an Oklahoma City establishment featuring adult entertainment. There, he
befriended one of the club’s dancers, whom we will call “M s. A,” and the two
made plans to meet at his apartment later that evening. Her visit lasted several
hours, during which time the pair engaged in a wide-ranging discussion that
culminated in an exchange about M r. Allen’s sexual proclivities. M r. Allen
described in graphic detail his preference for “younger kids”— girls as young as
eight-years-old— and his desire to kidnap, rape, and murder them. R. Vol. III, at
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16, 30–32. As M s. A recalled during an evidentiary hearing before the district
court:
He said that he would want me to help him, maybe, kidnap a girl, and
he said that he would like to get ahold of a child and— or a young
girl and kidnap her, rape her, and then, when he w as done w ith her,
he wanted to put a bag over her head and watch her breathe in and
out, and he— he wanted to see the moisture on her lips and the bag,
and everything, and watch her eyes bulge out.
R. Vol. III, at 16–17. Frightened by this turn in the conversation, M s. A soon left
the apartment. She testified that M r. Allen was, by this point in the evening,
naked.
Over the course of the next few days, the two had a brief meeting at the
adult entertainment establishment and conversed by telephone. During these
conversations M r. Allen reaffirmed his desire to have M s. A assist him in
sexually assaulting and murdering a young girl. Alarmed by the level of detail in
M r. Allen’s descriptions and persuaded that his desires went beyond the bravado
typically demonstrated by men who shared their sexual fantasies with her, M s. A
contacted the FBI and reported what had taken place.
The FBI conducted a background check on M r. Allen and discovered that in
1987 he had been arrested by Oklahoma authorities for kidnaping and raping a
fifteen-year-old girl, a crime that ultimately led to a conviction for rape. M r.
Allen’s presentence report provides the following details:
According to the Information and the Affidavit in this case, the
defendant put a knife to the 15[-]year[-]old female victim’s throat
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and pulled her into his apartment. He then forced her into the
bedroom where he vaginally raped her. Count 1 was reduced from
Rape I to Rape II as part of a plea agreement and a second count of
kidnapping was dismissed.
R. Vol. V, at 9. This history, combined with M s. A’s descriptions of her
interactions with M r. Allen, prompted the Bureau to commence a comprehensive
investigation of M r. Allen.
For six to eight weeks, beginning in early June 2005, the FBI surveilled M r.
Allen twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The surveillance failed to
uncover any nefarious activity by M r. Allen, other than his conversations w ith
M s. A. As the investigation rolled on with nothing to show for it, and resource
constraints mounted, the Bureau scaled back this surveillance to four to five days
a week.
The FBI also provided M s. A with a tape recorder and asked her to record
all further conversations with M r. Allen. On June 2, 2005, M s. A recorded a
conversation she had with M r. Allen at the adult entertainment establishment
where she was employed. M r. Allen reiterated his request for M s. A’s assistance
in a kidnaping, and told her that he would like to target another dancer at the bar
who had two younger daughters. M r. Allen also told M s. A that he had recently
had sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl. There was no other evidence
that this took place in reality.
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In the early morning hours of June 4, M s. A again met M r. Allen at his
apartment, and recorded the ensuing conversation. M r. Allen came to the door
naked and escorted her to his bedroom. They reclined on his bed, and M r. Allen
again began discussing kidnaping and murdering a pre-teen girl. As the district
court described the conversation:
Defendant’s recorded words further detail his plan, including: when
(“very soon too, but we just have to be careful”); the victim’s age
(“eight to ten” because he “would want them to know what’s going to
happen”); the kidnaping (“have ‘em for a couple of days”); the
killing (“don’t want it to be quick;” a gunshot would be “just too
fast;” strangulation “doesn’t have to” be fast); the place (“have to
pick” one); and disposal of the body (“one of the most thought about
details of the whole thing;” “as long as nobody ever says anything . .
. it’ll never be found”).
R. Vol. I, Doc. 34, at 3–4. Toward the end of this conversation, M r. Allen began
masturbating and M s. A asked him if he was “[j]ust gettin [sic] turned on by the
thought.” Add. to Br. of Appellee, Ex. 1, at 5; R. Vol. III, at 24–25. The
recording does not clearly reproduce his response.
M s. A testified that at some point in the days following this encounter, M r.
Allen left her a phone message to the effect that if she refused to engage in oral
sex with him, he did not want her calling him anymore. The FBI, by now
concerned that her further involvement with M r. Allen posed a safety risk, also
instructed M s. A to cease communicating with M r. Allen. W ith M s. A’s
participation at an end, the FBI continued its intensive surveillance of M r. A llen.
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That surveillance failed to reveal any further attempts on M r. Allen’s part to carry
out the acts he had described to M s. A.
At some point in June, the FBI contacted the Oklahoma City Police
Department (“OCPD”) to determine whether there were any unsolved child
abduction cases in the area that might be linked to M r. Allen. One, in fact, did
exist. On April 2, 2005, a ten-year-old girl entered the video-game area of an
Oklahoma City W al-M art while her mother checked out. A man approached the
girl and asked if she liked men in masks. W hen the girl expressed confusion, the
m an asked w hether she liked professional wrestlers. The girl looked toward tw o
nearby W al-M art employees, and the man said: “D on’t look at them; they’ll kill
you.” R. Vol. III, at 63. At this point, the mother noticed the interaction and
approached her daughter. The man immediately fled the store.
After learning of this incident, and after establishing through surveillance
that M r. Allen did visit this W al-M art, the FBI provided the OCPD with his
picture. The O CPD arranged two photo arrays, only one of w hich contained M r.
Allen’s picture, and asked the mother if any of the men in the photographs
resembled the man from the W al-M art incident. W hen the mother came to M r.
Allen’s picture, which was contained in the second array she viewed, she
immediately identified him as the man w ho was talking with her daughter, stating:
“That’s him. That’s the guy.” R. Vol. III, at 68. In response to a follow-up
question from the police she said “she was 80-percent sure” that M r. Allen was
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the man from the incident. Id. These facts, combined with what the FBI already
knew about M r. A llen, served to increase the Bureau’s concern about him.
In early July 2005, the FBI observed M r. Allen moving out of his apartment
complex. Upon interviewing the complex’s management, the FBI learned that
M r. Allen had been evicted due to suspicion that he was peddling drugs from his
apartment. On July 4, 2005, the FBI introduced an undercover agent into M r.
