IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-10730
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GABRIEL BENITEZ-VILLAFUERTE,
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
_________________________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
On July 2, 1997, Gabriel Benitez-Villafuerte (“Benitez”) was
deported from the United States under the expedited removal
procedure set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1228. Soon thereafter, he
illegally reentered. This appeal arises out of the government’s
criminal prosecution of Benitez under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2)
for that illegal reentry. In this prosecution, the government has
the burden to prove that Benitez had been previously deported.
During the prosecution of this case, Benitez collaterally attacked
the constitutionality of the previous § 1228 proceeding under
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), and moved the
district court to suppress the evidence of his deportation. The
district court granted the motion. It noted that Benitez had
waived his rights to judicially contest that deportation only
before the INS officers and that he had not been taken before any
neutral magistrate before he was deported. Consequently, it held
that Benitez’s deportation had failed to comport with Fifth
Amendment procedural due process. We hold that waiver of rights in
an administrative deportation under § 1228 satisfies procedural due
process. As such, since the record of Benitez’s § 1228 proceeding
is not constitutionally tainted, it is admissible in this case.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the
district court and remand the case for trial.
I
A
On February 13, 1997, Gabriel Benitez-Villafuerte, a Mexican
national, was convicted in Dallas County, Texas, of theft of
property exceeding $1,500 in value, in violation of Texas Penal
Code § 31.03.1 Benitez received a suspended sentence of two years
imprisonment.
Sometime later, Benitez was apprehended by the local
authorities and placed in the Dallas County jail.2 On June 30,
1997, Benitez was removed from jail and detained by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (the “INS”). After interviewing Benitez
in English and reviewing his conviction documents, Border Patrol
1
Although the record is not entirely clear, it seems that the
object of the theft was an air conditioning unit.
2
The record contains no information as to the exact date
Benitez was detained nor why.
2
Agent Michael Winfrey recommended to his supervisor, Debbie Bryant,
that because of Benitez’s prior felony conviction, he was subject
to deportation from the United States. Consequently, the INS
initiated expedited removal proceedings against Benitez under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)3 and 8 U.S.C. § 1228.4 The
deportation was administratively conducted by the INS. INS
Assistant Deputy Director Neil Jacobs prepared and signed the
Notice of Intent to Issue Final Administrative Removal Order
(“Notice of Intent”), the initial charging document, alleging that:
(1) Benitez entered the United States on or about January 20, 1997,
near Laredo, Texas, without inspection by an immigration officer;
(2) Benitez had not been admitted for permanent residence in the
3
Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides that “any alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
deportable.”
4
Section 1228(b)(1) provides for the expedited removal of an
alien who is not a permanent resident and who is deportable under
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This section reads as follows:
(1) The Attorney General may, in the case of an alien
described in paragraph (2), determine the deportability
of such alien under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of this
title (relating to conviction of an aggravated felony)
and issue an order of removal pursuant to the procedures
set forth in this subsection or section 1229a of this
title.
(2) An alien is described in this paragraph if the
alien--
(A) was not lawfully admitted for permanent residence
at the time at which proceedings under this section
commenced; or
(B) had permanent resident status on a conditional
basis (as described in section 1186a of this title) at
the time that proceedings under this section commenced.
3
United States; (3) Benitez had been convicted of theft on
February 13, 1997, which constituted an aggravated felony under
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G)5; and, thus, (4) Benitez was deportable
under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Agent Winfrey served Benitez with the
Notice of Intent form, and read the contents of the document to him
in English. Benitez, in turn, signed the second page of the Notice
of Intent form, acknowledging its receipt. After indicating that
he wished to return to Mexico, Benitez signed the “waiver” portion
of the Notice of Intent form, which provided:
I DO NOT WISH TO CONTEST
“I admit the allegations and charges of this Notice of
Intent. I admit that I am deportable and acknowledge
that I am not eligible for any form of relief from
removal. I waive my right to rebut and contest the above
charges and my right to file a petition for review of the
final order. I wish to be deported.
I also waive the 14 day period of execution for the final
order of removal....”
(1 R 0085).
