United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2493
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
BEVIL CAMPBELL, A/K/A WHOOPY, A/K/A WHOPS,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Stahl, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
Paul J. Haley for appellant.
John Wortmann, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
Jennifer Hay Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, and Donald
K. Stern, United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
October 11, 2001
STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge. In this appeal, defendant
Bevin Campbell challenges his convictions and sentence for
conspiracy to import a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 963;
aiding and abetting the importation of a controlled substance,
21 U.S.C. § 952(a); and conspiracy to possess a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846.
Specifically, the defendant appeals from the decision of the
district court to admit out-of-court statements made by his
alleged coconspirators. In addition to these purportedly
incorrect evidentiary rulings, the defendant claims that the
district court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of
acquittal and/or his motion for a new trial, because, defendant
maintains, the government failed to prove that he was part of a
conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine. Defendant also
alleges that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective as an
additional justification for a new trial. Finally, defendant
argues that, if his convictions are affirmed, his case should
be returned for resentencing, claiming that his sentence
violates the constitutional rule announced in Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). As none of defendant's arguments
have merit, his convictions and sentence are affirmed.
I.
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On November 15, 1998, at approximately 8:30 p.m.,
Noiyota Swinson and Ann DePolo arrived at Logan Airport on a
flight originating in Jamaica. Customs officials observed
Swinson place two pieces of checked luggage on DePolo's luggage
cart, and became suspicious when the two women then went in
separate directions. When individually interrogated, Swinson
and DePolo initially denied traveling together. The customs
agents then opened the women's luggage, revealing 17 shampoo
bottles containing more than 3.2 kilograms of cocaine. Upon
further interrogation, Swinson and DePolo separately stated that
they were planning to meet a black man known as “Whoopy” in a
black Lexus or BMW outside the international terminal. Swinson
had a piece of paper with a phone number in her possession at
the time of her apprehension.
When customs officials went outside the terminal, they
observed Campbell, a black male, in a black BMW. Campbell, at
the request of the customs officials, accompanied them into the
international arrivals building. He stated that he was there to
meet a friend, who was purportedly arriving on an 8:30 flight,
outside the KLM ticket counter. The customs officials soon
ascertained that there was no such incoming flight. When told
that he was possibly implicated in a seizure of drugs from two
women who had just arrived from Jamaica, Campbell denied knowing
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the women. But while he was being interviewed, the door to one
of the search rooms opened and Swinson and DePolo positively
identified the defendant as “Whoopy” and as the person who had
provided them with the shampoo bottles and their tickets to and
from Jamaica. An interrogating agent asked Campbell for his
pager number, which matched the number on the piece of paper in
Swinson's possession. In addition, although Campbell denied
going by the name “Whoopy,” he had a note in his possession
addressed to “Whops.”
Although Campbell was not detained at the airport, a
grand jury subsequently returned a superseding indictment,
charging him with the three counts on which, after a seven-day
trial, he was ultimately convicted to 121 months' imprisonment,
to be served concurrently, followed by 48 months' supervised
release. The defendant appealed both his convictions and his
sentence.
II.
Campbell maintains that the district court improperly
allowed the jury to consider statements made by unindicted
coconspirators who were unavailable to testify at trial.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), a “statement [made] by
a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy” is not considered hearsay, and may be
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considered by the jury for the truth of the matter asserted.
Because of concerns about the reliability of these statements,
however, the Supreme Court in Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171 (1987), announced that, prior to admitting a
coconspirator statement over an objection, “a court must be
satisfied that the statement actually falls within the
definition of the Rule,” meaning that “[t]here must be evidence
that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the non-
offering party, and that the statement was made 'during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.'” Id. at 175. The
party wishing to offer these statements to the jury must first
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
statements fall within the purview of the Rule. See id. at 176;
see also id. at 175 (noting that “preliminary questions
concerning the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court,” and the existence of a conspiracy is one such
preliminary question) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)). District
courts in this circuit, guided by United States v. Petrozziello,
548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977), which was decided prior to, but
consistently with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Bourjaily, make these preliminary gate-keeping determinations
regarding the admissibility of coconspirator statements during
so-called Petrozziello hearings.
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Because the defendant failed to object to the district
court's ultimate determination that the statements were, in
fact, declarations by a coconspirator, we review the district
court's decision for clear error. See United States v. Mojica-
Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 303 (1st Cir. 2000). During Swinson's
testimony, but prior to the issue being raised formally by the
defendant, the trial judge explained to counsel at a sidebar
conference how he would proceed in deciding any questions
regarding coconspirator statements:
Now, at this point, my attention has not
been called, I believe to any coconspirator
statement that will make it necessary for me
to have such a hearing. I don't know
whether it will or not, but in any event, on
the basis of the evidence I have heard thus
far, the proffer suggested in the
government's opening statement, it appears
to me very likely, most probable, that if I
hold a Petrozziello hearing, it will support
findings by a preponderance of the evidence
which is a standard I am supposed to use in
making the findings of conspiracy. So
unless you can call my attention to some
particular problem that I am not aware of, I
think the appropriate thing for me to do is
to receive in this evidence over objection
at this point.
