PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 2/21/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 95-3083
)
MICHAEL E. CAPPS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 93-CR-20091)
____________________
Michael Lewis Harris, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kansas
City, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Robert S. Streepy, Assistant United States Attorney, Kansas City,
Kansas (Randall K. Rathburn, United States Attorney, with him on
the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
____________________
Before TACHA, COFFIN, 1 and LUCERO.
____________________
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. At his trial for violating the
"felon-in-possession" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Michael Capps
stipulated that 1) he was previously convicted of two federal
felonies; 2) he was in possession of a functioning firearm; and 3)
the firearm was not manufactured in Kansas. Though acknowledging
that these stipulations facially satisfied the government's case in
chief, Capps offered as a defense his good faith and reasonable
belief that, because his civil rights were restored under Kansas
1
The Honorable Frank M. Coffin, United States Senior Circuit
Judge for the First Circuit, sitting by designation.
law, the federal convictions did not count as predicate felonies
and, therefore, did not prohibit his firearm possession. The court
ruled that Capps' knowledge as to his felony status was not an
element of the offense, and Capps was swiftly convicted.
This appeal presents two claims. First, Capps reiterates the
claim that knowledge of his felony status is an element of §
922(g)(1). Second, Capps claims that applying to him the Supreme
Court's decision in Beecham v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1669
(1994), which holds that a state's restoration of civil rights does
not affect federal felonies, retroactively expanded criminal
responsibility under § 922(g)(1) in violation of ex post facto
principles and the Due Process Clause. We address each claim in
turn and, discerning no error, we affirm.
DISCUSSION
A. The Mens Rea Requirement
The "felon-in-possession" statute provides, in relevant part:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person--
(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year
. . .
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition
. . . .
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
A conviction, for purposes of the act, does not include a
prior conviction "for which a person . . . has had civil rights
restored, . . . unless such . . . restoration of civil rights
expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport,
-2-
possess, or receive firearms." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Under
Kansas law, at the time of his most recent arrest, Capps suffered
no deprivation of civil rights or limitation on his firearm
privileges. If, indeed, as Capps allegedly believed, a state
restoration scheme could nullify federal convictions (for purposes
of the act), Capps would not have been subject to § 922(g)(1)
liability.
At the time of Capps' possession, two circuits had held that
state schemes could affect federal convictions. See United States
v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Edwards, 946 F.2d 1347, 1348 (8th Cir. 1991). Though these
holdings were rejected by Beecham in 1994, Capps wanted to argue to
the jury that the earlier rulings supported his reasonable belief
that his felonies no longer served as predicate convictions, and
that, consequently, he should not be convicted under § 922(g)(1).
The problem with this argument is that its central premise is
contrary to the law in this circuit. The Kansas restoration scheme
is relevant only if Capps' knowledge concerning the status of his
prior convictions is an element of § 922(g)(1). In other words,
does a conviction under § 922(g)(1) require proof that the
defendant knew that he had suffered a prior felony conviction? We
have held implicitly that it does not.
Our cases identify three elements necessary to sustain a
conviction under § 922(g)(1):
1) the defendant was convicted of a felony;
-3-
2) the defendant thereafter knowingly possessed a firearm; and
3) the possession was in or affecting interstate commerce.
United States v. Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Flower, 29 F.3d 530, 534 (10th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Shunk, 881 F.2d 917, 921 (10th Cir. 1989). As our formulation
makes clear, "the only knowledge required for a § 922(g) conviction
is knowledge that the instrument possessed is a firearm." Mains,
33 F.3d at 1228. Indeed, in setting forth the elements in Shunk,
we relied upon United States v. Dancy, 861 F.2d 77, 81 (5th Cir.
1988), where, upon examining the legislative history and statutory
predecessors of § 922(g), the Fifth Circuit explicitly held that
the government need not prove that the defendant had knowledge that
he was a felon. 2
Moreover, as far as we can tell, no circuit has extended the
knowledge component of § 922(g)(1) beyond the act of possession
itself. See, e.g., Langley, 62 F.3d at 606; United States v.
2
Section 922(g)(1) was enacted as part of the Firearms
Owners' Protection Act (FOPA), Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449
(1986), and consolidated various laws placing firearm disabilities
on felons. Courts interpreting these statutory predecessors
consistently held that a mens rea requirement, if any, applied only
to the conduct (possession, transportation or reception) itself.
Dancy, 861 F.2d at 81. Indeed, prior to FOPA, the firearm
provisions were often considered strict liability offenses. United
States v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 1988).
FOPA also amended the penalty provision for § 922, which
authorizes punishment for "[w]hoever knowingly violates subsection
. . . (g)." 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (emphasis added). The addition
of the term "knowingly" created a textual ambiguity as to which
elements "knowingly" attached. However, the legislative history
indicates that Congress intended to incorporate former law, and at
most was attempting to avoid punishing unintentional conduct. See
United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602, 605-06 (4th Cir. 1995) (en
banc); Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1001-02; Dancy, 861 F.2d at 81.
-4-
Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 713 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. McNeal,
900 F.2d 119, 121 (7th Cir. 1990); Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1002-03.
Seeking relief from this precedential albatross, Capps argues
that the 1994 Supreme Court cases of Staples v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1793 (1994), and United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,
115 S. Ct. 464 (1994), mandate a different interpretation of §
922(g)(1). In Staples, the Court held that to sustain a conviction
for the possession of an unregistered firearm under 26 U.S.C. §
5861(d), based on defendant's possession of a machinegun, the
government had to prove that the defendant knew of the features of
his gun that brought it within the scope of the act. 114 S. Ct. at
1804. This required proof that Staples knew that his weapon could
shoot, or be readily restored to shoot, automatically, without
manual reloading. See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).