A second INS agent, Detention Enforcement Officer Darrell
Russell, witnessed Benitez’s signature, and attested to such on the
Notice of Intent form. That same day, INS Deputy District Director
William G. Harrington executed a Final Administrative Removal Order
(the “Removal Order”), which was also served on Benitez and read to
him in English. In the Removal Order, Harrington made the
5
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) defines that the term “aggravated
felony,” inter alia, as “a theft offense (including receipt of
stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year.”
4
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: (1) Benitez was
not a citizen or national of the United States, nor had he been
lawfully admitted for permanent residence; (2) Benitez had been
convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in § 1101(a)(43)(G)
and therefore was ineligible for any discretionary relief from
removal that the Attorney General may grant; and (3) the
administrative record established by clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence that Benitez was deportable under
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony.
The Removal Order further decreed that Benitez was to be deported
to Mexico. Consequently, on July 2, 1997, Russell served Benitez
with a warrant of deportation, and he was subsequently deported.
In less than a year, Benitez had reentered the United States.
On January 5, 1998, he was arrested in Dallas, Texas. While
incarcerated, Benitez was questioned by INS agents, and a criminal
investigation of his alien status was initiated.
On March 3, Benitez was indicted on one count of illegal
reentry after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and
(b)(2)6. Following a plea of not guilty, Benitez filed a motion to
6
Section 1326(a) and (b)(2) provides in relevant part:
(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien
who--
(1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or
removed or has departed the United States while an order
of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and
thereafter
(2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found
in, the United States, unless (A) prior to his
5
suppress the evidence of his prior deportation on the grounds that
it violated his right to procedural due process.7 The district
court granted Benitez’s motion to suppress.
The district court reasoned that because Benitez’s waiver of
rights in the § 1228 proceeding was not before a neutral magistrate
who formally advised Benitez of his basic rights, including the
right to contest his expedited removal, his waiver did not comport
with constitutional due process. The district court therefore
suppressed the evidence of Benitez’s July 2, 1997 deportation. The
government filed a timely appeal.
II
reembarkation at a place outside the United States or
his application for admission from foreign contiguous
territory, the Attorney General has expressly consented
to such alien's reapplying for admission; or (B) with
respect to an alien previously denied admission and
removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was
not required to obtain such advance consent under this
chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under Title 18,
or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.
(b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed
aliens
Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the
case of any alien described in such subsection--
(2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for
commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be
fined under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20
years, or both.
7
To obtain a conviction for illegal reentry, the government
must establish beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) alienage; (2) arrest
and deportation; (3) reentry into or unlawful presence in the
United States; and (4) lack of the Attorney General’s consent to
reenter. United States v. Flores-Peraza, 58 F.3d 164, 166 (5th
Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
6
A
The district court held that before evidence of a § 1228
administrative deportation can be introduced in a subsequent
criminal trial for alleged reentry, the administrative deportation
must satisfy the strictest standards for due process usually
applicable only in criminal trials. Specifically, the district
court held that Benitez’s waiver of rights executed before INS
officers did not constitute an effective waiver of his basic rights
to judicially contest his deportation because his waiver had not
been made in open court before a neutral magistrate who could
affirm that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. Thus, the
district court concluded that his deportation was ordered in
violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights, and evidence
thereof is inadmissible. The district court was unable to cite any
authority in support of its holding. This lack of authority is not
surprising since such a high hurdle has not before been raised in
order to comply with the basic notions of due process in a
deportation case.
Aliens who have entered the United States unlawfully are
assured the protection of the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
Nose v. Attorney General of the United States, 993 F.2d 75, 78 (5th
Cir. 1993); Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1036
(5th Cir. 1992). The due process clause forbids the state from
“arbitrarily . . . causing an alien who has entered the
country . . . illegally to be taken into custody and deported
7
without giving him all opportunity to be heard upon the questions
involving his right to be and remain in the United States.”
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101, 23 S.Ct. 611, 614-15, 47
L.Ed. 721 (1903). Courts have recognized that the constitutional
sufficiency of procedures required by due process varies with the
circumstances of each individual case. Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 33 (1982), citing Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,
452 U.S. 18, 24-25, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 2158 (1981). Generally, the
right to due process includes the right to a hearing before an
immigration judge prior to deportation. Nose, 993 F.2d at 79.
