United States v. Burgos-Chaparro

             United States Court of Appeals
                        For the First Circuit


No. 01-2394

                       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                               Appellee,

                                  v.

                       WALDEMAR BURGOS-CHAPARRO,
                         Defendant, Appellant.


             APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

           [Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]


                                Before

                          Boudin, Chief Judge,

                         Selya, Circuit Judge,

                 and Greenberg,* Senior Circuit Judge.


     Lorenzo J. Palomares, by appointment of the court, for
appellant.
     Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, and Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco,
Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, were on
brief for the United States.



                           October 23, 2002



     *
         Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
            BOUDIN,   Chief   Judge.     Waldemar   Burgos-Chaparro,   the

defendant-appellant in this case, was indicted along with 27 others

on September 22, 1999, for his role in a major drug conspiracy

involving cocaine and marijuana.       Burgos was charged in one count

with conspiracy to distribute both drugs and in a second count with

conspiracy to import them.      The defendants were allocated to four

different cases before different judges--seven defendants to a

case.    The cases were numbered 99-305 through 99-308, Burgos being

included in No. 99-307.

            On January 31, 2000, at the insistence of the government,

a Foster hearing1 was held to explore a possible conflict because

Burgos' then-counsel--Ernesto Hernandez-Milan--was representing a

co-defendant, Roberto Lopez-Morales, in No. 99-308.         After having

the risk of conflict explained to him by the judge, Burgos said he

preferred to continue being represented by Hernandez; but during

the same hearing Hernandez was replaced as counsel for Lopez by

another lawyer (Luis Rivera) at Lopez's request.         It appears that

Hernandez continued as counsel for Lopez in another unrelated

criminal case.

            After discovery, a trial date for Burgos was set for

February 27, 2001.       Two days before trial, Burgos reached an


     1
      Under United States v. Foster, 469 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1972), a
federal court is obligated to conduct a hearing to inquire into the
adequacy of a defendant's representation whenever co-defendants are
represented by the same counsel.     Id. at 4-5; see also Fed. R.
Crim. P. 44(c).

                                   -2-
agreement with the government and pled guilty to one of the two

counts, the other being dismissed.             On April 6, 2001, a new

counsel, Lydia Lizarribar-Masini, replaced Hernandez as counsel for

Burgos    and   represented   Burgos    in   his   sentencing    proceedings.

Lizarribar also represented Lopez in No. 99-308, having apparently

taken over from Rivera in December 2000.              On August 30, 2001,

Burgos--represented by Lizarribar--was sentenced to 168 months in

prison.

            Now represented by new counsel (his third), Burgos has

appealed, claiming that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel has

been   violated   by   conflicts   of   interest    on   the    part   of   both

Hernandez and Lizarribar.      The record is poorly developed, as one

might expect, because none of the present claims of conflict was

presented to the district court by Burgos; indeed, even in this

court his Sixth Amendment claims are not easy to disentangle.                But

nothing presented to us suggests that Burgos has been adversely

affected by the potential conflicts of which he complains.

            It might well be asked at the outset why Burgos should be

entitled to present what are at best marginal claims--certainly no

plain error is apparent--when he did not raise any of them in the

district court.        The short answer is that where a defendant's

counsel in a criminal case labors under a supposed conflict, it is

unreasonable to expect that counsel to accuse himself (or the

already-represented defendant to represent himself on that issue).


                                    -3-
See generally 3 LaFave, Israel, & King, Criminal Procedure §

11.7(e) at 629 & n.53 (2d ed. 1999).   Whatever qualifications may

exist on the right to raise such issues for the first time on

appeal, the government in this case makes no objection.

           We turn then to the merits.     In general, a criminal

defendant is entitled to conflict-free representation, although the

right may often be waived after appropriate warnings. See Wheat v.

United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159-63 (1988).   In this case Burgos is

not complaining about the conflict issue aired in the Foster

hearing.   Not only did Burgos after warnings agree to having

Hernandez represent him and co-defendant Lopez in their related

cases, but the potential conflict was negated on the spot by

Lopez's decision to have Rivera supplant Hernandez as Lopez's

counsel in No. 99-308.

           Instead, the focus of Burgos' appeal is on two other

alleged conflicts.     In brief, Burgos says that Hernandez also

represented a different co-defendant--Luis A. Feliciano-Valentin--

in one of the related cases (No. 99-308) without any examination of

the conflict by the district court or waiver by Burgos; and Burgos

says that Lizarribar's representation of him at sentencing is

similarly flawed because after Rivera took over the representation

of co-defendant Lopez, Lizarribar in turn succeeded Rivera and

represented Burgos and Lopez at the same time without judicial

scrutiny or consent.