Allen’s new apartment complex. The agent initially tried to pique M r. Allen’s
interest in participating in sexual intercourse with minors, but none of his
attempts were successful. At the evidentiary hearing, the FBI agent in charge of
the A llen investigation testified as follow s:
Q. And that agent tried to engage M r. Allen into traveling to Texas
to have sex with minors; is that true?
A. The— the agent spoke to M r. Allen and told him that he was
participating in sex with minors out of state.
Q. Okay. Did M r. Allen ever make any motions to go to Texas to
engage in such activity?
A. No.
Q. And was anything with that undercover agent and child sexual
abuse, did it ever come to fruition[?]
A. No. W hen they talked, M r. Allen would ask him how was your
weekend, and they would— they would talk about— the agent made
up a story about the weekend and stuff. He seemed interest[ed] and
asked, you know, “W atch out; be careful,” and that kind of stuff.
But, other than that, no, sir.
R. Vol. III, at 55–56.
At this point, the FBI shifted the focus of its investigation to M r. Allen’s
suspected illicit-narcotics activity. On July 7, 2005, the undercover agent had a
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lengthy conversation with M r. Allen, wherein M r. Allen discussed high-quality
methamphetamine production and his personal use of the substance. The agent
asked about purchasing some, and M r. Allen stated that he could sell him at least
a quarter-ounce for $365.00. M r. Allen later informed the agent that the
production process had faltered and he could not deliver on the promise.
Between July 9 and July 28, M r. Allen and the undercover agent engaged in
numerous discussions about methamphetamine, and M r. Allen repeatedly
promised and then failed to supply the agent with the drug. On July 29, the agent
pursued a new strategy and informed M r. Allen that he could provide four ounces
of high quality methamphetamine. M r. Allen was willing, and, in a series of e-
mails on August 2, he and the agent worked out an arrangement by which M r.
Allen would receive four ounces of methamphetamine at a value of $3,600.00,
would sell them quickly to repay the debt, and would, in the meantime, pledge
title to his motorcycle as collateral. On August 5, M r. Allen provided the agent
with the title to his motorcycle. He also showed the agent several small baggies
of high quality methamphetamine and asked if the narcotics he would be
receiving were of similar quality. The agent responded affirmatively and, later
that day, provided M r. Allen with the promised narcotics. As M r. Allen inspected
the drugs, FBI agents entered his apartment and arrested him.
During a subsequent search of M r. Allen’s apartment, the FBI discovered a
set of scales containing a w hite powder residue, a syringe filled with an unknown
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clear liquid, four empty syringes, several baggies containing residue, and a metal
measuring spoon containing white residue. On his computer’s hard drive the FBI
discovered files containing photographs of missing-children posters and several
stories M r. Allen had written about raping young girls. One of the stories
involved M s. A and another dancer at the adult entertainment establishment and
had a plotline similar to the scenes he had described to M s. A.
B. G uilty Plea and Sentencing
On September 6, 2005, a federal grand jury charged M r. Allen with a single
count of possession of fifty or more grams of methamphetamine with intent to
distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On October 5, 2005, M r. Allen,
w ithout entering into a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to this single count. He
agreed only to the following facts: “On 8-5-05 I accepted delivery of over 50
grams of methamphetamine from an undercover agent. I possessed the
methamphetamine with intent to distribute. This occurred in Oklahoma City[,]
OK.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 20, at 10.
A probation officer prepared a presentence report (“PSR”) in December
2005. The “Offense Conduct” section of the report detailed the portion of the
investigation relating to the narcotics charge. Another section, entitled “O ffense
Behavior Not Part of Relevant Conduct,” detailed the portion of the investigation
relating to potential sexual abuse and murder. The report advised that M r. Allen
should be held accountable for possession of 120 grams of methamphetamine, and
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calculated his total offense level at 29, a score which included a three-point
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. M r. Allen received five criminal
history points— three points for the 1987 rape conviction and two points for a
2004 conviction for driving under the influence of drugs— which translated into a
Criminal History Category of III. W ithout the statutory mandatory minimum, M r.
Allen’s G uidelines range would have been 108 to 135 months. Taking into
account the statutory mandatory-minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), however, M r. Allen’s advisory Guidelines range
was 120 to 135 months imprisonment. At the close of the report, the probation
officer stated that he “has no information concerning the offense or the offender
which would warrant a departure from the prescribed sentencing guidelines.” R.
Vol. V, at 15. The officer did recommend, however, imposing conditions upon
supervised release relating to the treatment and management of sex offenders.
The government subsequently requested that the court consider an above-
Guidelines sentence “based upon other uncharged conduct so severe in nature that
a greater sentence is warranted in order to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 24, at 1. The government recounted the details
of the W al-M art incident and M r. Allen’s conversations with M s. A, and
characterized the drug prosecution as “quite simply, the fastest w ay to take this
dangerous man off the street.” Id. at 2. The government noted that “[u]nder the
Guidelines, § 4A1.3 permits a departure if the criminal history category
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significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history
or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes,” and thus
requested that the court depart upward two criminal history categories. Id. at 4–5.
The government reasoned that if M r. Allen had been convicted of solicitation of
murder (the conduct with M s. A) and attempted abduction (the W al-M art
incident) he w ould have a Criminal History Category of IV and qualify for a
sentencing range of 121 to 151 months imprisonment. 1 The government urged a
sentence at the top of that range, 151 months. Alternatively, the government
asked the court to simply exercise its Booker discretion and impose a sentence of
151 months.
M r. Allen opposed this motion and objected to those portions of the PSR
that described his interactions with M s. A and to the recommendation for sex
offender treatment upon supervised release.
On February 16, 2006, the district court held an evidentiary hearing to
resolve M r. Allen’s objections. The government presented the testimony of M s.
1
The government’s calculations were not correct. It erroneously assumed
that M r. Allen qualified for an initial Criminal History Category of II instead of
III. Thus, accounting for the prior felonies of attempted abduction and
solicitation of murder, if that is what they were— each of which merits three
additional criminal history points— would qualify M r. Allen for a sentencing
range higher than the one recommended by the government in its motion. That is,
if we add these six points to the three points for the 1987 rape conviction and the
two points for the 2004 driving under the influence conviction, the result is a total
of eleven points. This would qualify M r. Allen for a Criminal History Category
of V and a sentencing range of 140 to 175 months imprisonment. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines M anual, Ch. 5, Pt. A (2004).
