United States v. Castelo

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 29, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________ Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-60874
_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

DAVID CASTELO,

Defendant - Appellant.
__________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
_________________________________________________________________

Before JOLLY, HIGGINBOTHAM, and JONES, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we consider whether the warrantless search of

the appellant’s truck falls within either the automobile exception

or the pervasively regulated industry exception to the warrant

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.

During a roadside inspection, Mississippi Department of

Transportation (“MDOT”) officers found approximately 112 pounds of

cocaine in the trailer of Castelo’s truck. At trial, Castelo moved

to suppress the cocaine. After a hearing, the motion was denied.

Castelo ultimately accepted a plea agreement, under which he

reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his

motion to suppress. We hold that the Mississippi statutory scheme

satisfies the requirements of New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691
(1987), that the initial stop was lawful under that scheme, that

after the stop the officers acquired probable cause to believe the

truck contained contraband, and that the ensuing search was

properly conducted under the automobile exception to the warrant

requirement.

I

On November 12, 2003, David Castelo and Luis Roberto Quintero

were stopped by MDOT officers while driving a tractor-trailer rig

north on Interstate 55 in Grenada County, Mississippi. The

officers, Sergeant James T. Luttrell and Officer Mark Hendrix, were

designated as a “portable scale team”, assigned to weigh and

perform roadside inspections of commercial vehicles.

Luttrell motioned the driver, Quintero, to the rear of the

trailer and asked whether it was loaded. Quintero stated that the

trailer was loaded with scrap metal. When asked where the trailer

had been loaded, Quintero could not recall, but stated that it was

“just a few miles from here”. Luttrell then asked Quintero to

produce various required documents for inspection –- specifically,

the permit book, international fuel tax agreement, bill of lading,

log book, driver’s license, and registration. While Quintero was

retrieving the documents, the officers inspected the seal and

padlock on the trailer, and noted that the seal was fastened but

not locked.

Luttrell later testified that, while he was inspecting the

documents, Quintero was repeatedly sipping water from a bottle and

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kicking grass on the shoulder of the road, and generally appeared

uneasy. During the inspection, Luttrell discovered that the

vehicle’s registration had been illegally altered. When

questioned, Quintero admitted that he had changed the

registration’s expiration date by writing the number “1" in front

of the eight, causing the actual date –- November 8 –- to appear as

November 18 (thus falsely indicating that the registration was

valid at the time of the stop).

The officers then instructed Quintero to remove the padlock on

the trailer so that they could verify that the actual cargo matched

what was listed on the bill of lading. Quintero explained that the

trailer had been sealed, to which Luttrell responded that he would

break the seal, re-seal it after inspecting the cargo, and “sign

off on his bill [of lading] that he had broken the seal”.

Quintero proceeded to unlock the trailer and Luttrell entered

to inspect the load. Luttrell testified that he saw two “soft

carry bags” and a pillowcase lying on the floor of the trailer, and

that outlines of “brick-shaped objects” protruded from the sides of

the pillowcase. Suspecting that the objects were cocaine bricks,

Luttrell exited the trailer and called for backup. Once the scene

was secure, Quintero and Castelo were arrested. DEA agents

confirmed that the bags contained 45 bricks of cocaine, weighing

approximately 112 pounds.

Quintero and Castelo were each charged with one count of

possession of a Schedule II narcotic controlled substance with

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intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). At

trial, Castelo moved to suppress the cocaine on the grounds that

Luttrell’s warrantless search was unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment. After a suppression hearing, the district court denied

the motion, as well as Castelo’s motion for reconsideration.

Castelo ultimately accepted a plea agreement, under which he

reserved –- under FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) –- the right to appeal

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.

II

Castelo contends that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress evidence obtained via Officer Luttrell’s

warrantless search of the trailer. We start with the premise that

warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth

Amendment “unless they fall within a few narrowly defined

exceptions”. United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 350

(5th Cir. 2002). Thus, the question before us is whether

Luttrell’s search fits within any such exception.

A

As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the initial

stop was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Generally, where

the police lack probable cause to stop a vehicle –- or some

constitutionally adequate substitute therefor –- evidence obtained

from a subsequent search of the vehicle may be suppressed. See,

e.g., United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1998).

The government contends that both the stop and subsequent search of

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the trailer were permissible under the “pervasively regulated

industry” exception to the warrant requirement, as set forth in New

York v. Burger.