See Trans. Vol. 2 (Afternoon) at 28. As demonstrated by this
excerpt from the transcript, the trial judge correctly
anticipated this issue and demonstrated his awareness of the
appropriate legal standard for making his determination.
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When Swinson began to recount for the jury the
statements made to her by “Corey,” an alleged coconspirator with
the defendant,1 the government made the following proffer in
response to defendant's objection:
Respectfully, this statement is being
offered as a coconspirator declaration under
Federal Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E),
Corey is a coconspirator, and the Court has
already heard testimony that Corey
instructed the girls at Wollaston Beach they
were bringing back flav in conjunction with
Whoppy [sic], and we would submit that this
is a probative statement. It is being
offered for the truth of the matter asserted
as a coconspirator declaration.
Id. at 78. At that point, the trial court announced that it had
“already heard enough to have a view that it is more likely than
not after I have heard all the evidence and hold a Petrozziello
hearing, that I will make findings that this is admissible as
that [sic] coconspirator statement . . . .” Id. Consequently,
the judge lifted the limiting instruction that he had previously
1 During the trial, the government incorrectly stated
that Corey was an indicted coconspirator, see Trans. Vol. 2
(afternoon) at 78, when, in fact, he was an unindicted
coconspirator. See Appellee's Brief at 9 n.5. Nevertheless,
this misstatement by counsel for the government is irrelevant to
our analysis, as Rule 801 makes no distinction between indicted
and unindicted coconspirators. See, e.g., United States v.
Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 294 (7th Cir. 1979) (“[I]t is well
established that co-conspirators need not be indicted, and a
fortiori need not be named, for the [Rule 801] exception to be
applicable.”).
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given to the jury regarding the consideration of this testimony.
When Swinson testified regarding statements made by “Carl,”
“Dred,” and “Culture,” who were also alleged conspiracy
participants residing in Jamaica, the defendant renewed his
objection and again requested a limiting instruction. The trial
court, however, accepted the government's argument that these
statements were also covered by Rule 801(d)(2)(E), and told
counsel, “[If] you see a problem that I have not ruled on, you
may let me know.” See Trans. Vol. 3 at 20. Upon the conclusion
of the evidence, and after charging the jury, the trial judge
reiterated his decision to admit the coconspirator testimony
without limitation, and confirmed with counsel that a formal
Petrozziello hearing would not be necessary.2
As explained in United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707
(1st Cir. 1992), the jurisprudence of our circuit requires that
the district court make its Petrozziello determination “at the
2 THE COURT: All right, now, one other thing that I want
to call attention to is that I explicitly have decided
not to give any modification of instructions on my
evidentiary rulings during the course of the trial,
and no one has requested such modifications, and in
those circumstances a Petrozziello hearing is not
required. I just wanted to be sure that everybody
understood that.
MR. FAHEY (DEFENSE COUNSEL): That's correct, your
Honor.
Trans. Vol. 7 at 112.
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close of all the evidence.” Id. at 715 (quoting United States
v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1038 (1980)). However, in Ortiz, we also made clear that
a “defendant's failure to object to the omission of such an
express trial-end determination bars him from raising the point
on appeal in the absence of plain error.” Id. (quoting United
States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1283 (1st Cir. 1991)).
Here, the trial judge made his provisional
determination regarding admissibility early on during the trial,
and reaffirmed his holding upon the conclusion of evidence.
Nevertheless, he did offer counsel the opportunity to request a
formal Petrozziello hearing. In light of counsel's failure to
accept the Court's invitation, the defendant waived this
objection. Even if we assume arguendo that the defendant did
not waive this issue, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in
the lower court's decision to admit the coconspirator
statements. Although the defendant correctly notes that a trial
judge may not rely solely on coconspirator statements to
establish the existence of a conspiracy, see United States v.
Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1182 (1st Cir. 1993), here the court
had before it ample extrinsic evidence demonstrating that a
conspiracy existed. There was, inter alia, testimony that the
defendant had been in the vehicle with Corey, Swinson and Avery
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Fortes,3 and, while they were driving around, had instructed
Corey to tell the two women why they were getting a free trip to
Jamaica. The defendant also drove the two drug couriers
(Swinson and DePolo) to the airport, gave them the shampoo
bottles that they subsequently used to transport the drugs,
purchased their tickets for them through his friend Gregg Bush,
told the two women not to be seen together while traveling so as
not to arouse suspicion, and told Swinson to braid her hair so
that she would look more like a tourist. Along with the acts and
statements of the defendant himself, the government offered
evidence linking the defendant with his alleged coconspirators
in the drug scheme.4 The district court did not commit error,
plain or otherwise, when it ruled that the government had
demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of
the evidence and allowed the jury to consider the statements of
unindicted coconspirators without a limiting instruction.
3 Avery Fortes was originally offered the “opportunity”
to go to Jamaica, but chose not to go. Swinson invited DePolo
to take Fortes' place.