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A, of the FBI agent in charge of the Allen investigation, and of the OCPD officer
who arranged the photo array relating to the W al-M art incident. M r. Allen cross-
examined these witnesses but did not present any witnesses of his own. The FBI
agent noted that the Oklahoma County district attorney was considering
prosecuting M r. Allen “for solicitation of murder and any other charge stemming
from this investigation.” R. Vol. III, at 51–52.
After this hearing, the district court, in a written order, held that the facts
stated in the PSR had been proven by a preponderance of the evidence and would
be considered in sentencing M r. Allen. The court explained that these matters
were “highly pertinent to the issue of Defendant’s sentence, particularly in view
of his past conviction of raping a fifteen-year-old girl by putting a knife to her
throat and pulling her into his apartment.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 34, at 1–2. The court
further held that these facts:
reflect the history and characteristics of Defendant and pertain to the
statutory purposes of sentencing set forth in [18 U.S.C.] §
3553(a)(2), such as protection of the public from further crimes by
Defendant and deterrence to criminal conduct. The Court also finds
that the Sentencing Guidelines provide no particularly appropriate
mechanism for an upward departure under these extraordinary and
extreme facts. The applicable guideline range based on Defendant’s
offense and criminal history (120–135 months) is grossly inadequate
and does not accurately reflect either D efendant’s criminality or his
propensity for violent crime involving adult and minor victims and
sexual offenses. Rather, these extraordinary and extreme facts lend
themselves to a district court’s authority to deviate reasonably from
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to satisfy the goals of sentencing.
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R. Vol. I, Doc. 34, at 4–5 (internal citation omitted). The district court also
rejected M r. Allen’s objections to the inclusion of sex-offender release conditions
and stated that it w ould include such conditions in his sentence.
Sentencing occurred on M arch 9, 2006. At the hearing, the government,
without explanation, requested a longer sentence than the one it had previously
recommended to the court in its motion. Instead of arguing that M r. Allen’s non-
drug related conduct should be incorporated into his criminal history, the
government now argued that this conduct should be punished in its own right,
explaining that application of the sexual abuse provision of the Guidelines, §
2A3.1, would result in “a total offense level of 36, with a Criminal History
Category of three, which would recommend a sentencing guideline range of 235
to 293 months.” R. Vol. IV, at 77. M r. Allen’s counsel requested that the court
“not deviate to any substantial degree,” noting that Oklahoma authorities w ere
considering prosecuting M r. Allen for the other aspects of the investigation and
that his “original guideline sentence began at a level less than the ten-year
mandatory minimum stated in the presentence report.” R. Vol. IV, at 78–79.
After hearing these arguments, the district court pronounced M r. Allen’s
sentence. 2 The court concluded that the “advisory guideline range of less than
twelve years in prison [was] vastly inadequate to satisfy the statutory purposes of
2
The court issued both an oral ruling and a contemporaneous written order.
The oral ruling essentially constitutes a paraphrasing of the written order, and w e
quote from the latter.
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sentencing,” R. Vol. I, Doc. 37 at 1, and found that the “unusual facts of this case
plainly warrant an exercise of the Court’s ‘broad discretion to consider
information concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics, including conduct
on which he ha[s] not been convicted,’” id. at 3 (quoting United States v.
M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 684 (10th Cir. 2005)). Citing both M r. Allen’s
interactions with M s. A and the W al-M art incident, the court reiterated that it had
found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “in 2005 Defendant was actively
planning and taking steps to accomplish a number of violent, sexual crimes
against females and children.” Id. at 3. The court was convinced of “the severity
of [M r. Allen’s] threat to the community, and found no basis to question the
seriousness of [his] criminal and violent intentions. In fact, his criminal history
confirm[ed] his ability to act on his violent sexual desires.” Id. at 5–6.
The district court concluded that because “the Sentencing Guidelines
provide no particularly appropriate mechanism for an upward departure under
these extraordinary facts, [it] must go outside the guideline range,” taking
guidance from the § 3553(a) factors and Booker’s “standard of reasonableness.”
Id. at 3. Turning to these factors, the court reasoned as follows:
Two of the statutory factors . . . cause grave concern: the need for the
sentence imposed (1) to protect the public from further crimes of
Defendant and (2) to provide adequate deterrence to criminal conduct
by others. Defendant’s degree of dangerousness and the nature and
seriousness of his threatened conduct demand a severe sentence in
order to serve these dual purposes. In addition, in view of the
similarity between his past conviction of the violent rape of a fifteen-
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year-old girl and his recent actions, the Court finds a high likelihood
of recidivism; indeed, the evidence established not only Defendant’s
propensity but his actual determined efforts toward recidivism. . . .
Defendant’s penchant for targeting children and inflicting cruel fear
and torture as a form of personal sport or sexual pleasure warrants
even greater reprobation.
Id. at 6. The court imposed a sentence of 360 months imprisonment as
“reasonable, necessary, and minimally sufficient to satisfy the incapacitative and
deterrent goals of sentencing.” Id. at 6–7.
Despite its earlier statement that the Guidelines provided “no . . .
mechanism” to compute an appropriate sentence, id. at 3, the court “recognize[d]
its duty to consult [them],” and thus “searched the Sentencing Guidelines for
guidance,” proceeding as follow s:
It appears the most closely analogous basis for an upward departure
lies in § 5K2.21, entitled “Dismissed and Uncharged Conduct.” This
provision permits a sentencing court to depart upward “based on
conduct (1) . . . underlying a potential charge not pursued in the case
as part of a plea agreement or for any other reason; and (2) that did
not enter into the determination of the applicable guideline range.”
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual § 5K2.21 (emphasis added). The
facts stated above, viewed under a preponderance of the evidence
standard, establish conduct underlying a potential charge of attempt
or solicitation to commit aggravated sexual abuse or first-degree
murder. Considering the guideline provisions for such offenses
based on the conduct shown by the evidence and Defendant’s
criminal history would yield an advisory guideline range of 360
months to life, calculated as follow s.