                                -4-
           In general, ineffective assistance of counsel--as opposed

to the complete absence of counsel at a critical stage--is tested

under the familiar Strickland test; this requires the defendant to

show    that   counsel's    performance       is    so   impaired   as   to   be

constitutionally inadequate and that this likely affected the

outcome of the case.       See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

694 (1984).     However,     a lesser showing of prejudice is enough

where ineffectiveness is traced to a             conflict of interest--rather

than some other impairment of the right to counsel--that was not

identified and properly waived.        See Mickens v. Taylor, 122 S. Ct

1237, 1240-41 (2002).        Why Supreme Court precedent so qualifies

Strickland need not concern us here.

           It is a commonplace that divided loyalties may undermine

the ability     of   a   single   lawyer    to     represent   effectively    two

defendants charged in the same case.                  This "potential," said

Mickens, ripens into an "actual" conflict where such "a division of

loyalties" is shown to have "affected counsel's performance."

Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1243.           Where such an effect is shown,

reversal is required without any further showing that the defect in

performance altered the outcome.           This lessening of the Strickland

burden occurs, according to Mickens, whether or not the court has

itself failed in its duty to inquire into the conflict.                  Id. at

1244.




                                     -5-
            We    start    with   Burgos'      claim     that   Hernandez's    dual

representation (of Burgos and Feliciano) amounted to such an actual

conflict.    The district court files in No. 99-308 show that on

November 12, 1999, attorney David Roman entered an appearance

reciting that he had been retained in this case by Feliciano and

that Hernandez agreed to "this substitution."                   Thus, even before

the Foster hearing afforded Burgos and well before his guilty plea,

it appears that Hernandez was no longer conflicted on account of

his earlier representation of Feliciano in the related case.

Burgos'   brief    is     based   on   the    premise,    which   appears     to   be

mistaken, that Hernandez continued to represent both Feliciano and

Burgos during the latter's plea negotiations.

            In any event, even if Hernandez had represented both

Burgos and Feliciano at some time that mattered, Burgos would have

to identify some way in which his representation by Hernandez was

compromised by the latter's representation of Feliciano.                       This

could be because of some action taken by Hernandez or by some

opportunity foregone, see Guaraldi v. Cunningham, 819 F.2d 15, 17

(1st Cir. 1987) (Breyer, J.); but some adverse action or inaction

is required that can be traced to the conflict in loyalty.                  Merely

to speculate that the divided loyalty could have caused such a step

is not enough.      See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Lebron, 23

F.3d 600, 606-07 (1st Cir. 1994).




                                        -6-
              All Burgos offers is speculation. Thus, Burgos says that

where counsel represents two plea bargaining defendants, each

defendant may have an interest in implicating the other in order to

secure a better deal.        Burgos certainly did bargain for a plea.

But now represented by conflict-free counsel, he points to nothing

to    suggest   that   the   government   needed   Burgos'   help   against

Feliciano, nor that Hernandez failed to get the best deal he could

for Burgos because he was trying to protect Feliciano's interest.

              Our case law, admittedly pre-Mickens, says that it may be

enough to point to an alternative strategy or approach, beneficial

to the complaining defendant, that counsel might have taken but was

foregone because of conflicting loyalties.          See United States v.

Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 40 (1st Cir. 1991).            Burgos says that he

might have chosen to plead innocent and insisted on trial.           But, of

course, Michaud assumes a showing that such a course would have

been undertaken but for counsel's dual loyalty; and Burgos makes no

showing on this point.       Nor, given the evidence against Burgos, is

there any reason to think that this course held out any promise.

The    plea   colloquy   reveals   that   the   government   had    multiple

witnesses ready to testify against Burgos and, apparently, had a

videotape of Burgos' illegal activities.

              Finally, Burgos says that his plea agreement designated

him as a leader of the conspiracy, an admission that would normally

adversely affect the guideline range.           This is a concession that


                                    -7-
could be influenced by dual representation; but again Burgos offers

nothing to show that it was so affected.         The concession may have

been compelled by the evidence or been made a requirement of the

plea bargain by the government.         Nor did Burgos' concession mean

that Feliciano could not also be designated as a leader: "There

can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader

. . . of a criminal . . . conspiracy."          U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. n.4

(2001).

            Burgos'    alternative    claim--that    Lizarribar    provided

ineffective assistance--is even more quickly answered.            It is true

that while representing Burgos at sentencing, Lizarribar also

represented co-defendant Roberto Lopez-Morales.           By the time she

began to represent the latter, Lopez had already determined to

plead guilty.     Burgos provides no reason to think that this dual

representation adversely affected Burgos.           At most, he speculates

that he could have sought to withdraw his own guilty plea but

offers no reason to think that this was either a plausible course

or   that   it   was    adversely    affected   because   Lizarribar   also

represented Lopez.

            Affirmed.




                                     -8-