Nevertheless, due process rights, including the right to a hearing,
may effectively be waived. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
378-79, 91 S.Ct. 780, 786, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971)(holding “the
hearing required by due process is subject to waiver”).
A deportation hearing is a civil, not a criminal, action.
Prichard-Ciriza v. I.N.S., 978 F.2d 219, 222 (5th Cir. 1992)
(citing I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038-39 (1984);
Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952). As such, the full
range of constitutional protections available to a defendant in a
criminal case are not afforded an alien in a deportation
proceeding. Id.; Patel v. U.S. I.N.S., 803 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir.
1986) (citations omitted); Ramirez-Osorio v. I.N.S., 745 F.2d 937,
944 (5th Cir. 1984) (citations omitted). “The power to expel
aliens is essentially a power of the political branches of
government, which may be exercised entirely through executive
8
officers, with such opportunity for judicial review of their action
as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit.” Carlson v. Landon
342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) (citations omitted). See also The
Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1903); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-15 (1893). Although in some
contexts, Congress has statutorily provided for the judicial review
of deportation hearings, such review is not guaranteed by the
Constitution. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 537 (citations omitted).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that due process requires
only that an alien be provided notice of the charges against him,
a hearing before an executive or administrative tribunal, and a
fair opportunity to be heard. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 1953, 344
U.S. 590, 597-98 (1953). “The role of the judiciary is limited to
determining whether the procedures meet the essential standard of
fairness under the Due Process Clause and does not extend to
imposing procedures that merely displace congressional choices of
policy.” Landon, 459 U.S. at 34.
Relying on this precedent, it is clear to us that the
administrative deportation procedures of § 1228 afforded Benitez
the unimpeded opportunity to claim all the procedural due process
to which he was constitutionally entitled. Section 1228 expressly
provides that in carrying out the expedited removal procedures, the
Attorney General shall provide that--
(A) the alien is given reasonable notice of the charges
and of the opportunity described in subparagraph (C);
9
(B) the alien shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the government) by such
counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as
the alien shall choose;
(C) the alien has a reasonable opportunity to inspect
the evidence and rebut the charges;
(D) a determination is made for the record that the
individual upon whom the notice for the proceeding under
this section is served (either in person or by mail) is,
in fact, the alien named in such notice;
(E) a record is maintained for judicial review; and
(F) the final order of removal is not adjudicated by
the same person who issues the charges.
§ 1228(b)(4). See also 8 C.F.R. § 238.1. The statute further
instructs that the Attorney General may not execute any final order
of removal until 14 calendar days have passed from the date that
such order was issued, unless waived by the alien, in order that
the alien has an opportunity to apply for judicial review under 8
U.S.C. § 1252. § 1228(b)(3). Clearly the expedited statutory
deportation scheme comports with the minimum requirements of due
process pronounced by the Supreme Court in Kwong Hai Chew. Thus,
if INS complied with the statutory mechanism when deporting Benitez
on July 2, 1997, such deportation complies with the standards of
due process, and evidence of this prior deportation is admissible
in this case.
The record indicates that Benitez was given notice of the
charges against him by Agent Winfrey. Agent Winfrey explained to
Benitez that he had a right to contest the deportation at a
hearing, and Benitez waived this right. Finally, Benitez waived
his 14-day stay of execution of the Final Removal Order, during
which time, Benitez would have had an opportunity to raise any
10
opposition to the proposed deportation. Following the waiver of
the 14-day stay, Officer Darrell Russell served Benitez with a
warrant of deportation, which was subsequently executed by Officer
Alfredo Garza on July 2, 1997, near Laredo, Texas. Clearly, this
chain of events provided Benitez with ample constitutional
protection. Further, there is no evidence in the record that
Benitez’s waiver was anything other than knowing and voluntary.
Thus, the evidence of the prior deportation is admissible.