For criminal sexual abuse or attempt to commit criminal sexual
abuse, the applicable guideline section is 2A3.1. The base level is 30
and the specific offense characteristics would w arrant increases for:
(a) aggravated conduct (using force and placing the victim in fear of
death, serious bodily injury or death), 4 levels; (b) the age of the
victim (under twelve years), 4 levels; (c) life-threatening bodily
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injury to the victim, 4 levels; and (d) abduction of the victim, 4
levels. The adjusted offense level under Section 2A3.1 is 46. If the
victim was murdered, the cross-reference requires the application of
Section 2A1.1 if a greater offense level results. Section 2A1.1
provides a base offense level of 43. However, Section 2X1.1(b)(3)
would require a decrease of 3 levels because it was a solicitation
rather than a completed offense. Thus the total offense level for
uncharged conduct would be at least 40. W ith Defendant’s criminal
history category of III, the Sentencing Table yields a recommended
guideline range for offense level 40 of 360 months to life. Thus
view ing the Sentencing Guidelines as an objective marker, this
analysis confirms the reasonableness of the sentence determined by
the Court based solely on the sentencing factors and its reasoned
judgment as a sentencing court.
Id. at 7–8 (omission in original).
M r. Allen appeals his sentence on the ground of substantive
unreasonableness under Booker. He also contends the sentence violates the
Eighth Amendment. 3 Because w e vacate the sentence on reasonableness grounds,
we do not reach his Eighth Amendment argument.
II. D ISC USSIO N
M r. Allen pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine. The statutory punishment range for this crime is broad: ten
3
In his statement of facts, M r. A llen also asserts that the “district court . . .
imposed condition[s] of supervised release just as if [he] had been convicted of []
criminal sexual abuse.” Appellant’s Br. at 9–10. M r. Allen does not return to the
issue in the argument section of his brief and provides no legal authority in
support of it. Thus, to the extent this lone phrase represents an argument against
the imposition of these conditions, we decline to address it. See United States v.
Banks, 451 F.3d 721, 728 (10th Cir. 2006) (“M r. Banks provides no legal
authority to support this argument; therefore, we decline to address it.”).
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years to life. In light of his criminal history— which includes the forcible rape of
a minor female— as well as a congressionally imposed mandatory minimum based
on drug quantity, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A )(viii), the district court correctly
calculated an advisory sentencing range of 120–135 months in prison.
The district court then sentenced M r. A llen to 360 months imprisonment.
This dramatic upward variance was based on the fact that, during the course of
this investigation, M r. Allen expressed a continued desire to sexually assault,
rape, torture, and murder young girls, along with some evidence that he may have
taken preliminary steps toward acting upon these desires. Reasonable minds may
differ on just how to interpret this evidence, and the issue was not put to a jury.
The defense presented a plausible argument that M r. Allen was, like a twisted
W alter M itty, simply fantasizing. But the district court concluded that M r. Allen
actually desired and planned to commit these crimes and was taking steps tow ard
doing so. Based on the record in this case, that conclusion was not clearly
erroneous. And the district court’s conclusions regarding M r. Allen’s proclivities
undoubtedly bear a logical relation to the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), most especially the need to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant.
The question presented is whether it was reasonable for the district court
effectively to sentence M r. Allen as if he had been tried and convicted of
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attempted criminal sexual abuse or solicitation of murder, when his crime of
conviction was sale of methamphetamine.
A. Standard of Review
Under our decision in United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050 (10th Cir.
2006), we follow a two-step approach in reviewing a district court’s sentencing
decision. First, we review the court’s calculation of the defendant’s Guidelines
sentence, if challenged. Id. at 1054–55. Second, if the district court correctly
determined that range, we review the actual sentence imposed for reasonableness.
Id.; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261–62 (2005). Because M r. Allen
does not challenge the district court’s calculation of his Guidelines range, we
proceed directly to the second step of the Kristl inquiry.
W ithin-G uidelines sentences enjoy a presumption of reasonableness, Kristl,
437 F.3d at 1054, while sentences that fall outside of this range are reviewed on a
“sliding scale,” United States v. Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir.
2006). W e look to the “discrepancy between the advisory guidelines range and
the actual sentence,” Cage, 451 F.3d at 594, “in terms of both percentage and
absolute time,” Valtierra-Rojas, 468 F.3d at 1240. “The farther the [sentencing]
court diverges from the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons
for the divergence must be.” Id. at 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). In
Cage, the district court imposed a sentence of six days’ imprisonment, a
downward variance from the guidelines range of forty-six to fifty-seven months.
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W e characterized this variance as “extreme” and “reasonable only under dramatic
facts.” Cage, 451 F.3d at 594. In Valtierra-Rojas, we described the “thirty-three-
month/122% ” upward variance as “not nearly so extreme,” but nevertheless
treated it as a “substantial” variance requiring “compelling reasons.” 468 F.3d at
1240. The variance here— 225 months, or 167% — is more substantial than that in
Valtierra-Rojas. W e regard it as sufficiently extreme that it can be upheld only
based upon a compelling justification.
B. Consideration of this Sentence Under the Sentencing G uidelines
The district court concluded that the Sentencing Guidelines provided “no . .
. mechanism” to compute an appropriate sentence under the “extraordinary facts”
of this case. R. Vol. I, Doc. 37, at 3. That is why it imposed an upward variance
in the exercise of its Booker discretion. W e begin our analysis of reasonableness
with a discussion of why the Guidelines w ould not permit the court to impose this
kind of sentence; we can then consider w hether it was reasonable for the court, in
its exercise of Booker discretion, to disregard the relevant limiting principles
found in the Guidelines.
1. Attempted Crimes Versus Threatened Future Conduct
As a first step, we must consider how to interpret the evidence of M r.
Allen’s non-drug-related conduct, which consisted of discussions with M s. A and
an encounter w ith a child in the W al-M art. These events can be viewed in two
different ways. First, they may have been actual attempted criminal activity. M r.
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Allen’s conversations with M s. A may have constituted the crime of solicitation
of murder and the W al-M art incident may have constituted the crimes of
attempted abduction or attempted sexual abuse of a child. Portions of the district
court’s opinion suggest this attempted-crimes perspective. For example, the court
outlined the “steps” M r. Allen had already taken “to accomplish a number of
violent, sexual crimes.” Id. The court’s sentencing calculation was based on the
crime of criminal sexual abuse or attempt, with a four-level enhancement for
aggravated conduct, a four-level enhancement for age of the victim, a four-level
enhancement for life-threatening bodily injury to the victim, and a four-level
enhancement for abduction of the victim. Id. at 7–8. The court also calculated the
sentence for murder, with a three-point decrease in offense level because the
conduct was solicitation rather than a completed homicide. Id. at 8. All this
reads as if these crimes had already been committed.