X-Citement Video involved the Protection of Children Against
Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, which prohibits "knowingly"
transporting, shipping, receiving, distributing or reproducing a
visual depiction, if such depiction involves the use of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). The
Court held that the term "knowingly" modifies the phrase "the use
of a minor," primarily because the "age of the performers is the
crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct."
115 S. Ct. at 469. Relying on these cases, Capps argues that the
government should be required to prove that he had knowledge of the
facts that brought his conduct within the scope of § 922(g)(1),
-5-
including knowledge that he suffered a predicate conviction under
the act.
Capps' post-Staples argument has been thoroughly considered
and rejected by the Fourth Circuit en banc in Langley, 62 F.3d at
606-08. We agree with the analysis in
Langley, and briefly recount
the reasons presented there that clearly distinguish Staples and X-
Citement Video. First, in contrast to an ordinary citizen
possessing a firearm unaware of its automatic firing capability or
trafficking in sexually explicit materials involving adults, a
person convicted of a felony cannot reasonably expect to be free
from regulation when possessing a firearm. This is accordingly not
a situation involving a need to apply a scienter requirement to
"each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise
innocent conduct." Id. at 607 (quoting X-Citement Video, 115 S.
Ct. at 469).
Second, the statutes at issue in the Supreme Court cases
did not have long-standing, firmly entrenched, uniform
judicial interpretations that necessitated the
application of the presumption that "Congress acts with
knowledge of existing law, and that 'absent a clear
manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or
revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with
existing law and its judicial construction.'"
Id. at 607-08 (citations omitted). In contrast, the statutory
predecessors of § 922(g)(1) were consistently interpreted not to
require proof of defendant's knowledge of either felony status or
interstate nexus. See supra note 2.
Moreover, we think Staples and X-Citement Video are
particularly inapposite to the circumstances presented here. There
-6-
is a vast difference between knowledge of facts that pertain to the
criminal conduct, and knowledge of the law prohibiting such
conduct. See Staples, 114 S. Ct. at 1805 n.3 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) ("The mens rea presumption requires knowledge only of
the facts that make the defendant's conduct illegal, lest it
conflict with the related presumption, 'deeply rooted in the
American legal system,' that, ordinarily, 'ignorance of the law or
a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.'")
(citation omitted). Capps asserts that his reasonable
misinterpretation of the effect of state law on his federal
conviction negates an element of the offense. However, we have
held that whether a prior conviction serves as a predicate under §
922(g)(1) is a question of law. See Flower, 29 F.3d at 534-35.
Therefore, his complaint is essentially one of ignorance of the law
-- "I thought the law applied differently than it does."
Finally, Capps' argument is wholly different from the
challenges advanced in the Supreme Court cases. Instead, it is
more akin to the hypothetical situation of Staples contending that,
though aware of the automatic nature of his gun, he did not know
that the definition of a machine gun included his weapon, or the
owner of X-Citement Video, Inc., admitting knowledge that the video
portrayed a 16-year-old, but claiming a good faith belief that
"minor" defined only persons under 16. Such an ignorance of the
law defense is easily rejected. See Sherbondy, 865 F.2d at 1002.
In sum, Staples and X-Citement Video have not changed the
scienter requirements applicable to a prosecution under §
-7-
922(g)(1), and "knowingly" still modifies only defendant's
possession of the firearm. Accordingly, issues regarding the
reasonableness or sincerity of Capps' interpretation of a legal
question were not legally relevant to his guilt or innocence, and
were properly excluded from the jury instructions.
B. Due Process
Resolving a conflict in the circuits, 3 the Supreme Court in
Beecham interpreted § 921(a)(20) to require that only federal
restoration of civil rights could remove firearm disabilities
resulting from federal convictions. 114 S. Ct. at 1672. Capps
claims that the application to him of this interpretation
constituted a retroactive expansion of criminal responsibility in
contravention of ex post facto principles and the Due Process
Clause.
"A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause when it punishes
behavior which was not punishable at the time it was committed or
increases the punishment beyond the level imposed at the time of
commission." Stephens v. Thomas, 19 F.3d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1994)
(citing U.S. Const., art. 1, § 10., cl. 1; Collins v. Youngblood,
497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990)). Though the Ex Post Facto Clause serves to
limit legislative power, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of
a criminal statute, applied retroactively, can function like an ex
post facto law, and violate the Due Process Clause. See Bouie v.
3
Compare United States v. Geyler, 932 F.2d 1330, 1333 (9th
Cir. 1991) and United States v. Edwards, 946 F.2d 1347, 1348 (8th
Cir. 1991) with United States v. Jones, 993 F.2d 1131, 1136 (4th
Cir. 1993).
-8-
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1964); Coleman v. Saffle,
869 F.2d 1377, 1385 (10th Cir. 1989).
Capps' ex post facto claim confronts two insurmountable
hurdles. First, it is clear that Beecham did not alter a Tenth
Circuit interpretation regarding the power of state restoration
schemes over prior federal convictions. Because we had never
addressed the issue, Capps has no basis to argue that Beecham
constitutes a "judicial enlargement" of the "felon-in-possession"
statute.
Second, even if we were to apply ex post facto principles, we
would conclude that the result of Beecham was foreseeable. We have
maintained that if the interpretation of a statute was "dictated by
the plain language," it was foreseeable. See Lustgarden v. Gunter,
966 F.2d 552, 554 (10th Cir. 1992). In Beecham, a unanimous Court
held that the unambiguous statutory language of § 921(a)(20)
governed its decision. 114 S. Ct. at 1672. As such, Beecham
neither altered the law nor ruled in an unforeseeable manner.
Therefore, Capps' challenge must fail.
Affirmed.
-9-