4 For example, there was testimony that “Carl” and “Dred”
picked Swinson and DePolo up at the airport in Jamaica and
brought them to their hotel. Furthermore, the government
presented documentary evidence of defendant's phone records,
revealing numerous calls made to Jamaica during the time that
the drug transactions were consummated; part of an envelope with
“Carl's” phone number on it, which had been in DePolo's
possession at the time of her arrest; and Swinson's calendar,
which included the notation, “Wait for Carl.”
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III.
The defendant argues next that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for acquittal and/or motion for new trial
filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 and 33, because, defendant
maintains, there was no evidence linking him to the conspiracy
charged. The denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of
acquittal is reviewed de novo to determine “whether any rational
factfinder could have found that the evidence presented at
trial, together with all reasonable inferences, viewed in the
light most favorable to the government, established each element
of the particular offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United
States v. Richard, 234 F.3d 763, 767 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting
United States v. Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61, 67 (1st Cir. 1995)). The
denial of a motion for a new trial, on the other hand, is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, provided that the motion is
not based on grounds arising subsequent to trial or due to an
alleged error in the legal standard applied, neither of which
applies here. See United States v. Freeman, 208 F.3d 332, 339
& n.6 (1st Cir. 2000).
In addition to the properly admitted coconspirator
statements and the testimony of Fortes, Swinson and DePolo, the
government offered substantial testimonial and documentary
evidence, discussed supra, linking the defendant to, and
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suggesting that he was, in fact, the leader of the conspiracy to
import and to distribute cocaine. The fact that Swinson and
DePolo may have been under the mistaken impression that they
were being asked to transport marijuana rather than cocaine into
the United States is irrelevant because, based on the evidence
presented, a rational factfinder could conclude that the
defendant and his American and Jamaican (unindicted)
coconspirators were of one mind in conspiring to import and
distribute cocaine.5 With the exception of his claim of
ineffective assistance, which is discussed infra, the defendant
has failed to offer any additional argument or evidence to
support his claim that the trial judge abused his discretion in
failing to grant a new trial. The decision of the trial court
denying both the motion for judgment of acquittal and the motion
for a new trial is hereby affirmed.
IV.
Finally, the defendant suggests two additional grounds
of error. Defendant first argues that he is entitled to a new
trial because his counsel's performance was constitutionally
deficient. Second, the defendant maintains that his sentence
must be vacated in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
5 The trial testimony of Fortes suggests that, in certain
communities, “flav” is commonly understood as a slang term for
cocaine. See Trans. Vol. 2 (morning) at 86.
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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We dispose of
these arguments summarily, as the former issue has been raised
prematurely and the latter is without merit.
A.
In raising a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the defendant alleges that his trial counsel (1) failed
to question two witnesses on their prior testimony regarding
their knowledge of the conspiracy; (2) failed to raise the issue
of racial profiling; (3) failed to call defense witnesses; (4)
failed to argue the absence of proof of a conspiracy in the Rule
29 motion; and (5) failed to request a charge relating to the
perjury of a witness. However, “[t]he rule in this circuit is
that a fact-specific claim of ineffective legal assistance
cannot be raised initially on direct review of a criminal
conviction, but must originally be presented to the district
court.” United States v. Hunnewell, 891 F.2d 955, 956 (1st Cir.
1989). In order for the defendant's claim to be considered
fully, he must first build a record in district court
cataloguing his complaints regarding his counsel's allegedly
faulty strategic choices and general performance. Therefore,
any consideration of defendant's ineffective assistance claim by
this Court is premature. See also United States v. Natanel, 938
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F.2d 302, 309 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We do not normally consider
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal.”).
B.
The defendant also alleges that the trial judge ran
afoul of Apprendi v. New Jersey when determining the applicable
penalty range under the Sentencing Guidelines, because he
calculated the sentence based on the amount of drugs involved in
the offense, even though a specific drug quantity had not been
included in the indictment.6 As this Court has held on numerous
occasions, “[n]o Apprendi violation occurs when the district
court sentences a defendant below the default statutory
maximum.” United States v. Barnes, 244 F.3d 172, 177-78 (1st
Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Robinson, 241 F.3d 115,
119 (1st Cir. 2001).7 The trial judge sentenced the defendant
to 121 months, which falls below the statutory maximum of 240
months provided by the catch-all provision of the controlled
6 The defendant only disputes the propriety of his term
of incarceration. He did not raise any challenge to his term of
supervised release either at sentencing or in his appellate
brief.
7 It is unclear whether the Supreme Court contemplated
the impact of its decision in Apprendi on the calculation of
sentencing guidelines ranges generally, and drug violation
guideline ranges in particular, where drug quantity is one of
the most important variables in determining where a guideline
range will fall. Nevertheless, until the Supreme Court offers
us additional guidance, First Circuit jurisprudence on this
point has been well-established.
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substances statute for offenses involving cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(C). Therefore, no Apprendi violation has occurred,
and the defendant's sentence is affirmed.
V.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
Affirmed.
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