Alternatively, M r. Allen’s statements and behavior may raise a concern
about his potential future criminality. Portions of the district court’s explanation
suggest this future-crimes perspective. For example, the court discussed the
“seriousness of his threatened conduct,” id. at 6 (emphasis added), as well as his
“propensity” and “penchant” for “targeting children and inflicting cruel fear and
torture as a form of personal sport or sexual pleasure.” Id.
This distinction has significance under the Guidelines because of the
different ways in w hich related conduct, past crimes, and future dangerousness
-20-
are treated. Conduct related to the offense of conviction is treated as an offense
characteristic, whereas past criminal convictions are generally treated as an
offender characteristic, and taken into account by assigning a criminal history
score. See Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 89,
89–90 (2004) (distinguishing between offense characteristics and offender
characteristics). Future dangerousness also is an offender characteristic. Because
evaluation of future dangerousness could otherwise veer into speculation, it
generally is evaluated on the basis of the defendant’s recidivism, which takes into
account prior convictions and prior similar adult misconduct. United States
Sentencing Guidelines M anual §§ 4A1.1, 4A.3.(a)(2)(E). To predicate a sentence
on evidence that a defendant is likely to comm it a particular crime in the
future— based not upon past or similar crimes, but upon expressions of
desire— takes us into uncharted waters. For the most part, we regard the district
court’s order as relying on uncharged, attempted criminal activity. Toward the
end of the opinion, we consider the propriety of basing a sentence on threatened,
but as yet not executed, crimes. Either way, reliance on this past or threatened
future conduct is problematic.
2. O ffense Characteristics
As Justice Breyer explained in Booker, “Congress’ basic statutory goal— a
system that diminished sentencing disparity— depends for its success upon
judicial efforts to determine, and to base punishment upon, the real conduct that
-21-
underlies the crime of conviction.” 543 U .S. at 251. Accordingly, the first
fundamental element of the G uidelines calculation is the assignment of a base
offense level, which is calculated by accounting for “all acts and omissions
comm itted . . . by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the
offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines M anual § 1B1.3(a)(1) (2004). Known as relevant conduct, this
comprises more, often much more, than the offense of conviction itself, and may
include uncharged and even acquitted conduct. See Magallanez, 408 F.3d at 684.
As stated in the commentary to the Guidelines, “[c]onduct that is not formally
charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the
determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3
cmt. background. But though relevant conduct includes more than just the
conduct for which a defendant was convicted, it has limits: the conduct must
relate to the offense of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Asch, 207 F.3d
1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Custodio, 39 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1040 (4th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Leonard, 289 F.3d 984, 987–88 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v.
M cGahee, 257 F.3d 520, 532 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cross, 121 F.3d
234, 238–39 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 682–84 (2d Cir.
1990).
-22-
The relatedness principle is fundamental because of our commitment to
sentencing based on the seriousness of the actual offense proven or admitted. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (“the nature and circumstances of the offense”) (emphasis
added); id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the
seriousness of the offense . . .”) (emphasis added); W illiam W . W ilkins, Jr. &
John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 495, 497–99 (1990). This is not unrelated to the
Sixth Amendment principles underlying Booker. M ost crimes include within their
ambit a broad range of conduct. Depending upon the circumstances of its
commission the same “crime” will have a different impact, reflect varying levels
of culpability, or portend unlike consequences. W hen a sentencing court
considers conduct related to the offense of conviction, the objective is to
determine the seriousness of the very crime found by the jury or admitted by the
defendant. If the considered conduct has nothing to do with the offense of
conviction, the court is effectively sentencing a defendant for a crime that was
never proved to the jury, or admitted by the defendant. To allow this w ould
empow er the government to obtain punishment for any number of unrelated
crimes, based on bench trial rather than jury trial. The relatedness principle thus
keeps the system from straying too far beyond the Sixth Amendment line.
In assessing whether conduct is sufficiently related to the offense of
conviction, courts ask “whether there is a strong relationship between the
-23-
uncharged conduct and the convicted offense, focusing on whether the
government has demonstrated a significant similarity, regularity, and temporal
proximity.” Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1040 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
United States v. Roederer, 11 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1993). For example, this
Court has found that drugs possessed for a defendant’s personal use were related
to the defendant’s drug manufacturing and distribution offenses because the
quantity of drugs the defendant personally consumed was relevant to the total
amount of illicit narcotics she received during the drug conspiracy. Asch, 207
F.3d at 1244. On the other hand, we have also held that certain forms of
overbilling were not related to a doctor’s offense of billing for services he did not
perform. Custodio, 39 F.3d at 1126. The Custodio Court explained that the
government had not proven the overbilling practices were “the same type of
conduct” or part of “the same scheme or plan” as the offense of conviction, and
noted that if the overbilling had been charged, the defendant might have had
viable defenses, such as mistake or misunderstanding. Id. In a particularly
striking case, the Sixth Circuit reversed a § 1B1.3 enhancement where the
defendant pled guilty to distribution of cocaine. Cross, 121 F.3d at 240–41. The
district court applied an upward enhancement based on evidence that the
defendant had participated in the gruesome torture of a former confederate
suspected of stealing drugs. Because the appellate court concluded that there was
-24-
an insufficient connection between the torture and the defendant’s cocaine sale, it
reversed the enhanced sentence. Cross, 121 F.3d at 238–41.
In this case, the district court correctly concluded— and the government
does not contest— that the horrific sexual abuse or murder that M r. Allen either
contemplated or took steps tow ard committing was not relevant conduct because
it w as completely unrelated to his sale of methamphetamine. Although the two
forms of criminality occurred during the same time frame, there is no other
connection between them. The W al-M art incident and M r. Allen’s discussions
with M s. A did not occur in preparation for the methamphetamine sale, during the
execution of the sale, or in the course of avoiding responsibility for the sale. See
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). This case thus bears a close resemblance to Cross,
except that in Cross the torture actually occurred, and the torture and the drug
offense were more arguably connected. W e conclude that M r. Allen’s uncharged
activities, whether threatened or attempted, did not constitute relevant conduct
under § 1B1.3 of the Guideline. To the extent that the district court used the
uncharged conduct in this case as an offense characteristic, w hich is not clear, it
violated a basic structural norm of the Guidelines system.