B
Under certain circumstances, an alien who is being prosecuted
under § 1326 can assert a challenge to the underlying deportation
order. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839; 107
L.Ed. 2148, 2155 (1987). In order successfully to collaterally
attack a deportation order in a § 1326 prosecution, the alien must
show (1) that the deportation hearing was fundamentally unfair,
(2) that the hearing effectively eliminated the right of the alien
to challenge the hearing by means of judicial review of the
deportation, and (3) the procedural deficiencies caused him actual
prejudice. See United States v. Palacios-Martinez, 845 F.2d 89, 91
(5th Cir. 1988); Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 735; quoting United
States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 1992,
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 945, 113 S.Ct. 391, 121 L.Ed.2d 299 (1992).8
8
We note that our law is in accord with the majority rule.
See, e.g., United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367, 378 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied 119 S.Ct. 143 (1998); United States v.
Loaisiga, 104 F.3d 484, 487 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 127
11
The law is clearly established that a showing of actual
prejudice is required to succeed in such a collateral attack.
United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 409 (5th Cir.
1992); United States v. Santos-Vanegas, 878 F.2d 247, 251 (8th Cir.
1989); United States v. Espinoza-Farlo, 34 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir.
1992)(en banc). “If [the alien] cannot make [a showing of
prejudice], the deportation order may be used to establish an
element of a criminal offence.” Espinoza-Farlo, 34 F.3d at 471;
see also United States v. Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d 733, 735 (5th
Cir. 1995). A showing of prejudice means “there was a reasonable
likelihood that but for the errors complained of the defendant
would not have been deported.” Estrada-Trochez, 66 F.3d at 735;
(1997); United States v. Perez-Ponce, 62 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir.
1995); United States v. Espinoza-Farlo, 34 F.3d 469, 471 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Meraz-Valeta, 26 F.3d 992, 998 (10th Cir.
1994) (citations omitted); United States v. Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d
592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (citations omitted); Figeroa v.
U.S. I.N.S., 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989); and United States v.
Holland, 876 F.2d 1533, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
To be sure, in 1996, Congress effectively codified our reading
of Mendoza-Lopez in 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which provides:
In a criminal proceeding under this section, an alien may
not challenge the validity of the deportation order
described in subsection (a)(1) or subsection (b) of this
section unless the alien demonstrates that:
(1) the alien exhausted any administrative remedies that
may have been available to seek relief against the order;
(2) the deportation proceeding at which the order was
issued improperly deprived the alien of the opportunity
for judicial review; and
(3) the entry of the order was fundamentally unfair.
(Emphasis added.)
12
quoting United States v. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d 402, 406 (5th
Cir. 1992, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 945, 113 S.Ct. 391, 121 L.Ed.2d
299 (1992). In short, “[i]f the defendant was legally deportable
and, despite the INS’s errors, the proceeding ‘could not have
yielded a different result,’ the deportation is valid for purposes
of section 1326.” United States v. Galicia-Gonzalez, 997 F.2d 602,
603 (9th Cir. 1993) quoting Proa-Tovar, 975 F.2d at 595.
The record is clear that irrespective whether the alleged
errors in the § 1228 proceeding occurred, Benitez would have been
deported from the United States. It is indisputable that Benitez
was convicted of a theft over $1,500 for which the term of
imprisonment was at least one year. Such conviction constituted an
aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43)(G), and, therefore, he was
“conclusively presumed to be deportable from the United States”
under § 1228(c). See also § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“any alien who is
convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is
deportable”). Moreover, as an alien convicted of an aggravated
felony, Benitez was also ineligible for any discretionary relief
from removal. § 1228(b)(5) (“no alien described in this section
shall be eligible for any relief from removal that the Attorney
General may grant in [her] discretion”). Consequently, in the
light of the incontestable evidence against him, Benitez’s
deportation was a foregone conclusion. See Perez-Ponce, 62 F.3d at
1122 (noting that absent a showing of prejudice, an alien convicted
of an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43) “would have no chance
13
of winning an appeal” of deportation order); Espinoza-Farlo, 34
F.3d at 471-72 (noting same). Thus, because he can show no
prejudice resulting from any deficiencies in the § 1288 proceeding,
Benitez cannot successfully collaterally attack his deportation.