Under Burger, a warrantless search of a pervasively regulated

business is permitted if: (1) there is a substantial government

interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which the

inspection is made; (2) the inspection is necessary to further the

regulatory scheme; and (3) the statutory or regulatory scheme

provides a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. See

482 U.S. at 702-03.

Initially, it is clear that commercial trucking is a

pervasively regulated industry. As we noted in United States v.

Fort, the myriad federal and state statutes that govern commercial

trucking place it squarely within the class of industries to which

Burger applies. See 248 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2001). It is also

clear that Mississippi has a substantial interest that informs the

regulatory scheme –- i.e., random roadside inspections and weighing

of commercial vehicles –- pursuant to which the stop and search

occurred. See id. (“[T]he state has a substantial interest in

traveler safety and in reducing taxpayer costs that stem from

personal injuries and property damage caused by commercial motor

carriers.”).

Thus, whether the stop was permissible under the pervasively

regulated industry exception turns on whether the last two prongs

of the Burger test are satisfied –- that is, (1) whether the stop

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was necessary to further Mississippi’s regulatory scheme, and (2)

whether that scheme provides a constitutionally adequate substitute

for a warrant.

1

Castelo contends that the stop in this case exceeded the

statutory authority conferred to MDOT officers. As such, Castelo

argues, the stop was not conducted in furtherance of Mississippi’s

regulatory scheme, as required under the second prong of Burger.

The argument is without merit.

Section 63-5-49(1) of the Mississippi Code gives MDOT officers

the authority to require drivers of commercial vehicles to “stop

and submit to a weighing of the vehicle”. Section 63-5-49(3)

provides that “pursuant to subsection (1) ... [MDOT officers] shall

have the authority to inspect such vehicle to determine whether or

not such vehicle is engaged in the illegal transportation of

contraband”.

Castelo contends that, because the officers never actually

weighed the rig in this case, Luttrell’s search was not “pursuant

to” a weighing stop, and therefore cannot be justified under § 63-

5-49(3). This argument misses the point. As explained infra, the

search of the trailer was supported by probable cause stemming from

Quintero’s conduct and various irregularities in the truck’s

documentation. As such, the government’s reliance upon the

“pervasively regulated industry” exception need extend only so far

as the initial stop. Once the government establishes that the stop

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was authorized under § 63-5-49(1), the question of whether the

ensuing search was “pursuant to” that stop, as required by § 63-5-

49(3), becomes moot for our purposes today.

Luttrell and Hendrix were designated as a “portable scale

team” and were carrying portable scales at the time of the stop.

Although it is true that they ultimately did not weigh the vehicle,

Quintero’s unusual behavior intervened and gave Luttrell probable

cause to search the trailer and discover a large quantity of

cocaine.

Thus, the initial stop in this case was authorized under § 63-

5-49(1) of the Mississippi Code. We therefore hold that the stop

was carried out in furtherance of Mississippi’s regulation of the

commercial trucking industry, as required under the second prong of

Burger, and was a lawful stop.

2

Castelo further contends that, even if the initial stop was

authorized under the relevant statutory provisions, those

provisions fail to provide a “constitutionally adequate substitute

for a warrant”, as mandated by the third prong of the Burger test.

We do not agree.

In order to satisfy Burger’s requirement of a constitutionally

adequate substitute for a warrant, a regulatory regime must (1)

advise the owner of the regulated business that the inspection is

being made pursuant to law; and (2) limit the discretion of the

inspecting officers. See 482 U.S. at 703. Castelo concedes that

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§§ 63-5-49(1) and (3) provide notice to commercial drivers that

they may be subject to random stops and inspections. Thus, the

question before us is whether Mississippi’s regulatory scheme

adequately limits the discretion of MDOT officers.

The government contends that the Mississippi Code limits the

discretion of MDOT officers in three ways. First, the particular

regulatory scheme at issue in this case applies exclusively to

commercial vehicles. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-5-49(1). Second, and

more generally, officers may stop and inspect only vehicles

“operating upon the highways of [the] state”. MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-

19-137. Finally, the scope of the officers’ discretion is limited

by the scope of their duties.