3. Criminal H istory
The second fundamental element of the Guidelines calculus is based on an
offender characteristic, namely criminal history. In this context, prior acts that
are not related to the offense of conviction may be considered because a
-25-
“defendant’s prior record of past criminal conduct is directly relevant to” the
purposes of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). U.S.S.G. § 4A intro.
cmt. “A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than
a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment.” Id.
Criminal history points are assigned for prior crimes only when the
defendant w as previously tried and convicted of the offense. See U.S.S.G. §§
4A1.1, 4A1.2. Each of the criminal history categories is defined according to the
defendant’s “prior sentence,” w hich in turn is defined as “any sentence previously
imposed upon adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not part of the instant
offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1). This limitation, like the relatedness rule for relevant
conduct, has Sixth Amendment implications: criminal history points are assigned
only on the basis of prior convictions by a jury or pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere. A sentencing judge cannot impose additional punishment pursuant to
criminal history without a “jury . . . stand[ing] between the individual and the
power of the government.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 237. M r. Allen’s non-drug
related conduct therefore could not count toward his criminal history without
violating a second fundamental structural feature of the Guidelines, which limits
criminal history to misconduct that was formally adjudicated, with Sixth
Amendment safeguards.
-26-
4. Upw ard Departures Under the G uidelines
Nor could the district court have departed upward under the Guidelines on
the basis of these facts. Under § 5K2.0, a court can depart from “the applicable
guideline range based on offense characteristics or offender characteristics of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration in determining that
range.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 cmt. n.2(A). 4 But like enhancements for uncharged
conduct under § 1B1.3, when a § 5K2.0 departure is based on ‘“acts of
misconduct not resulting in conviction’” those acts must still “‘relate
meaningfully to the offense of conviction.’” United States v. Neal, 249 F.3d
1251, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9, 12
(1st Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Haggerty, 4 F.3d 901, 903 n.2 (10th Cir.
1993) (“[I]f we were presented with a case where a district court departed based
upon a totally irrelevant circumstance, we w ould not hold such a departure
authorized merely because the circumstance was of a kind omitted by the
Guidelines.”); Cross, 121 F.3d at 240; Kim, 896 F.2d at 684. Section 5K2.0 was
therefore unavailable in this case.
The Guidelines also recognize that the criminal history scoring system will
sometimes underrepresent (or overrepresent) the seriousness of an offender’s
4
Section 5K 2.0 is not applicable to departures pursuant to other guidelines,
such as underrepresentation of criminal history. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 cmt. n.2(B).
Neither criminal history nor underrepresentation of criminal history is limited to
crimes related to the crime of conviction.
-27-
criminal past. Section 4A1.3(a)(1) therefore provides that “[i]f reliable
information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially
under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the
likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may
be warranted.” One might argue that M r. Allen’s statements and behavior during
this investigation render his criminal history, and in particular his past conviction
for forcible rape of a fifteen-year-old girl, more ominous, and thus that a
departure would be warranted under this section. That, presumably, is why the
government initially proposed to the court an upward departure of two criminal
history categories.
But there are problems w ith this approach. In the 2004 Guidelines M anual,
§ 4A1.3(a)(2) reads as follows:
The information described in subsection (a) may include information
concerning the following:
(A) Prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal
history category (e.g., sentences for foreign and tribal
offenses).
(B) Prior sentence(s) of substantially more than one year
imposed as a result of independent crimes committed on
different occasions.
(C) Prior similar misconduct established by a civil adjudication
or by a failure to comply with an administrative order.
(D) W hether the defendant was pending trial or sentencing on
another charge at the time of the instant offense.
(E) Prior similar adult criminal conduct not resulting in a
criminal conviction.
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual § 4A1.3(a)(2) (2004). It does not appear that
M r. Allen’s uncharged conduct falls into any of these categories. 5 All prior
convictions may be considered, but only similar adult criminal conduct. His
perverse sexual desires and putative acts in furtherance of them are distinctly
dissimilar from the crime of conviction.
M oreover, even assuming prior misconduct outside the categories listed in
§ 4A1.3 could be the basis for a departure for underrepresented criminal history,
such misconduct would still have to be considered and weighed in a manner
similar to that employed for acts of prior misconduct already contemplated by the
Guidelines, that is, as increasing the defendant’s criminal history score, not his
offense level. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual § 4A1.3(a)(4) (2004);
United States v. Thorton, 922 F.2d 1490, 1494 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he district
court erred in determining the degree of upward departure because it ignored the
distinction between offense level and criminal history category departures.
Thorton’s prior uncharged criminal conduct reflects on the adequacy of her
5
It may be significant that, prior to 2003, the Guidelines M anual expressly
stated that a district court was “not limited to” the information in the five
categories listed above. The Sentencing Commission dropped these words from
the M anual in 2003 when it substantially amended §4A1.3 to comport with the
PROTECT Act, which directed the Sentencing Commission to “substantially
reduce[]” the incidence of downward departures. Pub. L. 108-21. Nothing in the
commentary regarding this amendment suggests that the change was meant to
transform the list into an exhaustive one, U.S.S.G. App. C, Vol. II, Am. 365, but
the change in language might be read that way. Because the district court in this
case did not justify the sentence as a departure under this provision, we need not
resolve that issue today.
-29-
criminal history category, not the base offense level.”); United States v. Wittig,
206 F. App’x 763, 771 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (“[W ]e understand why M r.
W ittig’s [current] sentence should reflect the criminal history established by his
convictions in the [prior] W estar case; but we fail to understand why those
convictions are otherw ise relevant to the present case.”).
Had M r. A llen’s non-drug-related conduct been worthy of a § 4A1.3
departure, as the government initially urged, the district court could have added
two felonies to his record (assuming, as did the sentencing judge, that attempted
sexual abuse and solicitation of murder were the crimes to be considered). As set
out in the margin above, see supra note 1, this would have added six criminal
history points to M r. Allen’s score, qualified him for a criminal history category
of V , and resulted in a G uidelines sentencing range of 140 to 175 months. M r.
Allen’s actual 360 month sentence obviously far exceeds the range that would
have been applicable even if a departure were warranted.