C
In urging us to affirm the district court’s judgment, Benitez
raises an additional due process argument. Benitez complains that
the INS impermissibly functioned in both a prosecutorial and an
adjudicative capacity during the § 1228 proceeding. Benitez
further contends that because the INS’s federal budget is measured
largely by the number of aliens it apprehends and deports, the INS
has a fiscal interest in his deportation that infects the
impartiality of the proceeding. As a result, Benitez contends his
administrative deportation was adjudicated by a biased tribunal,
which amounts to the type of procedural error that is so
fundamentally unfair that he need not show actual prejudice.
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 839 n.17 (1987).
14
(1)
Benitez’s first allegation of bias--that in enacting § 1228,
Congress impermissibly commingled the prosecutorial and
adjudicatory functions of the INS--is wholly devoid of merit. In
the early case of Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955), the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that his
deportation hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) was neither fair nor
impartial because the special inquiry officer who conducted the
proceeding was subject to the supervision and control of the INS:
Petitioner would have us hold that the presence of this
relationship so strips the hearing of fairness and
impartiality as to make the procedure violative of due
process. The contention is without substance when
considered against the long-standing practice in
deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous
decisions in the federal courts, and against the special
considerations applicable to deportation which the
Congress may take into account in exercising its
particularly broad discretion in immigration matters.
Similarly, in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 56 (1975), the
Supreme Court held that “it is [] very typical for the members of
administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations,
to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting
enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing
hearings.” The Withrow Court further elaborated that the fact that
the initial charge in an administrative proceeding is brought by
the same agency who later adjudicates the matter is not, in and of
itself, violative of due process. Id. at 58. Thus, the Supreme
Court’s precedent on this point is clear: we will not presume bias
15
from the mere institutional structure of the INS. See Marine Shale
Processors, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 81 F.3d 1371, 1385 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1055 (1997).
To be sure, one INS officer compiled the allegations
supporting Benitez’s deportation (Jacobs), while another
(Harrington) reviewed the record, and upon concluding by clear,
convincing, and unequivocal evidence that Benitez was subject to
deportation, ordered him removed from the United States. Benitez,
however, has pointed to no evidence that shows in carrying out
these dual functions, the INS officers prejudged his case before
all facts were known to them to the extent that minds were
“irrevocably closed” to the possibility of him avoiding
deportation. See Baran, 57 F.3d at 446. Absent this showing, we
cannot say that the commingling of prosecutorial and adjudicative
functions in a § 1228 proceeding poses a risk of impermissible
bias. See id. (citing Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47).
(2)
Additionally, we summarily reject Benitez’s second charge of
bias--that the INS purportedly has a pecuniary interest in his
deportation. Although the INS’s congressional funding depends to
some extent on its statistical workload in apprehending and
deporting illegal aliens, this fact provides too tenuous an
influence to warrant a presumption that the INS or its personnel
had a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in
Benitez’s deportation. Instead, the alleged pecuniary interest
16
here is of the type identified by the Supreme Court as being “so
remote, trifling and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed
to be incapable of affecting the judgment or of influencing the
conduct of an individual” INS hearing officer. Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 827 n.3 (1986) (citing
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 531)).
III
To conclude, we hold that the district court erred in granting
Benitez’s motion to suppress the evidence of his July 2, 1997
proceeding. The expedited deportation procedure established by
§ 1228 clearly comports with minimal due process requirements.
Further, Benitez has failed to demonstrate that he can mount a
successful collateral attack on the validity of the § 1228
proceeding. Nor has he shown that he was prejudiced by any
deficiencies in the § 1228 proceeding.9 Thus, the evidence of the
prior deportation is admissible in Benitez’s subsequent criminal
trial, and the district court erred when it suppressed evidence
thereof. As such, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court
9
Benitez also argues that his administrative deportation was
fundamentally unfair because no record was made of the § 1228
proceeding and his waiver of rights in the administrative
proceeding was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Neither of
these alleged errors constitute structural errors in the § 1228
proceeding, however. In the light of our holding that Benitez has
failed to show actual prejudice, we need not consider these
arguments on appeal. Encarnacion-Galvez, 964 F.2d at 406
(citations omitted).
17
and REMAND the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
18
United States v. Benitez-Villafuerte
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-08-24
Citations: 186 F.3d 651
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