These limitations are markedly similar to the limits on

officer discretion in Burger and Fort. In Burger, the Supreme

Court held that a New York statute, authorizing warrantless

inspections of vehicle dismantling businesses, sufficiently limited

officer discretion as to the “time, place, and scope” of the

inspections because it: (1) limited inspections to regular business

hours; (2) limited the scope of inspections to vehicles or parts of

vehicles covered under the relevant statute; and (3) applied only

to vehicle dismantling businesses. See 482 U.S. at 711-12.

Likewise, in Fort, we held that a Texas statute sufficiently

limited officer discretion because it limited inspections to “motor

carriers” –- i.e., commercial vehicles -- at “reasonable time[s]”.

See 248 F.3d at 482.

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 Mississippi’s regulatory scheme limits the scope of officer

discretion in much the same manner as the statute in Burger,

insofar as only commercial vehicles may be stopped and searched.

Moreover, since MDOT officers may only stop commercial vehicles

operating on a state highway, their discretion as to the time and

place of a stop is likewise constrained. We therefore hold that

the provisions of the Mississippi Code regulating commercial

trucking place adequate limits on the discretion of inspecting

officers, and thus, provide a constitutionally adequate substitute

for a warrant.

In sum, having found all three prongs of the Burger test to be

satisfied with respect to the Mississippi scheme, we hold that the

initial stop of Castelo’s vehicle by the MDOT officers was

permissible under the “pervasively regulated industry” exception to

the warrant requirement.

B

Thus, we reach the final determinant of this case: whether

Luttrell’s warrantless search of the trailer falls within any

exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The

government contends that the search was permissible under both the

automobile exception and the “pervasively regulated industry”

exception. This may well be true, but because we hold that the

former applies, we need not address the latter.

A warrantless search is permissible under the automobile

exception if (1) the officer conducting the search had “probable

9
cause to believe that the vehicle in question contain[ed] property

that the government may properly seize”; and (2) exigent

circumstances justified the search. See United States v. Reyes,

792 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1986). Given that Castelo and Quintero

were stopped while traveling on an interstate highway, the

requisite exigent circumstances were clearly present. See, e.g.,

United States v. Sinisterra, 77 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1996)

(exigent circumstances are supplied by “the fact of the

automobile’s mobility”). As such, the sole question before us is

whether Luttrell’s search was supported by probable cause.

Probable cause to search an automobile exists where

“trustworthy facts and circumstances within the officer’s personal

knowledge would cause a reasonably prudent man to believe that the

vehicle contains contraband”. United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d

883, 895 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978).

In determining whether probable cause exists, “[e]ach individual

layer of information is not to be weighed. Rather the ‘laminated

total’ of the facts available is the source of the justification

for a vehicle search”. Id. (quoting Smith v. United States, 358

F.2d 833, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).

The government contends that Luttrell had probable cause to

search the trailer based on six facts:

1. Quintero’s illegal alteration of the
expiration date of his registration;

2. Quintero’s inability to recall where he
loaded the trailer, although he insisted

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 the location was “just a few miles from
here”;

3. The fact that the trailer was not sealed;

4. The fact that Quintero’s log book showed
that he had stopped in El Paso, Texas –-
a known “source city” for illegal drugs
–- for two full days;

5. Quintero’s abnormal behavior, including
refusal to make eye contact with the
officers, repeatedly kicking the ground
and sipping water, and glancing at the
back of the trailer; and

6. Castelo’s climbing out onto the running
boards of the cab to watch events unfold
at the back of the trailer.

We agree that these facts, when considered in context, support a

finding that Luttrell had probable cause to search the trailer.

Castelo further contends that, even if probable cause existed

to search the trailer, the further search of the bags in which the

cocaine was found violated the Fourth Amendment. We find no merit

in this argument. Where probable cause justifies the search of a

lawfully stopped vehicle, “it justifies the search of every part of

the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the

search”. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).

Moreover, the “brick shaped” outlines visibly protruding from the

bags would have established probable cause to search them,

independent of the facts justifying the search of the trailer. We

therefore hold that both Luttrell’s search of the trailer and the

subsequent search of the bags were permissible under the automobile

exception to the warrant requirement.

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 III

Because both the initial stop of the vehicle and Luttrell’s

subsequent search of the trailer satisfy the reasonableness

requirement of the Fourth Amendment, the district court did not err

in denying Castelo’s motion to suppress the evidence in this case.

The judgment of the district court is, therefore,

AFFIRMED.

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