C. Exercise of Booker Discretion
The fact that M r. Allen’s sentence could not have been justified under the
Guidelines does not, of course, mean that it is unreasonable. The district court
did not purport to hew to the Guidelines in setting M r. Allen’s sentence, and as a
result of the Booker decision, was not required to do so. W e do not question, for
example, that a sentencing court may vary upward or downward based on the
court’s own evaluation of the defendant’s likelihood of recidivism or
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reform— though we note that courts of appeals have regarded extreme variances
on the basis of such factors unreasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Pyles, ___
F.3d ___, 2007 W L 1063616, at *1–2, 7 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 2007) (finding
substantively unreasonable a district court’s decision to vary downward from an
advisory range of 63–78 months and impose no prison time based on the
defendant’s “substantial rehabilitation”); United States v. Garate, ___ F.3d ___,
2007 W L 967317, at *2–3 (8th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007) (concluding that the district
court gave “undue weight” to defendant’s age and to a study showing that
younger perpetrators commit criminal acts due to cultural and environmental
influences); United States v. Perrin, 478 F.3d 672, 678 (5th Cir. 2007) (vacating a
downward variance and finding the defendant’s “contrition and his
comm encement of counseling” to be “inappropriate grounds for imposing a non-
guidelines sentence, because they are already accounted for in the reduction for
acceptance of responsibility”); United States v. Kane, 470 F.3d 1277, 1281 (8th
Cir. 2006) (vacating a 90-month downward variance and finding that the
defendant’s “rehabilitative efforts are not extraordinary and do not support a
sentence reduction”). See also United States v. Sindima, 478 F.3d 467, 473 (2d
Cir. 2007) (overturning an upward variance, based primarily on the need for
deterrence, because the Guidelines already accounted for this factor); United
States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 564–65 (4th Cir. 2007) (same).
-31-
W e recognize that, after Booker, sentencing courts have some latitude to
consider evidence and conduct beyond what would have been permissible under
§§ 1B1.3, 4A1.3, and 5K2.0 in the course of determining whether the defendant’s
criminal history adequately reflects his dangerousness to the community. For
example, this Court has upheld as reasonable an upward variance based on
evidence of past misconduct (such as police records in connection with arrests)
that did not result in conviction. See United States v. M ateo, 471 F.3d 1162,
1166–68 (10th Cir. 2006); see generally M agallanez, 408 F.3d at 684 (noting that
“[n]o limitation” should “be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person . . . for the purpose of imposing
an appropriate sentence.”).
The question posed by this case, however, is not whether consideration of
M r. Allen’s unrelated, unadjudicated, and dissimilar actions was improper, but
whether the weight given to those actions was excessive. See Cage, 451 F.3d at
595 (“The problem w ith the sentencing decision . . . is not in the consideration of
these factors; it is in the weight the district court placed on them.”); United States
v. M orales-Uribe, 470 F.3d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 2006) (noting that “while the
district court considered appropriate factors in imposing the sentence, [it]
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing these factors”).
It might well have been reasonable for the district court to consider M r.
Allen’s uncharged conduct as a factor bearing on offender characteristics, on
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analogy to departures under § 4A1.3. As noted above, that would lead to a
sentencing range of 140 to 175 months. This is essentially the approach urged by
the government in its written motion to impose an above-guidelines sentence. R.
Vol. I, Doc. 24. Although this would stretch the categories of information
bearing on underrepresentation of criminal history beyond those listed in § 4A1.3,
it would remain faithful to the fundamental architecture of the Guidelines and
might therefore fall within the realm of Booker discretion. Instead, however, the
district court essentially abandoned consideration of the advisory guidelines range
and substituted a calculation based explicitly on unrelated conduct with which
M r. Allen had not been charged or convicted.
The district court concluded that “the nature and seriousness of [M r.
Allen’s] threatened conduct” necessitated a 360-month sentence. R. Vol. I, Doc.
37, at 6. The court “confirm[ed]” the necessity of this punishment by looking to
the sentence M r. Allen would have received if he were actually charged for
additional crimes in a federal court and were convicted by a jury of his peers. Id.
at 8. As we explained above, the court at times seemed to be contemplating
crimes it felt were already completed and at times seemed to be forecasting what
M r. Allen might do in the future. W hichever it is, we think the district court
strayed from the path of reasonableness. Even if it is reasonable to conclude that
a defendant who committed uncharged crimes or who presents a serious risk of
comm itting future crimes deserves greater punishment than a similarly-situated
-33-
defendant who committed no such other crimes and presents no such risk, it is
quite another thing to conclude that the proper measure of that increase is the
sentence that would be imposed had the defendant actually been convicted of
those uncharged, unrelated crimes.
In United States v. Wolfe, 435 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2006), the district court
sentenced a defendant convicted of involuntary manslaughter as if he had been
convicted of second-degree manslaughter with malice aforethought. Id. at 1294,
1304. This Court held that a “district court cannot simply depart upward ‘based
in actuality on the contention that the offense of conviction is more properly
characterized as another, closely related offense.’” Id. at 1304 n.12 (quoting
United States v. Hanson, 264 F.3d 988, 995 (2001)). 6 This case involves an even
more extreme recharacterization of the offense: from methamphetamine
distribution to attempted sexual abuse of a child or solicitation of murder. If it
was error in Wolfe for the sentencing judge to elevate a conviction of
manslaughter from one degree to another for purposes of sentencing, it follow s a
fortiori that a sentencing judge may not sentence a defendant for an entirely
6
Wolfe involved a post-Booker review of a pre-Booker departure; but in
light of the advisory character of the G uidelines after Booker, this Court stated
that it was “informed by, and must take account of, the fact that the district court
would have enhanced discretion upon remand after Booker.’” 435 F.3d at 1296
(quoting United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 912 (10th Cir. 2005)). The
principles relied on in Wolfe thus remain applicable to our review of a post-
Booker sentencing decision.
-34-
different, and far more serious, crime. As we previously recognized when the
Guidelines were still mandatory:
To allow upward departure on the grounds that a second-degree
murder was premeditated would permit the sentencing court to treat
the offense of conviction (here, a murder that was not premeditated)
as merely establishing a floor offense level. “[E]ach sentencing
court could depart upward based upon the ‘real offense’ [i.e., a
premeditated murder] whenever the court wished.” Thomas W .
Hutchison, David Yellen, Peter B. Hoffman & Deborah Young,
Federal Sentencing Law & Practice § 2A1.2 comment. (f) (2000) . . .
. Such a result would allow substantially different sentences for the
same crime, a result inconsistent with the a primary goal of the
Guidelines— reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity.
Hanson, 264 F.3d at 996. This principle still has force in the post-Booker world,
not just because it preserves a policy judgment inherent in the Guidelines— itself
an important factor under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(5)(A )— but also because it respects
the Sixth Amendment values underlying both Booker and the structural safeguards
of the Guidelines.
There remains the possibility that the district court based M r. Allen’s
sentence not on evidence that he actually committed the crimes of solicitation of
murder and attempted criminal sexual abuse, but on the prospect that he would
comm it these crimes when he got the opportunity. M oviegoers will recognize the
scenario from M inority Report, a film that depicts a world in which would-be
criminals are apprehended and punished for crimes they are predicted to commit,
-35-
before they have the chance actually to commit them. 7 However effective this
approach may be in the world of science fiction, we think it violates the
Constitution’s basic guarantee that a defendant shall not be punished for “Crimes”
unless tried before and convicted by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const. art. III, §
2 (“The Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . .
.”); U.S. Const. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). It may be
tempting to depart from that principle w here, as here, the contemplated deeds are
horrific beyond measure, but it remains a fact that the only crime for which M r.
Allen was charged or convicted was distribution of a controlled substance.
If the government, federal or state, believes M r. Allen committed a crime in
his dealings with M s. A or at the W al-M art, it is free to bring a prosecution for
that conduct. In such a proceeding, M r. Allen would be entitled to put the
government to its proof. Despite the wide latitude Booker granted district courts,
we do not believe it sanctions an end-run around this fundamental process.
Booker’s precursor, Blakely, warned against the unconstitutionality of just such a
system:
Those who would reject Apprendi are resigned to one of two
alternatives. The first is that the jury need only find whatever facts
the legislature chooses to label elements of the crime, and that those
it labels sentencing factors— no matter how much they may increase
the punishment— may be found by the judge. This would mean, for
7
M inority Report (Twentieth C entury Fox and Dreamworks Pictures 2002).
-36-
example, that a judge could sentence a man for committing murder
even if the jury convicted him only of illegally possessing the firearm
used to commit it— or of making an illegal lane change while fleeing
the death scene. Not even Apprendi’s critics would advocate this
absurd result. The jury could not function as circuitbreaker in the
State’s machinery of justice if it were relegated to making a
determination that the defendant at some point did something wrong,
a mere preliminary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime
the State actually seeks to punish.
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306-307 (2004) (first emphasis added and
internal citation omitted). This case presents precisely the scenario the Blakely
Court labeled as too “absurd” to contemplate: that a judge could sentence a man
for attempted sexual abuse or solicitation of murder, even though he was
convicted only of distribution of methamphetamine. W e do not believe that the
Court’s remedial decision in Booker departs so dramatically from the C ourt’s
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment in Blakely that what was absurd in Blakely
is now a reasonable practice after Booker.
If this case had arisen under the mandatory Guidelines, it would be easy to
decide. The Sentencing Commission, acting under the authority of Congress,
incorporated safeguards to ensure that judicial fact-finding under the Guidelines
would not stray too far from the actual offenses for which the defendant was
convicted— whether the offense of conviction or the past offenses that make up
the criminal history calculation. Prominent among these safeguards were the
relatedness principle, the principle that criminal history must be based on prior
convictions, and the principle that departures based upon predicting the likelihood
-37-
that an offender will commit other crimes must be based upon specific
factors— prior criminal convictions and similar unconvicted criminal conduct.
Under this system, the district court could not have set aside the sentencing range
specified for a person who commits M r. Allen’s offense with his criminal history,
and replaced it with the sentence appropriate to a person convicted of crimes w ith
which M r. Allen has never been charged, which a reasonable jury might find he
never committed, and which have no logical connection or relation to his drug
distribution offense.
M any constitutionalists, including the five-Justice majority in the first half
of Booker, believed that even the carefully cabined practice of judicial fact-
finding allowed under the mandatory Guidelines was inconsistent with what they
called “Sixth Amendment substance.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 237. If their approach
were pursued to its logical end, the outcome of this case would likewise be
certain and sure. M r. Allen was convicted based on a plea of guilty in which he
admitted only to the distribution of a certain quantity of methamphetamine.
Under a strict Sixth Amendment regime, such as that advocated by the remedial
dissenters in Booker, M r. Allen’s uncharged, non-drug-related conduct could not
be considered for sentencing purposes.
This case is not so easy, however, under Booker. To some extent— within
the bounds of reasonableness— district courts are now free to sentence in ways not
permitted under the Guidelines, and without benefit of jury fact-finding.
-38-
Sentencing courts are empowered to impose lengthier sentences w hen needed to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(C). But we should not forget that the purpose of Booker was not to
liberate sentencing courts from statutory constraints. It was to bring our
sentencing system closer to the norms of the Sixth Amendment. If we affirm the
sentence in this case as a legitimate exercise of Booker discretion, we would
move in the opposite direction. Even more than was so under the mandatory
Guidelines system, where the sentencing judge was limited to enhancements
based on conduct related to the offense of conviction and previous convictions, or
to departures based on previous convictions and adult misconduct similar to the
offense, the jury would be “relegated to making a determination that the
defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere preliminary to a judicial
inquisition into the facts of the crime the State actually seeks to punish.” Blakely,
542 U.S. at 307. If that is what the Supreme Court intended by the Booker
decision, it should say so; w e w ill not leap to that interpretation on our own
authority.
In a case involving a variance of this magnitude, we hold that, whatever
latitude a sentencing court may have to adjust a defendant’s sentence in an
exercise of Booker discretion, it may not discard the advisory Guideline range and
impose sentence, instead, on the basis of evidence of the defendant’s uncharged,
unrelated misconduct, whether actually committed or contemplated for the future.
-39-
W e are confident that on remand, the district court can fashion a sentence that
reflects M r. Allen’s actual crime, that takes into account his dangerousness to the
comm unity, and that is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to achieve the
purposes of sentencing.
III. C ON CLU SIO N
W e VAC ATE the sentencing order of the district court and REM AND for
resentencing.
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United States v. Allen
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2007-05-31
Citations: 488 F.3d 1244
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